the HUMAN LIFE REVIEW

SPRING 1983

Featured in this issue:

Published by:

The Human Life Foundation, Inc.
New York, N.Y.

Vol. IX, No. 2 $4.00 a copy

This, our 34th issue, is our usual "unusual" spring edition. Unusual only because we are running an article that we may not equal again. We are proud to lead off this issue with an article written specially for our review by President Ronald Reagan. Because of the significance of the article and therefore the importance of the entire issue, we feel it should be distributed as widely as possible and are printing many extra copies. If you would like additional copies to send to friends, relatives, clergymen, or whoever, please write us at the address indicated on the inside back cover. Special bulk prices are available.

The President quotes from a number of books and articles, several of which might be of special interest to our readers. Professor John Hart Ely's "The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on *Roe* v. *Wade*" was first published in the *Yale Law Journal* (Vol. 82, No. 5, April 1973) and was reprinted in Vol. 1, No. 1 of this review (Winter, 1975). Malcolm Muggeridge's book on Mother Teresa, *Something Beautiful for God*, was first published in the U.S. by Harper & Row in 1971, and is still very much in print (for information address Harper & Row, 10 E. 53rd St., N.Y., N.Y. 10022). The "other" William Brennan's *Medical Holocaust* is now available from Saint George Publishing Co. (P.O. Box 31609, Houston, Tex. 77231). *Abortion, the Silent Holocaust*, by John Powell, S.J., is published by Argus Communications (Allen, Tex. 75002). The column by George Will which Mr. Reagan cites ("Who can forget George Will's moving account of the little boy who underwent brain surgery six times during the nine weeks before he was born?") first appeared in *Newsweek* (June 22, 1981) and was reprinted in this review (Summer, 1981—we still have copies available). Finally, the President takes special note of the now-famous *California Medicine* editorial: we have previously reprinted it three times; we reprint it yet again here (Appendix G).

Dr. Jérôme LeJeune's article, "A General Theory of Retardation," first appeared in the book *Infanticide and the Handicapped Newborn*, which can be obtained from Americans United for Life, 230 North Michigan Ave., Chicago, Ill. 60601 (price: $8.95 a copy). "The Mass Media" by James Hitchcock is a chapter from *What is Secular Humanism?*, published by Servant Books, Box 8617, Ann Arbor, Mich. 48109 (available at $6.95 a copy). The appendix by Malcolm Muggeridge, "The Overpopulation Myth," is reprinted with his permission from *Human Concern*, published by the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children, 7 Tufton St., Westminster, London SW1P 3QN.

All previous issues (and bound volumes of the years 1975-82) remain available; see inside back cover for details. Finally, *The Human Life Review* can be obtained in microform from both University Microfilm International (300 North Zeeb Rd., Ann Arbor, Mich. 48106) and Bell & Howell (Micro-Photo Division, Old Mansfield Rd, Wooster, Oh. 44691).

EDWARD A. CAPANO
Publisher

THE HUMAN LIFE REVIEW

SPRING 1983

Published by THE HUMAN LIFE REVIEW, INC. Editorial Office, Room 840, 150 East 35th St., New York, N.Y. 10016. The editors will consider all manuscripts submitted, but assume no responsibility for unsolicited material. All editorial and subscription inquiries (and all requests for reprints and permission) should be sent directly to the editorial office. Subscription price: $15 per year; single copy, $4. Bulk prices on request.

Vol. IX No. 2 ©1983 by THE HUMAN LIFE FOUNDATION, INC. Printed in the U.S.A.

INTRODUCTION

MOTHER TERESA, that good woman, rarely if ever speaks without condemning abortion. She once said: "Abortion is a crime that kills not only the child, but the consciences of all involved."

The President of the United States too has spoken often against abortion and, in our lead article, he does so again, also relating it to "the conscience of the nation," because, Mr. Reagan says, "Abortion concerns not only the unborn child, it concerns every one of us."

We are, needless to say, honored that the President should choose our review in which to make his most remarkable testament of faith in "the sacred value of human life." But in another sense it is perhaps fitting and proper that he should do so? This journal was founded shortly after the Supreme Court of the United States legalized abortion on demand a decade ago; our avowed purpose has been to publish the most compelling reasons why that decision of the Court must be reversed. Thus it will not surprise our readers that the President quotes Mother Teresa, or Malcolm Muggeridge, whose writings have appeared in our pages over the years.

But others may well be surprised that the President, writing shortly after the tenth anniversary of the Court's abortion *fiat*, should himself so strongly condemn what the Court did then, and equate it so precisely to the greatest of legal wrongs in our history, the *Dred Scott* decision ("This is not the first time our country has been divided by a Supreme Court decision that denied the value of certain human lives."). And the reader will note that Mr. Reagan is equally eloquent in condemning infanticide, and that "quality of life" ethic which, as in the Bloomington Baby case he cites so movingly, considers some defect or retardation in a newborn child as "the equivalent of a crime deserving the death penalty."

Surely all must agree that Mr. Reagan's testament is an historic document, instantly memorable if only because it evokes the moral passion of

Abraham Lincoln against Slavery. As the President concludes: "Abraham Lincoln recognized that we could not survive as a free land when some men could decide that others were not fit to be free and should therefore be slaves. Likewise, we cannot survive as a free nation when some men decide that others are not fit to live and should be abandoned to abortion or infanticide. My Administration is dedicated to the preservation of America as a free land, and there is no cause more important for preserving that freedom than affirming the transcendent right to life of all human beings, the right without which no other rights have any meaning." Without doubt, this will be the most widely read article ever published here. We expect that it will be read long after this journal has passed away.

For now, we carry on, fittingly we hope, with one of the most widely read articles we've published previously. The Honorable Clare Boothe Luce was recently awarded a Medal of Freedom Citation by President Reagan for her many accomplishments, not least for being an "effective advocate of freedom." But the freedom Mrs. Luce has championed is not any license to "freedom of choice" but rather the liberty necessary to choose the good. Here, she responds to the formidable challange of explaining the "New Morality" to a conference of business executives by asserting a universal morality to which we must be faithful, or suffer the consequences. It was first published in our Summer, 1978, issue, and has been reprinted in many other publications since then. We were inspired to run it again ourselves upon reading the President's article. For the abortion disaster is not the result of a singular moral failing, but rather of the broad moral decline that Mrs. Luce describes here. You will be happy to note that the indomitable Mrs. Luce insists "It is certainly not too late to hope" that we can reverse the decline, provided only that Americans can summon the courage to "bring up their children to remain faithful" to the universal morality.

Mr. Joseph Sobran, our most faithful contributor, and vendor of words *extraordinaire*, follows up with just the right article (another specialty of his). Abortion, he says, is a "hot" issue, and we have argued heatedly about *it*, while paying "less attention than we otherwise would have to the reasoning by which the Court in 1973 struck down the abortion laws of all 50 states." He proceeds to examine that reasoning with his usual patient reasonableness. We think you will thoroughly enjoy the resulting essay on just what the Constitution was meant to be, and do. For instance, it was *not* meant to confer supreme power, legislative or otherwise, on anybody, least of all the Court itself. Indeed, as Mr. Sobran explains (using that much-too-neglected scripture, *The Federal-*

ist), the Court was primarily conceived by the Fathers as "an additional check against federal encroachments and usurpations," whereas nowadays its primary function seems to be that of "enhancing federal power at the expense of the states and the people." Ten years after, it's difficult to imagine anybody's taking such a *fresh* view of all that *Roe* really means, but we claim that Mr. Sobran has accomplished exactly that here.

Next comes an article which, we think, neatly complements what the President and Mrs. Luce have told us. Professor James Hitchcock, another of our faithful contributors, describes the crucial role the "mass media" has played in the assault on traditional morality. As he points out, this is a recent phenomenon, beginning only about the mid-60's—roughly at the same time that the "reform" of abortion laws became a debatable issue. But it has been especially destructive in its "concentration on what is deviant and amoral" while denying "defenders of traditional values equal time." As our regular readers know, Professor Hitchcock is a master at marshalling the evidence for his arguments, as he demonstrates again here. Yet he too discerns some signs of better days ahead, so there remains hope.

Doctor Jérôme LeJeune is world-renowned for his work in genetics, especially for his discovery of the cause of Down's Syndrome. He is also an eloquent speaker and writer, talents he uses often to defend the unborn and the handicapped. We provide you here with his chapter from the new book *Infanticide and the Handicapped Newborn* (which we highly recommend; see our Publisher's statement for details). It is fascinating stuff, from the incisive beginning—"It seems that a dilemma exists . . . to kill or to heal. The answer is, of course, to heal."—right through to the noble hope for the future with which he concludes. And you will note that Doctor LeJeune deals with, and answers, many of the questions that concern the President.

Indeed, the same claim could be made for all that follows, for the rest of this issue is concerned with one aspect or another of that moral and civil decline which has permitted such once-taboo practices as abortion and infanticide to become everyday realities. Professor Thomas Molnar, currently a visiting professor in religious studies at Yale, tells us what "Science" can *not* do, which is to separate its own values from the religious heritage that has formed the values of our society. As usual, Professor Molnar is *convincing*: more, he says that scientists themselves are increasingly in agreement with his thesis.

Mr. Frank Zepezauer, who has long taught high school students, echoes the previous arguments from his specialized viewpoint. The schools, he argues, do indeed mold the thinking of our young, through a

selectivity as deliberate as it is disturbing. He concludes that some balance is called for between the dominant secularism and the religious values no longer taught (you know, so that the *kids* will know what they are choosing between).

Then Ellen Wilson returns (she is now on the editorial staff of the *Wall Street Journal*); she also writes of students, and another set of lost values. Ellen writes beautifully, as ever, and while (for the first time in these pages) she seems to be discussing problems far removed from our usual concerns, in fact her insights *in re* marriage, etc., could be transposed directly to our most central concern, abortion, which has become a prime symbolic example of the "entitlements" she deplores.

As it happens, our Appendices all relate to points made by the President in our lead article. Professor Hadley Arkes (Appendix A) argues that the Supreme Court wasn't persuasive in *Roe* v. *Wade* and, "In the spirit of Lincoln," legislatures should urge the Court to "consider the possibility" that it was mistaken. Appendix B is a chilling description of what Dr. Louis Lasagna describes as the "Murder Most Foul" of a Down's Syndrome baby in England (such eugenic "final solutions" are, it seems, an international problem—in the "civilized" world, at any rate).

Then we have three pieces, by three distinguished gentlemen, on the so-called "squeal law" (as its opponents have managed to label it) requiring that so-called "family-planning" organizations notify parents when providing their under-age daughters with contraceptive drugs and devices. Senator Jeremiah Denton (Appendix C) defends the law with his usual vigor and conviction. Mr. Wm. F. Buckley Jr. (Appendix D) probes the strange basis for many objections ("The reasoning here is that the more information you distribute to teen-age girls about how to conceive a baby, the fewer babies there will be."). And Mr. George Will (Appendix E) asks the fundamental question: What values does the law affirm? We think Messrs. Denton, Buckley, and Will provide much common sense on what has become a strangely-controversial issue (strange, because . . . well, we noticed a recent newspaper item offering free blood-pressure tests—surely a *harmless* procedure?—which required "parental consent" for those under 18!).

At this point the reader should appreciate the column (Appendix F) by our friend Mr. Paul Cole Beach, who provides some highly-relevant facts and figures supporting what the three previous writers argued, as well as some surprising news from Utah indicating that "squealing" may *work*.

Appendix G is the complete text of the *California Medicine* editorial to which President Reagan refers in his article. Read it, and you will see *why* it has become so famous a document. It prophesied changes which,

when it first appeared some dozen years ago, seemed unthinkable. Yet it has all come to pass, as predicted.

As a final treat (Appendix H), we close with another most relevant item by Mr. Malcolm Muggeridge. You will (we trust) have noted that the President quoted Muggeridge's book about Mother Teresa, *Something Beautiful for God*; Muggeridge himself quotes it again here, in reminding us that human life is sacred, which is exactly where we began this issue. As we said, and thanks to Mr. Reagan, it will surely be our best-read ever. Certainly it demonstrates how broad and vast is the "single issue" to which this journal, and the distinguished writers included herein, are devoted.

J. P. McFADDEN
Editor

Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation

Ronald Reagan

THE 10TH ANNIVERSARY of the Supreme Court decision in *Roe* v. *Wade* is a good time for us to pause and reflect. Our nationwide policy of abortion-on-demand through all nine months of pregnancy was neither voted for by our people nor enacted by our legislators—not a single state had such unrestricted abortion before the Supreme Court decreed it to be national policy in 1973. But the consequences of this judicial decision are now obvious: since 1973, more than 15 million unborn children have had their lives snuffed out by legalized abortions. That is over ten times the number of Americans lost in all our nation's wars.

Make no mistake, abortion-on-demand is not a right granted by the Constitution. No serious scholar, including one disposed to agree with the Court's result, has argued that the framers of the Constitution intended to create such a right. Shortly after the *Roe* v. *Wade* decision, Professor John Hart Ely, now Dean of Stanford Law School, wrote that the opinion "is not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be." Nowhere do the plain words of the Constitution even hint at a "right" so sweeping as to permit abortion up to the time the child is ready to be born. Yet that is what the Court ruled.

As an act of "raw judicial power" (to use Justice White's biting phrase), the decision by the seven-man majority in *Roe* v. *Wade* has so far been made to stick. But the Court's decision has by no means settled the debate. Instead, *Roe* v. *Wade* has become a continuing prod to the conscience of the nation.

Abortion concerns not just the unborn child, it concerns every one of us. The English poet, John Donne, wrote: ". . . any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind; and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee."

Ronald Reagan is the fortieth president of the United States.

We cannot diminish the value of one category of human life—the unborn—without diminishing the value of all human life. We saw tragic proof of this truism last year when the Indiana courts allowed the starvation death of "Baby Doe" in Bloomington because the child had Down's Syndrome.

Many of our fellow citizens grieve over the loss of life that has followed *Roe* v. *Wade.* Margaret Heckler, soon after being nominated to head the largest department of our government, Health and Human Services, told an audience that she believed abortion to be the greatest moral crisis facing our country today. And the revered Mother Teresa, who works in the streets of Calcutta ministering to dying people in her world-famous mission of mercy, has said that "the greatest misery of our time is the generalized abortion of children."

Over the first two years of my Administration I have closely followed and assisted efforts in Congress to reverse the tide of abortion—efforts of Congressmen, Senators and citizens responding to an urgent moral crisis. Regrettably, I have also seen the massive efforts of those who, under the banner of "freedom of choice," have so far blocked every effort to reverse nationwide abortion-on-demand.

Despite the formidable obstacles before us, we must not lose heart. This is not the first time our country has been divided by a Supreme Court decision that denied the value of certain human lives. The *Dred Scott* decision of 1857 was not overturned in a day, or a year, or even a decade. At first, only a minority of Americans recognized and deplored the moral crisis brought about by denying the full humanity of our black brothers and sisters; but that minority persisted in their vision and finally prevailed. They did it by appealing to the hearts and minds of their countrymen, to the truth of human dignity under God. From their example, we know that respect for the sacred value of human life is too deeply engrained in the hearts of our people to remain forever suppressed. But the great majority of the American people have not yet made their voices heard, and we cannot expect them to—any more than the public voice arose against slavery—*until* the issue is clearly framed and presented.

What, then, is the real issue? I have often said that when we talk

about abortion, we are talking about two lives—the life of the mother and the life of the unborn child. Why else do we call a pregnant woman a mother? I have also said that anyone who doesn't feel sure whether we are talking about a second human life should clearly give life the benefit of the doubt. If you don't know whether a body is alive or dead, you would never bury it. I think this consideration itself should be enough for all of us to insist on protecting the unborn.

The case against abortion does not rest here, however, for medical practice confirms at every step the correctness of these moral sensibilities. Modern medicine treats the unborn child as a patient. Medical pioneers have made great breakthroughs in treating the unborn—for genetic problems, vitamin deficiencies, irregular heart rhythms, and other medical conditions. Who can forget George Will's moving account of the little boy who underwent brain surgery six times during the nine weeks before he was born? Who is the *patient* if not that tiny unborn human being who can feel pain when he or she is approached by doctors who come to kill rather than to cure?

The real question today is not when human life begins, but, *What is the value of human life?* The abortionist who reassembles the arms and legs of a tiny baby to make sure all its parts have been torn from its mother's body can hardly doubt whether it is a human being. The real question for him and for all of us is whether that tiny human life has a God-given right to be protected by the law—the same right we have.

What more dramatic confirmation could we have of the real issue than the Baby Doe case in Bloomington, Indiana? The death of that tiny infant tore at the hearts of all Americans because the child was undeniably a live human being—one lying helpless before the eyes of the doctors and the eyes of the nation. The real issue for the courts was *not* whether Baby Doe was a human being. The real issue was whether to protect the life of a human being who had Down's Syndrome, who would probably be mentally handicapped, but who needed a routine surgical procedure to unblock his esophagus and allow him to eat. A doctor testified to the presiding judge that, even with his physical problem corrected, Baby Doe would have a "non-existent" possiblity for "a minimally

adequate quality of life"—in other words, that retardation was the equivalent of a crime deserving the death penalty. The judge let Baby Doe starve and die, and the Indiana Supreme Court sanctioned his decision.

Federal law does not allow federally-assisted hospitals to decide that Down's Syndrome infants are not worth treating, much less to decide to starve them to death. Accordingly, I have directed the Departments of Justice and HHS to apply civil rights regulations to protect handicapped newborns. All hospitals receiving federal funds must post notices which will clearly state that failure to feed handicapped babies is prohibited by federal law. The basic issue is whether to value and protect the lives of the handicapped, whether to recognize the sanctity of human life. This is the same basic issue that underlies the question of abortion.

The 1981 Senate hearings on the beginning of human life brought out the basic issue more clearly than ever before. The many medical and scientific witnesses who testified disagreed on many things, but not on the *scientific* evidence that the unborn child is alive, is a distinct individual, or is a member of the human species. They did disagree over the *value* question, whether to give value to a human life at its early and most vulnerable stages of existence.

Regrettably, we live at a time when some persons do *not* value all human life. They want to pick and choose which individuals have value. Some have said that only those individuals with "consciousness of self" are human beings. One such writer has followed this deadly logic and concluded that "shocking as it may seem, a newly born infant is not a human being."

A Nobel Prize winning scientist has suggested that if a handicapped child "were not declared fully human until three days after birth, then all parents could be allowed the choice." In other words, "quality control" to see if newly born human beings are up to snuff.

Obviously, some influential people want to deny that every human life has intrinsic, sacred worth. They insist that a member of the human race must have certain qualities before they accord him or her status as a "human being."

Events have borne out the editorial in a California medical jour-

nal which explained three years before *Roe* v. *Wade* that the social acceptance of abortion is a "defiance of the long-held Western ethic of intrinsic and equal value for every human life regardless of its stage, condition, or status."

Every legislator, every doctor, and every citizen needs to recognize that the real issue is whether to affirm and protect the sanctity of all human life, or to embrace a social ethic where some human lives are valued and others are not. As a nation, we must choose between the sanctity of life ethic and the "quality of life" ethic.

I have no trouble identifying the answer our nation has always given to this basic question, and the answer that I hope and pray it will give in the future. America was founded by men and women who shared a vision of the value of each and every individual. They stated this vision clearly from the very start in the Declaration of Independence, using words that every schoolboy and schoolgirl can recite:

> We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

We fought a terrible war to guarantee that one category of mankind—black people in America—could not be denied the inalienable rights with which their Creator endowed them. The great champion of the sanctity of all human life in that day, Abraham Lincoln, gave us his assessment of the Declaration's purpose. Speaking of the framers of that noble document, he said:

> This was their majestic interpretation of the economy of the Universe. This was their lofty, and wise, and noble understanding of the justice of the Creator to His creatures. Yes, gentlemen, to all His creatures, to the whole great family of man. In their enlightened belief, nothing stamped with the divine image and likeness was sent into the world to be trodden on . . . They grasped not only the whole race of man then living, but they reached forward and seized upon the farthest posterity. They erected a beacon to guide their children and their children's children, and the countless myriads who should inhabit the earth in other ages.

He warned also of the danger we would face if we closed our eyes to the value of life in any category of human beings:

> I should like to know if taking this old Declaration of Independence, which declares that all men are equal upon principle and making exceptions to it where will it stop. If one man says it does not mean a Negro, why not another say it does not mean some other man?

When Congressman John A. Bingham of Ohio drafted the Fourteenth Amendment to guarantee the rights of life, liberty, and property to all human beings, he explained that *all* are "entitled to the protection of American law, because its divine spirit of equality declares that all men are created equal." He said the rights guaranteed by the amendment would therefore apply to "any human being." Justice William Brennan, writing in another case decided only the year before *Roe* v. *Wade*, referred to our society as one that "strongly affirms the sanctity of life."

Another William Brennan—not the Justice—has reminded us of the terrible consequences that can follow when a nation rejects the sanctity of life ethic:

> The cultural environment for a human holocaust is present whenever any society can be misled into defining individuals as less than human and therefore devoid of value and respect.

As a nation today, we have *not* rejected the sanctity of human life. The American people have not had an opportunity to express their view on the sanctity of human life in the unborn. I am convinced that Americans do not want to play God with the value of human life. It is not for us to decide who is worthy to live and who is not. Even the Supreme Court's opinion in *Roe* v. *Wade* did not explicitly reject the traditional American idea of intrinsic worth and value in all human life; it simply dodged this issue.

The Congress has before it several measures that would enable our people to reaffirm the sanctity of human life, even the smallest and the youngest and the most defenseless. The Human Life Bill expressly recognizes the unborn as human beings and accordingly protects them as persons under our Constitution. This bill, first introduced by Senator Jesse Helms, provided the vehicle for the Senate hearings in 1981 which contributed so much to our understanding of the real issue of abortion.

The Respect Human Life Act, just introduced in the 98th Congress, states in its first section that the policy of the United States is "to protect innocent life, both before and after birth." This bill, sponsored by Congressman Henry Hyde and Senator Roger Jepsen, prohibits the federal government from performing abortions or assisting those who do so, except to save the life of the mother. It also addresses the pressing issue of infanticide which, as

we have seen, flows inevitably from permissive abortion as another step in the denial of the inviolability of innocent human life.

I have endorsed each of these measures, as well as the more difficult route of constitutional amendment, and I will give these initiatives my full support. Each of them, in different ways, attempts to reverse the tragic policy of abortion-on-demand imposed by the Supreme Court ten years ago. Each of them is a decisive way to affirm the sanctity of human life.

We must all educate ourselves to the reality of the horrors taking place. Doctors today know that unborn children can feel a touch within the womb and that they respond to pain. But how many Americans are aware that abortion techniques are allowed today, in all 50 states, that burn the skin of a baby with a salt solution, in an agonizing death that can last for hours?

Another example: two years ago, the *Philadelphia Inquirer* ran a Sunday special supplement on "The Dreaded Complication." The "dreaded complication" referred to in the article—the complication feared by doctors who perform abortions—is the *survival* of the child despite all the painful attacks during the abortion procedure. Some unborn children *do* survive the late-term abortions the Supreme Court has made legal. Is there any question that these victims of abortion deserve our attention and protection? Is there any question that those who *don't* survive were living human beings before they were killed?

Late-term abortions, especially when the baby survives, but is then killed by starvation, neglect, or suffocation, show once again the link between abortion and infanticide. The time to stop both is now. As my Administration acts to stop infanticide, we will be fully aware of the real issue that underlies the death of babies before and soon after birth.

Our society has, fortunately, become sensitive to the rights and special needs of the handicapped, but I am shocked that physical or mental handicaps of newborns are still used to justify their extinction. This Administration has a Surgeon General, Dr. C. Everett Koop, who has done perhaps more than any other American for handicapped children, by pioneering surgical techniques to help them, by speaking out on the value of their lives, and by working with them in the context of loving families. You will not

find his former patients advocating the so-called "quality-of-life" ethic.

I know that when the true issue of infanticide is placed before the American people, with all the facts openly aired, we will have no trouble deciding that a mentally or physically handicapped baby has the same intrinsic worth and right to life as the rest of us. As the New Jersey Supreme Court said two decades ago, in a decision upholding the sanctity of human life, "a child need not be perfect to have a worthwhile life."

Whether we are talking about pain suffered by unborn children, or about late-term abortions, or about infanticide, we inevitably focus on the humanity of the unborn child. Each of these issues is a potential rallying point for the sanctity of life ethic. Once we as a nation rally around any one of these issues to affirm the sanctity of life, we will see the importance of affirming this principle across the board.

Malcolm Muggeridge, the English writer, goes right to the heart of the matter: "Either life is always and in all circumstances sacred, or intrinsically of no account; it is inconceivable that it should be in some cases the one, and in some the other." The sanctity of innocent human life is a principle that Congress should proclaim at every opportunity.

It is possible that the Supreme Court itself may overturn its abortion rulings. We need only recall that in *Brown* v. *Board of Education* the court reversed its own earlier "separate-but-equal" decision. I believe if the Supreme Court took another look at *Roe* v. *Wade*, and considered the real issue between the sanctity of life ethic and the quality of life ethic, it would change its mind once again.

As we continue to work to overturn *Roe* v. *Wade*, we must also continue to lay the groundwork for a society in which abortion is not the accepted answer to unwanted pregnancy. Pro-life people have already taken heroic steps, often at great personal sacrifice, to provide for unwed mothers. I recently spoke about a young pregnant woman named Victoria, who said, "In this society we save whales, we save timber wolves and bald eagles and Coke bottles. Yet, everyone wanted me to throw away my baby." She has been helped by Sav-a-Life, a group in Dallas, which provides a way for

unwed mothers to preserve the human life within them when they might otherwise be tempted to resort to abortion. I think also of House of His Creation in Coatesville, Pennsylvania, where a loving couple has taken in almost 200 young women in the past ten years. They have seen, as a fact of life, that the girls are *not* better off having abortions than saving their babies. I am also reminded of the remarkable Rossow family of Ellington, Connecticut, who have opened their hearts and their home to nine handicapped adopted and foster children.

The Adolescent Family Life Program, adopted by Congress at the request of Senator Jeremiah Denton, has opened new opportunities for unwed mothers to give their children life. We should not rest until our entire society echoes the tone of John Powell in the dedication of his book, *Abortion: The Silent Holocaust*, a dedication to every woman carrying an unwanted child: "Please believe that you are not alone. There are many of us that truly love you, who want to stand at your side, and help in any way we can." And we can echo the always-practical woman of faith, Mother Teresa, when she says, "If you don't want the little child, that unborn child, give him to me." We have so many families in America seeking to adopt children that the slogan "every child a wanted child" is now the emptiest of all reasons to tolerate abortion.

I have often said we need to join in prayer to bring protection to the unborn. Prayer and action are needed to uphold the sanctity of human life. I believe it will not be possible to accomplish our work, the work of saving lives, "without being a soul of prayer." The famous British Member of Parliament, William Wilberforce, prayed with his small group of influential friends, the "Clapham Sect," for *decades* to see an end to slavery in the British empire. Wilberforce led that struggle in Parliament, unflaggingly, because he believed in the sanctity of human life. He saw the fulfillment of his impossible dream when Parliament oulawed slavery just before his death.

Let his faith and perseverance be our guide. We will never recognize the true value of our own lives until we affirm the value in the life of others, a value of which Malcolm Muggeridge says: ". . . however low it flickers or fiercely burns, it is still a Divine flame

which no man dare presume to put out, be his motives ever so humane and enlightened."

Abraham Lincoln recognized that we could not survive as a free land when some men could decide that others were not fit to be free and should therefore be slaves. Likewise, we cannot survive as a free nation when some men decide that others are not fit to live and should be abandoned to abortion or infanticide. My Administration is dedicated to the preservation of America as a free land, and there is no cause more important for preserving that freedom than affirming the transcendent right to life of all human beings, the right without which no other rights have any meaning.

Is the New Morality Destroying America?

Clare Boothe Luce

I WAS HONORED—as who would not be?—by the invitation to address this Golden Circle of remarkable IBM achievers. But I confess I was somewhat floored by the subject your program producer assigned to me. He asked me to hold forth for a half-hour on the condition of morality in the United States, with special reference to the differences between America's traditional moral values and the values of the so-called "New Morality." Now even a theologian or a philosopher might hesitate to tackle so vast and complex a subject in just 30 minutes. So I suggested that he let me talk instead about, well, politics or foreign affairs, or the Press. But he insisted that your convention wanted to talk on a subject related to *morals.*

Well, the invitation reminded me of a story about Archbishop Sheen, who received a telegram inviting him to deliver an address to a convention on "The World, Peace, War, and the Churches." He replied: "Gentlemen, I am honored to address your great convention, but I would not want my style cramped by so narrow a subject. However, I would be glad to accept if you will widen the subject to include 'The Sun and the Moon and the Stars.'" So I finally agreed to talk if I could widen my subject to include, "The Traditional Morality, the New Morality, and the Universal Morality."

There's another trouble about talking about morals. It's a terribly serious subject. And a serious talk is just one step away from being a dull, not to say a soporific one. So I won't be offended if, before I finish, some of you leave. But please do so quietly, so as not to disturb those who may be sleeping.

The theme of this convention is "Involvement." Now there is one thing in which all Americans, including every one of us here, are

---

Clare Boothe Luce was recently awarded the Medal of Freedom Citation by President Reagan for having "served and enriched her country in many fields." This article is adapted from her speech to the 1978 IBM Golden Circle Conference in Honolulu; it originally appeared in the Summer '78 issue of *The Human Life Review.*

already deeply involved. Every day of our lives, every hour of our waking days, we are all inescapably involved in making America either a more moral or a more immoral country.

So this morning, let's take a look at the direction in which we Americans are going. But first, we must begin by asking, "What are morals?"

Morals, the dictionary tells us, are a set of principles of right action and behavior for the individual. The "traditional morality" of any given society is the *set of moral principles* to which the great majority of its members have subscribed over a good length of time. It is the *consensus* which any given society has reached on what right action and decent behavior are for everybody. It is the way that society expects a person to behave, *even when the law—the civil law—does not require him (or her)* to do so.*

One example will have to suffice. There is no law that requires a person to speak the truth, unless he is under oath to do so in a court proceeding. A person can, with legal impunity, be a habitual liar. The traditional morality of our society, however, takes a dim view of the habitual liar. Accordingly, society punishes him in the only way it can—by social ostracism.

The person who believes in the traditional principles of his society, and who also succeeds in regulating his conduct by them, is recognized by society as a "moral person." But the person who believes in these principles—who knows the difference between "right and wrong" personal conduct, but who nevertheless habitually chooses to do what he himself believes to be wrong—is looked upon by his society as an "immoral person."

But what about the person who does *not* believe in the traditional moral principles of his society, and who openly challenges them on grounds that he believes to be rational? Is such a person to be considered a moral or an immoral person?

Today there are many Americans who sincerely believe that many of our traditional moral values are "obsolete." They hold that some of them go against the laws of human nature, that others are no longer relevant to the economic and political condition of our society, that this or that so-called "traditional moral value" contravenes the individual's Constitutional freedoms and legiti-

*Where the words man, he, him, his are used, woman, she, hers, and her are also meant.

mate pursuit of happiness. Others believe that while a moral value system is necessary as a general guideline for societal behavior, it cannot, and should not, apply to everybody. Every person is unique; no two persons are ever in exactly the same situation or "moral bind"; circumstances alter moral cases. These persons believe, in other words, that all morals are "relative," and all ethics are "situational." They argue that what is wrong behavior for others is right behavior for me, because *my* circumstances are different. The new principles of right action and behavior which such persons have been advancing and practicing today have come to be called "the New Morality."

But before we undertake to discuss the differences between the traditional American morality and the so-called "New Morality," let us ask a most important question: Is there any such thing as a universal morality? Is there any set of moral principles which apply to *everybody*—everybody who has ever been born, and which has been accepted by the majority of mankind in all places and in all ages?

There is, indeed, a *universal morality.* It knows no race, no geographical boundaries, no time, and no particular religion. As John Ruskin, the English social reformer, wrote, "There are many religions, but there is only one morality." Immanuel Kant, the greatest of Germany philosophers, called it the Moral Law, which, he said, governs all mankind. Kant compared this Moral Law to the Sublime Law that rules the movement of the stars and the planets. "We are doomed to be moral and cannot help ourselves," said Dr. John Haynes Holmes, the Protestant theologian.

When we study the history of human thought, we discover a truly remarkable thing—all the great minds of the world have agreed on the marks of the moral person. In all civilizations, in all ages, they have hailed truthfulness as a mark of morality. "The aim of the superior man," said Confucius, "is Truth." Plato, the Greek philosopher, held that "Truth is the beginning of every good thing both in Heaven and on earth, and he who would be blessed and happy should be from the first a partaker of truth, for then he can be trusted." "Veracity," said Thomas Huxley, the English scientist,

"is the heart of morality." In Judeo-Christian lore, the Devil's other name is "The Liar."

Another mark of the moral person is honesty. "An honest man is the noblest work of God," wrote Pope in his *Essay on Man.* "Every honest man will suppose honest acts to flow from honest principles," said Thomas Jefferson.

The moral person is just. "Justice is the firm and continuous desire to render to everyone that which is his due," wrote Justinian. Disraeli called Justice "Truth in action." The moral person is honorable. At whatever cost to himself—including, sometimes, his very life—he does his duty by his family, his job, his country. "To an honest man," wrote Plautus, the great Roman poet, "it is an honor to have minded his duty." Two thousand years later, Woodrow Wilson voiced the same conviction. "There is no question, what the Roll of Honor in America is." Wilson said: "The Roll of Honor consists of the names of men who have squared their conduct by ideals of duty."

If, in an hour of weakness, the moral man does a thing he knows to be wrong, he confesses it, and he "takes his punishment like a soldier." And, if he harms another, even inadvertently, he tries to make restitution. He takes responsibility for his own actions. And if they turn out badly for him, he does not put the blame on others. He does not, for example, yield to the post-Freudian moral cop-out of blaming his follies and failures, his weaknesses and vices, on the way his parents treated him in childhood. Here I cannot resist mentioning the case of Tom Hansen, of Boulder, Colorado, a 24-year old youth who is living on welfare relief funds. He is presently suing his parents for 350,000 dollars because, he claims, they are to blame for lousing up his life, and turning him into a failure. Adam was, of course, the first man to try to shift responsibility for his behavior onto someone else. As there was no Jewish mom to blame, he laid it on to his wife, Eve.

"Absolute morality," wrote the English philosopher, Herbert Spencer, "is the regulation of conduct in such a way that pain will not be inflicted." The moral person is kind to the weak and compassionate with those who suffer.

Above all, he is courageous. Courage is the ladder on which all the other virtues mount. Plautus, a true nobleman of antiquity,

wrote, "Courage stands before everything. It is what preserves our liberty, our lives, our homes, and our parents, our children, and our country. A man with courage has every blessing."

There is also one moral precept that is common to all the great religions of history. It is called the Golden Rule—"Do unto others as you would have them do to you." When Confucius was asked what he considered the single most important rule for right conduct, he replied, "Reciprocity."

The "universal morality" is based on these virtues—truthfulness, honesty, duty, responsibility, loyalty, honor, compassion and courage. As Americans, we can say proudly that the traditional moral values of our society have been a reflection, however imperfect, of this universal morality. All of our great men, all of our heroes, have been exemplars of some, if not all, of these virtues.

To be sure, different cultures and civilizations have placed more emphasis on some of these virtues than on others. For example, the morality of the early Romans heavily stressed courage, honor, and duty. Even today we still call these the manly virtues, and we tend to associate them with another value we call "patriotism." In contrast, the morality of the Judeo-Christian cultures of the West have placed their heaviest emphasis on altruism, kindness, and compassion. "Though I speak with the tongues of men and angels, and have not charity," St. Paul wrote, "I am become as sounding brass or a tinkling symbol." Americans, whose traditional morality reflects the Christian virtues of compassion, donated thirty billion dollars last year to charity. Americans also tend to consider compassion for the underprivileged a greater virtue in politicians than either honor or courage.

Now, if all these virtues do indeed represent the *universal morality*, then what do their *opposites* represent? Well, lying, dishonesty, dereliction of duty, irresponsibility, dishonorable conduct, disloyalty, selfishness, cowardice, cruelty and hypocrisy represent, of course, the universal *immorality*.

In passing, hypocrisy, which has been called "the compliment that vice pays to virtue," has been viewed as the height of immorality in all civilizations. "Of all villainy," cried Cicero, "there is none more base than that of the hypocrite, who at the moment he is most false, takes care to appear most virtuous." The English philo-

sopher Henry Hazlitt cursed only one category of sinner, saying, "Oh woe to Ye, scribes and hypocrites!" Even the cynic and agnostic Voltaire, cried: "How inexpressible is the meanness of being a hypocrite!"

So now we are ready to ask: In what direction can we say that Americans are going? Are we, as a people, going on the high road of the universal morality or on the low road of the universal immorality?

The question is a crucial one for the future of our country. All history bears witness to the fact that *there can be no public virtue without private morality.* There cannot be good government except in a good society. And there cannot be a good society unless the majority of individuals in it are at least *trying* to be good people. This is especially true in a democracy, where leaders and representatives are chosen from the people, by the people. The character of a democratic government will never be better than the character of the people it governs. A nation that is travelling the low road is a nation that is self-destructing. It is doomed, sooner or later, to collapse from within, or to be destroyed from without. And not all its wealth, science and technology will be able to save it. On the contrary, a decadent society will use, or rather, misuse and abuse, these very advantages in such a way as to hasten its own destruction.

Let us then face up to some of the signs which suggest that America may be travelling the low road to its own destruction.

Campus surveys show that one-third of our college students say they would cheat if they were sure they would not be caught. Forty-five percent say that they do not think that it is necessary to lead a moral life in order to be happy or successful. Sociologists note the extraordinary increase in blue and white-collar dishonesty, such as sharp business practices, dishonest advertising, juggled books and accounts, concealment of profits, and the taking and giving of bribes. These are all practices which rip off the buying public.

Unethical practices in the professions are becoming common. Honorable members of the Bar are today appalled at the increase of shysterism in the practice of law. A recent Congressional investigation of medical practices turned up the horrifying fact that

American doctors, greedy for Medicaid fees, are annually performing thousands of unnecessary operations. They are dishonoring their Hippocratic oath by inflicting unnecessary pain on helpless and trusting patients for profit. The public's increasing awareness of the lack of professional integrity in many lawyers and doctors is certainly what encouraged President Carter to make his recent attacks on these two professions.

According to the polls, the majority of our citizens think that politics—and, yes, post-Watergate politics—are riddled with graft, kick-backs, pay-offs, bribes and under-the-table deals. Polls also show that our people think that most politicians have no compunction about lying their heads off to get elected. A great number of Americans also question the accuracy and objectivity—in short, the integrity—of journalists. They think that far too many politicians and journalists are hypocrites—quick to expose the "immorality" of those who do not hold their own political views, but quicker by far to cover up the wrong-doing of those whose views they favor.

Addressing Harvard University's graduating class in June, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn said: "A decline in courage may be the most striking failure an outsider notices in the West. . . . such a decline in courage is particularly notable among the ruling groups and the intellectual elite, causing an impression of the loss of courage by the entire society . . . Should one point out that from most ancient times a decline in courage has been considered the beginning of the end?"

A recent TV documentary about the morale of our volunteer army and our armed forces in Germany was a shocker. It revealed that one-third of our enlistees quit after a few months, finding service in the best-paid army on earth too hard on their heads or feet. One-third of our troops in Germany freely admit that they would beat it out of the forces as fast as they could the moment they thought a war was coming, and that a majority of them felt that they could not trust their comrades in battle. The officer who did the commentary on this documentary said, "What we're getting is an army of losers." The Pentagon has recently told the Congress that quotas for the armed services cannot be filled unless more women are taken in, including into the combat forces. So much for

the condition of the manly virtues of duty, honor, courage in America's volunteer army.

Now I am sure that we would all agree that a rise in the crime rate indicates a weakening of society's social fiber. The staggering increase in the crime rate, especially in the rate of violent—and often utterly senseless—crime among American youth is surely a significant sign of moral decay. An even more significant sign is the impotence of our courts to cope with the enormous volume of crimes being committed. For example, of the 100,000 felony arrests made in New York City each year 97,000 or more cases are either dismissed, diverted for some non-criminal disposition, or disposed of through plea-bargaining. The average criminal who *is* sentenced is generally back on the streets in very short order. Studies show that most defendants arrested for serious crimes—*including murder*—go free. A society indifferent to the pervasiveness of crime, or too weak or terrified to bring it under control, is a society in the process of moral disintegration.

There is one other phenomenon in our society which has historically made its appearance in *all* decaying societies—an obsession with sex.

Sex—the procreative urge—is a mighty force. Indeed, it is *the* mightiest force. It is the *life* force. But since the dawn of history, what has distinguished man from the beasts is that he has made *conscious efforts* to control his lustful impulses, and to regulate and direct them into social channels. There is no primitive society known to anthropologists, no civilization known to historians, which has ever willingly consented to give its members full reign—bestial reign—to their sexual impulses. Sex morals, mores and manners have varied enormously from age to age, and culture to culture. But sexual taboos and no-nos, sex prohibitions (and consequently, of course, inhibitions) are common to all human societies.

Now the fact that mankind has instinctively sensed that there is a right and a wrong way of handling his procreative energies strongly suggests that there may be a universal *sexual* morality. And so there is. And when we examine it, we find that it is this very morality that has made all human progress, and what we call civilization, possible. It is the morality that protects and preserves

the basic unit of society—the *family*. The family is the foundation on which mankind has built all his societies. Jean Jacques Rousseau called the family "the most ancient of all societies," and "the first model of political societies."

Humans, like all animals, instinctively mate. And the male instinctively protects his mate and her offspring. If this were not true, the human race would have long since perished. For in the entire animal kingdom, there is nothing more vulnerable than a pregnant human female, or a human female giving birth. The human female carries her fetus longer, and her young remain helpless longer, than the females and young of any other species. But although humans, like all animals, instinctively mate, or pair-bond, they are not instinctively sexually faithful. Both sexes are promiscuous by nature. They come together naturally, but they do not naturally stay together. Marriage is a man-made institution. We do not know—or at least I do not know—its origins. They are lost in the mists of time. Marriage probably evolved by trial and error, as the most satisfactory way of both controlling the promiscuous impulses of the sexes, and satisfying the procreative urge in an orderly, uninterrupted basis. Bernard Shaw wittily remarked, "Marriage offers the maximum of temptation, with the maximum of opportunity." Marriage is also the enemy of man's worst enemies—loneliness and lovelessness. In any event, marriage has been the most servicable, perdurable and, on the whole, popular of all mankind's institutions.

Thousands of years ago, the poet Homer spoke in praise of marriage: "And may the Gods accomplish your desire," he sang to the unwed maidens of Greece. "A home, a husband and harmonious converse with him—the best thing in the world being a strong house held in serenity where man and wife agree."

Marriage customs have varied greatly throughout history. But what we know about the ageless custom of marriage is this: Whether a man took unto himself one wife, or like King Solomon, 1,000 wives, whether he "courted" his bride, or bought her from her father like a head of cattle, once he took a woman to wife his society *expected* him to assume the primary responsibility for her welfare and the welfare of their children. The first principle of the universal sexual morality is that the husband should protect and

provide for his wife and his minor offsprings *as long as they need him.* In many cultures, the man has also been expected to assume responsibility for his illegitimate children, or bastards, and for the fatherless or motherless children of his near relatives.

The second principle of the universal sexual morality is, in the words of St. Augustine, that "They who are cared for obey—the women their husbands, the children their parents." St. Augustine adds, however, that "in the family of the *just man* . . . even those who rule serve those they seem to command; for they rule not from a sense of power, but from a sense of duty they owe to others; not because they are proud of authority, but because they love mercy."

In all human undertakings, responsibility and authority go—as they must go—hand in hand. In order for a husband and father to discharge his responsibilities, it was necessary for him to have some measure of authority—let us call it the final "say-so"—over his family. The patriarchal family has been, up to now, the family pattern of all the world's civilizations. It will remain so until the vast majority of women are completely self-supporting.

The third principle of universal sexual morality is that spouses should be faithful to one another. Certainly this principle has always been more honored in the breach than in the observance for the simple reason that the animal side of human nature *is* promiscuous. But the fact remains that the faithfulness of both spouses throughout time has been considered the *ideal* of marital conduct.

You may search through all the great literature of the world and you will find no words extolling marital infidelities.

While it is true that the "sins of the flesh" have always been more readily forgiven to husbands than to wives, all human societies have taken a very harsh view of men who seduce—or rape—the wives or daughters of the men of their own society.

When the Trojan, Paris, ran off with Helen, wife of the Greek King Menelaus, Greece fought a seven-year war against Troy, to protest the seduction and abduction of Helen. King David's abduction and seduction of Bathsheba, the wife of Uriah, the Hittite, scandalized his court. It also caused that God-fearing monarch great agonies of repentance. In passing, King David's repentance produced some of the world's greatest poetry—perhaps, an early proof of Sigmund Freud's theory that all the creative works of

man—all his art, poetry, architecture, even his proclivity for money-making, political power and Empire building, are *au fond*, sublimations of his consciously or subconsciously repressed sexual desires.

The fourth, and most important principle of the universal sexual morality is that moral parents, in addition to supplying the physical and emotional needs of their children should educate them to become moral adults.

"Train up the child in the way he should go; and when he is old he will not depart from it," says the Bible. John Stuart Mill wrote, "The moral training of mankind will never be adapted to the conditions of life for which all other human progress is a preparation, until they practice *in the family* the same moral rule which is adapted to the moral constitution of human society." In the universal family morality parents who neglect, abuse or desert their young or who fail to train them to become moral citizens are bad parents.

There are several other aspects of the universal sexual morality which should be mentioned. Although incest is natural among all the lower animals, and has correspondingly also made its appearance in all human societies, none has ever considered incest moral. Even in most primitive societies incest is viewed with horror. The 3,000 year old story of Oedipus Rex is the tragic story of the "guilt complex" of a man who slept—albeit accidentally—with his own mother.

History does tell us, however, that sodomy, homosexuality, and Lesbianism—virtually unknown in the lower orders—have been widely practiced, though seldom condoned, in all civilizations. But history also tells us that whenever incest, perversion, or marital unfaithfulness have become rampant, and whenever sex becomes, as we would say today, "value free," the family structure is invariably weakened; crimes of all sorts increase—especially among the neglected young; and then more or less rapidly all other social institutions begin to disintegrate, until finally the State itself collapses. Rome is perhaps the most famous example.

In the time of Christ, when Imperial Rome was at the very height of its wealth and power, when the brick structures of the old Roman Republic had all come to be faced with gleaming marble,

Rome had become a city obsessed with the pursuit of sensual pleasures. The Emperor Augustus Caesar, seeing the breakdown of the Roman family that was consequently taking place, tried to shore up the institution of marriage by passing laws making divorce more difficult and increasing punishments for adulterers, rapists, and abortionists. It was already too late. Those monsters of iniquity, perversion and violence, Caligula and Nero were already in the wings, impatiently waiting to succeed him, and to hasten the decline and fall of the Empire.

So now let us come to "sex" in America. There is no doubt that what most Americans mean when they speak of "the new morality" is the "new" *sexual* morality which holds that "anything goes" between consenting adults in private—and that almost anything also goes in public. The English critic, Malcolm Muggeridge had America much in mind when he wrote, "Sex is the *ersatz*, or substitute religion of the 20th Century."

The social results of this new American *ersatz* religion are best seen in statistics most of which you can find in your Almanac. Today 50% of all marriages end in divorce, separation, or desertion. The average length of a marriage is seven years. The marriage rate and the birthrate are falling. The numbers of one-parent families and one-child families is rising. More and more young people are living together without the benefit of marriage. Many view the benefit as dubious. Premarital and extra marital sex no longer raises parental or conjugal eyebrows. The practice of "swinging," or group sex, which the ancients call "orgies," has come even to middle-class suburbia.

Despite the availability of contraceptives, there has been an enormous increase in illegitimate births, especially among 13-15 year-olds. Half of the children born last year in Washington, the nation's capitol, were illegitimate. The incidence of venereal diseases is increasing. Since the Supreme Court decision made abortion on demand legal, women have killed more than six million of their unborn, unwanted children. The rate of *reported* incest, child-molestation, rape, and child and wife abuse, is steadily mounting. (Many more of these sex connected acts of violence, while known to the police, are never brought into court, because the victims are certain that their perpetrators will not be convicted.) Run-away

children, teen-age prostitution, youthful drug-addiction and alcoholism have become great, ugly, new phenomena.

The relief roles are groaning with women who have been divorced or deserted, together with their children. The mental-homes and rest-homes are crowded with destitute or unwanted old mothers. These two facts alone seem to suggest that American men are becoming less responsible, less moral, and certainly less manly.

Homosexuality and Lesbianism are increasingly accepted as natural and alternative "life styles." "MS," the official Women's Lib publication, has proclaimed that "until all women are Lesbians, there will be no true political revolution." By the same token, of course, until all men are homosexuals, the revolution will be only *half* a revolution. In passing, the success of the Lesbian-Gay revolution would end all revolutions—by ending the birth of children.

But the most obscene American phenomenon of all is the growth of commercialized sex and hard and soft-core pornography. In the last decade, hard-core film and print porn, which features perversion, sadism and masochism, has become a billion dollar business. It is a business which is not only tolerated, but defended by the press in the sacred name of "freedom of the press." One would find it easier to believe in this noble reason for defending the filth that is flooding the nation if the newspapers did not reap such handsome profits from advertising and reviewing porn. In my view, newspaper publishers who carry X-rated ads are no better than the pimps for the porn merchants. Billy Graham may have been exaggerating when he said "America has a greater obsession with sex than Rome ever had." But he was not exaggerating very much.

Now when we examine the "new" sexual morality, what do we discover? We discover that the new sexual morality comes perilously close to being the old universal sexual immorality, whose appearance has again and again portended the decline and fall of past civilizations. Jane Addams once said, "The essence of immorality is the tendency to make an exception of myself." The principle on which the new sexual morality is based is sexual selfishness, self-indulgence, and self-gratification. Its credo is I-I-I, Me-Me-Me, and to hell with what others call sex morals.

In the 1976 Presidential campaign—*for the first time in American history*—the moral condition of the American family became a

political issue. Candidate Jimmy Carter gave the problem particular stress.

"I find people deeply concerned about the loss . . . of moral values in our lives," he said. And like Augustus Caesar 2,000 years before him, he fingered the cause quite correctly: "The root of this problem is the steady erosion and weakening of our families," he said. "The breakdown of the family has reached dangerous proportions." Candidate Carter also saw the relation between good government and weakened families. "If we want less government, we must have stronger families, for government steps in by necessity when families have failed . . . It is clear that the national government should have a strong pro-family policy, but the fact is that our government has no family policy, and that is the same thing as an anti-family policy."

It is far too late in the day to review the curious ideas Mr. Carter put forth in 1976 for the steps the Federal Government might take to strengthen the American family, except to say that they largely consisted in programs for *more* rather than less government assumption of marital and parental responsibilities. In any event, very little has since come of Carter's promise "to construct an administration that will reverse the trends we have seen toward the breakdown of the family in our country." The truth is that very little *can* be done by government to shore up the family, although a great deal can be done and has been done to hasten its collapse.

But the real cause of the breakdown is the abandonment, by millions of people, beginning with husbands, wives and parents of their *interior* devotion to the principles of the universal morality. To ask what can be done to reverse the trend is to ask, what can the individual members of society do? The answer is—everything.

When Goethe, the great German poet, lay on his deathbed, an old friend asked him what farewell message he had to give the world. Goethe replied, "Let every man keep his own household clean and soon the whole world will be clean."

If not every American, but just every other American man and woman were to begin today to keep their own households clean, this process of moral decay would *immediately* be halted.

It is certainly not too late to hope that this will happen. There are still millions of good people in America who try, try, try to

remain faithful to the American version of the universal morality, and who also bring up their children to remain faithful. These Americans constitute the true *Golden Circle* of our country. If they will try to strengthen and enlarge *that* circle, by only so much as one virtuous act a day, a strong and happy America will make it safely into the 21st Century.

Tearing Up the Contract

Joseph Sobran

BECAUSE ABORTION is a "hot" issue, we have paid less attention than we otherwise would have to the reasoning by which the Supreme Court in 1973 struck down the abortion laws of all 50 states. We have paid even less attention to what the Court *implied* by its ruling in *Roe* v. *Wade*.

It may be instructive for our present purpose to abstract abortion right out of the case. Imagine that the Court had made a similar ruling on a less hot issue: jaywalking, say. Nobody is very passionate about jaywalking, so there would be no heated debates as to whether or not anti-jaywalking laws rest on inadmissible theological presuppositions.

Instead we would focus our attention on the sheer oddness of the ruling. "What!" we would say to the Court. "You mean to tell us that all fifty states, in trying to ban jaywalking, have violated their fundamental compact with each other? That each of them, in its own way, has failed to come up with an anti-jaywalking formulation that is compatible with the Constitution?

"You are in effect telling us that we, the people, don't know how to govern ourselves; don't even understand our own national social contract; and that only now, thanks to a sudden revelation from the judiciary, have the terms of our contract been made intelligible to us. We find that highly implausible, to say the least, and we suspect those who assert it of being possessed by a truly stunning arrogance.

"Now," we might add, calming down a little, "it is just barely possible that the laws of each of the fifty states relating to jaywalking has represented the tyranny of the majority. Such a thing is conceivable. Unlikely, but conceivable.

"But," we would continue, triumphantly, "in that case, where, while the majority was tyrannizing, was the tyrannized *minority*? Is

---

Joseph Sobran, our longtime contributing editor, is the author of the newly published book *Single Issues: Essays on the Crucial Social Questions* (The Human Life Press, 1983).

there any record, in the original legislative debates on these laws, of an opposition desperately asserting, against the impending darkness, its right to jaywalk?

"No? Then is there, somewhere along the line, an article in one of the law journals, say in 1910, or 1926, or 1952, pointing up the fundamental imcompatibility between our constitutional principles and the mass of anti-jaywalking laws currently on the books?

"No again? Then isn't it possible that this Court has erred? Because either this Court is mistaken, or practically every American who has ever addressed the subject of jaywalking has been constitutionally purblind. And frankly, we find the hypothesis of a national Constitution that is unintelligible to the very people it purports to speak for—well, a little hard to swallow."

One thing is conspicuously missing from this fanciful example: motive. There is no ideological reason for the Court to throw out our jaywalking laws. Destroying those laws is not on the liberal agenda.

The Court's sudden constitutional scruples against abortion laws, on the other hand, coincided precisely with the rise of the campaign for legal abortion. That campaign was marked by volcanic passions on both sides, and the issue of abortion itself upstaged the issue of the means by which the liberal Court got its desired result.

But the fanciful objections to the jaywalking decision apply fully to *Roe* v. *Wade*. *Nobody*, as far as I know, objected to the original passage of abortion laws on constitutional grounds. No scholar, as far as I know, ever wrote in any of our law journals that, for what it was worth, those laws were incompatible with the Constitution. And none of the early advocates of legal abortion, as far as I know, supposed that the Constitution was on their side, or for that matter on the *other* side. Everyone assumed, for generations, that abortion was a subject for legislation, and that was that. If you wanted legal abortion, you just had to legislate it. That was how the game was played, under the contract, i.e., the Constitution.

It is worth reminding ourselves how the Constitution used to be understood.

It was *not* understood as an attempt to "build a new society," to use the socialist idiom of the twentieth century. It was an attempt

to firm up the union among thirteen sovereign states. It was *not* understood as the conferral of almost unlimited power on a legislative majority, even a bicameral one. It was the delegation of certain specified powers, "few and defined," as James Madison put it, to the federal government, with all other powers, "numerous and indefinite," reserved to the states.

From the first, however, the partisans of the Philadelphia Constitution had to fight against certain misconceptions. Madison's coauthor of *The Federalist*, Alexander Hamilton, opposed the addition of a bill of rights on grounds that this would only tend to confuse the public. Why *forbid* Congress to regulate the press, for instance, when it had no *authority* to do so? As the original Constitution stood, the presumption would be that Congress could act only in pursuance of the powers specified under Article I, Section 8.

During the ensuing debate over the Bill of Rights, Madison made the point again. He argued that we should "confine ourselves to an enumeration of simple, acknowledged principles" *a la* Article I, since "amendments of a doubtful nature will have a tendency to prejudice the whole system."

The difficulty, recognized by both sides, was intended to be laid to rest by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, which reaffirm the presumption in favor of a) the rights of the people and b) the powers of the states and of the people where the Constitution confers no powers on the federal government. These amendments were conceived as a further safeguard against federal "encroachments" and "usurpations"; terms debaters on both sides used to express their most common anxiety about ratification. It is significant that both words have dropped out of our political vocabulary.

And we should bear in mind that the Federalist side conceived the Supreme Court as an additional check against federal encroachments and usurpations. This is the widely-missed point of Hamilton's great argument, in *The Federalist* No. 78, for judicial review. The power of judicial review, remember, was seen as part of the plan *before* the Bill of Rights was added; seen as such by men who, like Hamilton, *opposed* a bill of rights. This, we shall see, is a fact of considerable importance.

Although the doctrine of judicial review soon took root in the United States, it by no means was interpreted as implying that

interpreting the Constitution was the exclusive prerogative of the judicial branch. On the contrary, the Constitution was assumed to be a contract among the people and the states that anyone might appeal to in the course, say, of ordinary legislative debate. The question whether the Constitution authorized or permitted a given act came up time and again, as during the debates over the Alien and Sedition Acts, the Louisiana Purchase, the nullification doctrine, and the Fugitive Slave Law Act. As a contract, it was a convenient device for a legislative minority to appeal to whenever it thought the majority was going too far. Before the Civil War this was a common forensic ploy: one side would often say to the other, "You may have the votes for your proposal, but it's not in the contract."

An interesting case in point occurred in 1817, when President James Madison made yet another stand in favor of limiting Congress to its enumerated powers. In vetoing a public works bill that would have created a federally-funded system of highways and canals, he referred to Article I, Section 8, and said Congress simply had no legitimate power to do what the bill proposed. To pass the bill, he argued, would be to exercise "an impermissible latitude of construction" of the Constitution.

Ironically, one of his severest critics on that occasion was John Calhoun, later the foremost spokesman for states' rights. Calhoun argued that Madison was being excessively literal-minded: Congress had already exceeded its enumerated powers, strictly construed, several times in the recent past. Simple common sense required this, and would do so again. But even Calhoun did not argue that federal power was unlimited in principle, or limited only by the Bill of Rights; or that only the Supreme Court could decide constitutional questions. He merely disagreed about the application at hand.

In other words, Congress and the President were perfectly competent to read the Constitution and interpret it themselves. "We the People" spoke through it; it was the ultimate expression of popular sovereignty, at once legitimating and limiting federal action. The Constitution was to be a *constant* presence in legislative debate, a permanent component of government by deliberation, reminding our representatives of the abiding will of the

people (as against the will of any immediate majority).

Throughout *The Federalist* we hear warnings of "faction" and "passion" set against the permanent interest and "deliberate sense" of the nation as a whole. This "whole" was made complex on purpose, under the constitutional scheme, so as to check precipitate and partial majority rule. The presence of the Supreme Court would be an additional safeguard, ensuring that the Constitution would stand for something stabler and more principled than the will of any simple majority ("faction") in pursuit of its own interest.

On this plan the Court too would have a "reminding" function, as I call it. Hamilton stresses that the Court is to have neither "force" nor "will," which are attributes of the people's representatives, but only "judgment." It would be there to call the people's attention back to the terms of their contract with each other: another counteragent to faction and passion.

This original plan was very different from the system most intelligent people now take for granted. The prevailing view of our constitutional system is that the Framers created a sort of ocean of federal power in which, through the Bill of Rights, they placed a few islands of personal liberty. On this view, the job of the Supreme Court is not to limit the area covered by the ocean, but simply to prevent those islands from being swamped and occasionally to expand their area a little.

This is altogether different, be it noted, from the original plan. In fact it is the very misunderstanding the authors of the plan were afraid of fostering. In their view, federal power would be more like a river, with safeguards to prevent it from overflowing its banks. They had no intention of creating a nearly unlimited democracy at the national level, in which personal rights would be minor exceptions to the general power. They had a horror of any such majority rule.

For complex reasons, which I will not rehearse here, the original system of the Framers has been replaced by the very kind of system they were bent on avoiding. And the Supreme Court has become an engine of this transformation. Using the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has "incorporated" the Bill of Rights to require their observance by state governments. In fact the Court

now spends far more energy striking down state and local ordinances than federal ones. Far from being a *check* on federal power, it has turned into an *expander* of that power. Ominously, it seldom refers to two articles of the Bill of Rights it is widely thought to be defending: the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.

And by what I have called a "gentlemen's agreement," Congress declines to use its powers to check the Court. It says, when pressed, that this would upset the balance of powers under the Constitution, even though its own authority to impose "exceptions and regulations" on the Court's appellate jurisdiction is *part* of the balance of powers.

Congress permits the Court to act, unchecked, against state and local governments that have no effective way of defending their own prerogatives against the federal leviathan. What we are seeing is less a balance of powers than a convenient division of labor: in their different ways, Court and Congress advance the liberal agenda, enhancing federal power at the expense of the states and the people.

One major difficulty created by this new, tacit social contract is that there is no longer any clear rationale for either state or federal government. As a result the whole original plan has developed into a contest for power, with the big boys, as usual in such contests, winning. Among other things, the decay of constitutionalism has brought about perennial budget crises, for the simple (though usually overlooked) reason that there is no principled criterion to decide what any particular level of government should or should not do. The entire wealth of the nation is consequently up for grabs—a situation the Framers would certainly have abhorred. And today, liberal congressmen and pundits are actually indignant if more money is spent for constitutional purposes (e.g. national defense) than for extraconstitutional ones (e.g. "social programs").

The new constitutional confusion reached its moral nadir when seven justices of the Supreme Court informed the nation that the people of the 50 states had, for several generations, misunderstood their own social contract with respect to abortion. Not only had the majority been consistently wrong; until just yesterday, historically speaking, *no minority or individual had ever been right*!

Even so, we are now frequently reminded that abortion is "a

fundamental constitutional right." Justice Harry Blackmun, author of the majority opinion in *Roe*, recently boasted to an interviewer: "I feel that the abortion decisions are among the most liberal that the Court has produced in many a year."

Here we have the juridical smoking gun: a justice of the Supreme Court says casually that the criterion for evaluating a decision of the Court is whether or not it is "liberal." Fidelity to the original Constitution seems not to carry any weight.

Blackmun's defenders may trot out the familiar line that the Constitution is a "living document," whose meaning has to change with the times. It is remarkable, however, that those who most aggressively play on our reverence for the Constitution are also those who insist on the fluidity of its meaning. We are to revere not the ascertainable meaning of the words written by the Framers, but the unpredictable findings of today's liberal exegetes. From which it is not so hard to conclude that what the liberals really want is not adherence to ancient constitutional principles, but unquestioning deference to contemporary interpreters.

The Constitution was conceived as the scaffold of American self-government. It was meant to stand for something larger than the immediate will of a majority. If the Court means to defend in that spirit, then it should speak out of an American consensus that overarches the generations, whatever the passions of the moment.

But the Court does not speak for the generations. It all too clearly despises them. It represents not something broader than a majority of the living, but something narrower, less moderate, more factious. In *Roe* v. *Wade*, Justice Blackmun spoke, indeed, for a faction that could not win its ideological goals in any other way than by a *fiat* thinly disguised as a principle. He told the American people that they could forget about governing themselves. In the name of the Constitution, the Court tore up the contract.

The Mass Media

James Hitchcock

ANTI-RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT in earlier times was mostly confined to elite circles. Print was virtually the only means by which new ideas were disseminated, and the great majority of people, until at least the middle of the nineteenth century, were illiterate. It is the mass media which, more than anything else, account for the rapid spread of secularism in the late twentieth century.

For a long time, the media were not in principle biased towards secular values. If anything, the opposite seemed to be the case. While radical ideas were discussed in somewhat rarified social settings, in popular culture traditional values were still honored. American films are an example. There was a brief flurry of experimentation with "daring" themes around 1930. The popular outcry was so strong that the film industry introduced voluntary censorship, which remained in effect for over thirty years. During that time, no matter how objectionable certain scenes in certain films might be, there was a generally accepted code whereby virtue had to be honored (and usually rewarded), while vice had to be acknowledged as such (and usually punished). Moral and religious values were never ridiculed or attacked.

As did so many other things, the mass media began to change around 1965, with the most dramatic changes occurring during the 1970's. The changes were related to the pervasive prosperity of the period, and to the cult of self-worship which this produced. Put simply, those who controlled the media realized that there was a substantial audience which had broken with traditional moral values and wanted entertainment that ventured into forbidden territory in hitherto forbidden ways. Not only were taboo subjects treated, they were treated iconoclastically; traditional moral values were ridiculed, assaulted, and ground into dust. The audience for

---

James Hitchcock is a professor of history at St. Louis University and a well-known author and social critic. This article is taken from his most recent book, *What is Secular Humanism?* (Servant Books, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1982).

this kind of entertainment wanted to experience the thrill of the forbidden. It also sought confirmation that its own break with the past was justified. Insecure in their rebellion at the deepest level of their personalities, they needed repeated public assaults on those values as a means of reassurance.

But if the revolution in the media had been supported solely by self-conscious moral rebels, its scope would have been far narrower. The manipulators of the media also suspected, correctly as it turned out, that many people who professed traditional values would nonetheless accept the new iconoclasm simply as entertainment, without examining too closely the values behind it. The moral corruption which affected even many good people in America was nowhere more ruthlessly revealed than here. As part of the general spirit of self-gratification, many people began to feel, instinctively and often without fully realizing it, that one of the things they "owed" themselves was a constant diet of entertainment. When the media underwent their moral revolution during the 1970's, many professedly Christian people made no protest. In fact, they remained an enthusiastic part of the audience because they found the new fare diverting. They drew an impregnable line between their religious lives and the hours they spent relaxing, convinced that what they consumed as entertainment could not affect their personal values.

In a great many instances, this belief was naive. Many people were corrupted through means they did not take seriously. Where parents proved relatively immune, children did not. Above all, even where there was some immunity, many Christians made the moral revolution in the media possible because they patronized it. In effect, they helped to subsidize the corruption of others.

This moral revolution was achieved in a variety of ways. On the simplest level, it consisted merely of talking about what was hitherto unmentionable. Subjects previously forbidden in the popular media (abortion, incest) were presented for the first time. In the beginning these presentations were brief, cautious, blandly neutral. There were cries of protest. These were met by boasts about how "tastefully" the subject had been dealt with. "After all," the argument ran, "knowledge is better than ignorance. No one can object to the public recognition that certain things exist. In the

end, we will all be better off for our frank willingness to talk about our problems."

There were many flaws in this argument. Among them is the general unsuitability of the mass media for a serious discussion of sensitive and delicate issues of any kind. By their very nature, the media deal with such questions briefly, simplistically, and in a style which borders on the sensational. Their aim is not primarily to explore problems responsibly but to attract the largest possible audience. Since the various media are in competition with each other, there is strong pressure on each to do something just a bit more "daring" than its competitors.

The mass media also have the power to confer instant respectability. In a mass society, to be ignored is the worst possible fate. To be noticed is tantamount to being deemed worthy. To be noticed by a mass audience is almost a kind of canonization. No matter how seemingly "neutral" the treatment, when certain ideas are given time and space in the media they acquire a respectability that increases with frequency. Then comes the point where previously taboo subjects become familiar and acceptable. There is deep hypocrisy in the media's pious claims that they merely reflect reality and do not shape it. In fact the power of celebrity is used deliberately and selectively in order to effect changes in values.

The second stage of the revolution is ridicule, the single most powerful weapon in any attempt to discredit accepted beliefs. Within a remarkably brief time, values the media had celebrated during the 1950's (family, religion, patriotism) were subjected to a merciless and constant barrage of satire. Only people with an exceptionally strong commitment to their beliefs could withstand being depicted as ignorant buffoons. Countless Christians subtly adjusted their beliefs, or at least the way in which they presented those beliefs to the public, in order to avoid ridicule. Negative stereotypes were created, and people who believed in traditional values were kept busy avoiding being trapped in those stereotypes.

The final stage of the moral revolution is the media's exploitation of traditional American sympathy for the underdog. Judeo-Christian morality, although eroding for a long time and on the defensive almost everywhere in the Western world, is presented as a powerful, dominant, and even tyrannical system against which

only a few brave souls make a heroic stand on behalf of freedom. Thus secularists of all kinds and those who deny traditional morality in words and behavior are treated as heroes by the media. Their stories are told over and over again in order to elicit sympathy and, finally, agreement.

Probably the greatest power which the mass media possess is the ability, in effect, to define reality. What is presented in the media, and the way in which it is presented, are for many people the equivalent of what is real. By determining what ideas will be discussed in public, the media determine which ideas are to be considered respectable, rational, and true. Those excluded from discussion, or treated only in a negative way, are conversely defined as disreputable, irrational, and false.

The media have the power almost to confer existence itself. Unless a belief or an institution receives some recognition, it does not exist. Even those who know that the media are fundamentally hostile to their values nonetheless court media recognition as a way of achieving status in the public eye.

Many people also look to the media for authoritative guidance in their own lives, especially when traditional sources of authority—family, church, school—are in decline. From the media, people learn how to dress, what to eat and drink, and what kind of car to drive. They also learn how they should think about public issues, how they should react to personal crises, how they should live their lives. The rapid spread of the ideology of Women's Liberation, for example, is in large measure due to the overwhelming sympathy of the media towards that movement. American women are invited to define themselves by reference to models the media hold up to them. Deviation from those models (being "just a housewife," for example) is embarrassing and even reprehensible.

The media's secularism should be recognized in its fullness. Complaints about television, in particular, have tended to focus on the twin problems of sex and violence, but the nature of the sickness goes a good deal deeper. It is directly related to the social circumstances which made the revolution in values possible in the first place.

For the most part, the media depend on advertising for their support; it is key to their profit. To an extent, therefore, the media

must appeal to the widest possible audience. Roughly, the larger the audience, the more advertising and the greater profit.

But it is not quite that simple. If it were, the secularization process would not have been so swift and so complete. All opinion polls show the great majority of Americans wedded to traditional moral and religious values, despite some erosion over the past twenty years. However, as noted, many religious believers have at least passively supported the media's moral revolution by their complete separation of entertainment from other areas of their lives.

Advertising is not directed simply at the greatest number of people, but rather at the greatest number of potential buyers of the advertised product. Certain commodities are bought by practically everybody, but many items are available only to a limited class of people. Many advertisers are primarily interested in an elite market—people who have money and are likely to spend it.

In general, older, more traditional people have had a lifetime in which to accumulate savings and make investments. If retired, they also have the leisure to buy and enjoy things they may have denied themselves in earlier years. But other aspects of aging tend to cancel this out—illness, weariness, a traditional frugality, the desire to live simply in one's declining years. On the other hand, younger people raising families do not possess a great deal of "disposable income," money left over after the necessities. The shopping habits of young parents are likely to be determined by very practical considerations.

By the 1970's, a recognizable new class had emerged—people young enough to be active and mobile, but old enough to have accumulated a certain amount of wealth, above average in income, and bound by a minimum of family responsibilities.

The "typical" example of such people in contemporary society is the couple (married or unmarried) with one child or none and no desire to increase that number. They are educated professional people or are lucratively employed in business. They have taken maximum advantage of the new prosperity, and their entire outlook on life is shaped by that prosperity. Such people want only "the best" for themselves, not only in material goods but also in their way of life. They have made themselves maximally mobile.

They are prepared to move—geographically, spiritually, intellectually, in terms of career—in whatever direction seems to offer the greatest and most gratifying opportunities.

Such people have more or less consciously chosen to sacrifice the joys and responsibilities of children for the sake of their own gratification. If they have children they arrange for them to be raised to a great extent by other people. Two incomes are essential to their way of life. They have the greatest possible "disposable income," and are the advertisers' favorite target.

Such people are likely to be highly secular in their outlook. If they belong to a church (they probably do not), it is a liberal church peopled mainly by others like themselves. Their way of life would be difficult to reconcile with traditional religious and moral values, and the rejection of those values is a pre-condition for living the way they do.

Certain of the media (for example, *Playboy* magazine) are aimed almost exclusively at such people. They are the people who buy luxury cars, designer clothes, and condominiums. They patronize exclusive restaurants, stock their cellars with fine wines, and travel all over the world for vacations or business. Even in those media (for example, television networks) which reach a wider audience, such "preferred customers" have a disproportionate influence.

The media began their moral revolution secure in the belief that, whatever popular outcry might ensue, they were unlikely to alienate those they most wanted to reach. Indeed, many such people were eager for more "sophisticated" entertainment. They were in principle "open to all points of view" and were anxious to see "controversial" subjects explored "frankly." There are people who must eventually shatter all taboos because they deny themselves nothing. Their taste in "sophisticated" entertainment reinforces their self-image, and they are estranged from traditional moral values.

An overlooked cause of the moral revolution is also the style of life of many media people themselves. For whatever reason—the pressures of their work, the unreality of the media world, or because the entertainment profession attracts iconoclastic people to begin with—it appears that there are few moral traditionalists in the industry. In his book *The View from Sunset Boulevard*, Ben

Stein interviewed television producers and writers. He found, overwhelmingly, that they are not only devotees of "the new morality"; they think traditional religion and morality are meaningless or even pernicious.

Thus the personal values of media people in conjunction with the personal values of their favored audience promote a particular point of view at odds with the expressed values of a majority of Americans. This is one of the places where the hypocrisy of media people is most blatant. They tend to treat all criticism as a threat to freedom of expression and wrap themselves in a high-minded moral rhetoric. Yet profit is almost their sole purpose for existence. A small and unrepresentative group of people imposes its skewed view of reality on everyone else.

The essence of the media's secularism is self-worship. Implicitly denying the existence of God or an objective moral order, they reduce life to an endless quest for personal fulfillment. Anything which some people find "meaningful" automatically acquires legitimacy, provided it runs counter to traditional beliefs. Life is depicted as a process which demands constant acts of rebellion against all moral absolutes and all social rules. The "free" individual is regarded as the one who has thrown off all constraints of any kind—religious, moral, familial, cultural, political—in order to make repeated assertions of "liberation" from all authority.

This kind of freedom is endlessly celebrated in the media, its devotees the new American heroes. This canonization also stimulates the sales which make advertising possible. There is a deep connection between this secular amorality and certain features of the American economy, in which total personal mobility is a requisite both for one's job and for being the best possible consumer.

By their very nature, the mass media are incapable of dealing with permanent truths, much less with the things of eternity. Newspapers are made to be thrown away the next day. The television image is gone almost instantly. Very few films are ever seen a second time. The media are constructed so as to deal with what is ephemeral, insubstantial, even illusory. It is of their essence that what is celebrated one year is denigrated or ignored the next. Regardless of explicit content, one of the most important messages the media convey to people is that change is the only reliable rule

of life. In order to exist comfortably in the modern world it is necessary to hold only very loosely to one's beliefs and loyalties, because tomorrow the unrelenting demands of the culture will require a radical shift in those loyalties.

Each of the media function somewhat differently, even though each tends to the same result.

By far the most frankly pagan and anti-religious branch of mass culture, at least since the middle 1960's, is popular music. In no other branch is the depravity of the moral revolution more easily grasped. Traditionally the popular-music industry—from "Tin Pan Alley" of the early years of this century down to celebrities like Bing Crosby and Perry Como in the 1950's—reflected established moral and religious beliefs and, for the most part, supported them.

The first break came with the earliest rock singers of the 1950's, especially Elvis Presley. Presley himself was a proclaimed religious believer who told the public that he too lived according to Christian morality. But, as clearsighted observers noted even at the time, there was a contradiction between Presley's wholesome words and his suggestive actions. His theatrical style was aggressively erotic, frankly abandoned, and designed to arouse similar reactions in his audience. After his death, it was revealed that he was a deeply divided man, torn between moral ideals he sincerely believed in at some level of his being and a personal life totally debauched by drugs and sensual indulgence.

The revolution of rock music preceded the revolutions in other branches of the media and to a great extent made them possible. It was unique in being, perhaps, the only such revolution in which ideas were unimportant. The lyrics of songs were for a while unobjectionable. Not many people paid attention to them anyway. Rather, rock music assaulted people in a deeper, largely unconscious level of their being. It proclaimed in its rhythms and in the personal style of its devotees the annihilation of all moral restraint, hedonistic abandon, and ecstatic acting out of forbidden desires.

When the Beatles appeared in the middle 1960's they at first seemed merely boyish and playful. But as they grew more "serious" they revealed still other dimensions of the rock revolution. Precisely because they were less blatantly shocking than other groups (like the Rolling Stones), they could insinuate their iconoclastic

energies in subtle, almost surgically precise ways. They were quickly elevated above the level of mere entertainers and came to be treated as prophets, sages, and moral heroes. They were mainly irreligious but could be overtly anti-religious. In the song "Eleanor Rigby," after describing a Christian funeral, they intone "No one was saved." Most importantly, they, more than perhaps anyone else, were responsible for elevating narcissistic self-absorption to the level of a cult, deifying personal and subjective feelings, and establishing self-satisfaction as the principal goal of existence.

By the 1970's, the rock-music industry had become openly nihilistic, its leading practitioners seemingly motivated by the desire to shock, affront, destroy, and negate. An Arizona minister's son appeared on stage in women's clothes, called himself Alice Cooper, and performed mock executions and suicides, which sometimes included the actual dismemberment of chickens. The Rolling Stones stirred up such frenzied passions in their followers that they took to hiring members of a motorcycle gang, The Hell's Angels, to protect them during concerts. (At one concert their bodyguards wantonly killed a young man who was approaching the performers on stage.) In costume, in lyrics, in their lives offstage, the leading rock stars of the 1970's degenerated into beings cut off from all spiritual roots, wholly self-absorbed, unrelentingly hedonistic, and often brutal. Yet their influence did not diminish. Two generations of young people all over the world were corrupted by them.

The economics of the rock-music industry is directly relevant to understanding this phenomenon. Popular music is only partly dependent on advertising (mainly through radio). It depends rather on direct purchase by the customer of records and concert tickets. The popularity of rock coincided with the emergence of the largest generation of young people in American history. These young people had always had their desires catered to and were the most affluent younger generation in history. Supported by their parents, they had a good deal of "disposable income."

The popular-music industry deliberately set out to create a youth culture which was highly self-conscious and at odds with the culture of the parents' generation. The new culture exploited the young's perennial restlessness under parental authority and their, quite literal, irresponsibility. Modern adolescents are kept in a con-

dition of immaturity and are not held fully responsible for what they think or do. They are systematically encouraged to "find themselves." This makes for a strong sense of egoism and rebellion against all external constraints.

The youth culture has one thing in common with the more sophisticated culture of older iconoclasts. Neither, because of its alienation from family and religion, has much stake in the future, even less in the prospect of eternity. Both groups, for different reasons, live in an eternal present dedicated to self-satisfaction. Both are secularists in the most literal sense, wholly bound to the time in which they live.

The film industry during the past twenty years has followed a curve roughly parallel to that of the popular-music industry, although perhaps somewhat less sharp. In both cases, there has been a sudden and swift movement from moral conservatism to moral iconoclasm. In both cases the medium depends primarily not on advertising but on direct patronage by the consumer. In both cases the principle consumers are young people. The "family film" practically disappeared during the 1960's, probably the victim of television. Films came to be heavily patronized by young people who sought their entertainment outside the home. Films became "franker" and more "serious." Predictably, this seriousness was equated with the prejudices of the counterculture.

The size and influence of these branches of the media catering primarily to youth has wrought a special kind of revolution in American society. In the past, whatever youth culture existed—literature for young people, for example, or Walt Disney films—aimed to integrate youth into the values of the adult world. There was no contradiction between the content of the youth media and the beliefs of the parents. They were merely different stages of development. Now, however, the youth culture is explicitly opposed to parental values, sets itself up as a rival authority, and seeks to prolong adolescent attitudes throughout life. The moral confusion of so many young adults can be traced directly to their previous immersion in a special youth culture from which they have never escaped.

If rock music was the catalyst which got the moral revolution started, television has been by far its chief disseminator. It would

be almost impossible to overestimate its influence.

In some ways television remains the most cautious of the media. The limited number of channels makes government regulation necessary and makes television stations at least somewhat answerable to public opinion. But this relative caution is offset by the medium's immense range; it reaches almost every American.

Television is primarily an entertainment medium, and primarily a profit-making one. The economics of advertising is maximally operative. Prior to the 1960's, television entertainment was criticized as bland, boring, and lacking in substance. During the past twenty years there has been a deliberate effort to overcome this criticism. It is evidence both of the industry's lack of imagination and of its crudely stereotypic thinking that the only way writers and producers can make their programs more "meaningful" is by the now-familiar assaults on traditional values. A program gains a reputation for "seriousness" to the extent that it deals with hitherto taboo subjects. There is irresistible pressure towards the increasingly sensational.

The chief prophet of what might be called the "new television" was Norman Lear, creator of *All in the Family, Maude,* and *Mary Hartman.* Lear was praised for going beyond mere entertainment to give audiences "thoughtful" comedies. But his programs were mainly devices for disseminating his own ideology. *All in the Family*, the most popular, presented Archie Bunker as the quintessential ignorant bigot. Since Archie believed in God, country, family, and traditional sexual morality, those beliefs were tarred with the same brush. Obviously, no humane, thoughtful person could hold such beliefs. For contrast, Lear's programs also presented people who dissented from such values, models of rational humaneness.

The passive cooperation of religious believers in their own destruction was illustrated in the popularity of *All in the Family.* People accepted ideas in the guise of entertainment which they would have rejected indignantly had they been confronted with them outright. In 1980, Lear founded an organization with the arrogant title People for the American Way and sent out letters that almost hysterically denounced conservative religious movements as a threat to American freedom.

Lear's career is not the only example of blatant use of television

for propaganda. The "talk shows," such as Phil Donahue's, compulsively seek out spokesmen for "controversial" ideas and actions. They rarely allow defenders of traditional values equal time. The daytime "soap operas," once the stronghold of genteel domesticity, have become display cases for every kind of depravity.

Just as destructive as its concentration on what is deviant and amoral has been television's general ignoring of religion as a positive force. Religious programs are usually confined to Sunday mornings, when the audience is small. Such programs are token concessions by stations required by law to give time for public service. When providing viewers with fictional images of what life is like, television rarely adverts to the fact that, for the great majority of Americans, religious belief is an integral part of their lives. Religiously motivated characters are likely to be neurotics for whom religion is a form of sickness. Rarely are sympathetic characters presented whose lives are strengthened by prayer or by the guidance of clergy. Millions of Americans attend church on Sunday and pray in their homes, but rarely are they shown doing this on television.

Television is also the society's principal disseminator of "news"—information about the world and, by implication, how to live in the world. Here religion sometimes fares better. It is not ignored as completely as it is in television entertainment. However, in keeping with its bias in favor of what is ephemeral and sensational, television news compulsively treats religion according to a single formula. That formula essentially consists in searching for religious factions in conflict with one another, one of which can be called "liberal," the other "conservative." The liberals are then treated as the voice of reason and compassion against the rigidity and irrationality of the defenders of religious orthodoxy. Often, by a judicious editing of film, liberals are presented at their best, conservatives at their worst. When Pope John Paul II appeared in America as a formidable spokesman for orthodoxy in 1979, the media effectively undercut his message by providing commentators each evening who dutifully pointed out the "errors" in the Pope's words. Television is especially eager to give time to church members who attack the Christian code of sexual ethics or who are

partisans of Women's Liberation. Sometimes such people are, overnight, set up as heroes.

The behavior of the print media—newspapers and magazines—is not essentially different from that of television. There is a vast proliferation of journals of all kinds, many of them religious in nature. However, the major print media which reach mass audiences share in the general secularist prejudices of the other media. Because the print media can give more space to subjects, orthodox Christians probably get more attention there than they do on television. However, the standard way in which newspapers deal with religious questions is to devote the headlines and the opening paragraphs to dissenters and secularizers, so that only the most diligent readers reach the later paragraphs in which orthodoxy is allowed a token voice.

The mass media distort religion in a very fundamental way. Properly understood, religion is something which goes very deep in a person's being; it permeates all of existence. The media, however, tend to notice it only when it generates controversy. Furthermore, it must be controversy which is easily understood in secular terms—the "liberation" of women, for example, or sexual "freedom." The media allow people to view religion only as filtered through secularist lenses. Although the media piously insist that they merely seek to give expression to "unpopular" views, the effect of their revolution has been to give deviant ideas privileged status and to banish orthodoxy to the darkest corners.

There is no doubt that the media seek to dominate public opinion. For all their talk about freedom and diversity, there is remarkably little diversity among the media. By 1980, the attacks on Evangelicals like Jerry Falwell and Don Wildmon's Coalition for Better Television had become frequently savage and hysterical. In no small measure this was due to fear that the long-standing secularist monopoly on communications was in danger of being broken.

An important development of the late 1970's was the emergence of wide-reaching religious telecasting, most of it under Evangelical Protestant auspices. Some Christians have legitimate questions about this development (for example, how substantial is a conversion gained over television?). The phenomenon has, however, been

of great importance precisely because it has demonstrated that Christians can use the mass media for their own purposes, that an audience for this ministry exists, and that it is possible to present an alternative view to the dominant secular one. The coming of cable television will undoubtedly lead to a more depraved kind of entertainment than has thus far been seen on television. However, it also carries with it remarkable possibilities for the spread of religious values to a mass audience.

A General Theory of Retardation

Jérôme LeJeune, M.D.

IT SEEMS THAT a dilemma exists in the civilized world today: to kill or to heal. The answer is, of course, to heal. This chapter argues, in technical terms, that healing of the seriously retarded is beginning to be possible.

Because it can be caused by so many different diseases, mental retardation is, strictly speaking, not a disease but a symptom. Out of the formidable array of congenital afflictions that can produce mental retardation, we can make some order and glean some understanding if we first ask ourselves about the substratum of the intelligence, that is, the "wiring" of our brain.

When Pascal discovered that arithmetic calculation could be simulated by the play of gears and rods correctly arranged in a little machine, he demonstrated at the same time that logic can be inserted in matter if matter is properly shaped. Nowadays, computers are much more complicated, but no matter what kind of procedure they use to manage matter and energy, they must fulfill three very simple requirements. These three are the same for any machine, whether it is a pocket calculator or a huge and complex computer used to put a man into space. The three requirements are: (1) there is a preestablished, logically constructed network; (2) inside the machine there are clear, diffusion-free transmissions; and (3) each element of the machine answers clearly and without inertia or hesitation.

I do not claim that what you have in your braincase is a kind of computer, but the way we have built the machine shows us that the same breakdown that can impair the functioning of a computer can occur in human pathology to damage the efficiency of the

Jérôme LeJeune, M.D., is the Chairman of the Department of Fundamental Genetics at the University of Paris. He has done extensive research on Down's Syndrome, and is credited with the discovery of its cause. This article first appeared in the recently-published book *Infanticide and the Handicapped Newborn*, edited by Dennis J. Horan and Melinda Delahoyde (Brigham Young University Press, 1982). It is reprinted here with permission ().

brain. It is with that model that we can attempt to understand what mental retardation is.

Our brain greatly outclasses any actual or foreseeable machine. We have some eleven billion neurons inside our brain interconnected by some eleven trillion contacts called synapses—components in number and complexity of a far greater magnitude than the biggest computer system ever built. If we look at the links in the network of wiring inside our brain, the number is astronomical. If you disentangled all the small neural fibers which intercommunicate between the cells and laid them end to end, they would go from Chicago to Mexico City without difficulty. But if you took the tiny fibers which are inside the cellular process and which constitute the very wiring of the brain and laid *them* end to end, they would go to the moon and possibly back. That gives you an idea of the complexity of this marvelous machine that is working inside our head.

A repairman opening a big computer which does not work is in exactly the same situation as a neurologist examining a mentally retarded child. For example, our repairman could observe easily that a rack of electronics has been burned, and that the machine does not work because part of it has been destroyed. In like manner a neurologist might determine that one of several diseases has caused a progressive destruction of part of the brain—either by an infection, a trauma, or by the hydraulic pressure of hydrocephalia (which laminates the brain)—which has reduced enormously the efficiency of the substratum of the mentally retarded child's intelligence.

Sometimes it is a part of the machine itself which has not been built during embryonic development. Neural tube defects are of utmost importance in understanding this type of mistake. At the beginning of life—around ten days—the first line appears on the embryo showing where the neural tube will grow. Once the tube begins to grow the closing continues in both directions, exactly like a zip system going both up and down. If it does not close at one end, you get spina bifida or meningomyelocele; if it does not close at the other end, you get an aplasia of the cerebellum and eventually anencephaly, that is, an absence of the brain. Anencephalic children cannot survive because they do not have the ability to

regulate themselves since their system has not been built.

Interestingly, climate apparently has a major effect on the incidence of neural tube defects. The disease is rather rare in the south, but it increases as you go north. This is very true in Great Britain, for example. There are many more cases in Scotland than around London. Neural tube defects are very rare in Sicily, but the frequency increases when you come to France, and there is a gradient within that country, increasing as you go north.

The climate-related nature of the disorder is the first characteristic that does not fit what is normal of genetic disease. The second is that there is a very curious familial and sociological distribution of the disease. Low-income parents in a given town have a greater risk of having afflicted children than do the rich. Also, when a mother has an afflicted child, the risk of the next child being afflicted is increased. For example, in Ireland the risk is 0.2 percent for the population as a whole, but if a mother already has a child afflicted with neural tube defect, the risk for the next child is around 5 percent—twenty-five times greater. But what is again very surprising is that if the mother is rich, the risk is lower than 5 percent; if the mother is poor, the risk is greater than 5 percent.

A discovery in England in 1971 further complicates the picture. That year there was harvested a blighted crop of potatoes. Normally, blighted potatoes are given to the pigs, but that year they were sold on the market, and a very curious statistical trend emerged: among the mothers who had children afflicted with neural tube defect that year, many had consumed blighted potatoes, but far fewer mothers of healthy children had eaten the potatoes.[1] It was then believed that it was a poisonous substance causing the defect. Unfortunately it was not; you cannot produce neural tube defect with blighted potatoes. The mystery was growing deeper when it was discovered that when a neural tube does not close, alpha-fetoprotein leaks into the amniotic fluid; from the amniotic fluid it can penetrate the blood of the mother. With a special alpha-fetoprotein kit one can determine the level of that substance in the mother's blood to confirm the suspicion of neural tube defect by examining the amniotic fluid.

In 1976 an enormous and very costly program was begun in England (a program I understand is being considered in the United

States also) to screen every pregnant woman for alpha-fetoprotein. They are now going to be able to screen half of the would-be mothers in England in order to detect if the child has a problem, then kill the baby if he or she is afflicted. But the story does not stop here; it is just beginning.

In 1980 R. W. Smithells from Leeds, England, published the first data about prevention of neural tube defect. From his own research and in light of the discovery in 1968 of Hibbard and Hibbard (who had found that mothers of children affected by neural tube defect had a low level of folic acid in their blood),[2] Smithells concluded that he should treat future mothers with a special diet containing folic acid and a few other vitamins—such treatment to begin, where possible, before conception. Smithells selected two samples of mothers who had previously delivered an afflicted child. Of the two samples, one received the vitamin therapy and the other did not. The outcome was that of the 178 children born from treated mothers, only one was afflicted with neural tube defect. Remember that the risk was 5 percent and that eight or nine afflicted babies were expected. On the other hand, of 260 pregnancies of the untreated mothers there were 13 neural tube defect children—exactly that 5 percent expected.[3]

Smithell's study apparently explains the previously cited epidemiology of the disease. Folic acid is found on the leaf of fresh vegetables. The further north you go, the fewer fresh vegetables are available in winter, and the resulting higher prices of fresh vegetables even further restricts their purchase by the poor. Additionally, the boiling of fresh vegetables, a common cooking method in England, like the canning process, destroys folic acid. Therefore, Smithells's study strongly indicates that the most purely sporadic cases of congenital neural tube defects are due to a preventable abnormality in the metabolism of the folic acid system.[4]

Curiously, even abortionists could have added a stone to this castle. Unwillingly, J. B. Thiersch stumbled over it around twenty-five years ago. Thiersch wanted to induce so-called therapeutic abortions. (By the way, there are no therapeutic abortions because abortion kills the baby virtually 100 percent of the time, and a therapy which kills the patient 100 percent of the time is not a therapy.) He tried to kill the babies by giving the mother amniop-

terine, a very powerful drug which impedes the normal action of the folic acid (amniopterine is classified as an anti-folic acid). He succeeded, but a few of the babies managed one way or another to survive and some of the surviving ones had some type of neural tube defect.[5] Unfortunately, had these results been properly analyzed, research on prevention could have started a quarter of a century earlier. But fighting *against* life is a type of medicine that blindfolds: the relevance of facts, even correctly observed, remains unrecognized.

The second requirement is to prevent short circuitry inside the network. To prevent it, nature folds around the small fibers of all the nerves inside our brain a kind of insulating substance that we call myelin. There is a vast array of diseases in which the building up or breaking down of the molecular components of the myelin is deficient, so that intermediate products which should be transformed into the myelin accumulate in the cell and kill it, producing severe neurological damage. For example, Tay-Sachs disease, which is exceedingly rare (about 20 cases a year in the United States), can produce very severe degeneration of the brain just because the myelin is not perfectly used. We know of many other afflictions, each of them very rare, which are due to this difficulty of handling the insulators inside our brain. There are, for example, Niemann-Pick disease, Gaucher's disease, Krabbe's disease, and metachromatic leukodystrophy.

We know that destruction of the network or trouble with the insulating system cannot explain the vast majority of cases of mental retardation because in most cases there is a brain which is more or less normal, that is, it may have some imperfection but it is basically normal. What happens is that the brain apparently does not run at top speed. It runs, but not at the full speed we expect of it.

The brain runs just the way a computer does; that is, each of the connections is in fact the equivalent of a gate, and as we say in France, "*il faut qu'une porte soit ouverte ou fermée*"—a door must be either open or closed. That is the basis of pure logic: the interdiction against being something and not being it at the same time. When you make a succession of steps in your thoughts, you are obliged to go from one, which is like this, to another, which is like

that and not like any other; logic requires saying yes or no at every step of your reasoning. The binary logic used by computers does the same thing. What is important is the speed with which those little gates can open and close. Very likely, when you just say a word, you travel a few kilometers along the wiring of your brain without knowing it.

The speed with which the transmission is achieved through all those gates is of the utmost importance; we can understand that just by looking at babies. For example, a baby afflicted with Down's syndrome is a little weak, a little hypotonic. His look is also a little weak, a little floppy. It is not very sharp, it has fatigue in it. But what is much more evident is that he cannot close his mouth. When he is very young his mouth is open and his tongue is out most of the time. This is because he cannot go fast enough along his own nervous network. He just does what any traffic agency would do in a big town. When there is a traffic jam—that is, when the speed with which the cars are going through the streets is slow because there are too many cars—there is only one solution: access to some highways must be closed temporarily so that people already on them can go on. When a person is using all the power of his intellect to admire a painting or statue or to listen to wonderful music, he is agape. Because he is using all his power, he has no power left to think about giving an order to the muscle of his mandible to close his mouth. The power to use his brain is limited and he must close down some highways so that he can have enough fluid circulation to concentrate fully on the piece of art.

Every one of us knows that we cannot think at a great speed. For example, when we want to be sure of what we are thinking about, we must go step by step. If we try to go too fast, we cannot follow ourselves. We can accept the fact that we cannot go very fast, but if we try to think of something very slowly and we slow down the path of our minds, suddenly another idea goes through our minds and we lose our train of thought. That is proof that for using our brain we cannot use first gear, second gear, or third gear at will, but rather we must use that speed at which the brain functions best.

There are, of course, significant differences in the particular structures of computers and our brains. One difference is that,

unlike the gates in electric circuitry, it is not an electric current that goes from one cell to the next. At the end of one cell a molecule called the chemical mediator is ejected. When this molecule (acetylocholine, noradrenalin, serotonin, et cetera) comes to the surface of the next cell, it changes the property of that cell, which suddenly becomes able to engulf some special ions; that is, to count them particle by particle.[6] So we have in our brain a kind of geiger counter, but one which is much more efficient than any geiger counter invented so far.

To perform properly, each cell has to give the right molecule to the next cell. This system closely resembles a security key that will go only in one lock and will not be accepted by any other. In our brain each cell is able to emit a special molecule which will be understood only by a given type of cell and not by others. This specificity of molecules makes it possible to identify functional systems within the complicated tangle of networks. These functional systems probably correspond to the major cerebral functions (motor system, pain transmission system, mood regulation, et cetera) and each uses its own personal molecular language. It is this specificity that enables us to understand the pharmacological activity of certain drugs affecting almost exclusively one system or another.

It is clear that the molecular machinery must be extremely precise in order to manufacture the right amount of the mediator molecule—at the right time and in the right place—and to then ensure its disposal or recovery. It is therefore possible that many mental deficiencies (in which there is neither gross anatomical decay nor lesions on the insulating sheaths of the nerves) are the result of problems in supplying the necessary mediators to the proper location.

The Monocarbon Hypothesis. Monocarbons are tiny molecules containing only one atom of carbon; their purpose is to methylate particular molecules (phospholipids). This transmethylation process is as complex as it is crucial. In some development processes every molecule must be methylated three times. For example, in the manufacture of myelin, three monocarbons are used to make one molecule of insulating substance. Another example is the manufacture of the mediator molecules. To make any security key

to open the locks we have to methylate three times. This explains why in every disease in which we find mental retardation due to a blockage that we know chemically, the monocarbon system is not running at a proper speed.

It is clear that monocarbons are the smallest building blocks in the cerebral edifice. They are also the most frequently used and are found in very diverse locations. From this we can arrive at the general hypothesis (the "monocarbon hypothesis") that problems in providing raw material (forerunners of monocarbons), in transporting monocarbons (folic acid cycle), or in the utilization of monocarbons (methyl transfer or transmethylation), may be key factors in mental retardation.[7]

A double argument reinforces this point of view. First, the brain has a kind of folic acid pump—such that the cerebral concentration is always greater (as much as four times greater) than that in the rest of the human body. For example, even in the case of folic acid deficiency the level in the liver falls long before the cerebral reserve is tapped. Second, all diseases which block transformations of folic acid or which block the transport of monocarbons to transmethylation bring on all the formidable neurological syndromes.[8]

This general hypothesis (proposed in 1979 but apparently not accepted because nobody noticed it) seems to fit with the data that have been accumulated since that time. The effect of folic acid on neural tube defects is explained by the fact that during the building of the brain we need a fantastic number of monocarbons in order to build both the insulating system and the special protein inside. If there is suddenly a shortage of folic acid, which is the monocarbon transporter, the brain is shorted the necessary number of such carriers. Evidently, when there are no carriers at all, the brain is not developed—as in the case of full anencephaly.

Disorders caused by chromosomal aberrations are difficult to fit into the monocarbon hypothesis of mental retardation. As a full discussion of chromosomal pathology would be far too voluminous, only one, representative, such disorder will be examined here—trisomy 21, or Down's syndrome.

Occasionally a woman experiences what is known as a translocation; that is, one of her chromosome 21's has been cut in two pieces and one of the pieces has been translocated to another

chromosome. Although she is perfectly normal (the fact that her chromosome 21 is split does not affect her), a child she bears might be afflicted with trisomy 21 because he received not only two normal chromosomes but also the untranslocated piece from the mother. An excess quantity of genetic material produces the disease.

In other cases the mother has one normal 21 but the other 21 has received a part of chromosome 15, and part of chromosome 21 has translocated to chromosome 15. Again, the mother is perfectly normal although she does not have the correct distribution of genes. One of her children would receive a normal 21 and a 15 with an extra piece, so the child is now trisomic, but not for the whole chromosome 21, only for the end part of it. On the other hand, another child of this mother would receive normal 21's and normal 15's, but would also receive the extra piece, from the top of chromosome 21, not the end of it.

In the case of a girl who carries the same translocation as the mother, she is perfectly normal. Perhaps her sister would receive the extra piece of chromosome 21, but the one which is close to the top. She has no Down's syndrome whatsoever, but she has a mild mental deficiency—a very curious one with a little touch of autism.

Families where parent(s) and children both have abnormal 21's are extremely rare, but among the 3,000 cases we are following, even rare events are expected. We can summarize it as follows: When children have an excess of the top part, they do not show Down's syndrome. They are not normal, but they do not have Down's syndrome. When they have too much of the *end* piece they too show no Down's syndrome, but when they are carrying that piece in the middle (designated 9221) they show the full syndrome. The disease is thus related to a tiny part of the chromosome.

We can go deeper than that. We know four functions, four chemical reactions, that are going too fast because of this extra chromosome: Superoxide dismutase (SOD 1), located in zone Q221,[9] is 1.5 times as active in persons afflicted with Down's syndrome[10] as it is in persons not afflicted with the disorder. The same is true for glycinamide ribonucleotide synthetase[11] and possibly for 5-aminolevulinate dyhydratase. A fourth gene is known to be on

chromosome 21: the one which controls the manufacture of a protein sensitive to interferon.[12]

Why should these speeded-up chemical reactions affect intelligence? For example, suppose that the genes are the musicians of an orchestra. Suppose also that when there are, as is normal, two musicians for one position (that is, we have two chromosomes—one from the father and one from the mother), they go at a given speed. But if there are three musicians (like in trisomy 21, where there is one chromosome too many), there is one too many, and they go a little too fast. They don't play louder; they play faster. The result is very interesting because when we compare children who have an excess of a chromosome to children who are missing part of the same chromosome, we find that their morphologies are the opposite of one another. For example, trisomy 21 children have small ears and a flat nose; children who are lacking part of chromosome 21 have a prominent nose and big ears. So, an excess of chromosome gives the opposite effect as that produced by a deficiency of the chromosome. But where intelligence is concerned it does not matter whether there is not enough of a chromosome or too much of it. The result is the same: mental retardation.

Life is a kind of music and genes are a kind of musician. When we look at a morphological trait we are looking at something directed by one gene. Suppose that we have the whole orchestra playing the symphony of life. Suppose further that one musician goes faster than the tempo of the orchestra. If this musician executes a solo, the solo will be changed. Instead of *andante* it will be *presto*. But that will not destroy the symphony; it will just change one of the traits of the symphony. On the other hand, if the musician is not playing at the same speed as the rest of the orchestra at a time when all the instruments are playing together, the result—whether the off-tempo musician is playing too slowly or too quickly—is cacophony. It is what produces the equivalent of mental retardation because the human mind is the most complicated thing that living systems have been able to sustain. There is no other thing in the world as complicated as our brain; for its proper running we obviously need the full interplay of all the elements of our genetic endowment. If something is going too fast or too slow,

the main property of the system, which is the efficiency of the intelligence, is affected.

An analysis of comparative pathology, that is, illnesses in which certain major symptoms resemble some of those of trisomy 21 (hypothyroidism, iminodipeptiduria, Alzheimer's disease, Lesh Nhyan disease, et cetera), or in which the symptoms are the opposite of trisomy 21 (homocystinuria, for example), permits saying that the probability of monocarbon deficiency in trisomy 21 is very great.[13]

Another chromosomal disease, which is *a priori* quite different from trisomy 21, seems to offer an excellent opportunity for research on the role of monocarbons. In this disorder, called Xqfra syndrome, there is a fragile zone of the distal part of the long arm of the X chromosome, hence the name Xqfra. A culture medium low in folic acid very often causes a gap on the X chromosome. But in a culture medium enriched with folic acid or formyltetrahydrofolate, the fragile zone remains unaffected.[14] This discovery was recently confirmed and enlarged upon: adding monocarbon precursors (such as serine and hydroxyproline) to a culture medium low in folic acid can also prevent the appearance of the gap.[15]

Suppose we are dealing with a school; the school is our brain. There are buses to take the children from their homes to school. The children are the monocarbons, the tiny molecules. But the children have to stay in the houses, which are the precursors of monocarbons. It is the monocarbons which can cure the disease. The bus is the folic acid; it transfers the children to the school. If the buses are not in service, the children cannot go from their homes to school. The school is empty. The folic acid has not brought the monocarbons to the brain.

There is another possible disease in which the doors of the home are closed. The buses are running but the children cannot go out of their houses because the doors are closed. In that case the school is again empty. It is not the same disease because there are so many different doors to so many different houses. If you number each of the doors you will find an enormous number of diseases, each apparently entirely different, which prevent the children from going to school. That is what really happens in mental retardation.

Although it seems clear that monocarbon metabolism plays a

significant role in mental retardation, it is too early to say that the results obtained *in vitro* can be applied *in vivo*, that is, that they will lead to a systematic, effective treatment. However, neuropsychological correlations between the utilization of folic acid derivatives and the functioning of the brain have already been found.

But what can we do for the children? The answer to that question cannot be determined until a very long clinical trial has been conducted. All that can be stated safely is that in the few cases in which we have treated trisomy 21 children we have achieved positive results. We have treated these children in a double blind test, giving them serine. Serine is an ordinary amino acid, totally nontoxic, but one that can produce monocarbons. Children whose diets are enriched with serine do slightly better during the next six months than children who receive a placebo.[17] This does not mean that the treatment has been found. It means simply that we can transfer a general hypothesis to clinical investigation to see what the effect is. This is very painstaking and very time consuming. For example, to test three substances normally found in food in very small quantities, 120 children must be tested for one year in order to accurately measure just how much intellectual gain there might be. Still, we hope that this type of research will lead to a cure.

We do not know if the cure will come tomorrow, the next day, next year, in ten years, or in fifty years. And we can do nothing to make time go faster. But we can nevertheless do something.

A man named Liautey wanted to improve the economy in his country and was wondering what he could do. After consultation he decided that the best thing was to plant more date trees because his people so much loved dates there were never enough to meet the demand. But his counselors told him to remember that it takes twenty years before a date tree begins to bear fruit. Liautey said, "Are you really sure it takes twenty years?" When they answered affirmatively, he replied, "Then, we begin today."

NOTES

1. Renwick, "Hypothesis: Anencephaly and Spina Bifida Are Usually Preventable by Avoidance of a Specific but Unidentified Substance Present in Certain Potato Tubers," 26 *British J. Preventive & Soc. Med.* 67 (1972).

2. Hibbard & Hibbard, "Folate Metabolism and Reproduction," 24 *British Med. Bull.*, pp. 10-12 (1968).

3. Smithells, Sheppard, Schoran, et al., "Possible Prevention of Neural-Tube Defects by Periconceptional Vitamin Supplementation," *Lancet*, Feb. 16, 1980, pp. 339-40.

4. The Smithells et al. study has been confirmed in part by Laurence, James, Miller, Tennant, & Campbell in their study, "Double-blind Randomised Controlled Trial of Folate Treatment before Conception to Prevent Recurrence of Neural-Tube Defects," 282 *British Med. J.*, pp. 1509-11 (1981).

5. Thiersch, "Therapeutic abortions with a Folic Acid Atagonist, 4-Aminopteroylglutamic Acid (4-Amino G.P.A.) Administered by the Oral Route," 63 *Am. J. Obstetrics & Gynecology* pp. 1298-1304 (1952 vol. II); Thiersch, "The Control of Reproduction in Rats with the Aid of Antimetabolites; Early Experiences with Antimetabolites as Abortifaciond Agents in Man, Acta Endocrinologica p. 37 (1956 Supp. 28).

6. LeJeune, "Is the Sodium Ionic Channel a Cyclic Hexapeptide?", 22 *Annales De Génétique*, p. 108 (1979).

7. LeJeune, "Biochemical Investigations and Trisomy 21," 22 *Annales De Génétique*, pp. 67-75 (1975) [hereinafter cited as LeJeune, "Biochemical Investigations].

8. Rowe, "Inherited Disorders of Folate Metabolism," in *The Metabolic Basis of Inherited Disease*, p. 430 (4th ed. J. Stanbury, J. Wyngaarden, & D. Frederickson eds., 1978).

9. Sinet, LeJeune, & Jerome, "Trisomy 21 (Down's syndrome): Glutathrone Peroxidase, Hexose Monophosphate Shunt and I.Q.," 24 *Life Sci.* p. 29 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Sinet et al., "Trisomy 21"].

10. Sinet, Allard, LeJeune, & Jerome, "Augmentation d'Activité de la Superoxyde Dismutase E'rthrocytaire dans la Trisomie pour le Chromosome 21," 278 *Comptes Rendus De L'Academie Des Sciences*, p. 3267 (1974).

11. Sinet et al., "Trisomy 21," *supra* note 9, pp. 29-34. See also Moore, Jines, Kao, & Dates, "Synteny between Glycinamide Ribonucleotide Synthetase and Superoxide Dismutase (Soluable)," 29 *Am. J. Human Genetics*, pp. 389, 391 (1979); Bartley & Epstein, "Gene Dosage Effect for Glycinamide Ribonucleotide Synthetase in Human Fibroblasts Trisomic for Chromosome 21," 93 *Biochemistry & Biophysics Research Committee*, p. 1286 (1980).

12. J. Grouchy & C. Turlean, *Clinical Atlas of Human Chromosomes*, pp. 187-209 (1977).

13. LeJeune, "Biochemical Investigations," *supra* note 7, at. 76-75.

14. Sutherland, "Heritable Fragile Sites on Human Chromosomes," 31 *Am. J. Human Genetics*, p. 125 (1979).

15. LeJeune, "Fragile Site X 27 and Metabolism of Monocarbons," 22 *Annales De Génétique,* p. 1075 (1980). Recent research indicates that folic acid administration to patients themselves not only protects the fragile zone of their X chromosome but also seems to improve their mental status. LeJeune, "Fragile Site X 27 and Metabolism of Monocarbons: Significant Decrease of the Frequency of Chromosomal Gaps by Treatment *In Vitro* and *In Vivo,*" 292 *Comptes Rendus De L'Academie Des Sciences* p. 491 (1981).

16. Botez, Botez, Leveille, Bielmann, & Cadotte, "Neuropsychological Correlates of Folic Acid Deficiency: Facts and Hypotheses," in *Folic Acid in Neurology, Psychiatry, and Internal Medicine*, p. 435 (1979).

17. LeJeune, unpublished data.

Christianity and the Scientific Worldview

Thomas Molnar

NOT SO LONG AGO, the fashionable thing in scientific circles was to separate knowledge and religion, facts and values. Knowledge was something positive, religion a subjective choice. Facts were "hard" facts, results arrived at in laboratories or through the astronomer's lens; values were supposed to be personal idiosyncrasies of the researcher, among which a religious worldview was the most damning. Thus Darwin's evolutionary theory was a fact, the biblical propositions about genesis were fiction; infiniteness of the universe in time and space was a fact, a beginning of the universe through the act of an Intelligence was fiction, and so on.

In the last few decades this rigid division has been much mellowed: inquisitive minds are now challenging the "scientific" orthodoxy. Their conclusions have not yet, however, penetrated the consciousness of the general public, nor even the minds of most students *via* college courses. Still, the discipline of the history of science and philosophical speculations about this history now propose a novel view concerning the relationship of the scientist to his science. Men like Alexandre Koyré, Thomas Kuhn, Michael Polanyi, B. J. T. Dobbs, Giorgio de Santillana, Stanley Jaki, Frank Capra, and others have established that the process of scientific discovery takes place in a mental climate consisting of philosophical presuppositions, religious belief, esthetic and moral preferences, the influence of myths, and so on. These factors do not obstruct scientific investigation, on the contrary, they nourish it. At any rate, they are inseparable from the on-going work of probing the universe, the physical as well as the mental.

It should therefore come as no surprise that the intellectual tools brought by Christianity 2,000 years ago to complete, but also to transform, the mental world of Greek science have provided us with the general framework within which modern science has

Thomas Molnar, a prolific author, has recently published *Politics and the State* (Franciscan Herald Press, Chicago, Il). He is currently a visiting professor in religious studies at Yale.

evolved. What follows here will suggest the crucial areas of the fundamental transformation in thinking by which Christianity has decisively influenced our view of science and of the universe to this day.

II

Every day we say and hear things—we call them scientific statements, sensible, matter-of-fact, obvious—that are not really derived from examined evidence, but from mental habits and instilled psychic automatisms. Very often they are derived from ideological indoctrination that is by now so widespread that hardly anybody notices the source or the technique. And when confronted by statements based on premises different from our now-habitual ones, we tend to call those who advance them backward fellows, obscurantists who would "turn back the clock," ignoramuses, full of prejudice.

Among these lines of division to which our modern ideologies have accustomed us, surely the most popular is the one between *science* and *religion*. *Science* is supposed to be certain, promoting mankind's hope; *religion* is supposed to occupy an inferior position, a ghetto, a place where the timid and unthinking withdraw for mental comfort. This general perception is evidenced in the present controversy between the teaching of the "evolutionist" and the "creationist" theory about man's origin, in which the creationists are labeled mystified fools at best, while the incredible non-sequiturs, the fables, and fairy tales of the evolutionists are automatically accepted as pure (even awe-inspiring) scientific data.[1] If you doubt this, try to reverse these appreciations at a Manhattan cocktail party or a college faculty meeting!

But all great scientific discoveries are rooted in a much vaster philosophical and religious worldview.[2] Observation, investigation, experimentation, and the formulation of theories, are directed not only by search for new corroborating or invalidating facts, but also by the scientist's previously established "personal system," so to speak; when scientific theory changes, it does so under the double pressure of observed data *and* another scientist's deeper preferences. Just one illustration: for two thousand years Aristotle's astronomy prevailed in academies, universities, in the workshops of

science, and in the study of philosophers. This astronomy was not only universally accepted, it also worked—it accounted for the observed data—although it was partly based on religious and esthetic postulates: the celestial bodies were supposed to move on circular paths because circular motion was considered the most perfect. But then this world-image was discarded as non-scientific; the rule of Galileo and Newton began, in which the universe was described as infinite. *That* scientific worldview hardly lasted three centuries; Einstein, in ours, has returned us to a quasi-Aristotelian image of a finite, rounded universe in which not only the movement of objects, but also that of light, is circular. Light, said Einstein, goes around the universe, and returns ultimately to its point of departure—just as the earliest circumnavigators of the Earth did, somewhat to their surprise.

I am by no means trying to discredit science, only to show that the man-in-the-street, and the intellectual too, manipulate scientific notions which, in fact, are inseparable from intuition, esthetic imagination, religious thought, and philosophical systems. Yet, they are expected to separate these from the scientific notions, and to regard the former as inferior. My second, more important objective, is to show that it was Christianity which has served, to the largest extent, as the conceptual foundation for science as we have known it in the West. And by Christianity I do not mean some diluted version of it, re-defined to make it look "scientific," but indeed the dogmatic-doctrinal Christian edifice as it has stood for two thousand years.

This issue is surrounded by thick layers of clouds. It is for example assumed by theological writers like Adolf von Harnack and E. R. Goodenough that Christianity took over any rational framework it has "from the Greeks"; others, too many to name, teach that religion presided over the "dark ages," that "the Church lost the battle against Galileo," and other similar stories. Such silly nonsense is so ingrained by several centuries of brainwashing that my students, and many colleagues, are happy with this fairy tale; it protects them from the arduous task of thinking. It also protects them from the critical re-reading of texts, such as the letters that great scientists exchanged, the minutes of academies, the records of ecclesiastical tribunals—or simply the histories of science written

by such scholars as Alexandre Koyré, Giorgio di Santillana, Thomas Kuhn, Stanley Jaki.

II

It is sufficient to take only a few key concepts to establish that in the first centuries Christian doctrine confronted Hellenic theories at points where the latter, although it had achieved stupendous results, was, so to speak, blocking its own progress. It is best to begin with the concept of God.

The Concept of God

Not only for Greek speculation at the height of its efforts, but also for the entire pagan world ("pagan" used here as "non-monotheistic"), the gods were part of the universe which they had fashioned from pre-existing matter or monstrous animals, and which they ruled as "good" forces together with other, "bad" gods. Such gods, "good" and "bad," were personifications of natural powers. They permeated the universe, inseparable from it, friendly or hostile to man, as indeed Nature is. Consequently, the heavens were inhabited by spirits and magical forces, a state of affairs most favorable to mythology and to the assumption of all sorts of occult cross-influences, but not for scientific investigation. It was a most varied heaven, with every new pagan sage free to populate it with further powers and dominations; also, a hierarchically-organized heaven where the chief god on Olympus had under him a whole extended family of lesser gods and goddesses, executors and messengers.

You might object that this picture was that of the masses, and that the philosophers thought otherwise. Yet, they too could go no further than to regard the gods as part of the cosmos, either haughty and indifferent in the enjoyment of their immortality (Epicurus), a kind of distant mathematician (Plato), a "first mover" of all change (Aristotle), or the abstract *One* (Plotinus)—to name the greatest of the Greek philosophers and their concept of god. To be sure, these same penetrating and sublime thinkers also grasped god's incorporeality, but they then equated him with the law of the universe, or, at the other end, with a mysterious inspiration of the soul.

What no pagan thinker assumed is that God is an external and

wholly independent *creator* of the universe, transcendent yet personal. As suggested before, the Greek's greatest speculative effort resulted only in an artist-like god, a fashioner of pre-existing material, a chaos on which he imposed order; thus matter itself was regarded as a counter-force, another god, an opponent, a rival, with its own respective legion of auxiliaries. This is what we call *dualism*, a phenomenon usually accompanied by *polytheism*.

But the Christian monotheistic concept postulates that all power is in God, while nature and man possess only derived powers (so-called secondary causes), and that the universe was caused, and subsequently sustained, by God. The universe, however, is emphatically not divine, as most pagan thinkers (e.g., the Stoics) believed. The consequence for science is that evil as well as good powers vanish from the physical universe, the heavens are depopulated (a loss to mythology, imagination and art) and are replaced by *space*, a new term which suggests that it is homogeneous, ready for man to approach it without fear and to investigate it.

The Idea of Soul

How did the Christian view of the *soul* differ from the Greek view? In the systems of the Greek thinkers, the soul was either an aggregate of very fine, but still material, atoms (Epicurus, Lucretius), or little divine particles which somehow got detached from the divine substance and floated into, or, being punished for their escape, were imprisoned in, man's bodies (Plato). In this case the soul is understood to be an enemy of the body, a divine spark held in bondage by the material principle, the Prince of Darkness. The punishment of the soul is that it becomes individualized through the body in which it now dwells, instead of being delivered back into the divine substance.

The dreadful consequence of such a conception is that the soul animates the human being *not* as an inseparable partner, but as a slave chained to his turning-wheel. In other words, the soul is chastised for its escape from the divine substance, it feels wretched while in the body. Such a soul cannot do anything for man, his "temporary owner"—it constantly aspires to a return to its original, divine condition. It is a stranger ("alienated," in Greek *allogenous*) in the material construct of the body, having no solidarity

with man whose body is its prison. Metempsychosis (transmigration of the soul from one body to another) tried to remedy this situation, but made things only worse: a well-behaving (that is abstemious) soul may leave the body of a lower order (an animal, or a criminal, let's say) for one of a higher order (a sage). But in that case too, man as such is ignored, he is seen as the soul's temporary and despised abode. In short, the pagan conclusion is that man is badly put together; he is a dual being, having a body which is evil because material and a soul which is not his own because it is divine. In other words, the harmony of the *createdness* of body and soul, this monotheistic "invention," is sorely lacking.

Thus it is no wonder that on this point too Christianity advocated the opposite. The soul's origin, in the Christian view, is in the creative act of God, and every soul is endowed with the knowledge of what God means by good and evil, with the ability to follow the former, but with a free will to do or not to do so. Hence, there is no transmigration of the soul, the soul is neither independent of the body, nor is it "in" the body as in a prison, desirous to get out. While life lasts, the union between body and soul is indissoluble. The responsibility is reciprocal; it belongs to the *person.* Contrasted to the pagan sage, the saint makes use of his powers and the grace he receives to promote the spiritual and material well-being of the members of the mystical body, the community of Christians, indeed of all mankind. Where the sage withdraws from the concerns of the world, the saint diffuses his charity in words, acts and prayer. What could be more contrary to the pagan sage's excessive affirmation of the self than St. Augustine's analysis: "The assertion of selfhood involves a danger: man may be led to assume that in his consciousness and activity there is evidence that he embodies a scintilla of the divine essence, the mere possession of which proves the claim to divinity, lifting man above the natural order." His folly may suggest that his limitations are "external," that his unique essence is blocked only by circumstances, society, class-origin, or the like.

The Greek View of Matter

This brings us to the Greek view of *matter*, the opposite of soul and spirit—indeed for the pagan mind, the evil principle—impure,

corrupting, the breeding ground of hostile powers. As we have seen, for this very reason the soul does not cooperate with the material body; it is miserable while incarcerated in this tomb (*sema* in Greek, while body is *soma*—a wordplay much appreciated by those late radical pagans, the Gnostics). Matter is the archenemy, not fashioned by God but by his rival, the Demiurgos; thus matter is a totally opposite, negative principle, forever an adversary, serving Satan and his temptations.

It is perhaps in this area that Christianity revolutionized most thinking in the West with its stupendous proposal of an incarnate God. The thrust of the pagan sage, from the Hindu Brahmans to the Neo-Platonists of the third century A.D., was to rid himself of the impurities of materialness and become increasingly spiritual. The sage indeed defined himself as a quasi-pure spirit developing techniques of controlling the body and thus avoiding suffering for body and mind. Nascent Christianity came as an exalter of the "spirit made of flesh" (the exact reverse of the pagan assumption!), an act of special divine grace for the sake of mankind. Moreover, this spirit made flesh was the central object of worship as a God-man who suffered torments in his flesh, shed tears, felt betrayed, and predicted with an infinite sorrow the destruction of his religion's holy city. In the eyes of pagan philosophers the sage is above such preoccupations. Celsus, the first systematic opponent of Christianity (*circa* 180 A.D.), was categorical on this point: a god descending in person from heaven and taking a human body would upset the orderliness of the universe, so that catastrophe would ensue. This argument was eminently usable against the dogma of incarnation: god becoming man, Celsus wrote, indicates a contradiction because it would involve a diminution, hence a change. But gods are unchangeable. Besides, Celsus argued, how can god assume the body of the lowliest of the low, a man sentenced to the ignominious death of a fugitive slave—to crucifixion?

History or Endless Cycles?

The educated pagan consensus, from Buddhism to Hellenic speculation, was that the gods—insofar as there were such, which Buddhism denied—live in happy indifference, infinitely above men who are mere mortals. Man's lot and the world's structure are bur-

dened with misery. And since the universe is eternal—uncreated, to go on forever, cycles following each other indefinitely—the world always contains more accumulated evil than good, its balance inexorably tipping towards increased misery. As it is impossible for the human mind to deal intelligibly with the concept of eternity, pagan speculation divided it into *cycles* or Great Years; yet, in order to avoid inconsistency, it also postulated the repetitiousness of these cycles, so that in each, eternally, the same things, people and events recur. Again, in Augustine's inimitable style, this is to assume that through countless ages, again and again, Plato sits in the Academy of Athens, teaching the same disciples in the same school, and all of this is destined to be repeated through countless ages of the future. Augustine adds: "God forbid that we should swallow such nonsense. Christ died, once and for all, for our sins."

Augustine's exclamation brings out well the impossibility for Christianity to accept theories of "eternal return" or historical cycles, the center of pagan speculation, as it was similarly impossible for it to adopt the doctrines of migrating souls, evil matter, and other basic pagan presuppositions. The Christian position ultimately depends on how we see God and whether we see him as the creator *ex nihilo*. The pagan saw the gods as gigantic natural forces, limited only by other gods' similarly gigantic force. Even in the most refined version of pagan speculation, in Plato and Plotinus, god is consubstantial with the souls, and he did not create matter which has another maker: an essentially hostile power. The God of Christians is an omnipotent creator (not a mere shaper) who brought forth the universe by his love of *being* (rather than of non-being or nothingness, as in Buddhism), while in the view of radical pagans—the Brahman and the Gnostic—being is evil and its emergence is a flaw. While the Christian God maintains the universe in existence and his human co-creators make prodigious efforts to improve and embellish it, it is incumbent on the pagan sage to promote the annihilation of the universe, and first of all to cause its weakening in himself.

His religion compelled pagan man to adopt fatalism in personal life and history. The cosmic-divine reality above him consisted of incomprehensible forces and determinisms over which he may have had some influence in personal life, mostly through magic tricks,

but, in the unraveling of history, no influence at all. Hence the pessimism of even the greatest Greek historians who did not go essentially beyond the Hindu concept of eternal return. They called it *anakyklosis*, the circular replay of the same drama forever, ending in decline, just as the Cosmos of the Stoics was to end in eternal fire. Such a worldview did not block the great public, political, and empire-building careers of a Pericles, an Alexander, a Caesar—which shows that the pagan wisdom is not in conformity with man's will to live and to act—but it did discourage the view about what such efforts may accomplish in the long run, and it did discredit the meaning of history and of politics.

III

Even though some passages in this brief overview may appear as abstract speculation, it is not difficult to translate them as crucial instances in the process of change from one worldview to another, from pagan to Christian. The Christian worldview, and in its wake the philosophical, historical and scientific endeavors, were by no means servile reformulations of Greek concepts, as it is still fashionable to argue; the Christian dogmatics engendered an altogether new conceptual framework, inside which and as a consequence of which, science could thrive. It is not difficult to understand why a creator God "cleaned up" the universe for the enterprise of fearless (of gods, spirits and powers) investigators, for the scientific mentality. And the other dogmas and teachings of Christianity have had a similarly positive impact on man's mind and on the development of western science, scholarship, and political endeavor, to mention only three areas.

The Impact on Morality

The proposition that God is the transcendent creator of the "world-all" has the most far-reaching consequences, not only for science, but also for morality. In the pagan view, good and evil are both embodied by a god; it is their duel which decides the triumph of good or evil, whether man turns this way or that. Thus man is not responsible for his own actions. When Christianity concentrated all goodness in God, one may say that only evil remained for man. Yet, the human person is free, only his own choices commit him, and they commit him radically. From St. Augustine to

Kierkegaard, the drama that pagan thinkers had imagined between warring gods has been placed inside man's soul. If the removal of mythological wars and games have impoverished artistic and literary imagination (soon replenished by Christian themes), much was gained by the morally-sharpened conflict of good and evil in the soul, and by the concept of moral, and thus also legal, responsibility.[3]

When Christianity rehabilitated matter from the philosophical status of impurity, it also relieved the enterprises and ambitions connected with matter from the state of ignominy. Because God assumed material shape, work was no longer linked to slavery, and technical inventions were no longer regarded as serving merely the playful divertissements of the wealthy; they became the occasion for manufacture and industry,[4] and in general for a civilization more harmoniously balanced between its material and spiritual components, expressed some centuries later in St. Benedict's *laborare est orare* ("to work is to pray").

The Meaning of Life

Nevertheless, pagan wisdom postulated, from Hinduism to Pythagoras (6th century B.C.) and Plotinus (3rd century A.D.) that life is a place of exile and that man is an inconsequential, generally wretched and harmful, particle of the whole. He must tend toward the reintegration of this whole whose noble immobility and cold indifference he had disturbed when he came into existence and became an individual. The impersonal Supreme Substance of the pagan worldview was regarded as robbed when man became even a semi-independent being, and is satisfied only when the particle returns to the original substance. This is what the pagan sage considered deliverance from the misery of existence: a traceless absorption in Nothingness (the Hindu) or in the *One* (Plotinus).

How different is the Christian outlook! The personal God created in joy; He is satisfied with His creation. As its crowning, He created man, to His own image, that is conscious, free, a full-valued co-creator, with his own autonomous tasks. Man's is not a borrowed existence, a grudgingly consented consciousness. Nor does he use life and knowledge for tearful lamentation, for deliverance from his misery. Man does *his* work, and remains in dialogue

with God. At the end of his life, his *having been* and having marked the world by his presence and handiwork are not abolished, his soul is immortal and he will resurrect with his body. In other words, over against pagan pessimism both at birth and death, there are Christian joy and gratefulness for creation, and, after death, the direct vision of God. Let us emphasize it: *not* extinction, nor fusion with the world substance, but *heightened* consciousness, and praise of God (Dante's *Paradiso*).

The Christian worldview thus rehabilitated, over against the combined view of paganism, all the great ultimates that give meaning to life. The person, his freedom, his moral accountability, the independence of his created soul, the essential goodness of the material universe, knowledge, science, the meaningfulness of history and of participation in politics—all these have become positive things. Man has it in his power to corrupt each, from politics to soul, but he knows that this very act of corruption is the fruit of a free decision, thus reversible. Whoever speaks of science and the Christian religion as two contradictory domains in which religion is, if a partner at all, an inferior one, simply has no knowledge of the truth as he could find it in history, philosophy, and the study of science. In spite of our immense debt to, and legitimate admiration for, Greek thought (in all areas from astronomy to politics), it would be foolish to deny that Christianity both as religion and philosophy broke with Greek premises and thus liberated both knowledge and imagination from fatally-paralyzing roadblocks and dead-end streets. The Christian owes it to himself to state that, without Christian dogmas and doctrines, the modern world and its science would simply *not be.*

IV

The title of this short essay implies the juxtaposition of religion and science; thus it may surprise the reader that the second term is not here discussed in detail: astronomy, physics, biology, geology, and other branches. Beyond the fact that a detailed discussion of astronomy, physics, biology, or the other branches would be beyond the author's competence, our point is something else: to make it clear that science itself, today a sacred cow, depends on the quality of the general philosophical, religious and moral climate in

which it is conceived, undergoes variations, and approaches—forever only approaches—the knowledge and description of reality. The enterprise of scientists is not an independent activity. It bears the stamp of its time, and of other-than-scientific preoccupations. Thus for science to reach (or even reach for) its conclusions, it is essential that it ask: What image of God do we have? What is our concept of time? What meaning do we attribute to life, to ethics, to spirit and matter? All of this we call a worldview. And our contention here is, simply, that the successive scientific worldviews for the past 1500 years or more have been products not only of "detached" observation and experimentation, but also—and mainly—of the Christian worldview, which has caused scientists to reformulate both the questions they ask, and the answers they seek.

NOTES

1 Consider just two of the gratuitous assumptions in which partisans of evolutionism believe in as articles of faith: the transformations took place in an enormous amount of time—but a maximum of half a million years, allegedly the existence of man, is simply not enough to account for all these transformations. Granted the variations were gradual; but then each new variation was so minimal that it could not adapt the subject any better to his environment (supposedly the objective of the transformation), in fact it could debilitate him just as well in the struggle for survival.

2. "Not only epistemological considerations, also religious and moral values were present at the birth of the new Cosmology [of the twentieth century], as well as at the origin of relativistic cosmology also." Jacques Merleau-Ponty, *Cosmologie du XXe siècle*, 1965, p. 115. The book exists in an English translation also.

3. We are struck by the extreme scarcity of Greek and Roman expressions of such feelings as charity, indignation at the mistreatment of slaves, or ordinary pity. We read a rare statement in Seneca's *Letters to Lucilius* about his disgust with the gory spectacle at the circus which he left one day at mid-time.

4. When for example a man in Emperor Tiberius's time invented a clearer transparent glass, he did not think of starting a manufacturing plant, but took his invention to the emperor. The latter asked him if he had spoken to anyone about it. No, the man answered. Thereupon Tiberius had him beheaded so that the "secret" would not spread.

Secular Saints

Frank Zepezauer

THE SPEED ASTONISHED us. Young people entered college, learned new ways to see the universe and, it seemed, within a week laughed off the antique faith of their parents. Struck like Saul by a bolt equally powerful, they stopped, they renounced, they converted. Within another week they joined a crusade to lay waste their spiritual homeland.

We know the story well, have puzzled over it for a decade trying to distinguish it from other stories of youthful rebellion. We'd had warnings from a young William Buckley and others of a counterculture forming on college campuses, anti-theistic yet quasi-religious, universal in reach, ambitious and self-assured in purpose. Even so it seemed no more than the normal rumblings of campus politics. Then it exploded, and we haven't been the same since.

For all its noise it made spiritual conquests silently. On the devoutly tolerant campus no one pulled newcomers into revival tents, or dropped leaflets on lunch trays, or wrenched the talk toward ultimate belief. The secularist missionaries of the counterculture didn't have to. All they needed was an attitude—as ever-present as denim pants—that their creed was "where it was at," and where it was going, and where it had to be. Because this attitude claimed its gravitational center in science, it could foster the illusion that no matter how far out their opinions reached and no matter how much feeling propelled them, and no matter how much they rebelled against reason itself, secularists remained fixed in a logical orbit. Thus the feminists among them got away with the biggest scam of the decade. They persuaded an indulgent public that their jerry-built ideology and emotional appeal nevertheless connected them with the party of reason and progress. When they pushed "reproductive freedom," they could dramatize their cause as a war between the open and closed mind.

Frank Zepezauer is a teacher at Menlo-Atherton High School in Atherton, California. He is the co-author of some dozen books in an English textbook series, and has written for such journals as *National Review, The Educational Digest,* and *Commentary.*

The secularists of the counterculture took this attitude to such extremes that many of us have been provoked to fight what it has brought about. Yet its power to generate rapid conversions among the young still lies in the unspoken assumption that it offers the definitive description of reality. Many forces have built that assumption over the past century, none more influential than modernist literature which has helped secularism define its moral center.

Literature works mythically, on the feelings and imagination, and in these regions of the American psyche a new hero has been emerging, a good guy, a solid citizen, a home-spun American. In earlier guises he accepted the religion of the preachers but didn't think much about it. Religion helped in some ways, and the women liked it. But as this American explored new geographical and cultural terrain, he moved away from old-style religion and began to chafe at its obsolete demands. He soon believed he grasped the facts of existence more firmly than bible-waving clergymen. Eventually he built a moral vision based on personal experience. He now has an image as potent as a cowboy or an astronaut. I call him the secular saint, and I have seen him appear in a number of widely-used public high school literature texts where he quietly helps shape the secularist attitude that now permeates our colleges.

The name "secular saint" first came to me when I was reading, with a class of high school juniors, *Inherit the Wind*, the play based on the Scopes trial, pitting fundamentalist William Jennings Bryan against agnostic Clarence Darrow. In the terms of the play, it's a mismatch between a lightweight and a heavyweight. Bryan's biblical literalism makes it easy for Darrow to trap him. As he loses ground to his free-thinking antagonist, Bryan gives way to sarcasm: "Is it possible that something is holy to the celebrated agnostic?" Darrow responds with an impromptu sermon:

> Yes! The individual human mind. In a child's power to master the multiplication table there is more sanctity than in all your shouted "Amens," "Holy Holies," and "Hosannahs!" An idea is a greater monument than a cathedral. And the advance of man's knowledge is more a miracle than any stick turned to snakes . . .

It's all there—individualism, rationalism, empiricism, progres-

sivism—the whole secularist creed delivered by a shirt-sleeved, red-suspendered, down-country champion of common sense, a saint who is secular. But what about Bryan? Wasn't he in his own way a saint, deeply religious, steadfast in his faith, always ready to defend it? Well, yes, but he was also, you see, a pompous fool. And at the end of his encounter with Darrow, we see him whimpering to his wife, "They're laughing at me, mother!" In the audience they're also laughing at his old style religion.

Darrow's triumph over Bryan is so complete that he can later mediate between the apparent extremes of biblical literalism and atheism. To a smart-aleck newspaperman who ridicules the fallen fundamentalist Darrow says that Bryan "got lost . . . because he was looking for God too high up and too far away," suggesting in the process where we might more profitably search for God, and where we might find a guide better equipped to lead us. He also makes the ultimate tolerant gesture of the play: at his final departure from the courtroom he first picks up Darwin's *Origin of Species*, then the *Bible*, debates silently which to take, and then takes both.

This symbolic gesture supposedly softens the attack on traditional religion. But the play's total effect leaves no compromise. Bryan the buffoon and Darrow the saint stand too sharply contrasted to produce a balanced impression, particularly when the rest of the fundamentalists in the play appear as fire-and-brimstone fanatics. *Inherit the Wind* thus melodramatically confronts religion at one of its worst moments against secularism at one of its best. It is the secular saint, after all, who directs us to the reality principle, reaffirms its moral code, opens our eyes to the truth. The religious people, sophisticated or not, fair minded or not, are simply out of touch. That's part of the deep message reaching the high school student, the feeling that a good-guy secularist like Darrow is at the core of our values.

What's wrong with that? High school kids could do worse for heroes, and both bible literalism and "scientific creationism" are tough to defend. Yet something kept bothering me about this play. There was, for example, the question as to whether it does justice to the complexities of the Scopes trial. I remember Joseph Sobran saying that secularists have controlled the "mythology" of the

event, portraying it as a contest between tolerance and repression, prompting the idea that not only a politically-ambitious sect but religion in general confronted its more realistic successor that summer in Tennessee. There was also my growing conviction that stories like *Inherit the Wind* did not work alone in the high school literature curriculum, but joined others to build a modernist universe where religious fools and scoundrels seemed always to be fighting a losing battle against secular saints.

Thus when I looked at another frequently used highschool text, *The Crucible* by Arthur Miller, I saw a re-iterated assumption. As with *Inherit the Wind*, Miller's play focuses on one of religion's great embarrassments, the Salem witch trials. The incident spawned its own mythology in which the religion that helped lay our intellectual foundations became forever linked with hysteria and superstition. In Miller's hands the mythology serves not only to dramatize his war against McCarthyism but also to preach his secularist faith. In fact, to amplify his underlying message, he added commentaries to the paperback edition of the play (the one most often used in high schools). In these he describes a world divided by two absolutes, the first a discredited "diabolism" which centers in the "invisible" world and generates all sorts of mischief like witch hunts and McCarthyist smear campaigns, the other an up-to-date "concept of unity" in which positive and negative are attributes of the same force, and good and evil are relative. The playwright assures us that such break-through ideas are entertained only by physical scientists and the "few who have grasped the history of ideas." People like Arthur Miller, for example.

His play thus sorts out religious scoundrels and secular saints very neatly. Its feet-on-the-ground hero, John Proctor, always sees clearly what clergymen can only see through theological fog. And what a scruffy bunch these men of God turn out to be! The doctrinal rigidity of the Puritan judges blinds them to the lunacy dancing before them. The local pastor, one of literature's arch villains, knows the truth yet supports the witch hunt out of cowardice and vindictiveness. The most sympathetic among them (a minister called in as an authority on witchcraft) flip-flops intellectually, is slow to discover the truth and then ineffective in making it bear on events. Thus, in *The Crucible*, among the ministers of the gospel,

the worst embrace the play's central evil. The best discover the truth too late, and fade into irrelevance, leaving it to the secular saint to straighten things out. And the highschool student absorbs still another lesson about religion's role in our society.

Sometimes the lesson comes at him directly in open attacks against religion. That happens, for example, in *Black Boy* and *Native Son* by Richard Wright, two of the first books by a Black writer to reach a large multi-racial audience and to serve as texts in highschool literature classes. In the autobiographical *Black Boy*, Wright reports a miserable experience with religion, full of hell-fire imagery, doctrinal bickering, and psychological manipulation. The scenes strike the reader vividly: Granny taking Richard to all-night prayer meetings, an obtuse country Black boy mouthing religious slogans, a decision for Christ wrung from him through social pressure. Wright concludes: "Wherever I found religion in my life I found strife, the attempt of one individual or group to rule another in the name of God."

He also claimed that he discovered in himself the means to resist, which turn out to be the secularist touchstones of reality: "I felt that I had in me a sense of living as deep as that which the church was trying to give me . . . my faith was welded to the common realities of life, anchored in the sensations of my body and what my mind could grasp. Nothing could shake that faith and surely not my fear of an invisible power."

This faith in the authenticity of experiences is united with his conviction that religion buttressed racial oppression. Such ideas provided an essential theme in his fictional work *Native Son*, his story of a young south Chicago Black who, in a spasm of fear, kills a white girl. He runs from an outraged white society back into the ghetto, where he intensely relives the Black experience, part of which consisted of submission to an emasculating religious life. At one point, while taking refuge in an empty apartment, he hears voices from a choir floating over to him from a neighboring church. "He tried not to listen, but it seeped into his feelings . . . It was his mother's world, humble, contrite, believing. It had a center, a core, an axis, a heart, which he needed but could never have unless he laid his head upon a pillow of humility and gave up his hope for living in this world."

But Bigger, the young ghetto Black, like Richard Wright himself, found the way to break loose, first through a Marxism which seemed to offer a plausible explanation of the racial question, then through a crude existentialism that located meaning in the individual. Just prior to his execution Bigger cries out: "What I killed for *I am.*" To the secular saint, which Bigger had become, there is no God but private experience.

Native Son returns us to another of Christianity's great embarrassments, the fact that the faith of Jesus Christ could condone slavery and Jim Crow racism. On this issue and also in the character of its heroes, the novel shares common ground with *Huckleberry Finn* and *Catcher in the Rye*, both of them familiar in high-school literature programs and in the self-image of America's young people. Huck Finn was one of the first secular saints, establishing a pattern which was to reappear frequently into the next century. For, by dramatizing our greatest embarrassment, he delivered our greatest self-condemnation—that we are a society of hypocrites, that duplicity lies at the core of our national character and our religious sensibility. It apparently took a barefoot son of nature to tell us that, and we would have thereafter precocious moralists opening our eyes in every decade to post-pubertal evil. Holden Caulfield was one of the most recent, and his spirit permeated the sixties, where on every campus clear-eyed innocence confronted sophisticated iniquity.

The prophets of the sixties had other antecedents, few as influential as the early novels of John Steinbeck, which nearly always show up on highschool reading lists. In fact, the entire countercultural text could be drawn from one book, *The Grapes of Wrath*, where peasants and vagabonds take us with them to a culminating vision of the good society. It doesn't include old-fashioned religion unless the oppressive churches undertake the changes Steinbeck has in mind for them. In his fictional world the churches are almost beyond hope, feeding the ego of the upper classes, preaching obsolete doctrine, muddling our natural instincts with fussy abstractions. In *Grapes of Wrath*, for example, the secular saint, Jim Casey, begins his journey toward the truth the day he *leaves* the ministry. His early meditations reveal the fallacy in the idea of private sin: "There ain't no sin and there ain't no virtue. There's

just stuff people do." He moves from there to an amiable pantheism: "Maybe all men got one big soul everybody's a part of." From there he goes on to develop a social gospel which he preaches to his first convert, Tom Joad. He will make more converts among the readers of the novel who will savage middle-class proprieties while retaining middle-class privileges; stereo-set ascetics and sports-car revolutionaries waging righteous war against hypocrisy.

So the pattern grows and reinforces itself, building assumptions about who we are and how we relate to the cosmos, expressed ever more assertively with a secular voice. It comes through again sharply in the "cold, clear" vision of Hemingway, whose superlative prose style—terse, steady, concrete, like astronauts reporting from outer space—creates in the reader the impression that what he sees through the narrator's eyes is all there is to see and that what he absorbs is not an opinion about reality but reality itself. In the more advanced highschool classes students will encounter this style in *A Farewell to Arms*, a kind of *Bildungs Roman* whose hero struggles away from outmoded but still attractive religious beliefs, and the absurdities of a hollow universe, to arrive at a tight-lipped stoicism. He has looked outward and inward with almost empirical rigor and has seen . . . nothing, no salvation in connecting with any world beyond the human family, no salvation in our larger social arrangements, or in abstract ideals, only the possibility of a "separate peace" forged by discipline, skill, courage, and love. It is the ultimate secularist vision, offering an attractive, if demanding, response to its chilling implications.

Why would I then object? Doesn't *Farewell to Arms* and the other stories I've cited do what good stories are supposed to do: open our eyes, energize our feelings, reshape the images in our consciousness, challenge our unspoken assumptions? Wouldn't the same hold true for those I haven't mentioned, those for example by Stephen Crane, Jack London, James Joyce, Henrik Ibsen, Ken Kesey, Kurt Vonnegot, and others, many others? Don't they deserve a place in the highschool curriculum? Many are part of the modern classical canon. A greater worry is that they might *not* appear in the highschool classroom, giving way instead to bowdlerized pot-boilers adapted to below-average reading skills.

Why then object? First of all, because of the impression they

build of organized religion. Whether they attack religion to improve it or destroy it, collectively they deliver the message that the faith preserved in traditional churches no longer connects with the real world, nor plays any significant role in present day society. For all their worship of fact, they do not then tell the truth about religion in America. There's no denying that Puritans made fools of themselves at Salem; that fundamentalists blundered at the Scopes trial; that a Christian nation bought and sold slaves, or that spoiled priests and ministers shamed their faith. These things happened, but that's only part of what happened, and a partial truth is a distortion.

I also object because such books help build secular hubris, affirming repeatedly that there is now only one road toward the truth, and that secularists hold the only road map. These books do not, of course, act alone. All sorts of influences work on young people: peer groups, an increasingly-politicized pop culture, a secularist news media. But books, particularly those used as texts in the classroom, exert their own special kind of power. They are often provided by a formal institution secularist itself in spirit, assigned by authoritative agents of the community, studied and analyzed and written about, revered as instruments of our culture.

This battery of influences creates in the teen-ager the notion that their world divides into the closed religious mind and the open secularist mind. I recently asked some gifted highschool seniors to write intellectual autobiographies. The church-affiliated students asserted their convictions as if they had somehow capitulated, giving up the life of reason to acquiesce to a set of received doctrines. Some felt they had to insist that, in spite of their Christianity, they remained individuals with minds of their own. The budding agnostics on the other hand spoke confidently about their freedom . . . it was their basic word. Yet it was the religious students who had the greater freedom because they recognized their options. They at least recognized a tension between their own beliefs and the prevailing beliefs in the larger society; they were able to look at one and then at the other, and make comparisons. The young agnostics believed, however, that they did not believe. They were so saturated by a secularist culture that they fancied themselves free of the *kind* of conditioning mechanisms that supposedly ensnared their

religious classmates. I found the same self-deception operating when I studied feminism's rapid take-over of the public education establishment. Feminists had managed to convince themselves and just about everyone else that they had transcended partisanship and spoke instead for all women existing in a kind of universal Platonic idea.

What should we do about the continuing influence of these secularist books in highschool classrooms? Restrict their use? That would only create more problems. Balance their use with pro-religious stories, or with stories that at least showed clergymen capable of passing a fourth-grade reading test, and staying out of jail? Yes, if we can find good ones (and if we can stay within the non-sectarian guidelines of pluralistic public school systems). Take the kids out of public schools? Yes, if you demand that your religion shape your child's education.

But I don't think many of us want to go that far. We may want to re-invigorate the Judeo-Christian ethic, and we may have some luck in our efforts, but I don't think we want to "christianize" the public schools back to the days of the 19th century Protestant hegemony. I do believe we should want to establish the religious version of the secular pieties, equality, and freedom of choice. With regard to choices about religion, we should at least want our highschool graduates to recognize that they now face two competing ontologies, one affirming a God-centered universe, the other denying it; that men of good will and surpassing intelligence have embraced one view or the other; that accepting either position provokes risk and challenge and the frustration of profound mystery; that the choice finally is between one world view and another, not between Clarence Darrow reason and William Jennings Bryan superstition.

In any event, religious parents should want to know, in an image-conscious era, that in the public schools the story of religion will not be told by the village atheist.

The Age of Entitlement

Ellen Wilson

A FRIEND OF MINE teaches in what is reputed to be a better than average law school. The students, for the most part, are graduates of better than average colleges; they are mostly middle class, they are ambitious for a comfortable income, but they are dauntingly unambitious about the work done to achieve that income.

They are not spectacularly indolent, nor do they live lives of wild abandon. They dully contrived to fulfill past educational requirements, as they dully endeavor to fulfill today's. Their "good faith" effort strikes them as a sufficient exchange for good grades and a parting recommendation. Ideas of educational cause and effect—the notion that the law is a trade to be learned, and if it is not learned, one should be denied the Good Housekeeping seal—seem foreign to them. They are astounded by the suggestion that someone who attended classes and opened an exam blue book might fail.

Many lessons might be drawn from my friend's students, but the one that interests me—because I have seen it elsewhere—is the lost principle of educational cause and effect. Other ages have had lazy or stupid or imaginationless students, but I wonder how many have had so many passably intelligent students unaccustomed to the idea of academic accomplishment. In most cultures, barbaric or civilized, initiations are preceded by times of trial. For many of today's youngsters, initiations seem to be preceded merely by the passage of time and the avoidance of offense (the exception being school sports). Once upon a time this would be evidence that an institution had become corrupt; today, there are few incorrupt institutions to show the schools up.

There aren't, in fact, many places to become apprenticed to responsibility nowadays. The decline of the schools is shocking not because the schools are alone in their decline, but because theirs is a crucial surrender to the free-ride ideal. Before, one studied or one

Ellen Wilson, our long-time contributing editor, is now a member of the editorial staff of the *Wall Street Journal.*

was born a genius, and one got good grades. Barring favoritism and other evidences of our fallen nature, it was as simple as that. Education might be followed by a bureaucratic soft chair, but many graduates were independent enough or intellectually curious enough or self-respecting enough to work hard for a goal.

Today independence, curiosity, entrepreneurial drive are neither unpracticed nor unknown; but they are largely untaught. And it is a fallacy to believe that these cannot be taught or at least encouraged, since we see it is possible to smother or discourage them.

How did this situation arise? Largely, it seems, from that seedbed of sweeping principles, the sixties. It is a side-effect of the battle against privilege, exclusivity, discriminations of all kinds. As the decade wore on, less and less was required of people because fewer things were regarded as under our control, and fewer standards accepted as "objective," non-discriminatory.

So elementary schools began passing illiterates up the line, for was it the child's fault if he were culturally or psychologically disadvantaged, unable to satisfy white middle-class demands? So high schools began allowing students to take all sorts of electives in place of a set curriculum, for how could the teacher say that a preference for Drivers Ed. or the sociology of revolution was less "valid" than a preference for physics or French? So colleges let their students wander through course listings without guides, and cut out class requirements and inflated grades, for who could say what branches of knowledge were necessary for the good life, or the well-informed mind, or the pursuit of wisdom, or—whatever it was the colleges were supposed to be touting, as they played den mother to the nation's adolescents.

This stress on non-discrimination and non-exclusivity originated in good and morally necessary concerns. Background or skin color or other social and professional handicaps should certainly not have interfered with the achievements of the talented, or with the opportunity to achieve, even of the untalented. Problems arose when the means—opportunity—became the end. The opportunity to become this or that was transformed into the assurance that one would indeed become this or that. A combination of guilt, overoptimism and unconscious lying allowed a silly and self-conscious generation to practice gross self-deception. And (to borrow the

catch-phrase) is it the kids' fault if by now they are stunned to find that graduation from college or professional school may be contingent on real learning?

The sixties and seventies controversy over private voluntary organizations shows the strength of the age's bias toward entitlement rather than earning. From the country club closed to blacks or Jews or Catholics to McSorley's tavern closed to females to an upper-crust men's club closed to just about everybody—all discriminating institutions felt the undifferentiated wrath of the non-exclusivist. And of course all would, given the broad and sweeping simplicity of the non-exclusivist ideal. Unfortunately, it is a theory that submerges all differences and cuts short attempts at non-invidious discrimination. The non-exclusivist treats alike the segregated Southern bus, the anxious and unlovable social climbing of a country club set, the sociology of the Irish bar, and the professional and social concordances of a private club. Whether or not all of these are horrible things, they are very different things. But the world-view of the entitlement-holder does not permit him to think so, or to treat them differently. A single-sex college, an all-black college, disturb him whether or not the victim groups attending them freely chose them over other alternatives, for these exceptions frustrate the universality of his principle.

In the sixties and seventies the churches too came in for this kind of attack, being, in the minds of outsiders (and some insiders) clubs for the spiritual-minded. Church members who quarreled with their churches on matters of faith and morals were treated by many outsiders and some insiders like Soviet dissidents or Southern freedom-riders. The idea that one should *qualify* for membership by first establishing one's theological common ground with co-religionists was anathema to people who felt that one should be "entitled" to join just about any private voluntary association one chose.

Hence the dilemma of Mormon women torn by their church's doctrine on women was discussed and presented, by journalists, academics and political activists, as a simple case of victimhood. This falsified and cheapened the real issue, although some of these Mormon women and their families themselves adopted the falsification.The real issue was religious belief; these women were resist-

ing a doctrine they could not accept, and traditionally in such cases the church member eventually accepts the troublesome doctrine, in whatever troubled fashion, or renounces his faith. The non-exclusivists transformed a spiritual agony into a secular sex-discrimination case. They would not recognize that membership is "earned" and thus defined by acceptance of a common creed. The old-time apostate would have known that.

In the Catholic Church, the issue of a woman priesthood was also treated as a sex-discrimination case by non-exclusivists. If it weren't for separation of church and state, no doubt N.O.W. would have initiated a class action suit against the "repressive" male hierarchy. For are not women equally entitled to say words over a wafer of bread or pronounce absolution to a sinner?

The response of anyone who understands what a religion is, is no. Just as one becomes a member of the church by baptism, which one cannot "deserve" or be entitled to, so one becomes a priest not by his own choice, but by God's.

The non-exclusivist may argue that whatever believers *say* about these religious questions, in reality traditional Western religion assumes and fosters illiberal, sexist and discriminatory attitudes. That may or may not be true in individual cases, but like the private club, it is irrelevant to the issue of membership. One "achieves" church membership by belief (and one is not entitled to that either, traditional teaching tells us); one assents to a creed and attempts to conform to a moral code. If someone cannot or will not assent, if he refuses even to try assent, whether for good reasons or bad, he cannot qualify as a member. A church that paid no attention to orthodoxy would be a spiritual supermarket.

Take the case of another of those sixties to early seventies focuses of attack, the fraternity. We can deplore the snobbishness, occasional sadism and social cruelty that many fraternities and sororities are susceptible to without advocating open admissions or a lottery system as a solution. Fraternities are by definition exclusive, but that does not help us discriminate good ones from bad; it only isolates their moral weak point. Friendships, after all, are equally exclusive. So are marriages (which reminds me that open marriage and couple-swapping also entered public debate in the sixties); so is falling in love.

None of these are things we deserve or are entitled to; the problems of a loner or a social misfit are not solved by destroying all forms of membership or, what is the same thing, by forcing groups to accept all comers. And this is true even though many "exclusionary rules" have selfish or cruel or immoral purposes. That is because there are selfish and cruel and immoral people, and temptations to cruelty even in good people.

Rebuking associations for having admission standards or criteria of membership demonstrates either a scepticism about the reality of these standards or denial of their relevance. The argument of irrelevance makes more sense, since it varies from situation to situation. Intelligence is relevant in a school, irrelevant in a beauty pageant and marginally relevant in many other kinds of human relations. Goodness is not always relevant for academic or professional qualifications, but is highly relevant for friendship or guardianship.

But the non-exclusivist who pleads irrelevance explains away a relevance that really exists. At school he will say that poor background or lack of intelligence or irresponsibility are not necessarily relevant to grades or promotions: what *is* relevant is the child's need to remain with his peer group, his need for a supportive atmosphere, his need not to be held back in the future by the lack of a diploma.

"Marking on a curve" might seem the very pattern of exclusivism, since it divides students into separate categories of performance. But the spread of this practice in the past 15 years actually weakened educators' convictions about what schools were supposed to be doing to students—and what they should be demanding. For the curve substituted a shifting comparison among students for the measuring of each student against a fixed standard. Students could see that if better students did less well, worse students could relax efforts and still maintain the same ranking. If it were all relative anyway (teachers and students must sometimes have thought), perhaps it made no sense to require a student to achieve a certain passing grade, since a grade only announced his performance in relation to the top student.

Elsewhere grading systems collapsed completely, for if the mastering of a testable body of knowledge or set of skills was not the

object of education, then all that remained was an untestable, undiscoverable goal of personal fulfillment. Of course, the mid-70's marked a return to an interest in grades and indexes, but in the intervening years something had been lost. Grades are now invoked more as charms than as evidences of achievement. Good grades from a first-class school still usually mean more than similar grades from a third or fourth-class school, but the reason seems to lie in the selection of potential successes rather than in the spotting of actual ones.

And the students' means of achieving such grades differs somewhat too. Of course, many students have always tried to slide by—doing less work than the teacher required, selectively reading assignments, trying to present a second-rate paper as a first-rate product. The difference is that some students—even intelligent and in some respects conscientious ones—now believe that these efforts *ought* to reap them good grades. The display of basic intelligence and polite behavior (defined as turning in a nicely-typed paper of required length, or filling two blue books in an exam) do really seem to them all that a teacher should ask of his students. Any more would be—discriminatory. Any more would mean that not all could do well or even pass. Any more would be exclusivist.

I should emphasize that these are not the congenitally lazy or duplicitous or shiftless student subgroups of times past. These are people willing to turn up fairly frequently in class (or appear regularly at a job), people who will look over a reading, occasionally risk a remark in class, but who are no longer comfortable with the idea of acquiring a body of testable knowledge or exhibiting a set of skills in order to pass, let alone excel in a course of study. Some are not even familiar with the idea. Equally foreign or at least disconcerting is the concept of certification. That someone should take his high school diploma as evidence of a knowledge of grammar, reading, elementary algebra and the like—seems imprudent and perhaps presumptuous. That being the case, why not hand out diplomas like school rings—one to every warm body?

This kind of attitude, strong even in some "good" students, is likely to collide with more demanding expectations in schools and places of employment for some time to come. But the fallout in other areas of life is upsetting too. For if those traditionally strenu-

ous areas of life no longer seem to demand so much, then think of what people may feel entitled to *outside* the classroom or office.

We are no longer surprised when many loving relationships and even marriages fall apart because one party or both suffer hard times, great pressures or disappointments. Perhaps we do not see clearly enough that a number of these breakups are due solely to these "hard times"; often there is no suggestion that "love failed," or was too tepid. It was simply that "I couldn't go through any more" or "It was all getting too much for me." The film "Kramer vs. Kramer" captured this perfectly: husband and wife both loving their little boy with (the film suggests) an equal love, although "everything got too much" for the wife.

There are tragic cases where this is literally true—where someone lacks the psychological and emotional strength to endure the great pain or pressure he is confronted with. The burgeoning number of modern breakups, however, signals something different, and I think many of today's couples would admit that. Normally the husband or wife is not facing a nervous breakdown or bordering on child abuse. Instead, both parties have undergone difficulties and feel they have reached a reasonable limit. They are like the undergraduate who stays up all night to finish a typed fifteen-page paper complete with footnotes, and doesn't see why anything might be lacking in his performance. Given acceptable behavior and a "good faith" effort, isn't he entitled to success?

And so there are married couples and long-term lovers who likewise ask: Isn't our fondness and concern and capping of toothpaste and doing of dishes enough? What more could be expected? These couples see happy marriages, happy relationships primarily as an entitlement rather than as an achievement and a living-up-to objective standards.

Once again, it isn't a matter of laziness or insensitivity, but of expectations. Some disciples of the entitlement principle endure more than some holders of the achievement principle before breaking down or throwing in the towel. Often these two kinds of people are hard to distinguish in normal circumstances, and I suppose there is a lot of traffic back and forth between them. Finally, there are those special cases of insanity or extraordinary thresholds of pain. But the couple who believe a good marriage is largely earned

will recognize that they have failed if they separate. The entitlement-holders will think they have been assigned an unreasonable taskmaster.

APPENDIX A

[*The following article first appeared in the Washington* Post *on Sunday, December 19, 1982. It is reprinted here with the permission of the* Post, *and the blessings of the author. Professor Arkes is the Cromwell professor of jurisprudence at Amherst College, and is currently a visiting professor at Georgetown University. (© 1982 The Washington Post Co.)*]

Abortion: The Court Wasn't Persuasive

Hadley Arkes

Where does sedition lurk these days in the minds of Americans? Justice Harry Blackmun knows: behind every effort to restrain the practice of abortion, he sees the willful refusal to concede that when the Supreme Court has spoken, the final, authoritative word has been said on the meaning of the Constitution. And so Blackmun loosed his terrible swift sword on the solicitor general very recently, during an argument before the court over the laws on abortion.

The justice asked Rex Lee whether the administration was requesting the court, in effect, to overrule *Roe* v. *Wade*, the decision that made abortions legal for virtually any reason, at any stage of the pregnancy. When Lee denied that the administration was seeking that change just yet, Blackmun replied with sarcasm that "it seems to me . . . you are asking that or you're asking that we overrule *Marbury* v. *Madison*."

It is apparently a long while since Justice Blackmun has studied *Marbury* v. *Madison*, or he has absorbed now the fable that has been fashioned mainly by judges: that the case that established the authority of the court to interpret the Constitution also established the court as the *sole*, authoritative interpreter of the Constitution. In this superstition he is joined by most judges.

And yet, that understanding was not shared by the Founders, and it found no expression in the Constitution they framed. Nor was that understanding ever set forth by Chief Justice Marshall in his classic opinion in *Marbury* v. *Madison*. In later years, the supporters of the *Dred Scott* decision claimed that the court must be sovereign in settling the meaning of the Constitution. But that argument was rejected officially, decisively, by the Lincoln administration with reasoning—and precedent—that we could not wish to overturn, even today.

In *Marbury* v. *Madison*, Marshall had to confront a case in which a

statute passed by Congress came into conflict with an explicit provision of the Constitution. If the court failed to give precedence to the Constitution, then it would implicitly lower the Constitution to the plane of an ordinary statute, which could be altered and superseded by any piece of subsequent legislation. But if the Constitution had to be regarded as "fundamental law," then it had to follow, as Marshall said, that "those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each."

This "judicial duty," as Marshall described it, was modestly drawn: Marshall simply recognized that the court had an obligation to be governed by the Constitution as it sought to settle the particular case that was submitted for its judgment. In that sense, nothing was claimed for the judges that could not be claimed for other officers of the government: presidents and congressmen would also be obliged to consider whether their decisions were compatible with the text or the principles of the Constitution.

Such, at any rate, was the understanding of Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson, and, without that traditional understanding, it would be hard to grasp Lincoln's resistance to the *Dred Scott* decision. In that infamous case, the court "established" that blacks could not have the standing of citizens to sue in the courts, and that no man could be deprived of his property in slaves, even if he brought that property into the territories in which slavery had been forbidden by Congress.

In respecting the processes of law, Lincoln was willing to respect the disposition made by the court in settling the fate of Dred Scott in this case. But he and his party would "oppose that decision as a political rule which shall be binding on the . . . members of Congress or the President to favor no measure that does not actually concur with the principles of that decision."

Lincoln was willing, that is, to accept the judgment of the case as it bore on the conflict between two litigants. What he was not obliged to accept was the *principle* or the broader rule of law that the court was trying to create in the case. As Alexander Hamilton once remarked, the court had neither the power of the sword nor of the purse; its authority would ultimately depend on the force of its reasoned argument. In that spirit, Lincoln insisted that other officers of the government could not be obliged to accept any new "law" created by the court unless they, too, were persuaded by the force of the court's reasoning.

The Lincoln administration came to discover very quickly just how far

the executive branch had been willing to apply the principle of the *Dred Scott* decision. In two notable cases arising from Boston, a black student had been denied a passport to study in France and a black inventor had been denied a patent on a new invention. Since the court had decided, in *Dred Scott*, that blacks were not citizens, the local agents of the federal government now reasoned that blacks could not carry the passports of American citizens and they could not receive patents under the laws of United States.

The Lincoln administration reversed both decisions. The attorney general announced that the administration would be guided by its own understanding: that free blacks born in the United States were citizens of the United States. A year later Lincoln would sign new legislation that banned slavery from the territories of the United States—as the president affirmed, again, that in the decisions which came under his hand he would not be bound by the "principles" declared by the court in the *Dred Scott* case.

And yet, in the understanding that now dominates the federal courts, these moves of the Lincoln administration would be regarded as unconstitutional. They would be defensible only on the understanding held by Lincoln and the Founders about the separation of powers and the responsibility of each branch to interpret the Constitution. But when Congress and the state legislatures seek, in our own day, to restrict the practice of abortion, their efforts are instantly branded as unconstitutional if they seem to be acting on the premise that abortion is wrong. Since the Supreme Court "established," in *Roe* v. *Wade*, that abortion is a legitimate medical procedure, it is assumed now that it is impermissible for Congress or the states to legislate upon any other premise. To do that would be treason to *Roe* v. *Wade*, and in the temper of Justice Blackmun, treason to *Roe* v. *Wade* is treason to the Constitution itself.

But if Blackmun persistently faces, on the matter of abortion, an opposition that will not be stilled, it is precisely because the court has not passed the test proposed by Hamilton: 10 years after *Roe* v. *Wade*, people of serious reflection have simply not found compelling or persuasive the reasons offered by the court. A majority of women remain convinced that life begins at conception, that the offspring of Homo sapiens cannot be anything other than human from its very beginning, and that the matter cannot be, as Blackmun suggested, an inscrutable religious question.

In the spirit of Lincoln, legislators in Congress and the states are claiming their right to honor their own judgments in the matters that come before them; and in the spirit of the separation of powers—the

spirit of shared powers and reasoned exchange—they would urge the court to take a sober second look at what it has done and consider the possibility that it might have been mistaken.

APPENDIX B

[*The following column first ran in the August-September, 1982, issue of* The Sciences, *which is published by the New York Academy of Sciences. Dr. Louis Lasagna, a regular columnist for the publication, is in the department of pharmacology and toxicology at the University of Rochester School of Medicine. The column is reprinted here with permission (©1982 by the New York Academy of Sciences).*]

Murder Most Foul

Louis Lasagna

On June 28, 1980, a baby with Down's syndrome was born at an English hospital. Leonard Arthur, a senior consultant pediatrician, examined the infant in the presence of its understandably distressed parents, who rejected the child. Arthur then wrote a note in the hospital chart: "Parents do not wish it to survive. Nursing care only." The baby died sixty-nine hours later, and after seven months Arthur was charged with its murder. This shocking case, and the shameful role played by some of Britain's most distinguished physicians, are described in various issues of the *British Medical Journal* [November 14 and 28 and December 5, and 19-26, 1981] and the *Lancet* [November 14, 1981 and January 2, 1982].

The meaning of "nursing care only" was significant; in that hospital, apparently, its interpretation was "no food." But Arthur's involvement did not end with his note; he also prescribed a large dose of dihydrocodeine, a morphine-like drug whose side effects include the suppression of appetite and respiration, "to alleviate distress as and when it arose." (One *BMJ* correspondent asked pointedly, "Is there a single pediatrician in this country who would administer dihydrocodeine in doses of 5 mg as a sedative to his own new-born baby? . . . The neonate with uncomplicated Down's syndrome has no suffering or pain whatsoever.") At autopsy, the blood levels of the drug were twice the average fatal level for adults, a finding most easily explained by a clocklike administration of doses, regardless of clinical state, by a nursing staff who, at the very least, read between the lines of Arthur's order.

A shameful bit of legal flim-flam occurred in regard to the autopsy findings. At Arthur's trial, Alan Usher, a pathologist-consultant to the government, who acted as a witness for the prosecution, testified that the child had died of pneumonia resulting from lung congestion (such as one

might expect from an overdose of a respiratory depressant) and that, aside from Down's syndrome, there was no other abnormality.

The defense rebutted with its own pathologist, J. L. Emery, who had participated in the autopsy with Usher. After studying tissue sections, Emery testified that the baby had "calcification of the brain, fibroelastosis of the heart, and congenital abnormalities of the lung." (None of these had been known prior to death.) The presiding court officer, Justice Farquharson, promptly directed that the charge of murder be withdrawn in favor of attempted murder because the prosecution's case had been "conceived in ignorance." Said the judge: "It is a prospect one views with some alarm that expert evidence can be given . . . in a charge of murder which turns out to be incomplete and inaccurate."

But *was* Usher "innaccurate"? In a letter to the *BMJ*, Usher states that the "defects" newly introduced as evidence were trivial, of a sort often seen in infants postmortem, and in his opinion unrelated to the fate of a child poisoned with drugs and deprived of both nourishment and antibiotics.

The way in which the new evidence was obtained and presented was particularly appalling. The slides were made by the defense without the knowledge of the prosecution, and not shown to Usher until he was in the witness box testifying. Emery was in fact expressly forbidden to talk to Usher, who was given only a short time during a lunch break to examine the slides before cross-examination. One cannot imagine a scenario less likely to come up with the truth. Usher himself complained of these "distasteful legal maneuvers": "Those who trust in secrecy . . . have little faith in the justice of their cause."

The jury needed only two hours to return a verdict of not guilty—understandable when one considers the conduct of the trial and the testimony of witnesses. Both the prosecutor and the judge accepted Arthur's motives as humanitarian, "of the highest order." A parade of eminent physicians testified that Arthur's treatment of the baby "had fallen well within generally accepted norms of medical practice." A *Lancet* editorial called Arthur "a pediatrician of conspicuous integrity . . . with compassion and courage." Even Usher, despite his objections to the conduct of the trial, joined "in the general rejoicing that this skilled and caring physician was acquitted." (One recalls Mark Antony at Caesar's funeral: "For Brutus is an honorable man; so are they all, all honorable men.")

The lack of logic and legal rigor in the Arthur case is amazing, in view of English statute and legal precedent. In English law, human life is sacred, so that while you may without peril watch a child drown if you have no responsibility toward it, if you do have a responsibility and you

fail to feed the child or call in a doctor for essential treatment, you are legally liable. In 1893 a woman was convicted of manslaughter for failing to feed or fetch medical aid for an elderly aunt who was dying of gangrene; the precedent still stands.

English law also recognizes that a baby, even before the umbilical cord is severed, is an indepedent being, with its own rights, *regardless of its parents' wishes.* In the present case, the parents' wish that their handicapped baby not survive is irrelevant; this is illustrated by a recent case in which a baby was made a ward of an English court, which authorized an operation to remove an otherwise fatal intestinal obstruction.

Fortunately for British honor, the Arthur acquittal was not universally popular. Kenneth Roche, on behalf of the Guild of Catholic Doctors, wrote, "Human life can be ended by neglect just as much as by action. . . . allowing people to die as a result of deliberate neglect is just as wrong morally as actively killing them."

Another correspondent protested that the *BMJ*'s reference to a "policy of selection on the basis of likely prognosis" had a "sinister evocative ring. . . . How can anyone . . . prophesy what sort of quality of life a handicapped child will lead? . . . I can think of many people whose quality of life and . . . prognosis is much worse than a baby with Down's syndrome. . . . Giving a drug to relieve discomfort to a child you have decided not to treat or feed may not be criminal. Deliberate starvation of a patient most certainly is." (In April, 1982, this problem surfaced in Bloomington, Indiana, when another Down's baby died after his parents—and the courts—denied him food, water, and medical care.)

As the father of a twenty year old with Down's syndrome, I find it incredible that there are British experts whose appreciation of the capacities of Down's children is about forty years out of date. My son Christopher, like most Down's children I know, is a delightful, functional, sentient person who feels joy, sadness, love, satisfaction, and frustration as keenly as his normal siblings. He is, to be sure, "different"—in physical appearance, in capacity for scholarly pursuits, and in his congenital inability to hate. I cannot believe that he, or the world, would have been better off if his pediatrician had written a death sentence for him in the doctor's order book on the day of his birth.

The tragedy of the Arthur case goes far beyond the death of an innocent child. Its implications for the ethical fabric of British medicine and law are chilling.

J'accuse.

APPENDIX C

[We reprint the following from the Washington Post *of March 2, 1983, with permission of that paper and the author. Jeremiah A. Denton, Jr., is a Republican senator from Alabama, and chairman of the subcommittee on aging, family and human services.]*

Parents Ought to Know

Jeremiah A. Denton, Jr.

> **Notice to Taxpayers:** A portion of your tax dollars will be used to make sex counseling and prescription birth control drugs and devices available to your minor children at no cost and without your knowledge. This is the only notice you will receive.

How would parents react if they found that notice on their income tax forms? It is an entirely accurate statement of prevailing federal laws, regulations and practice. Parents are simply not told when big government counsels and equips their children for sex.

At long last, in 1981, Congress did mandate that federally funded "family planning" programs "to the extent possible . . . shall encourage family participation" in the provision of contraceptives to minors.

Accordingly, on Jan. 26, 1983, the Department of Health and Human Services took a small step toward involving the parents by issuing a regulation requiring that parents be notified within 10 days after their minor child receives prescription contraceptives from a federally funded clinic. This regulation is a sensible step to chip away at the "Berlin Wall," as then HHS secretary Richard Schweicker characterized it, that government has erected between parents and their children.

In attacking the regulation, the "family planning industry" and many newspapers claim, without credible evidence, that informing the parents will increase the number of adolescent pregnancies and abortions. The "industry" accepts the increasing rate of teen-age sexual activity as unalterable if not desirable. It conveniently ignores the fact that, ever since the federal government got involved, virtually every problem that the family planning formula of counselors and contraceptive service providers is supposed to prevent has grown much worse:

- Teen-age pregnancy rates continue to rise; abortion among teen-agers has skyrocketed.

- Increasing millions find themselves exposed to and victimized by venereal diseases such as herpes.
- Increasing numbers of illegitimate children are handicapped in their early lives as their unwed mothers face the difficult problems of raising children alone.
- Social costs escalate as single mothers join the welfare ranks and poorly reared children grow into problem citizens.

That sex is beautiful, joyful and powerful is not at issue here. No one opposes teen-agers' receiving information to help them place it in perspective. Indeed, parents have a special right and duty to provide such information, a duty shared by the clergy and physicians.

What is at issue is the role the federal government has been playing in facilitating and encouraging adolescent sexual activity without parental knowledge or participation. Millions of parents angrily resent the violation of their right to know what is said and given to their children by the government through entities like Planned Parenthood.

Moreover, the "family planning" industry downplays the health risks for teen-age girls using prescription contraceptives. Clinics provide the pill and intrauterine devices with insufficient regard for the potential harm to the bodies of the recipients.

Articles in The Post itself have described the dangers of prescription birth control drugs and devices. For example:

"According to a number of scientists familiar with research on oral contraceptives, there is no longer any doubt that the pill's side effects include potentially fatal diseases: heart attacks, strokes, blood clots, brain hemorrhages. Its relation to cancer is confusing. . . . It will be years before its real impact is known" [Feb. 15, 1981].

"A leading pathologist [Dr. Prabodh K. Gupta, Johns Hopkins School of Medicine] says, "There is no safe IUD and urges the nearly 3 million women using them to find another form of contraceptive because they cause infertility and life-threatening infections" [March 4, 1981].

Yet children as young as 13 years old, and perhaps younger, are expected to decide without the help of any responsible adult—except, of course, the "family planning professional"—whether to use those dangerous drugs and devices.

Research has shown that, when adolescents communicate with their parents about sex and sexuality, they are more likely to postpone sexual activity. Those who are sexually active after talking with their parents are far more likely to use contraceptives consistently and carefully. The fact is that the increase in premarital adolescent pregnancy is only the most obvious symptom of a deeper societal problem, a dramatic increase in

illicit and ill-advised sexual activity among very young teen-age boys and girls.

A government policy that continues to wink at such activity, using tax-payer dollars to pay for contraception for any adolescent who solicits it and withholding that information from parents, fails to pay even token respect to the overall emotional and physical health of the child, to the values of the family, and, most important, to the rights and duties of parents.

APPENDIX D

[The following syndicated newspaper column was issued on March 5 of this year, and is reprinted here with permission (© 1983 by the Universal Press Syndicate).]

Who's Squealing Now?

Wm. F. Buckley Jr.

The furor over the squeal law appears endless. In part, of course, the controversy has been prolonged by the curious decision of a federal court to the effect that the same Congress that desires to diminish teen-age pregnancy cannot logically endorse a protocol (advising the girl's parents that she has put in for birth control information) the effect of which might be to frustrate Congress' objective. The reasoning here is that the more information you distribute to teen-age girls about how to conceive a baby, the fewer babies there will be.

Unhappily, not much attention, in disputes which are fundamentally ideological, is ever given to available data. The country in the world in which the access is easiest to birth control information is Sweden, where the number of bastard births is highest. The profusion of information about cigarette smoking and cancer is not seriously affecting the rate of addiction. As for alcohol, which is probably the single greatest threat to individual health and productivity, the same country that gave us Gulag as a means of controlling its people can't seem to figure out how to keep those people away from booze. The good news, recently got out by a gentleman whose hammerlock on Soviet data never ceases to amaze, is that the tax on vodka in the Soviet Union is proving sufficient to generate revenues to finance the entire military establishment. Our lawmakers should perhaps cope with the budget deficit by inducing more drunkenness. They could be encouraged to give the public an example by their own conduct, except that one would not know the difference.

Beyond the failure of the birth controllers to establish a causal relation, a few other points ought to be stressed.

The first of these is that teen-age sex is most usefully thought of as a drug. That is to say, sex gives pleasure, as drugs give pleasure; and sex is somewhere between a habituate and an addiction, which is true of many drugs. Alcohol, which is a drug of sorts, is innocently consumed in moderation, and the point is therefore to instruct potential victims on where

the point of moderation lies. The analogous question in sex is to instruct those who are unaware or uncaring of the implication of wanton sex of its limitations. Just as the drug taker who overdoes it can damage himself physically, so the human animal who looks on sex merely as one of the smorgasbord of pleasures available to the pleasure-seeker needs to be instructed in the discipline of sensible self-limitation. The 15-year-old girl who has had no instruction at all in the subject is really quite helpless, particularly inasmuch as the routine inducements are to libertinism, rather than to self-restraint, even as you will find more advertisements to buy this or that alcoholic drink than you will find warnings against buying it. What happens, then, is that the 15-year-old girl runs a number of risks. One is that of finding herself, though unprepared, pregnant. Other risks include diseases and emotional derangements. Insufficient attention, it seems to me, is paid to the question of whether the male (or female) animal whose sex life is undisciplined is happier than his/her complement. I see no evidence that this is so.

Acordingly, since most of the instruction in sex discipline issues from parents—and issues from them more often indirectly than directly—it would seem sensible to pass along to the parents information about a child's misgovernance. This would appear to be a point especially relevant given that the question of sexual activity is significantly informed by matters that deal with right and wrong, which is the dominion of religion. One is constantly surprised that those who oppose any religion in the schools, usually giving as a reason that religion is a matter for the home, are almost uniformly opposed to parental authority being exercised at home in matters that pertain to religion.

The Voice of America is in a tizzy over what kind of rock lyrics should be countenanced, and poor Mr. Scott, the director of programming, is discovering that if you rule out rock songs that are an invitation to round-the-clock sex, you pretty well rule out rock music. The measure of civilized activity, then, is equilibrium. And equilibrium in sex (as in most other matters) is informed by empirical studies (too much booze equals alcoholism), and by codes of behavior (thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife), which are informed primarily by religion. So that the lesson of the day is that parents ought to know when their children are falling into habits that could wreck their lives, and those of others.

APPENDIX E

[*The following column by George F. Will originally appeared in the February 28, 1983 issue of* Newsweek *magazine. (* ©*1983 by Newsweek, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission.)*]

Teen-agers and Birth Control

George F. Will

Victoria Will is two years old and perfect. That is, she is perfectly like a two-year-old, which means she has the executive disposition of Lady MacBeth:

Me: "What is your name?"

She: "No!"

That word will stand her in good stead in about 15 years. Until then I live in blissful ignorance of the special tribulations of a parent of an adolescent daughter. But as a citizen as well as a father, I favor the Department of Health and Human Services' rule requiring federally funded birth-control clinics to notify parents whose daughters 17 or under are receiving prescription contraceptive drugs or devices.

Opponents call this the "squeal rule," implying that it is dishonorable for the government to codify the fact that parents have an interest in knowing of a minor daughter's receipt of prescription materials related to sexual activity. Notice, the rule does not require parental permission. A child may need parental consent even to take a school trip to the zoo, but the HHS rule requires only parental notification, and only after prescriptions have been filled.

Civil Liberty: A civil liberty, correctly understood, is a liberty central to the functioning of a democracy. The American Civil Liberties Union evidently thinks it is a civil liberty for children to be given federally subsidized contraceptive measures and counsel, in secret. In response to an ACLU suit, a judge has blocked implementation of the rule, arguing that it would lead to an increase in teen-age pregnancy and thus constitute "blatant disregard" for Congress's intent in supporting family-planning clinics. Arguing against the rule in another court, a lawyer said it would cause 33,000 such pregnancies annually. Amazing, how folks can know these things.

It is devilishly difficult to prove cause-and-effect relationships between social policies and social changes. But this is clear: the problem of teen-

age pregnancy has grown as contraceptives and sex education have become increasingly available. I am not saying the availability caused the growth. But it would be rash to say the availability is irrelevant. And many of those who today are predicting with such certitude awful results from the HHS rule predicted that teen-age pregnancies would decline as contraception and sex education became more available.

Supporters of the rule note that prescription birth-control measures can have serious side effects. Opponents reply that pregnancy is more dangerous than contraception, especially to adolescents. That is true, but hardly an answer to this argument: in a society where most schools will not give a child an aspirin without parental consent, parents have the minimal right to be notified after a minor daughter has received a drug related to sexual activity. Besides, adolescents have a third choice between contraception and pregnancy. It is continence.

Opponents of the rule say it constitutes governmental intrusion into family relationships. But surely the government subverts family relationships when it subsidizes 5,000 clinics that purvey to children medical treatment and counsel on morally important matters, and do so without informing those who have legal, financial and moral responsibility for children—parents.

Opponents say that if parents are told that their minor daughters are on the Pill, some daughters will be deterred from seeking contraceptives, but will be no less sexually active. This is true. But the law that the HHS rule implements does not say that all values shall be sacrificed to the single aim of reducing pregnancy. Indeed, the law stipulates that subsidized clinics must "encourage," to the extent practical, "family participation." Again, the HHS rule does not require parental participation. It does not, for example, require that parents accompany the child to the clinic. It does not even require that contraceptive drugs or devices be withheld until parents are notified. It requires only that parents receive after-the-fact information that parents can act on as they please. It is hard to imagine a more minimal compliance with Congress's mandate to "encourage" parental participation. The rule is just an executive-branch attempt to balance the various values Congress affirmed.

It has provoked a disproportionate response. The New York *Times* has editorialized against the rule at least six times, denouncing it as "cruel." The *Times* says the rule would increase bureaucracy, which in this case the *Times* is against. The *Times* says the rule is an example of intrusive government, which in this case the *Times* is against. (Force busing? Fine. Parental notification of drugs prescribed for unemancipated minors? Too intrusive.) Why such uproar over a halfhearted rule that barely consti-

tutes compliance with Congress's unexceptionable affirmation of parental involvement? Perhaps the decay of liberalism into a doctrine of "liberation" has led to this idea: even children must be "liberated," even from parental knowledge of even their sexual activities. Perhaps the extreme individualism of today's liberalism finds "repressive" even restraints associated with a collectivity as basic as the family.

The Rule: Many opponents of the rule seem to think that realism consists of accepting as irreversible the recent increase in teen-age promiscuity. (Be honest, readers: how many of you think the value-laden word "promiscuous" is illiberal?) Granted, governments can do nothing to make teen-agers less sexually ardent. And when traditional mores are dissolving as fast as ours are, trying to arrest the dissolution with a law is like trying to lasso a locomotive with a thread. However, policy need not passively reflect and accommodate itself to every change, however destructive. It need not regard social change as a process that is or ought to be entirely autonomous, utterly immune to the influence of judicious interventions. The HHS rule is such an intervention.

Law should express society's core values, such as parental responsibility. If HHS's mild rule is declared incompatible with public policy, what, for goodness' sake, is that policy? What values does it affirm, or subvert by neglect? HHS's rule at least does not express complacent acceptance of the inevitability of today's rate of teen-age sexual activity. Obviously the trend is against sexual restraint. But as has been said, a trend is not a destiny.

APPENDIX F

[*The following column was first published in the Charleston, South Carolina* News and Courier *on March 27 of this year, and is reprinted here with permission. Mr. Paul Cole Beach is a political scientist specializing in problems of ethics and public policy.*]

The New Mentors of Youth?

Paul Cole Beach

"Most kids are very liberal here, a lot of sex with a lot of guys," the schoolgirl explained with a note of pride. "Being aware of all these contraceptive methods means, well why not? What could be wrong about that?"

While the attitude of this New York high school student is typical of many teenagers today, it is not a view widely shared by parents.

Since the problem of teenage pregnancy started to attract serious attention in 1978, several major polls have indicated that 66% of Americans disapprove of sexual relations among adolescents, 70% believe easy access to contraceptives has led to more teenage promiscuity, and 79% are not in favor of "sex education" by the state except with express parental consent.

Most people still put great importance on the family, and the "sexual revolution" among youth has met with growing skepticism. Many parents, as critic William V. Shannon points out, are saying "too much, too soon."

Since the public is not sympathetic to the "new sophistication," it is not surprising that attorneys for the ACLU, Planned Parenthood, and state health agencies moved quickly to block the Reagan administration from lifting the policy of "confidentiality" shrouding federal programs of birth control for teenagers.

Although seeking a permanent injunction in New York federal court against the "squeal rule" caused a momentary furor, it may have avoided a far more damaging exposé of the full extent of official involvement with the population control movement in activity undermining the authority of the home, a potentially explosive issue politically.

Many parents seem to have little more than an intimation of the fact that a potent bloc of interest groups has been drawn to what economist

George Gilder calls the fashionable business of "making sexual liberation ring on the cash registers of revolution."

Most of the political clout and intellectual legitimacy for the "modernization of sex," in scholar Paul Robinson's phrase, stems from the support of an influential array of allies in the media, medicine, education, the social service bureaucracy, pharmaceutical corporations, the "sex industry," and over 4,700 clinics performing abortions or sterilizations in American society.

More than 37 national organizations, indeed, budget a minimum of $298.1 million a year to promote the reduction of what the *Washington Post* once described as "socially undesirable" births among the poor, minorities, and youth. Much of that money comes from taxes.

Spending $1 billion for "family planning" projects under Title X of the U.S. Public Health Service Act alone since 1970, the federal government has long backed the supplying of contraceptives to teenagers and made it a top priority in 1978.

While this program has faced mounting criticism on Capitol Hill for waste and mismanagement costing almost $40 million a year, Congress was effectively lobbied by Rep. Henry Waxman (D-California), chairman of the House subcommittee on health, and a consortium of population control groups to approve a controversial $230 million Title X appropriation for 1982 which slated $130 million in matching funds to subsidize 5,125 "family planning" clinics across the country.

Serving 3.8 million people annually, these clinics provide "sex counseling" and prescription contraceptives to 1.5 million teenagers. Many of these "clients" are recruited by school and "peer counselors," and 615,000 of them under the age of 17 are given the pill, the IUD, and diaphragms without parental knowledge or consent regardless of possible medical side-effects (the pill alone accounts for 47% of "reproductive" deaths nationally).

Similar efforts are aimed at boys even though girls are the primary target of clinics. Sending bright red condoms inside "love carefully" valentine cards in 1978, for instance, Planned Parenthood also financed a "rubber disco" in the nation's capitol last year as part of "a symposium on male sexuality" with a $161,000 Title X grant. "The height [sic] of this fabulous dance," the promos said, "will culminate with a condom-blowing contest . . ."

Started on the pretext of curbing adolescent pregnancy and hailed as a "stunning success" in congressional budget testimony in 1981 by Faye Wattleton, the head of Planned Parenthood, this program has actually proved a dismal failure.

APPENDIX F

"More teenagers are using contraceptives and doing so more consistently than ever before," noted a Planned Parenthood report in 1980, "but the number and rate of premarital adolescent pregnancies continues to rise." Since this approach was begun, in fact, it has more than doubled to 700,000 a year, leading to an equally staggering increase of 240,000 out-of-wedlock births and 460,000 abortions annually.

Countenancing a lack of self-restraint, this costly experiment has not only produced a 50% rise in the frequency of intercourse by teenagers going to clinics, but has helped to double the number of children engaging in premarital sex. With the high rate of "contraceptive failure" among teenagers, the effect is predictable.

After a study of California's showcase program of sex education and birth control, for example, Dr. Jacquelin Kasun, an economist at Humboldt University, found that "for every extra million dollars spent by the Office of Family Planning, almost 2,000 additional teenage pregnancies occur in this state"—a sharp contrast to Utah's 8% reduction in illegitmate births and 13% decline in abortions in 1981 to those under 18 following the passage of a statute requiring the notification and consent of parents.

Moreover, Utah cut the teenage clientele of birth control clinics by over 59%. It may have done so, in effect, by making parents aware of the troubling assertion of Dr. Rhoda Lorand, a New York clinical psychologist, that "one dimensional people, devoid of an understanding of the nature of love and the fusion of civilized sexuality with the tender emotions, have become the new mentors of youth."

APPENDIX G

[*We reprint here—for the fourth time in this review—the complete text of an editorial first published in* California Medicine, *the official journal of the California Medical Association (Vol. 113, No. 3) in September, 1970—several years before* Roe *v.* Wade. *It remains probably the single most-quoted document in the abortion/euthanasia debate; President Reagan quotes from it in our lead article, and we reprint it here for the benifit of those readers who have not actually read the original, or who would like to do so again.*]

"Eroding the Old Ethic . . ."

The traditional Western ethic has always placed great emphasis on the intrinsic worth and equal value of every human life regardless of its stage or condition. This ethic has had the blessing of the Judeo-Christian heritage and has been the basis for most of our laws and much of our social policy. The reverence for each and every human life has also been a keystone of Western medicine and is the ethic which has caused physicians to try to preserve, protect, repair, prolong, and enhance every human life which comes under their surveillance. This traditional ethic is still clearly dominant, but there is much to suggest that it is being eroded at its core and may eventually even be abandoned. This of course will produce profound changes in Western medicine and in Western society.

There are certain new facts and social realities which are becoming recognized, are widely discussed in Western society and seem certain to undermine and transform this traditional ethic. They have come into being and into focus as the social by-products of unprecedented technologic progress and achievement. Of particular importance are, first, the demographic data of human population expansion which tends to proceed uncontrolled and at a geometric rate of progression; second, an ever growing ecological disaparity between the numbers of people and the resources available to support these numbers in the manner to which they are or would like to become accustomed; and third, and perhaps most important, a quite new social emphasis on something which is beginning to be called the quality of life, a something which becomes possible for the first time in human history because of scientific and technologic development. These are now being seen by a growing segment of the public as realities which are within the power of humans to control and there is quite evidently an increasing determination to do this.

What is not yet so clearly perceived is that in order to bring this about

hard choices will have to be made with respect to what is to be preserved and strengthened and what is not, and that this will of necessity violate and ultimately destroy the traditional Western ethic with all that this portends. It will become necessary and acceptable to place relative rather than absolute values on such things as human lives, the use of scarce resources and the various elements which are to make up the quality of life or living which is to be sought. This is quite distinctly at variance with the Judeo-Christian ethic and carries serious philosophical, social, economic, and political implications for Western society and perhaps for world society.

The process of eroding the old ethic and substituting the new has already begun. It may be seen most clearly in changing attitudes toward human abortion. In defiance of the long held Western ethic of intrinsic and equal value for every human life regardless of its stage, condition, or status, abortion is becoming accepted by society as moral, right and even necessary. It is worth noting that this shift in public attitude has affected the churches, the laws, and public policy rather than the reverse. Since the old ethic has not yet been fully displaced it has been necessary to separate the idea of abortion from the idea of killing, which continues to be socially abhorrent. The result has been a curious avoidance of the scientific fact, which everyone really knows, that human life begins at conception and is continuous whether intra- or extra-uterine until death. The very considerable semantic gymnastics which are required to rationalize abortion as anything but taking a human life would be ludicrous if they were not often put forth under socially impeccable auspices. It is suggested that this schizophrenic sort of subterfuge is necessary because while a new ethic is being accepted the old one has not yet been rejected.

It seems safe to predict that the new demographic, ecological, and social realities and aspirations are so powerful that the new ethic of relative rather than of absolute and equal values will ultimately prevail as man excercises ever more certain and effective control over his numbers, and uses his always comparatively scarce resources to provide the nutrition, housing, economic support, education, and health care in such ways as to achieve his desired quality of life and living. The criteria upon which these relative values are to be based will depend considerably upon whatever concept of the quality of life or living is developed. This may be expected to reflect the extent that quality of life is considered to be a function of personal fulfillment; of individual responsibility for the common welfare, the preservation of the environment, the betterment of the species; and of whether or not, or to what extent, these responsibilities are to be exercised on a compulsory or voluntary basis.

The part which medicine will play as all this develops is not yet entirely clear. That it will be deeply involved is certain. Medicine's role with respect to changing attitudes toward abortion may well be a prototype of what is to occur. Another precedent may be found in the part physicians have played in evaluating who is and who is not to be given costly long-term renal dialysis. Certainly this has required placing relative values on human lives and the impact of the physician to this decision process has been considerable. One may anticipate further development of these roles as the problems of birth control and birth selection are extended inevitably to death selection and death control whether by the individual or by society, and further public and professional determinations of when and when not to use scarce resources.

Since the problems which the new demographic, ecologic and social realities pose are fundamentally biological and ecological in nature and pertain to the survival and well-being of human beings, the participation of physicians and of the medical profession will be essential in planning and decision-making at many levels. No other discipline has the knowledge of human nature, human behavior, health and disease, and of what is involved in physical and mental well-being which will be needed. It is not too early for our profession to examine this new ethic, recognize it for what it is, and will mean for human society, and prepare to apply it in a rational development for the fulfillment and betterment of mankind in what is almost certain to be a biologically-oriented world society.

APPENDIX H

[*Mr. Malcolm Muggeridge, now in his eightieth year, continues to write prolifically, and frequently contributes short articles to various publications around the world, not least those which oppose abortion and euthanasia. The following article appeared in the Winter, 1982, issue of* Human Concern, *published in London by The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children, and is reprinted here with permission of the author.*]

The Overpopulation Myth

Malcolm Muggeridge

I first became aware of the notion that too many children were being born when I was quite young. This was in overhearing my father and his friends talking about what was then called the Irish Question.

As Socialists, they were in favor of the Irish being given self-government, but they shook their heads over the miserable conditions under which they lived, largely due, they considered, to their having too many children, encouraged thereto by reactionary priests to whom contraception was anathema. Thus, I was led to believe that the Irish were creating their own misery by inordinate procreation.

Later, I realized that attributing penury and undernourishment to excessive breeding was simply a device to evade responsibility for the poor and destitute. The implication was that the solution to their poverty was in their own hands; all they had to do was to lay off procreating and reduce their numbers, and all would be well.

Enlightenment first came to me when, on leaving Cambridge in 1924, I went to teach at a Christian college in South India, in what was then Travancore, and is now Kerala. The college was in a remote part of very beautiful countryside, and the students were mostly Syrian Christians and Nairs, very unsophisticated by western standards.

I got to know and like them, and visited some of their homes, where I was sure to be asked by their mothers how many children I had.

When I told them I was unmarried and had none, they looked at me with the greatest sympathy. In the light of this early experience of village India, far and away the best part, as Gandhi always insisted, I was not in the least surprised to learn that it was an experience in India that led Germaine Greer to alter her attitude towards alleged over-population, and bravely make a public announcement of the change.

Actually, I had a premonition that this would happen when I heard her say that seeing and listening to Mother Teresa had reminded her of things she wanted to forget. So, with the deepest humility, I say: "God bless her."

I thought of the homes I had visited in Travancore when, later on, I became aware of the activities of family planning agencies, and their insistence that contraception supported by legalized abortion was the formula for ever-expanding prosperity and marital contentment.

On the one hand I could see that the western world was debauching itself by separating the sexual impulse from its purpose, which was procreation, and its condition, which was lasting love; on the other, there was the spectacle of the so-called backward or under-developed countries being bribed and bamboozled into following suit, and sometimes resorting to compulsory sterilization—for instance, in India—in order to speed up the process.

They asked for food, and we gave them condoms; even at the heart of the most gruesome situations there is often a sick joke, and in this case, I came upon it in an official report of how, to promote family planning in backward countries, a string of beads, green, yellow and red, had been distributed to remind the recipients of the menstrual phases, and how among primitive people, instead of the beads being used for this purpose, they had been worn for mere adornment, thereby, perhaps, actually stimulating procreation.

There have not been lacking authoritative voices—for instance, Professor Colin Clark's of Oxford University and Monash University in Australia, and Professor Julian Simon's of the University of Illinois—which have blown sky-high the whole concept of a population explosion, actual or to come.

The arguments and data in Colin Clark's books are, in my opinion, unanswerable, and have never been seriously challenged, though they have been dismissed on the ground that he is a Roman Catholic. Likewise, Julian Simon's latest book, *The Ultimate Resource*, described by Professor Baumol of Princeton University as "a very salutary balance for the many hysterical predictions about our environmental future."

In Professor Simon's case, his lucid cogent views have been denigrated on the ground that they are "inspired by his contact with the Bible." So, by the way, have been the most far-seeing views, the most deeply held beliefs and the most sublime expectations of the last two thousand years.

Apart from such learned, and, to the un-brainwashed, convincing defusion of the population explosion, there is also commonsense, which tells us that if, for instance, the population of India were to be

halved, as most of them are engaged in subsistence agriculture, there would be half as much food available.

In other words, the situation, as far as food supplies were concerned, would be unchanged. Again, some two-and-a-half percent of the population of the United States are engaged in agriculture, and they produce an abundance of food for 200 million-odd Americans, as well as a huge surplus, some of which is sold to the USSR, where some *forty* percent of the population are engaged in agriculture and produce less per acre than in Tsarist days.

As for there being no room in the world for an expanding population, I remember seeing years ago an analysis of the world's population in relation to the space available, and one point made has stuck in my mind—namely, that almost the whole population of the world could stand up in the Isle of Wight. It seems preposterously absurd, but work it out for yourself, and you will find it is true.

Then take the case of Australia—a huge continent in which there is every kind of climate from temperate Tasmania to tropical Queensland, abundant mineral wealth, plenty of oil, space and resources to support many times its present population, which is about the same as Greater London's, and for the most part concentrated in coastal areas.

So situated, the Australians pride themselves on a zero growth rate, and have instituted very strict immigration controls. At the time of the American Civil War, the population of America was about the same as Australia's today. By opening their frontiers and multiplying themselves, they have become the richest and most powerful country in the world; the 12 million or so Australians—and they know it in their hearts—are just waiting to be swallowed up by the 1,000 million Asians milling round them.

Whenever I think of this population explosion hoax, one memory comes vividly into my mind. The scene is Mother Teresa's children's clinic in Calcutta; we are making the TV program about her and her work called *Something Beautiful for God*, and she and I are being filmed walking together through the clinic.

To make conversation, I say to her: "Mother, in view of the notorious overpopulation of India, is it really worthwhile going to the troubles and expense of trying to salvage these abandoned babies?" For answer, she picks up one of the babies, a girl so tiny that it seems amazing she can live at all, perhaps salvaged that day from a dustbin—Mother Teresa's Sisters of Charity look in such places for abandoned babies.

Holding up the baby, she says exultantly: "Look, there's life in her!" For me, this episode disposes utterly and for ever of the notion of a

population explosion. Yes, there was life in the tiny baby, and life is sacred, and must in all circumstances be cherished as such, being God's creation and so deserving of our love and care.

Special Notice

Additional copies of this issue are available at $4.00 each; 25 copies, $75; 100 copies, $200; (bulk prices on request). Order direct from the Human Life Foundation at the address above. Please include payment with order; we pay all postage and handling.

IMPORTANT NOTICE

THE HUMAN LIFE REVIEW accepts regular subscriptions at the rate of $15 for a full year (four issues). Canadian subscribers and all other foreign please add $4 (U.S. currency). Please address all subscription orders to the address below and enclose payment with order. You may enter gift subscriptions for friends, libraries, or schools at $15 each.

How to order previous issues:

This issue—No. 2, Volume 9—is the 34th issue published to date. You may order single copies of this issue—or the 33 previous issues—by sending $4 per issue to the address below. Simply designate copies desired by asking for any issue(s) by number: #1-4 (1975), #5-8 (1976), #9-12 (1977), #13-16 (1978), #17-20 (1979), #21-24 (1980), #25-28 (1981), or #29-32 (1982), and #33 or #34 (the current issue). You pay only the single copy price ($4); we pay all postage and handling.

Bound Volumes: we now have available Bound Volumes (in permanent, library-style hard-cover editions, with gold lettering, etc.) of the first eight years (1975-1982) of this review. *All volumes are completely indexed*, and are available postpaid at $30 per volume, or all eight volumes for $200. Separate copies of each index are also available at $1.00 per copy.

Bulk Orders: while supply of back issues lasts, we will supply 10 or more copies of any issue at $2 each; 100 or more copies at $1 each. Please indicate quantities per issue desired and include payment in full with order.

Address all orders to:

The Human Life Foundation, Inc.
150 East 35th Street
New York, New York 10016


THE HUMAN LIFE
FOUNDATION INC.