


the HUMAN LIFE REVIEW



WINTER 1988

Featured in this issue:

Joseph Sobran on Us against Ourselves

J. P. McFadden on Clare Boothe Luce

Clare Boothe Luce on Abortion *et al.*

The London *Spectator* on The Alton Bill

John Wauck on The 'Personhood' Mistake

Joan Frawley Desmond on Will We 'Harvest'
Fetal Tissue?

Tina Bell on Allan Bloom's Message

Nika Hazelton on Being Only a Kid

Also in this issue:

President Ronald Reagan • Cardinal John O'Connor • Heidi Evans
Pat Buchanan • Ray Kerrison • Thomas Sowell • Pastor R. J. Neuhaus
*plus the lyrics to the hit tune *Adiós Mamá**

Published by:

The Human Life Foundation, Inc.

New York, N.Y.

Vol. XIV, No. 1

\$4.00 a copy

. . . FROM THE PUBLISHER

With this issue we make some changes in our printing and mailing operations which we hope will both improve our journal and speed its delivery. The most obvious to regular mail subscribers will be the plastic wrapper that replaces the old familiar envelope—but your mailing label will still be available should you want to change your address, or whatever.

We think this, our 53rd issue (beginning Volume XIV), brings you as great a variety of writers and subjects as we've ever offered—a full score of items, on everything from Joseph Sobran's usual acute analysis of what's gone wrong with society to the sad words of a popular Mexican song hit about . . . *abortion*.

We would like to thank those who helped us by granting permission to reprint various pieces, including the London *Spectator* (and the New York Times syndicate); their credits are listed with each article.

Also, we highly recommend the *Spectator*: it is not only a delightfully literate paper but also carries much that will interest American readers. Subscriptions may be ordered from: Spectator Subscriptions Dept., 298 Sandycombe Road, Kew, Richmond, Surrey TW9 3NG, England (Telephone 01-940 9550).

You will find full information about back issues, Bound Volumes, microfilm services, books available, etc., printed on our inside-back cover.

EDWARD A. CAPANO
Publisher

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Published by THE HUMAN LIFE FOUNDATION, INC. Editorial Office, Room 840, 150 E. 35th St., N.Y., N.Y. 10016. The editors will consider all manuscripts submitted, but assume no responsibility for unsolicited material. Editorial and subscription inquiries, and requests for reprint permission, should be sent directly to the editorial office. Subscription price: \$15 per year; Canada and foreign \$20 (U.S. currency).

Vol. XIV, No. 1. ©1988 by THE HUMAN LIFE FOUNDATION, INC.

Printed in the U.S.A.

INTRODUCTION

AS WE BEGIN OUR fourteenth year of publication, the issue we *began* with—abortion—remains with us, and then some. We write this the morning after President Ronald Reagan’s final State of the Union address, from which we quote the following:

Well now, we come to a family issue that we must have the courage to confront. Tonight, I call America—a good nation, a moral people—to charitable but realistic consideration of the terrible cost of abortion on demand. To say to those who say this violates a woman’s right to control of her own body—can they deny that now medical evidence confirms the unborn child is a living human being entitled to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness?

Let us unite as a nation and protect the unborn with legislation that would stop all Federal funding for abortion—and with a human life amendment making, of course, an exception where the unborn child threatens the life of the mother. Our Judeo-Christian tradition recognizes the right of taking a life in self-defense.

But with that one exception, let us look to those others in our land who cry out for children to adopt. I pledge to you tonight, I will work to remove barriers to adoption and extend full sharing in family life to millions of Americans, so that children who need homes can be welcomed to families who want them and love them.

Needless to say, we hope that our own efforts have contributed to making abortion the burning national issue the President describes. But then we’ve had plenty of help from those who *support* abortion. For instance, on the morning of the day Mr. Reagan spoke (Jan. 25), the lead front-page headline in the New York *Times* ran “Multiple Fetuses Raise New Issues Tied to Abortion.” The story began:

Quietly, with virtually no publicity, a number of doctors have begun offering a way out for women who are pregnant with more fetuses than they want or can carry safely: They are aborting some of the fetuses while allowing the rest to proceed to birth.

The *Times*’ subhead noted that the new “treatment” raised “Deep Ethical Questions.” It surely does. One might describe it as yet another example of a most serious dilemma: “medical science” is more and more capable of performing “miracles” which simply do not fit into our traditional moral reasoning. Worse, the new *medical* “ethic” seems to be: If it *can* be done, it *should*

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be done? All this at a moment in our history when virtually every tenet of the Old Morality is under sustained attack (if not already discarded).

As it happens, that is the kind of thing Joseph Sobran writes about in our lead article. Nobody can do it better than our old friend Joe, who is right on target again here. He reminds us that every age seems “normal” *at the time*; it’s difficult to stand back and view what’s really happening. But later, we may find that “Things that are now taken for granted will appear so arbitrary and just plain wrong that people will wonder how they could have passed unchallenged.”

Dare we hope that the “technology” which now enables us to kill *some* siblings in the womb will not pass unchallenged?

Sobran ranges far and wide (as usual) over currently-disputed moral territory; there are a great many things about the New Morality that he dislikes, especially our confounded unwillingness to defend what we *know* to be right simply because it is challenged—which makes us our own worst enemies. We’re sure you’ll enjoy this one.

It is followed by a piece that began as a brief preface, but ended as a kind of article itself. When Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce died last October, we sadly re-read the various pieces of hers which she had written for this journal (or let us publish). We were struck by just how prescient she had been, on abortion, and all that has followed in its wake (a fitting word). Of course we shouldn’t have been: Mrs. Luce was indeed our Woman of the Century, justly renowned for having a mind which was . . . well, beautiful, as she was herself. So many memories flooded back that we ended up attempting to provide some notion of what sheer, stimulating *fun* it was to talk to her about anything whatever.

We think you will find that what she had to say about abortion, euthanasia *et al.* remains both fresh and powerful. Not too long before she died, she called to “chat” (her casual observations rated college-level credits) about an article of ours which she thought “missed the most important point!” At that moment there was a raging controversy about keeping children with AIDS out of school: her point was that it had to be in *their* interest not to risk infections harmless to *well* kids, but potentially lethal to the hapless victims involved. Their “civil rights,” CBL said, ought to include the chance to live long enough to benefit from an always-possible cure? Quite right. Then she suddenly said: “How I wish I’d concentrated on *one* thing, as you have on abortion.” Ours would be a much poorer world if we had not benefited from the incredible range of her accomplishments. On the other hand, *had* she concentrated on one battle, it’s hard to imagine that she would not have won it.

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In fact, we feel a bit sheepish about reprinting her rousing answer to “The Kilpatrick Position.” Mr. Kilpatrick is an old colleague, and a good man. But then he too knew her well, and doubtless appreciates that there was nothing *personal* about Clare’s taking her friends apart when she caught them on a slippery slope. She was always even-handed about foes and friends.

The *argument* was the thing, which is why Mrs. Luce might have felt at least as much at home in England as in her beloved America. The British *do* have a full-color, wide-screen way of handling public debates, and the hot topic as we write is once again abortion. Last fall a young Liberal MP, Mr. David Alton, introduced a new bill that would reduce the legal “termination” limit from the current 28 weeks to 18; most observers thought that such a reactionary proposal would get nowhere.

They were wrong. The original “liberalization” happened in 1967, more than 20 years ago—six years before our *Roe*. It would seem that the British may also be some years ahead of us in voicing a general revulsion at what legalized abortion on demand has done to civilized society. Mr. Alton gained immediate support from many quarters, not least in the pages of the prestigious London *Spectator*. We reprint three relevant examples here (the final one by the eminent Historian Paul Johnson). As we say, the British have a flare for incisive prose: you will find the rhetoric powerful stuff, dished out with gusto—and surprising effect. Far from being easily turned back, Mr. Alton’s *démarche* remains (if you’ll pardon the word) viable. On Jan. 22—yes, the 15th anniversary of our *Roe*—it survived a crucial “second reading” by what the *Washington Post* described as an “unexpectedly decisive majority” of 296-251, meaning that it is now a bill with which the Parliament *must* deal. True, it may well be amended (if not gutted) in committee, but the moral momentum has clearly shifted to the *anti*-abortion side.

We expect to have more on the British initiative in due course. Meanwhile, we return to our own debate with an unusual article by our colleague John Wauck, which is not only highly readable but also important. His point is, that anti-abortionists are unwise to make the personhood of the unborn their central issue, if only because our society can no longer agree on a *definition* of it. Wauck’s argument is likely to surprise—and perhaps anger?—both sides; some may think that he *weakens* the case against abortion, while others may decide that he strengthens it by, well, eliminating the *need* for agreement on the definition of a person. We hope you will read it very carefully. It’s an important issue, and we expect to receive considerable commentary (which we invite) on it.

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Next, Joan Frawley Desmond provides a calm look at another vexed question: the use of “fetal tissue” in the treatment of various diseases (e.g. Parkinson’s disease). It is a story much in the news lately, and there is little doubt that more medical “miracles” seem possible. Nor is there any doubt that the prime source of “tissue” is aborted babies. As we say, Mrs. Desmond handles it calmly: you will learn a great deal (we did) about the many “complex” moral choices already upon us in this new area. And you will note that she asks the crucial question: Can a society that aborts babies at will be expected to make the right decisions?

Hardly, if you agree with the thesis of Professor Allan Bloom’s bestseller, *The Closing of the American Mind*. As Tina Bell points out, “Bloom’s *point* is that our universities have been poisoning the nation’s moral bloodstream with virulent skepticism for decades.” Mrs. Bell, a young mother of four, who describes herself as “a terrible housekeeper, a rather good cook” is, we’d say, a thoughtful reader and a good writer. We think you will greatly enjoy her careful analysis of what Bloom says, and what it means—or ought to mean—to Americans. We certainly hope to have more from her before long.

Our final article is something quite different—the change of pace we always try to provide after giving you so much heavy going. Nika Hazelton is herself “different”—a marvellous change from the ordinary to anybody lucky enough to know her. Famed for her many books on food, wine (and how to *enjoy* such) and other delectable subjects, she is also an authority on *people*. We asked her why she never did a piece for *us*? So she did. Mrs. Hazelton spent much of her childhood in Italy, and her observations on life there then and now make most enjoyable reading (we hope she too will be back in our pages again soon).

* * * * *

Our other custom is to conclude with various appendices that are both interesting *per se* and “relevant” (if you’ll forgive us that trendy word) to what has come before. We certainly have some good ones this time. *Appendix A* is something we’d never fail to print: the Proclamation by Ronald Reagan which declares (*pace* Mr. Wauck) “the unalienable personhood” of the unborn. Regular readers will recall that in 1983 Mr. Reagan contributed an article (later published in book form) to this journal—a most unusual thing for a sitting President to do. Then as now he is eloquent in his opposition to abortion, God bless him for it.

Appendix B is a column by another eloquent anti-abortion spokesman, New York’s Cardinal John O’Connor, who hopes that honesty is beginning to creep into the rhetoric of the debate—we’re calling a baby a *baby* again!

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Naturally we hope he is right. *Appendix C* is also about abortion *et al.*; it is only one good example of the many fine columns our friend Patrick Buchanan has written on such life-and-death issues (reading *anything* by Pat always makes you glad he's on *your* side!). Another powerful writer, Ray Kerrison, follows (*Appendix D*) with one of his distinctive blasts; it is all the more interesting after you've read the Cardinal's column.

Lest you think we might run out of strong stuff, *Appendix E* gives you a sample of the kind of thing Thomas Sowell, the well-known author and columnist, writes regularly (we certainly wish he'd get around to doing a full-length piece for us someday soon). *Appendix F* is "news": the New York *Daily News'* Heidi Evans did a solid investigative-reporting job on a Manhattan abortuary. Similar exposés have been done in other cities, of course, but seemingly with little effect. This time, Heidi was able to report a week later that the "clinic" involved "has closed its doors" (good show!). *Appendix G* is a fitting wrap-up, by the prolific Lutheran Pastor Richard John Neuhaus, which neatly summarizes most if not all that has preceded it in this issue.

But there is a final item. Abortion is a world-wide tragedy because it is a human one, the reality of which is everywhere the same. You may find it surprising that a *song* about it would hit Number #1 on the pop-music charts, but it happened in Mexico. We wish you could hear the tune—it sounds very much like most other mass-market hits—only the words are different. Very different.

There you have it, until next issue, which we will try to make as varied and unusual as we think this one is.

J. P. MCFADDEN
Editor

Us against Ourselves

Joseph Sobran

EVERY AGE SEEMS NORMAL at the time, but comes to look quaint and highly artificial within a few generations. When we look back on the daring thinkers of the Enlightenment—Hume, Voltaire, Rousseau—we are struck by a style of writing that seems as dated as the wigs and costumes of the age. But it takes an effort of detachment and imagination to see our own time as the future will see it.

The problem is compounded by the fact that our time has a peculiar confidence in itself. We believe in “progress,” we assume we know where it leads, and we are not shy about speaking on behalf of the future without waiting for it to speak for itself. When it actually arrives, it may shock those of us who are left by having a few ideas of its own. Things that are now taken for granted will appear so arbitrary and just plain wrong that people will wonder how they could have passed unchallenged.

Sometimes this process can be accelerated by dramatic events: we all look back on Hitler’s Germany and ask how people could have been so caught up in its obvious madness. One answer is that it didn’t seem like madness to many people at the time. That should cause us to ask ourselves just what *we* may be unconsciously being caught up in.

In my judgment, Hitler was—historically speaking—only a brief surface phenomenon. Despite the enthusiastic fanaticism he generated, lots of people did recoil, rebel, flee the country, or simply lie low. Most people go along with such things without any particular commitment, living their own lives from day to day and making such terms as they can with the larger political order, which they don’t feel competent or powerful enough to oppose in any case.

And there is a deeper level now at which most people are “good Germans” in the sense of merely acquiescing to dominant powers. The twentieth century has had a huge though usually slow momentum, and by now everyone has been caught up in it, including anyone who has

Joseph Sobran, our senior Contributing Editor, is a prolific writer, columnist, and commentator on political and social affairs.

tried consciously to resist it.

I doubt that I can describe it very fully, being caught up in it like everyone else. But it is worth trying, because few people in any age are completely reconciled to the prevalent powers. Pockets of detachment always remain. They even have a kind of informal tradition of their own—the common sense and decency that can show up even in a Gulag camp.

We all “know” the peculiarities of our time, the way a typist’s fingers “know” where the letters on the keyboard are even when she can’t rattle them off in order. We grope our way through the dimly lit room, and a hundred-watt bulb would hurt our eyes for a moment before we could see anything by it.

But for me, the hundred-watt bulb is this remark by C. S. Lewis: “In this shop, the customer is always wrong.” He was speaking of avant-garde art and literature. But what he said can be transposed to cover just about any field of interest. The Church is always wrong. The family is always wrong. The market is always wrong. Society is always wrong. The artist, the heretic, the misfit and the malcontent are always right.

There is a fine line to be noted here. The dissident voice can often have something valuable to say, precisely because the conventions of a given age never incorporate the whole truth. But to recognize that is a very different thing from holding an automatic presumption against not only the current majority view but durable traditions as well.

I heard the distinctive note of our time in a recent *New York Times* Quotation of the Day from a New York state supreme court justice: “Who among us is not familiar with the tattered, filthy, malodorous presence of the wretched homeless? The blame and shame must attach to us, not them.”

This was extracted from a ruling that a mad and truly malodorous woman living in the streets of New York could not be put in an institution against her will—even for her own good. Society, in this case, was trying to *help* her, not neglect her. But the court not only ruled in her favor but actually blamed society—“us”—for her condition.

Of course it would be wrong and priggish simply to blame such wretched people for their plight without any further question. But it is also wrong—it’s wildly irrational—to invert that sort of priggery and

blame everyone *except* those who choose to live in the street for the fact that they do.

It can be fatally easy to confuse mercy and charity with guilt-mongering. But the injunction “Feed the hungry” is not an accusation. It doesn’t mean “It’s your fault they’re hungry.” It may, in some sense, be society’s fault. It may even be their own fault. That doesn’t matter. What matters is simply that they need to be fed. If guilt or blame has to be apportioned, it can only be done case by case.

“Society” neither claims nor deserves credit for its saints. A Mother Teresa isn’t “produced” by socio-economic vectors. By the same token, “society” is not an adequate explanation for those who deviate from the norm in a downward direction.

But the justice was expressing one of the most deep-rooted modern prejudices—a prejudice so ingrained, so completely taken for granted now, that it isn’t even stigmatized with the word “prejudice.” Namely, the prejudice against the normal core of Western society. Unlike racism, anti-Semitism, sexism, homophobia, ethnocentrism, xenophobia, nativism, superpatriotism, chauvinism, McCarthyism, jingoism, and the like, this one hasn’t even picked up a name. It isn’t recognized as a distinctive attitude, because nearly everyone shares it, this presumption against “us.”

A prejudice is only really powerful when it’s accepted even by people whose interests are hurt by it. That is very much the case now. A kind of official alienation is built into our institutions, and nobody is shocked when a judge says things that our ancestors would have seen as paradoxical nonsense.

And so, when the daughter of a Hollywood star writes a book denouncing her mother, we are too diffident to respond: “Honor thy father and thy mother.” When protestors defile the American flag, we are unsure to reply: “*Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.*” It would be fascist to teach a child, “The policeman is your friend.” It would be philistine to comment about a formless and ugly modern painting, “My five-year-old can paint better than that.”

Middle-class common sense has fallen into complete disrepute. Moralists call it “complacency,” leftist intellectuals call it “false consciousness.” The general idea is that truth is always counter-intuitive. Or, as

the comedy team The Firesign Theater put it, “Everything you know is wrong!”

To be an “intellectual” almost by definition means holding the disaffected attitude, along with some sort of theoretical rationale for it, though this part is usually a vague amalgam of Marx, Freud, Bertrand Russell, Sartre, and such general notions about modern art as that great artists are rarely recognized in their own time, except by a few initiates. Tom Wolfe satirizes this endless rebellion against the defunct bourgeoisie in *The Painted Word* and *From Bauhaus to Our House*, and there is no sign that he is in danger of running out of material.

Not that the bourgeoisie, in its day, didn’t warrant some satirizing itself. It got plenty of it, from Gilbert and Sullivan to Oscar Wilde and Bernard Shaw. But what Shaw did with fine wit is now done with very blunt instruments, and the sort of engagingly precious little *aperçu* that must have been refreshing in the heyday of Colonel Blimp has been lifted to the status of the Thought of Chairman Mao, blaring from every loudspeaker. It has come down to the Howard Cosell level.

Yet it still passes, wearily, for bold heresy. Intellectuals, like the old generals, keep fighting the last war, rallying to the latest battle against the Class Enemy in the person of Ronald Reagan or Jerry Falwell. This could be excused in the time of Shaw, who turned out to be a sucker for the Soviet Union. (Shaw’s form of satire against the establishment, which made him a celebrity in the society he satirized, could not have been safely whispered, let alone put on stage, in Stalin’s Russia.) The amazing fact—and this *will* amaze the future, we can safely predict—is that after 70 years, Western intellectuals still frown on anti-Communism, which they simply equate with jingoism. It’s too obvious to need saying that South Africa excites their moral outrage in a way the Soviet Union never has.

The alienated attitude—I call it alienism, by analogy with nativism, its rough opposite—has a strange power not only to unite intellectuals but to win the deference of everyone else. It’s like a communion without either a cathedral or even a formal creed. It’s everywhere and nowhere. Nobody spells it out and asserts it as a single bloc of doctrine, but it always seems to be present and operative. It works not only against the churches but within them, even at very high levels. It has all but officially taken over the universities: to get a college education

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nowadays is to undergo a prolonged initiation into secularism, epistemological skepticism, political leftism, anthropological relativism, esthetic nihilism, and sexual libertarianism whose bottom line is not so much that the moral and religious traditions of the West are false as that *it goes without saying* that they are false. The attitude underlies liberalism as well as Communism, which accounts for liberals' persistent, even increasing reluctance to take the side of the West against the Soviet imperium. Loyalty to the West, though still deep in most people, is beleaguered, inarticulate, shrinking. Patriotism is lumped with the other "attitudes of the past" the alienism scorns, and has become self-conscious and shy, though it peeped out briefly in the earlier years of the Reagan Administration.

The modern state has a split personality. On the one hand, it has to perform the traditional functions of maintaining the rule of law and being prepared for war. These tasks presume a society worth preserving and defending, a system of family and property arrangements that have to be recognized and upheld, and a norm of official impartiality in disputes among citizens. On the other hand, the modern state is partly possessed by the spirit of alienism—the view that all's wrong with the world, and that the state's job is to set it right. Thanks to this view, the state has taken on myriad new jobs and roles: redistributing wealth, eliminating property, making things up to special classes of citizens making effective political claims of victimhood, saving artists from market neglect, intervening in the economy in the name of "social justice" and the like, abolishing war, general "consciousness-raising," and otherwise pursuing utopian goals at the expense of the traditional role of maintenance. Though the laws are still based on the presumption in favor of family life, the modern state is drawn to succoring so many anomalies—abortion, divorce, erotic entertainment, homosexuality, and everything that falls under the heading of "sexual freedom"—that the family itself has become somewhat vestigial. In short, the modern state is bound to preserve the very things it's trying to abolish. Alienism has given it a contradictory agenda.

This contradiction is expressed in practical ways. Our regular budget battles reflect the tension between the state's normal role of maintaining property rights and its enormous new role in reducing private wealth through redistributive taxation. The state is supposed to be neutral

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about race, but actively coerces racially preferential hiring. Democracy presumes that the general will of the majority should prevail, but the Supreme Court, reading the alienist agenda into the Constitution, has countermanded the legislatures and the Western moral tradition itself in such basic matters as abortion, pitting individual rights *against* majority rule instead of interpreting both as different aspects of one coherent system.

No wonder our leaders themselves are confused. They treat the Soviet Union (whose strategists define the United States as “the main enemy”) not only as a legitimate state, the equivalent of free societies, but even as our “partner” in the “peace process.” They unconsciously reduce the Soviets’ total repression of freedom to “human rights violations,” as if this were a mere blemish, like residual poverty in the West, that could be corrected without changing the entire system into a radically different kind of system.

Almost nobody in the West idealizes the Soviet Union anymore (though some of the old admiration gets transferred to newer Communist regimes, such as Nicaragua’s). But there is a strange inhibition against focussing on the system’s essential nature. It has become customary to focus on specific features instead: “Soviet Jews,” “dissidents,” “political prisoners.”

The fact is that *everyone* in the Soviet Union is a prisoner. This is not a rhetorical charge but a simple truth. It becomes clear the moment you think of one of the Soviet Union’s key institutions: the armed border. That border is armed not only against foreign aggression, like those of traditional states, at times, but against any subjects of Communism (“citizens” would be a grotesquely misleading word for them) who might try to escape. Barbed wire, guard towers, police dogs, machine guns, and land mines all stand ready to kill any would-be emigrant.

Communism recognizes no right to leave. Emigration has been so normal a prerogative of human life for eons that we hardly think of it as a “right.” Large numbers of people rarely want to leave the land of their ancestors even under fairly stern governments, unless poverty or natural calamity makes other prospects inviting. Communism makes *all* other prospects inviting. That has been the lesson of the Berlin Wall, of the Vietnamese “boat people,” of millions of refugees whose stories get little coverage in the progressive-minded media.

Leaving the Soviet Union is not a right but a privilege, one the regime occasionally grants for its own purposes, as a terrorist may release a hostage or two during ransom negotiations. The number of Jews or others released could be multiplied many times, and it would mean nothing, in terms of real reform. As long as those armed borders remain, *glasnost* is not a fiction but an impossibility.

My point is simply this: the armed border is the most concrete expression of alienism—hatred of the normal. In the name of “the people,” Communism treats the entire populace as the enemy. In principle it denies them any rights and freedoms whatever. It completely despises their religious and moral sentiments along with their simplest personal desires. This is its nature, and this accounts for its structure and history.

“Building socialism,” also called “building a new society,” has amounted in 70 years to nothing but a massive campaign of enslavement and destruction. In the long run this undercuts the position of the rulers themselves, and they are forced at times to relax their grip somewhat. But Communist rulers have never compromised the essential principle. The KGB still watches all, and emigration is still taboo. The few exemptions are special cases.

All this couldn't be plainer. What is interesting is the response it evokes in the West: almost nothing. In fact, the West even has a somewhat guilty conscience about keeping all those nuclear weapons and troops at the ready. We are embarrassed to say why we do keep them, because it is bad form to oppose Communism in principle. Our own leaders have mixed feelings about a system that is no doubt brutal enough, but nevertheless has more and more in common with our own, and not just in military power and technology. Communism is the unabashed form of a principle we keep adopting by increments. What right then do *we* have to call them “evil”?

If there is no permanent standard of right and wrong, if all our traditions are nugatory, if the state's proper purpose is to correct rather than conserve the legacy of the past, then Communism can't be such a bad system. We should make offerings to it, sign treaties, learn from it, adopt some of its features (abortion on demand being one example), achieve the fullest possible concord with it.

With the extraordinary exception of Solzhenitsyn, no refugee from Communism (and to be precise, Solzhenitsyn isn't a refugee: he was

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expelled) has ever gotten much press coverage in the West. A Timerman from Argentina, a Bishop Tutu from South Africa, an Elie Wiesel recalling the horrors of Nazism after 40 years—these are honored witnesses. But a refugee from Communism is treated as a somewhat twisted, embittered, and unreliable reporter. Not only that, he is uninteresting. The press knows what it wants to say about the Soviet world, and he isn't saying it.

Yet anyone who has talked to such a refugee knows the amazing passion such people feel—and also the undistracted concentration on essentials, not to mention huge, baffled frustration about making Americans *understand*. “These people want to do to all of you what they did to my family, my people—and you don't even care!” they say. Here is the great geopolitical drama of the twentieth century, and one of the two titanic adversaries wants to pretend it isn't even happening.

This is what people in the future will be struck by, assuming of course that in the future they will be able to read a reasonably accurate history of it. And it is baffling, until you realize that under all the surface conflict there was a deep consensus shared by people in both the superpowers, according to which the legitimacy of the totalitarian country was never in question but the legitimacy of the free country was.

From that perspective, Communism will appear not just the enemy of the West but the purest expression of a philosophy—a popular twentieth-century version of gnosticism—that also had a strong hold in the West itself. The West was taught to blame itself, for everything from its own madmen in the streets to global conflicts that were initiated and fueled by the Soviet Union. It could tolerate everything but its own traditions. It could find excuses for everyone but itself.

Hitler perished quickly, because he held “reactionary” views that couldn't be assimilated to the progressive consensus. Stalin managed to die in bed. If his reputation has fallen, that is largely because Western progressives preferred to make him a scapegoat rather than blame the evils of his regime on the principle of Communism itself. When Solzhenitsyn challenged this view, *his* mental balance was called into question. His heresy, in terms of the topsy-turvy orthodoxy, was to argue—and testify—that Communism is *evil in principle*. Reagan too was accused of a sort of “gaffe,” a social blunder, for calling the Soviet

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Union “an evil empire.” No intellectual would be so indiscreet as to *deny* this, but Reagan was sneered at anyway, just for having uttered something that is simply Not Said.

Part of the genius of alienism lies in its elusiveness—its skill at turning a set of incontrovertible propositions into an unarguable etiquette. He who blurts out the obvious truth meets not with debate but with stares, snickers, and whispers that give him the unmistakable message that he has somehow said the wrong thing. Nobody ever quite explains why.

Strange, but true. Yet maybe not so strange after all. Human nature is always in revolt, against God and to some extent against all intermediary authority. “Honor thy father and thy mother” is a necessary commandment, because the disposition to honor them is not as reliable as the disposition, say, to eat three square meals a day. Alienation is natural enough that we find it necessary to instill an *ethic* of loyalty instead of just counting on spontaneous affections to hold society together. The good social impulses are there too, or social cohesion could only be achieved the Soviet way, but they have to be fortified all the time.

Small disloyalties like adultery and desertion are common, and history is full of rebellion on a larger scale. But in our time—maybe uniquely—a sort of culture of disaffection has arisen and has even been fostered by the societies it preyed on. Parents and taxpayers have little notion, when they pay for “education,” that this may concretely mean subsidizing and sending their children to places of learning where old continuities are not so much extended as simply broken. Socially marginal people, from ethnic minorities to homosexuals, are encouraged in envy and resentment, and invited to make claims for special treatment on the larger society. It’s significant that one category of people who are specifically forbidden to demand special consideration are the religious, and religious persecution in the Soviet Union, unlike racial discrimination in South Africa, is hardly on the liberal map of worldwide human rights abuses: this may be hypocrisy, but it isn’t really inconsistency. The ultimate target of alienism is Christendom.

There was a time—it seems relatively innocent now—when social dissidents were frankly socialist or Communist or anarchist. They had

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ideals which, rightly or not, they were willing to be explicit about and argue for like men. (It's a sign of the times that even an expression such as "fight like a man" has become a gaffe.)

But the very note of dissent has changed. Instead of booming out "The Internationale," the new dissenters hint, sneer, quibble, and avoid debate. Their mission seems to be to put ironic quotation marks around words like *godly*, *patriotic*, and even *normal*. At least the old socialists drew a clear line; the current anti-anti-Communists want to obliterate definition. Confusion seems to be their natural element.

At this point the real problem is not the genuinely alienated. It's the mentality they have instilled in the rest of us. The New York justice who freed the madwoman was probably trying to take responsibility, in his way, for the order of society, but felt that he had to do everything possible to accommodate the freakishly hard case before him, even at the expense of the rights of normal people. Naturally, he had to pin the blame on the normal people. It probably sounded like a safe platitude to him, and to the editors of the *New York Times*.

Still, the natural result of normalizing the abnormal is to create an adversary relation between the state and the normal citizen. It's no longer enough to obey your moral sense in order to feel you are being law-abiding. You have to hire a lawyer to make sure you are complying with the countless laws, regulations, and state agencies that exist to address every possible contingency.

Anyone who doubts that what I am calling alienism is a potent prejudice should ask himself which side tends to be presumed to be in the wrong in conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union; whites and blacks; Christians and non-Christians; men and women; the wealthy and the poor; the West and the Third World; or just "society" and "the individual." It seems beyond dispute, to me, at any rate, that the old presumptions have been not been suspended but simply turned around. And this is just the surface. As I say, the deeper presumption is that common sense and moral tradition are usually wrong. What nobody ever explains is how, if normal human reason is so unreliable, the state can be counted on to set things right.

A Valiant Woman

J. P. McFadden

WHEN CLARE BOOTHE LUCE died last October 9th (aged 84), scores of publications here and abroad lavishly recounted her Life and Time, so to speak (a visual pun Clare enjoyed, I know). Lord knows she made enemies: anyone who can toss off the maxim “No good deed goes unpunished” or describe her seventy-ninth year as “the Springtime of my senility” could not avoid wounding sensitive egos. But who would deny that she was indeed America’s Woman of the Century?

Reading the many tributes, one thing struck us: so many people seemed to know her well, yet they all seemed to know a different Clare. That would have amused her too; perhaps her greatest talent was to know *you* in a unique way, a feat she accomplished by maintaining a genuine (the precise word for it) *interest* in you. It is hard to imagine that anyone who really knew Mrs. Luce could dislike her, no matter how much one might fail to share her always-strong opinions.

We wouldn’t dare attempt a eulogy here, but it would be unfair to her memory not to mention that Mrs. Luce was in fact a generous friend of this journal. And she had a strong interest in the abortion issue, not least because she realized long before *Roe v. Wade* that it would become a “women’s issue” of fateful importance. When we were pondering (in late 1974) whether a journal such as this one had any chance of success, Mrs. Luce was almost the first one we consulted.

That story *should* be told: another of her gifts was the ability to give “advice” that was a great deal more than that. Her opinion—strongly delivered as always—was that we hadn’t faced the *problem*: abortion was probably already a “lost cause,” did we realize we were getting into something we couldn’t get out of without hurting that cause further? In short, we had to be *certain* of success. Which of course was not possible. She delivered this paradox with a wry grace that made you laugh along with her at yourself. Knowing us more casually back then, she said *she* hadn’t realized we were the lost-cause type. (I

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remember her words: “Jim, you of all people!”)

Accepting her challenge caused a re-thinking of the whole idea: Could we be sure of getting an endless supply of good stuff on our “single issue”? No, Clare was right. Thus our review began (in early 1975) just as it has continued, with an editorial mix of new, old, and borrowed pieces, from well-known as well as newly-discovered contributors. To succeed, we had to make it what our old friend Malcolm Muggeridge advised: “Just a good mag.”

In the event, we were surprised to find that we *did* in fact get (as well as generate) a continuous supply of fresh material on abortion, and on the many issues related to it. But we’ve stuck to the inspiration Clare gave us, which we think *has* produced a “good mag.”

She maintained a sharp interest in our efforts, usually *via* unexpected phone calls, commenting on articles she liked (our friend Joe Sobran got consistent high praise) as well as the other kind (“You’ve got it all *wrong* . . .”). While living in Hawaii she would clip local newspaper articles on “our” issues and send them along with pithy comments, for instance a note (in June ’81) beginning “The enclosed articles all appeared in the Honolulu Advertiser,” adding:

As anyone with a shred of intelligence could have foreseen, the Supreme Court’s decision legalizing abortion-on-demand has opened the door to euthanasia-on-demand. After all, there is no argument for the abortion of unborn, unwanted children which is not just as valid for unwanted deformed infants, or unwanted senile adults.

One hears more and more stories about “mercy” killings by compassionate doctors and relatives. I’ve seen several movies on TV on this theme recently. But what *is* the *legal* state of euthanasia in the West, and what are the prognostications for euthanasia legislation?

If [you have run] an article on this, I must have missed it. Aloha, Clare

She had us again there: we had *not* run enough on infanticide, nor on euthanasia (although in 1976 we *had* re-published Prof. Yale Kamisar’s definitive study—then out of print—on Mercy Killing). But the following Good Friday (April 9, 1982) the Bloomington Baby was born—you remember, surely?—his was the first infamous “Baby Doe” case: an Indiana judge granted Doe’s parents “permission to withhold food from their severely retarded child,” who was duly and most painfully starved to death. It took a week (abandoned by everybody, even his mother, life was the only thing he could cling to, and he did). His only

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crime was to be born with Down's Syndrome, which might, or might *not*, have left him "severely retarded"—the judge who ordered his execution couldn't know; he knew only that little Doe's parents "chose" to be rid of him.

After that, of course, *everybody* began running articles on the questions Clare had raised.

Why had she been so pessimistic about ours being a "lost cause"? Again, we wouldn't dare attempt to summarize her sophisticated, hard-and-practical analyses of the many problems involved. But we think it's accurate to say Mrs. Luce foresaw that legalized abortion would command widespread support because the "New Morality" was breaking down the only decisive argument *against* it: that it is simply *wrong*.

She put the argument best herself. In mid-1970, her friend Wm. F. Buckley Jr. sent her several recently-published books on abortion, asking if she would review them for his *National Review*. What she wrote finally appeared in the magazine's January 12, 1971 issue (still more than two years before *Roe*) with an Editor's Note explaining how it had grown "far beyond the confines" of mere book reviewing "into a major statement on the abortion question that we felt required publication as an article." Indeed, it was quite a piece of work: some 6,000 words of tough analysis and commentary that was, to put it mildly, brilliant.

The books involved were *The Morality of Abortion*, edited by then-Professor (now Judge) John T. Noonan, and *Abortion: Law, Choice and Morality*, by Daniel Callahan. In effect, the two books—probably the best available at the time—summarized the opposing arguments. Noonan, joined by six other distinguished professors, made the case for Western Civilization's "almost absolute" rejection of abortion as a moral choice. Callahan presented the arguments for, as CBL described them, "the formulation of an abortion policy for our pluralistic, democratic society that the American people can morally 'live with.'"

Her own rigorous arguments shocked many readers at the time because, combined with her well-known support of the Equal Rights Amendment, they created the perception that Mrs. Luce had become *proabortion*. In fact she was asking the right *questions*, as illustrated by this excerpt:

Many young people in the West today believe that it is not only their right to control the size of their families, but that it has become their moral duty to society

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itself to limit them to at most three children. (This reviewer has recently had a letter from a happily married mother of two children, who is determined to abort her third pregnancy as a “voluntary sacrifice” to “the millions of already half-starving children who are being brought into the world in the underprivileged countries.” . . . “Americans must show the world,” she wrote, “that the overpopulation problem can be solved, if people only have the moral will to solve it. . . . How I wish we lived in the kind of world in which women could have all the children they want.”)

Theologically and morally, her Abramic notion of “a human sacrifice” to “a better world” is indefensible. And she may just be rationalizing her (and her husband’s) own selfishness. But the point here is that what was once considered an immoral attitude by the whole Christian West is now being presented as a moral, and unselfish, attitude.

Just two years later, of course, the Supreme Court awarded Mr. Callahan a gift victory far beyond anything he—or even the Feminist movement—imagined possible. As our regular readers know, Professor Noonan later became the nation’s best-known scholarly opponent of *Roe*; he was an original member of this journal’s Editorial Board (he resigned only after his confirmation as a federal judge two years ago), and contributed many articles to these pages. Mr. Callahan—if we read his recent writings correctly—is having some second thoughts about the New Morality he helped unleash.

As for Mrs. Luce, she made her own position on abortion clear—strongly and publicly—by resigning as a sponsor of the Women’s Lobby in late 1977. (Her letter was printed in the Spring, 1978 issue of this journal.) As always, CBL spoke hard truths. For instance, she told the Lobby “I do not care to be identified with” a pro-abortion campaign “that has already done so much to jeopardize the passage” of the ERA, adding that, if ERA “fails to pass, as I now fear it will, a large part of the blame must fall on those misguided feminists who have tried to make the extraneous issue of unrestricted and federally-funded abortion the centerpiece of the Equal Rights struggle.” How right she was.

But always correct as well: “As you are a sincere and dedicated feminist,” she wrote the group’s president, “I owe it to you and the Women’s Lobby to explain why I am for ERA and, at the same time, against legalized unrestricted abortion.” CBL proceeded to do just that, with her accustomed verbal *panache*. Forgive our inability to resist providing a sample passage:

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It is not the nature of all women to abort their progeny. If it were, the human race would have long since disappeared from the planet. It is natural and normal for women to bring their unborn children to term, and woman has a natural desire to do what nature intended. It is unnatural for woman to interrupt the natural process of pregnancy, in the only way she can do so—by killing the child in her womb.

Induced abortions are against the nature of woman. They are also against the nature of the unborn child, who, like all *living things*, instinctively desires to go on living. (Even a cockroach instinctively tries to evade your lethal foot, and if you half-squash it, tries to crawl away for another second of life.)

There is no logical process of thought by which the unnatural act of induced abortion and the destruction of the unborn child in the womb can be deemed to be a natural right of all women.

The following year, CBL did a similar job on the “New Morality” in a speech to the 1978 IBM Golden Circle Conference in Honolulu. We asked if we could reprint it. No, said Clare, “not good enough.” Clare was not unduly modest. But in her later years, she thought that she could no longer match the powerful *style* that was her trademark—she really didn’t care to promote comparisons. But it *was* fine stuff, and *we* knew her great friend (and long-time Gal Friday) Dorothy Farmer, to whom we placed a not unusual “Please get it for us?” call. In due course the text arrived, with a little note (meant for CBL’s eyes, not ours?) as follows:

Dear Jim McFadden:

With admonition: Clare sends
this even tho’ she insists it is not
suitable for any magazine —
certainly not one of the caliber
of HUMAN LIFE REVIEW.

—Dorothy

We first ran it in our Summer, 1978 issue. As expected, it produced a great deal of mail (did *anybody* ever draw more fan mail than Dear Clare?). And we ran it again (Spring, 1983) after CBL received the Medal of Freedom Citation from President Ronald Reagan for having “served and enriched her country in many fields.” (She sure did.) And predictably, it provoked another handsome response.

If CBL was a fine writer—and she was—she may have been an even *better* speaker: there was no substitute for actually seeing and hearing *La Luce* in person. She was, as everybody knows, a beautiful woman,

with peerless *presence*. Her vocal arsenal ranged from a quiet little-girl coyness to oratorical rockets. And of course she was unfailingly *funny*: she warmed up her IBM audience of “remarkable achievers” by informing them that the invitation to address them

. . . reminded me of a story about Archbishop Sheen, who received a telegram inviting him to deliver an address to a convention on “The World, Peace, War, and the Churches.” He replied: “Gentlemen, I am honored to address your great convention, but I would not want my style cramped by so narrow a subject. However, I would be glad to accept if you will widen the subject to include ‘The Sun and the Moon and the Stars.’” So I finally agreed to talk if I could widen my subject to include, “The Traditional Morality, the New Morality, and the Universal Morality.”

She focused on that Universal Morality which has sustained all viable societies and civilizations throughout history. Its basic unit is the *family*, not the individual. Thus its basic moral code supports *sexual* morality: if *that* breaks down, the society crumbles. “There is no doubt,” CBL said with characteristic finality, “that what most Americans mean when they speak of ‘the new morality’ is the ‘new’ *sexual* morality which holds that ‘anything goes’ [in private] and that almost anything goes in public. The English critic Malcolm Muggeridge had America much in mind when he wrote, ‘Sex is the *ersatz*, or substitute religion of the 20th Century.’” Accept no substitutes, Clare said: any society “obsessed with the pursuit of sensual pleasures” will collapse—Rome was only “the most famous example.” She didn’t need to lecture her business-person audience on the obvious: religion is morality’s *sine qua non*. Her Catholic beliefs were part of her public *persona*.

Not that CBL hesitated to proclaim her Faith—far from it. The last time we heard her speak publicly was at Washington’s National Press Club, on October 24, 1984, only a few days before President Reagan’s landslide re-election. She kept the newsmen in the proverbial stiches, with such as the all-too-sadly-accurate “This is the last time I will ever speak on this platform . . . I am of such an age that it is unlikely that I will be asked to fill in before the next presidential election because all the important speakers are on the road.” Her subject was the then-vexed question of “religion in politics.”

Now all I have to say really is that there is no room to inject religion into politics because there is no possibility whatever that religion can be kept out of politics, and this makes us unique among nations. We all know that. The reason

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we are unique is that, unlike any other nation in the world, we wrote our own scenario for the kind of life we would live as a people and what sort of people we wanted to be. [*Applause*]

We began by announcing in the Declaration of Independence that we had certain rights with which we had been endowed, not by any king, not by any tyrant, but by God Almighty himself, and this was the reason that they could not be taken away from us legally and lawfully.

She went on: “You may be well assured that if God should ever leave . . .”—at this point she was interrupted by a tremendous clangor of pots and dishes crashing in the kitchen. CBL paused dramatically—just long enough (her timing was pure instinct)—then smiled at her hushed, embarrassed-for-her listeners “. . . not only is He not going to leave, but He’s walking right *in* . . .” It brought down the house: the roar of laughter rolled on into a standing ovation, not for the merely-Clare-style *ad lib* but for *her*, the sheer pleasure of her company.

Back to the point. Mrs. Luce believed in America’s unique mission: it was by no means only her Catholicism that made her defend that “undeniable right to life” proclaimed by the Founders. But of course the two loyalties were not unconnected.

So it was not surprising that when her good-and-admired friend (ours too, for that matter) James Jackson Kilpatrick, the well-known author and columnist, dashed off a column which pontificated that abortion was really no more than an issue “hotly pursued by a relatively small group of unusually zealous persons, most of them fervent Catholics”—CBL would man the barricades herself. She called: “Did you *read* Jack Kilpatrick’s column this morning?” We sure did. “Well we *must* answer it.” Her vocal italics were marvellous, but more marvellous to us was that nonchalant “we”—it could only mean *she* would answer it. We could hardly wait.

We didn’t have to wait long. But Kilpatrick’s column had appeared on Sept. 18, 1976, in the midst of Jimmy Carter’s successful presidential campaign. Our final ’76 issue was already on the press, so we could not run her answer until the next (Winter 1977) issue. No matter: CBL’s arguments were always fresh. We have already given you samplings, but we would do her an injustice if we did not also let you read at least one in its entirety. Thus we reprint her “The ‘Kilpatrick Position’” next. And, immediately after it, we’ve added a short letter she

had written to the Honolulu *Advertiser* shortly before.

Ironically, the current *Good Housekeeping* (February '88) carries interviews with former First Ladies. It quotes Rosalynn [Mrs. Jimmy] Carter on abortion: "I really believe [it] should be a religious issue . . . the Constitution calls for separation of church and state. How can you impose through law a religious belief on all people?" So the "Kilpatrick Position" is still with us. How timely to reprint Clare's demolition of it—perhaps Mrs. Carter will read it? It will surely help her understand why CBL was indeed America's Woman of the Century.

Certainly Mrs. Luce—a most famous convert to Roman Catholicism—defended her Church's anti-abortion stand. But as you will see, she totally rejected the notion that abortion was merely a "religious" issue.

In any case, CBL was the antithesis of the notion that Catholics are not allowed to think (that hoary notion *also* remains alive—we'd say it still provides the psychological basis of the "Catholic issue" charge?). Discussing that subject once, we quipped that it reduced to the proposition "Catholics don't believe what they *believe*, they believe what they are *told* to believe." Clare howled. But then she loved other people's jokes as much as her own. She was always on the lookout for fun.

Permit us one illustration. As you can imagine, CBL—staunch advocate of a strong America—was not pleased with the U.S. Catholic Bishops' pastoral letter on nuclear weapons. (New York's Cardinal John O'Connor, who gave a eulogy at her Memorial Mass in St. Patrick's Cathedral, recalled how strongly she had delivered her views to *him*.) But Clare couldn't resist humor: one day her distinctive envelope arrived: we opened it to find the label—complete with Mitre and Stole—from a can of Prelate Brand Pink Salmon, plus CBL's handwritten note: "First the Bishops pink pastoral on Peace, then the pastoral on the Economy, & *now* they are into pink salmon—Holy Mackerel!"

It is hard to resist the temptation to regale you with more such: the quarter century during which we knew Mrs. Luce produced a wealth of amusing, often hilarious, memories. Her letters are strewn with *bon mots*. Perhaps we'll find an opportunity for more later. For now, we'll return to where we began: if she herself could oppose abortion so eloquently—valiantly—why *did* she give us that "lost cause" warning?

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The answer is in another story. Once she was asked: Are you not a pessimist? She answered (as only she could), "The difference between a pessimist and an optimist is that the pessimist has more experience." Mrs. Luce looked hard at the world, and saw clearly. She suffered few illusions. She fought for her beliefs (*not* "feelings"!) without counting on victory, or counting the costs. She believed in that Universal Morality, and thus in *ultimate* victory. We have no doubt that she has won it.

The 'Kilpatrick Position'

Clare Boothe Luce

IN THE 18TH AND 19TH centuries Slavery presented itself to Americans as a multi-dimensional issue. It raised religious, moral, economic, political, legal, and Constitutional questions. But the core question was scientific: Was the negroid race, although clearly belonging to the genus "mankind," nevertheless a sub-human species? Was the black man biologically inferior to the white man, or was he biologically his equal, and consequently entitled to those rights guaranteed by the Constitution to "all men"?

By 1850, it was the consensus among scientists that by all the criteria of biological science, a black man was as "fully human" as a white man. But in 1858, in the famous Dred Scott ruling, the Supreme Court totally ignored the findings of contemporary science, and reflecting the widespread century-old prejudice against blacks, the Taney Court ruled that it was legal for white men to treat black men as property, or as animals of a lower order, and to continue to deny them the constitutional rights accorded white men. Predictably, the Dred Scott controversy spilled over into presidential politics. Lincoln, the anti-slavery candidate, was elected by a plurality, the South seceded, and the Civil War became inevitable.

The constitutional question was finally settled by the passage in 1868 of the 14th Amendment which nullified the Supreme Court's Dred Scott decision. But the deep-rooted emotional bias of many Americans against accepting the biological equality of blacks has continued ever since to poison the moral and political life of the nation, under the rubric of "discrimination." (The recent Butz episode is only the latest example of the persistence of prejudice at the emotional level, even in those who, at the intellectual level, quite sincerely think they are free of it.*)

The abortion question, like the slavery question, also presents itself as a religious, moral, economic, legal, and Constitutional question. And

*Earl L. Butz, a secretary of agriculture in the Ford administration, resigned during the 1976 presidential election campaign, admitting "gross indiscretion" in a remark about blacks.

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curiously enough, it is also essentially a scientific, or biological question.

Is the child *in utero* a human being, a person? Or is a fetus non-human, or sub-human matter, and if so, at what “point in time” does the fetus *become* a human being?

In the 1973 (*Roe and Doe*) abortion decisions, the Burger Court, like the Taney Court, studiously avoided weighing the answers of contemporary science. The Court determined (7-2) that an unborn child is an “it-thing” that does not become “fully human” until, in effect, “it” is born; that as non-human or sub-human life, “it” is solely the property of its mother, who may destroy “it” with impunity, whenever and for whatever reasons she chooses. In short, the Court ruled that the unborn child has no constitutional right to life, or like all other innocent beings, to the protection of the state.

Although legally settled by the Supreme Law of the Land, the abortion question has now spilled over into politics, creating a movement for the passage of a Right to Life amendment that would nullify the Supreme Court’s unlimited abortion decision.

Perhaps the most dismaying aspect of the controversy is that so many intelligent people go intellectually to pieces when confronted with the core question: Is an unborn child a human being? And whether unable, or unwilling to recognize it as the *heart of the matter*, they settle for whatever rationale pops into their heads for sweeping the whole question of abortion under the political rug.

James J. Kilpatrick, one of America’s most respected columnists (and one of my favorite pundits), offers a melancholy example of the curious tendency of many intellectuals to cop out on a question which is not only of profound, even agonizing concern to millions of their fellow citizens, but of extraordinary moral and political significance for the future of America. He writes in a recent syndicated column: “. . . for every person who is absolutely against a right of abortion, or absolutely for a right of abortion, there must be a hundred persons whose *inchoate views lie uneasily in between. I count myself in this large number.*” (Emphasis added.)

Now Jack Kilpatrick has a well-deserved reputation for intellectual integrity. I am inclined to believe that if he felt his views were *inchoate* on any other public issue (political, economic, social, or scientific) he

would wait until he had got his own ducks in a rational row before undertaking to clarify it for his readers. Instead (for painful reasons I shall venture to suggest later), Mr. Kilpatrick chooses to emulate the blind leading the blind.

“It may well be true, as a matter of theology,” he writes, “that a ‘person’ or a ‘human being’ exists from the instant of conception; but the validity of this concept is a matter for theologians and not for presidential candidates.”

Imagine Kilpatrick, while breakfasting with his wife, suddenly remarking, “It may well be true, dear, as a matter of theology, that this egg I am eating became an ‘unborn chicken’ the instant it was conceived by its mother-hen, but the validity of that concept is a question for priests and ministers. I mean, I may be eating an unborn chick, or I may be eating just a Julia Child’s recipe for an omelette. But as my own views on the subject are inchoate, this clearly makes the question of what an egg really *is* a matter for theologians to determine.”

His wife might well reply, “Sorry darling, but if that’s some ‘in’ joke, I don’t get it. Everyone knows an egg is an unborn chicken, even if you can’t taste the feathers. That’s a biological fact, not a theological concept. Dear . . . think you may have a touch of fever?”

It is hard to believe that Jack Kilpatrick (or any educated person) is totally unaware of the overwhelming scientific proof which now exists that human life, like all animal life, is a biological continuum. From the moment of conception to the moment of death, the biologists say, there is *no* point at which a living human organism is *not* a “human being,” be it in the uterine or infantile process of development, or in the process of disintegration called “dying.” Geneticists have now discovered that in the very instant the ovum is fertilized by the sperm, the new human life receives its entire genetic inheritance from the parents: the color of eyes, hair, skin, the shape of nose, ears, mouth, jaw—all the physical characteristics the child will be born with; as well as the intellectual and creative capacities (the “brains” or “talent”) that may (with opportunity) lead in adult life to fame and fortune, or obscurity. Moreover, science asserts that no two inherited genetic structures are exactly alike. No two humans, even identical twins, have identical fingerprints. It is science, not theology, that has now determined that the unborn child,

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however tiny, helpless or “unviable,” is not only a human-in-being, but an utterly unique human-in-being—in short, a person.

The inchoate feeling of a pregnant woman—who, for whatever reasons, does not want to bring her child to term—that the “thing” growing in her belly is not “really human,” does not change her unborn child into a non-human blob of jelly or a “blueprint” for a person.

Nor do Mr. Kilpatrick’s “inchoate views” on abortion change a question of science into a “matter for theologians” to determine.

No one with any intellectual pretensions can ignore the fact that the abortion question (like the slavery question) turns on an *either-or* biological question that cannot be evaded by any honest mind: either the child *in utero* is, from conception, a human life in the process of developing fully into childhood, just as the born infant is a human life in the process of developing fully into adulthood; *or* the unborn child is a non-human form of life which becomes a human being only by virtue of being born. And this is to say that a miracle takes place at the split-second of birth much like the miracle performed by Cinderella’s fairy godmother who, in the twinkling of an eye, changed a pumpkin into a coach and six mice into liveried footmen.

The weight of science is overwhelmingly on the side of the first proposition, and against the Supreme Court’s view that the unborn child is simply disposable tissue (like a wart or tumor) until he or she can live outside the womb. Consequently, if the scientific view is the correct one, the question of abortion *inescapably* becomes a theological question, because it involves not only the taking of human life, but the question of the circumstances in which one person may morally take the life of another.

The Jewish and Christian religions teach that God is the Author of the Commandment *Thou shalt not kill*. But also, as in many other religions, they make notable exceptions. Theologians of all Western faiths are agreed that a person may kill innocently in defense of his or her own life, or the lives of innocent persons, or as in war, in defense of the life of one’s nation and fellow citizens. Otherwise, the willful act of killing—the taking of a life for personal and selfish reasons, has been regarded as the crime of *murder* for thousands of years by all theologians—and up to now by all the governments of the Western nations. But also, the theologians have always recognized extenuating

circumstances, and their theological positions have been reflected in the criminal laws of America. "Killing" can be first or second degree murder, or various less culpable degrees of homicide—manslaughter, killing while temporarily insane, etc.

If, as the scientists say, human life is a continuum from womb to tomb, theologians are required in faith and in conscience to protest against the Supreme Court's virtually *unlimited right of abortion* decision. It is a matter of record that many Protestant and Jewish theologians, as well as Catholics, have protested it. The Rev. Harold Brown, a well-known Evangelical theologian, wrote (in this Review): "The opinion that opposition to abortion stems chiefly from Roman Catholic sources remains widely held, although it is contrary to fact. The overwhelming consensus of the spiritual leaders of Protestantism, from the Reformation to the present, is clearly anti-abortion. There is very little doubt among biblically oriented Protestants that abortion is an attack on the image of God in the developing child and is a great evil."*

And, speaking recently in my hometown, Honolulu, Rabbi Julius J. Nodel told his congregation of Temple Emmanuel, ". . . The disposability of unborn children nowadays is simply another aspect of getting rid of things for which we have no use . . . there is a straight line from disposable things to disposable ideas, to disposable relationships, to disposable lives." Life, the Rabbi said, "is a gift of God . . . an unborn child is not a 'thing' which can be cut off like a fingernail . . . *Judaism vigorously opposes the total disposability of the unborn . . . we do say 'yes' to the inherent sanctity of life, which once created, may be ended only under the most stringent controls, both moral and legal.*" (Emphasis added.)

But *revenons nous a nos moutons*. . . How are we to explain the sheep-like preference shown by so many intellectuals—even by those of known intellectual integrity like Kilpatrick—in refusing to come to grips with the scientific findings about fetal life?

Certainly one reason is that many intellectuals are profoundly concerned about the economic and political threat of overpopulation to America and to the whole world. If the present world birthrate is maintained, by the year 2000 there will be seven billion people on a planet

*Harold O. J. Brown, "Protestants and the Abortion Issue: a Socio-Political Prognostication," *The Human Life Review*, Vol. II, No. 4 (Fall 1976) 131.

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which already seems to be running short of crucial raw materials and food. Many see the increasing quantity of human life as an intolerable threat to the quality of life. So, for humanitarian reasons, they are “uneasily” inclined to feel that although abortion may be the taking of human life, it is nevertheless a relatively simple, unbloody, and—today—popular way of slowing down the birthrate, and maintaining the present high living standard of individual American lives.

In a more optimistic century, the poet Wordsworth wrote:

A child more than all other gifts
that earth can offer to declining man
Brings hope with it, and forward-lookng
thoughts.

Many Americans today are sadly short on hope for both the economic and political future of their posterity. “Eat, drink, be merry—and abort our unborn children, for tomorrow our posterity will die,” is the prevalent doomsday attitude which probably explains why many of our Western intellectuals have copped out on the abortion question.

But there is also something else unmistakably influencing many of those who are quick to sidetrack the abortion question without troubling to think about it: there exists among many intellectuals a strong, emotional anti-Catholic bias that leads them almost automatically to disagree with any moral, legal, or political position that seems to be of more concern to Catholics than to non-Catholics.

Historian Arthur Schlesinger bluntly states that “prejudice” against Catholics is “the deepest bias in the history of the American people.” And many other students of American history agree with him. Adam Walinsky wrote that liberals have more or less consistently “treated defeats of Catholic interests as triumphs over the devil.” Professor Peter Viereck avers that “Catholic-baiting is the ‘anti-Semitism’ of American liberals.”

Mr. Kilpatrick, I regret to say, seems to be one of the heirs of this historic American bias. His anti-Catholic prejudice, certainly unconscious, clearly provides him with his particular rationale for intellectually copping out on the abortion question. The nature of fetal life is a “matter for theologians,” he insists, only to proclaim that theological matters have no place in American politics. “The abortion issue is being hotly pursued by a relatively small group of unusually zealous persons,

most of them fervent Catholics.” But when Catholics claim that there are “valid arguments” against abortion they are talking “arrogant nonsense,” for “Neither the Catholics, nor the members of any other denomination, have a right to impose their theology upon a free people through amendment of the supreme law of the land . . . people can advocate any constitutional folly they have a mind to” but to “write the ‘Catholic position against abortion’ into the Constitution would be profoundly wrong” since the Constitution “flatly forbids any law respecting an establishment of religion.” And when *Catholics* demand that the presidential candidates take a stand against unlimited abortion, Kilpatrick finds that “reason flees the temple.”

* * *

One morning not long ago, when Dr. Mortimer Adler, the philosopher, was visiting me in Honolulu, I came on him in the garden, sitting on a bench and staring somewhat blankly at his feet. Thinking he might be bored I said, “Mortimer, is there something you’d like to do this morning?” “I am doing something,” he replied, “I’m working.” Seeing my puzzlement he explained, “I’m thinking. And that’s the hardest work in the world, because you see, when you really want to think a question through, you’ve got to begin by laying all your own prejudices on the table. And that’s the toughest thing for anyone to do, even for a philosopher.”

Let us suppose that Mr. Kilpatrick, resolved to think the abortion question through, managed to lay his own prejudices on the table. He might then write a column confessing (again) his ignorance of the findings of science on uterine life, and saying it would not be useful to his readers to make a final judgment on the abortion issue until he had *thought through this core question*. Having done so much, he might then tell his readers that, under the Constitution, no Supreme Court ruling is considered infallible. First, historically the Court has been prone to reflect the political mood (and emotional prejudices) of the public, and as the mood changed or new facts emerged, the Court has often reversed itself. Secondly, as in the case of the Dred Scott decision, the Court’s decision has been reversed by amendment to the Constitution when it ceased to reflect a public consensus.

He might also point out that those who say it is “profoundly wrong”

for members of any religious denomination to “impose their theology” on the Constitution have little knowledge of how often this was done by Americans in the days when they were a religious people. He could cite America’s first “sacred” political document, the Declaration of Independence, as the supreme example. The declaration of “these truths we hold” is the statement of a *purely theological position*—namely, that God, the Creator of Man, created all men equal in their humanity and endowed them equally with “certain rights,” for which *precise theological reasons* these rights must be recognized as “unalienable.” The Founding Fathers, God-fearing men, also imposed this theological position, with no Kilpatrickian compunction whatever, on their second “sacred” document, the Constitution.

Another purely theological concept of ancient vintage imposed on the Law of the Land, by a predominately Protestant American people, was the Judeo-Christian concept of monogamous marriage, which they made the only legal form of marriage in the United States.

(In passing, this theological concept was definitely imposed by law by a predominately Protestant Congress on the Mormons in 1862, and upheld by a Supreme Court decision in 1890.)

Mr. Kilpatrick might also remind his readers that the movement to abolish slavery was begun, and for a long time “hotly pursued by a relatively small group” of religious people who were determined to impose their theological position that “all God’s chillun” were equal in His sight on the Constitution. And happily they succeeded in doing so, in the end. Millions of American lives would have been saved if they had “imposed” it when many religious leaders had wanted it imposed—which was some decades earlier.

In an even more philosophical mood, Kilpatrick might point out that not only the legal roots of our political and social system but of our economic system as well lie in the teachings of Judeo-Christian theology. The 8th and 10th Commandments (against stealing and coveting) sanction the ownership and acquisition of private property. These particular Commandments, as any Marxist will tell you, are the origin of the “Capitalistic System.” They are not the least of the reasons why Communists consider the Jewish and Christian religions the enemy of communism, since the first commandment—according to Marx—is: Thou shalt abolish all private property.

CLARE BOOTHE LUCE

Another commandment upheld by Judeo-Christian theologians over the centuries is "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." This theological position is politically reflected today in many of our welfare laws, and in our laws seeking to eliminate discrimination against minorities.

But returning to the abortion question, an unprejudiced Mr. Kilpatrick might point out that all Protestant theologians, until the last few decades, considered abortion, except for sound medical reasons, a crime against both God and Nature, and that most of the state anti-abortion laws, now struck down by the Supreme Court decision, were first put on the books by Protestants.

And, filled with righteous indignation, Kilpatrick might suggest that "reason" indeed "flees the temple" when Catholics are accused of trying to establish their church as the official church of America simply because they continue to support a theological position which many Protestants have abandoned. Finally, Mr. Kilpatrick might recognize the fact that as the majority of Catholics themselves do not practice abortion, clearly their purpose in seeking the passage of a Right to Life amendment is to save the lives of the unborn children of people of *all* faiths and of *no* faith.

Ask Not for Whom the Bell Tolls

Clare Boothe Luce

MANY ARGUMENTS FOR ABORTION have been advanced in letters to the editor of the *Advertiser*. Some have been intellectually more plausible than others. But a pro-abortion argument made on this page last week was so, well, crazy, that I cannot forbear commenting on it.

The writer (whose name I charitably refrain from mentioning), argued the following case for abortion: every child is entitled, at birth, not only to motherlove, but to adequate food, clothing and shelter; and, therefore, an unborn child who may be deprived of these birthrights by an unloving or impoverished mother should be aborted. In short (he argued), A should be killed because if A lives, B may deny A the things to which A is entitled.

The writer who propounded this travesty of justice was, of course, groping toward an idea that has long been familiar to Europeans, but is still new to most Americans, namely, that human beings lose their right to life when (a) their relatives or society feel they would be “better off dead”; and (b) when their relatives or society would be economically better off without them.

This utilitarian idea first made its appearance in 1920 in the democratic Republic of Germany, with the publication of a book called, “The Release of the Destruction of Life Devoid of Value.” The authors were Dr. Alfred Hoche, a distinguished psychiatrist, and Karl Binding, a highly respected jurist. In “Life Devoid of Value,” the learned judge and the brilliant doctor persuasively developed the concept of “worthless human beings,” such as the hopelessly crippled, deformed, and insane. They stressed the misery and futility of such unfortunate lives, and the cruel economic burden they represented to their relatives and society. German “intellectuals” quickly bought the idea as being both humane and socially practical, possibly because at that time, the “good German folk” were staggering under the blows of the post-World War I inflation-depression.

Mrs. Luce wrote this letter to the Honolulu Advertiser; it appeared in that paper's "Other Voices" column on Sept. 13, 1976. —Ed.

CLARE BOOTHE LUCE

The medical program began with the abortion of women, and sterilization of both sexes with “hereditary” diseases, among which German doctors listed imbecility, insanity, deafness, dumbness, blindness, epilepsy, and alcoholism. But the program was soon enlarged to permit “mercy killings” as a “final solution” to the problem of humans “devoid of value.”

In the beginning, only seriously deformed or mentally retarded children were “put out of their misery.” Later, children born with any imperfections, such as hare-lips, club feet, crooked spines, and children who showed withdrawn or hysterical behavior were dispatched to their careless Creator.

Most of these children were from poor families, or were war orphans.

By the time Hitler came on the scene, the concept of taking lives “devoid of value” had made enormous progress. Hospital records show that by 1935, 375,000 innocent Germans had been sterilized, and more than 250,000 had been “mercifully killed”—among them many World War I amputees and basket cases.

The German medical and legal professions had become so accustomed to expansions of the euthanasia program that when the Fuehrer discovered that Jews were also “devoid of value,” and parasites on the German economy, there was very little public protest.

Easy, you see, does it. Moreover, these things are done so quietly, so scientifically, so mercifully, in the hospitals that few but the doctors and the victims ever know much about them.

Launched in the 1920s as a humane undertaking, the “life devoid of value” program ended in the 1940s with the slaughter of 6 million Jews.

And easy may do it, too, in America.

For the first time in American history, the Supreme Court has now used its judicial power to decree that a human being who is innocent of any crime may be killed with impunity.

In its 1973 *Roe-Doe* decisions, the Supreme Court denied the right of the unborn child to life on the grounds that a child who cannot live outside the womb is not (in the language of the court) “fully human”; or “capable of meaningful life.” And it turned the right to kill any

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unborn child, unwanted by the mother, over to the medical profession. Since the Supreme Court decision, American doctors have sucked, scraped and cut 3 million unwanted babies from the wombs of their mothers.

All jurists now agree that the court's abortion decisions have laid the foundation for the legalization of euthanasia, or the killing of people medically judged to be "incapable of meaningful life," such as mongoloid idiots, imbeciles, and terminally ill, senile melancholics, stroke victims living like "vegetables," and—well, what sort of people, besides unwanted babies, do you think, dear reader, would be "better off dead?"

Be patient: Euthanasia is coming. And as political tensions increase, and the economic demands of the people in a declining economy grow fiercer, and taxes for supporting the "unwanted" grow higher, the list of the legally wasteable will grow longer. And who knows? One day you may find yourself on it.

The London *Spectator* on Abortion

Fifteen years ago, the Supreme Court inflicted on our nation the most “permissive” abortion laws in the Western world: in effect, the *Roe* decision mandated abortion on demand up until live birth—and opened the legal doors (as Mrs. Luce has reminded us) to infanticide, euthanasia, and God alone knows what next (eugenics, surely?).

Great Britain had “liberalized” its abortion law six years previously. The 1967 Abortion Act was introduced by Mr. David Steel (who later became the leader of the Liberal Party); it allowed abortion through the 28th week of pregnancy. At that time, supporters of the Act argued that it would *reduce* the number of abortions. In fact, the numbers have more than tripled. And the opposition to abortion has sharply increased.

Late last year a young MP, Mr. David Alton, introduced into Parliament a new bill to reduce the time limit to 18 weeks. It provoked an immediate storm of controversy. The London *Economist* ran an article (Oct. 31) headlined “The turn of the tide”—*no* question mark. It said that Mr. Steel’s 1967 Act had replaced the previous “fierce law” which had been “widely disobeyed,” adding: “To many, some disapproving, [the 1967 Act] symbolized the new-found social and sexual freedom—above all, for women—of the 1960s.”

But since then, the *Economist* continued, some three million British women have had abortions, and the new law has also been “widely disobeyed.” More, “the spirit of the 1960s has gone.” And, while to some Mr. Alton’s new bill “may look like a response to the medical advances that have made it possible to keep much younger fetuses alive” in fact “the battle will be fought on far wider grounds. This is the new-old morality of the 1980s on the warpath.”

The Alton Bill has indeed been fought on “wider grounds.” For instance, the fact that Mr. Alton is a 36-year-old bachelor and a Roman Catholic has become a major factor (no surprise to us over here!).

The prestigious London *Spectator* has run a number of articles on the debate which we think will be of considerable interest to American readers. Therefore we are reprinting three of them here (with permission, ©1987 *The Spectator*/NYTSS). The third one is by the eminent Historian Paul Johnson, whose books have been best-sellers in the U.S.; he is a regular *Spectator* columnist. —Ed.

The Chance of a Lifetime

Mary Kenny

If David Alton's Private Member's Bill—to be presented in the House of Commons on 28 October—fails to reform the Abortion Act, it will prove in practice what has usually been held in theory: that this is a subject impervious to compromise. "There are only two logical positions on abortion," Professor Peter Huntingford, the radical pro-feminist gynaecologist, once told me. "One is that you favour the woman's right to choose at any stage in the pregnancy. The other is that you maintain the child's right to life from the start. Logically, there is nothing in between."

In logic, this is perhaps the case, and yet Alton's proposal *does* try to offer a compromise, in the classical English tradition. It suggests that abortion should continue to be legal, but that it should not be performed after 18 weeks' gestation. In this compromise, it probably broadly reflects public opinion which has shown itself—through opinion polls—to favour legal abortion, but not too much of it, and above all not too late. The anti-abortion groups are behind David Alton in his measure, and their support represents a considerable concession on their part, for by agreeing to a legal limit of 18 weeks—the present deadline is 28 weeks, or seven months' gestation—they are in effect admitting the principle of early abortion.

Watching the attacks on David Alton, which have started and will continue until he is defeated—and he probably will be—is a hurtful business, for anyone sympathetic to him, as I am. Old myths are dragged up; statistics about back-street abortion from the 1930s are put forward as being contemporary; outright fibs are told; public figures trot out unfeeling slogans.

Here are some of them:

"The Abortion Act is working perfectly well as it is." Thus spake Kenneth Clarke, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, in self-satisfied tones. Well, the Abortion Act is working perfectly well if you are talk-

This article appeared in the Oct. 17, 1987, issue of *The Spectator* and is reprinted here with permission (©1987 *The Spectator*/NYTSS).

MARY KENNY

ing about productivity, that is, the number of women seeking abortions increases every year. The most recent government figures show that abortion increased from 141,000 in 1985 to 146,200 in 1986 for British residents. Who would now stand behind Sir Dugald Baird's prediction, made in *Observer* headlines in 1966: "As soon as contraception is free and easily available, there will scarcely be any further need for abortion"? For despite free and easily available contraception, despite the AIDS alarms which have made condoms more accessible and more acceptable than ever, "unwanted" and "unplanned" pregnancy is ever more commonplace. The abortion industry is working very well indeed in the light of free market enterprise; a nice little earner; a nice little earner of foreign "investment" too, since so many of the clients come from overseas; and high turnover, annually going up.

"The numbers involved [in late abortion] are so small as to be insignificant," Dr. Wendy Savage, the feminist gynaecologist, has said. The annual numbers involved in abortions after 19 weeks' gestation were, at the last count, 5,665; over a thousand of these were done at 23-24 weeks which is now the point where the baby has the possibility of surviving outside the womb. Of the 5,665 late terminations, 550 were done because the foetus was likely to be handicapped. The percentage of abortions done in England and Wales, since 1968, for genuine reasons to save the life of the woman was 0.005 (Hansard Written Answers, 1 July 1987).

Suppose we said about capital punishment, "The numbers likely to be hanged are insignificant"; suppose we said about children untreated for cancer, "The numbers involved are insignificant"; suppose we said of Asians attacked by National Front thugs, "But the numbers involved are insignificant."

Men, Miss Polly Toynbee tells us in the *Guardian*, have no entitlement to legislate about women's lives. It was arrogant beyond measure, she said, for a male-dominated Parliament even to think about restricting the Act. This claim covers a serious fiction, for if Parliament were dominated by women, we can be certain that we would have much more conservative laws on most moral issues, including abortion. Everywhere it has been found that men are more pro-abortion than women. The anti-abortion movements are hugely supported by women, while the pro-abortion national media is still directed by men.

There would be, we are told, a return to back-street abortion if there were any chipping away of abortion rights. I think it is likely that abortion would continue to take place if it were banned altogether. But you just cannot perform a “back-street” abortion on a woman who is beyond 18 weeks’ pregnancy any more than you could consider performing a “back-street” appendectomy. “Early abortion and late abortion are two such different procedures that they should be called by two different names,” says Malcolm Potts of International Planned Parenthood—and an energetic campaigner himself for permissive early abortion. An early abortion (before 12-13 weeks’ gestation) takes a few minutes; it is easy to disturb an early pregnancy—as the rate of miscarriage in the early weeks illustrates. Back-street abortions took place in the past because in early pregnancy the basic procedure only entails introducing an irritant into the cervix—yes, it was done with knitting needles, crochet hooks and even washing-up liquid—though of course it is dangerous to the woman. But late abortion involves, quite often, a ten-hour induced labour; you need prostaglandin drugs which induce labour; you need a trained midwife to monitor the delivery of the foetus, and an incinerator to dispose of what is now a small dead body. You require hospital or clinic conditions for a late abortion.

The cases put before us of desperate mothers of 12 children killing themselves through self-administered late abortions, in appalling social conditions, are without any perspective of these social circumstances. Mr. Pat Wall, the socialist MP for Bradford North said recently on *Any Questions* that such cases would be typical if abortion were restricted. He was talking of the 1930s, when there was no social welfare to speak of for poor families, when there was little contraception and ghastly health found among women and children.

That was a time when there were children with rickets in South Wales and women in the Gorbals so shrunk with hunger that obstructed labours were a commonplace. But how should a socialist react to such a picture? Why, improve the damnable conditions! “This woman,” went on Mr. Wall, speaking of the dead mother-of-12, “was also being knocked about by her husband.” So it is all right, is it, for men to be violent to their wives, just so long as they have recourse to abortion?

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There are many more parrot-cries. “No one likes abortion.” Actually, some people do not mind it at all, and will use it as a form of contraception simply because it is there. Why else would the numbers go on increasing—even though the fertile population is falling—if it were not an easy option for some people? “I’ve had eight abortions,” a fashion designer told me lightly. “But then I’ve had such wonderful lovers.” Some gynaecologists also like doing abortions; the money can be very rewarding and it gives a certain type of man power over women.

“It’s a woman’s body and it is her choice what she does with it.” But there comes a point when the law does not allow you to do what you like with your body. You are not permitted to pump your body full of hard drugs out of personal choice. You are not given the open choice of euthanasia—though I daresay that will come, too. A homosexual Canadian airline steward who died of AIDS—in a famous inquest just revealed in North America—went on infecting his many sexual partners although he knew he was fatally stricken with the disease. When asked why, as he lay dying, he replied with the same philosophy: “It’s my body. It was my choice.” But that does not make it right.

Of course, in abortion as in anything else, there are hard cases. There are women who do not find out that they are pregnant until the pregnancy has progressed into the second trimester (after 13 weeks); it occasionally happens that menstruation continues during the initial stages of pregnancy.

There are women who are refused abortions in the early stages. There are women who find it very difficult to make up their minds, and let the pregnancy drift on. There are women whose circumstances change—a boyfriend deserts them, they lose a job, their parents turn against them. But however unfortunate a woman is in these events, there still must come a stage when it is too late to terminate the pregnancy because the baby is so developed. In Luton, in 1983, a woman 33 weeks pregnant managed to get an “abortion,” though by sheer fluke the baby survived. The simple common-sense reason for lowering the present 28 weeks’ gestation (a normal pregnancy is 40 weeks) is that medical technology has enabled babies to survive earlier and earlier, and similar medical technology—the ultrasound scanner in

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particular—has brought about a revolution in knowledge about the unborn child

We know, for example, that a foetus of 19 weeks and over, is capable of feeling and of suffering. I have sat with women undergoing late abortions, during their protracted labours, while the foetus writhes through its death agony. It is a horrible experience for a woman and barbaric to developed foetal life. It is not nice to speak of these things, because they are distasteful, and some call the concern we feel “sentimental” and “emotional”; but it happens under our “perfectly well-working” abortion law and it is repugnant.

The pro-abortionists are the Bourbons of social thinking. They refuse to learn anything new, or take any new data on board. They refuse to compromise through doctrinaire adherence to old positions. I see their point—compromise is painful. It does not come easy to anyone with convictions or commitment. It always entails loss of ground. Some pro-life supporters may also hope in their hearts that the Alton Bill will fail, because its success would remove the strongest argument against abortion. But in the end, it seems to me to be preferable to halve the suffering involved in late abortion than to lose an argument.

Turning Abortion's Tide

The Spectator

Feminists, certainly older feminists, are in favour of abortion. They therefore oppose Mr. David Alton's Bill, which will be debated in the House of Commons next Wednesday. His proposal is a simple clause preventing abortion after 18 weeks (the present limit is 28 weeks, the highest in the world). Interviewing Mr. Alton in the *Guardian*, Miss Polly Toynbee wrote:

Yet again we are treated to the disgusting spectacle of a virtually all-male House of Commons pontificating sanctimoniously on when and how women must or must not give birth to children.

Never mind that it was an equally male House of Commons in 1967 that liberalised abortion in a way approved of by Miss Toynbee. She pressed on:

I thought long and hard before I asked him [Mr. Alton] the next question but it seems to me that in this matter, it is relevant as in few others. I asked if he were a homosexual.

Despite having "thought long and hard," Miss Toynbee nowhere explained why the question was relevant. She merely blamed Mr. Alton's attitudes on the "misogyny" of the Christian religion.

The assumption that abortion is an escape-route for women persecuted by men underlay an article against Mr. Alton's Bill by Miss Annabel Ferriman, the *Observer* health correspondent, but her conclusion worked against her beliefs. She wrote:

If all the three million women who had had an abortion since the Act was passed wrote to their MPs supporting it, their letters would far outweigh the lobbying campaign planned by the anti-abortionists. But because so many of them have ambivalent feeling about their own experiences, that will never happen and change may come about by default.

Why do these "ambivalent feelings" exist? Is the absence of three million letters really a "default"?

Shortly after Miss Toynbee's article, the *Guardian* commissioned an opinion poll on Mr. Alton's Bill. Last Friday, with commendable frank-

This editorial appeared in the Oct. 24, 1987, issue of *The Spectator* and is reprinted here with permission (©1987, *The Spectator*/NYTSS).

ness, it published the results as its main story. Only 15 per cent of those questioned wanted the limit to stay as high as it is. Fifty-one per cent of women said that it should be reduced to 18 weeks, as against 37 per cent of men. These findings should not surprise anyone, but one suspects that they have surprised Miss Toynbee and her allies. They help to expose the extraordinary moral *cul-de-sac* occupied by feminism and "liberal" ideas over the past 30 years.

Abortion is a man's solution, not a woman's. For a man it is, literally, painless. It is a convenience which absolves him of future responsibilities at very low cost. It fits into a pattern of exploitation which one would think feminists would recognize—sleep with a girl, then refuse to live with the consequences, make sure, indeed, that the consequences cannot live at all. Prostitute women, make money out of them by pornography, divorce them when they get old and ugly, deny them or encourage them to deny themselves the fruit of their womb: all these actions go together. Abortion is an instrument of male power over women.

For a woman, however, abortion must at least be, in Miss Ferriman's words, "ambivalent." It hurts. It distresses. It requires a decision which a man is always able to avoid. It means having to refuse the creative role unique to the female sex. Surely, then, abortion is an attack on what it is to be a woman? Surely feminists should see that it is an attack which comes mainly from men?

With the opposition to Mr. Alton's Bill, we are confronted with a weird spectacle. People who genuinely believe in the freedom and dignity of women find themselves arguing not just for a *status quo* which permits early abortion in some circumstances, but for one which also permits babies old enough to be capable of life outside the womb to be killed inside it. The right to choose death seems to be a jewel in the crown of the liberation of women. The word "human" is often linked with the word "right." The arguments of the pro-abortionists sever that link.

Supporters of Mr. David Steel's abortion bill in 1967 believed that a more liberal law would not lead to more abortion. They saw it as one weapon in the armoury of enlightenment which also included more sex education and the greater spread of contraception. In their hygienic view of life, more knowledge and more professional counselling were

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bound to make people more "sensible." Sexual problems only arose from the ignorance and superstition of the past. Twenty years of enlightenment have now gone by and yet abortion has increased. In 1969, there were 54,000 abortions in England and Wales. In 1985, there were 172,000.

There has never been a time when people have known as much as they now do about sex. There has also never been a time of so much child abuse, illegitimacy, abortion and divorce. Is it not possible that the breaking down of taboo has also broken down a moral tradition which enabled people, though poor, to cherish new life? A society which offers abortion or childbirth as almost equally acceptable alternatives does not do away with the sad phenomenon of an unwanted child. It makes children more likely to be unwanted. It encourages picking and choosing, throwing away those who might, for example, be disabled, as a stallholder might throw away bruised fruit. It allows the value of a future life to be assessed according to other people's criteria, and gives no independent right to that life at all.

Mr. Alton's Bill will only prevent the most grisly aspects of abortion. It will not greatly reduce the overall numbers. But it will begin the turning of the tide. Put the question this way: are you proud that three million foetuses have died in your country since 1967, or are you ashamed? If ashamed, support Mr. Alton.

When Is a Foetus Disposable?

Paul Johnson

NO RECENT ISSUE HAS PRODUCED so much passion in the press as David Alton's Bill, presented to Parliament on 28 October, to cut the time-limit on abortions from 28 to 18 weeks. A few days before the Bill was tabled, *Today* set the tone by devoting its front page to a striking photograph of an 18-week-old baby, still in the womb but unquestionably a human being, under the headline: "5,000 like him are killed each year." This picture has undoubtedly done the abortionists' case a lot of damage and they are furious about it.

In the *Sunday Times*, Simon Jenkins asserted that the image was "being peddled round the desks of Fleet Street." Its "true purpose," he complained, was to "use sentiment and horror" to secure "the eventual repeal of the 1967 Act." I would have thought the object was rather different: to bring home to people exactly what abortion involves, the killing of a living person. Jenkins claimed on behalf of the Act that it "has sent perinatal mortality plummeting." It has also disposed of more than three million foetuses, the vast majority of whom would otherwise now be alive.

Jenkins, incidentally, disproves the common view that this is a male-female argument. The abortionist lobby is getting a lot of support in the press from men. Clement Freud (also in the *Sunday Times*) called the Alton Bill "astonishingly foolish," an abandonment of "the fundamental principles of liberalism." He added: "I can think of no more illiberal, illogical act than to legislate for the sanctity of the unborn child," when an MP gets the chance, by coming near the top in the private members' ballot, "to do something constructive." In the *News of the World*, Woodrow Wyatt insisted that whether or not to kill the foetus "must be a matter for the doctors and women concerned," not "for the 36-year-old Mr Alton, who isn't even married."

Do I detect a smear there? The fact of Alton's unmarried status has been a recurrent theme of the pro-abortionists. In an interview with

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Alton in the *Guardian*, Polly Toynbee brought the smear into the open. Having worked herself up by dwelling on “the disgusting spectacle of the virtually all-male House of Commons pontificating sanctimoniously on when and how women must or must not give birth to children,” she went on: “I thought long and hard before I asked [Alton] the next question but it seems to me that in this matter it is relevant as in few others. I asked if he were a homosexual.” The reason she felt it was relevant was that “within all churches there has always been the strongest streak of misogyny,” which springs from “a fount of woman-hating passion that begins with the first chapter of Genesis and Eve in the Garden of Eden. For that reason I regard both his religion and his sexuality as a relevant issue.”

Writing in the *Daily Express*, “as a mother of three,” Harriet Harman MP denounced Alton as a Catholic, “single” and, even worse, as someone “who has had no involvement with the children’s lobby.” Julia Langdon, in the *Daily Mirror*, also pitched into Alton’s sex. He was, she wrote, “the latest in the long and wearisome line of MPs who are attempting to amend the abortion law. Men, of course, every one of them, and men who describe themselves, curiously in my view, as ‘Pro-life.’”

Why curiously? Surely the essence of the anti-abortion case is that you cannot make an artificial distinction between the sanctity of life just before, and just after, birth. Julia Langdon evidently thinks you can. In her article she described how she had a late abortion to rid herself of a foetus which tests showed would become a Down’s Syndrome baby. She added: “Not for a single moment have I ever regretted that decision,” and she is “suffused with resentment and anger” at people who would have denied her “that choice.” She says she now has a five-month-old daughter and her “joy in my newly-achieved motherhood is immeasurably increased by the fact that upstairs, or in a special hospital somewhere, she does not have a disabled three-year-old elder sister.” But what if a baby with Down’s Syndrome is actually born? Would the mother be justified in having it killed then? Julia Langdon does not discuss the key moral issue: the precise point at which, in the opinion of the pro-abortionists, it ceases to be right to kill. Is it the moment of birth?

In an article in this journal on 17 October, Mary Kenny quoted the pro-feminist gynaecologist, Dr. Peter Huntingford, as giving a straight answer to the question, or at least setting out the moral alternatives plainly. According to him, “There are only two logical positions on abortion. One is that you favour the woman’s right to choose at any stage in the pregnancy. The other is that you maintain the child’s right to life from the start.” That is fair enough, except that I would replace “the woman’s right to choose” with the more accurate words “right to kill or have killed.”

The “right to choose” phrase, beloved of fierce women journalists and feminists generally, is peculiarly obnoxious because it associates having children (or not) with the notion of shopping and “consumer choice”; a child in the womb is “disposable,” like panty-hose or plastic cartons. In an article in the *Guardian*, Dr. Pamela Sims objected to this “consumer-oriented attitude” to unborn life. She included in this approach the increasing use of what she termed “quality control” tests “to detect genetic abnormalities at an early stage of pregnancy,” with the implication that it is necessary to destroy the abnormal—that is, the sub-standard. Yet, she adds, “civilized societies have always tried to protect the weak and care for the sick.” She suggests that what is wrong with our society today is “an abortion mentality.”

Pamela Sims and Mary Kenny are not the only women advocates of the anti-abortion case. There are many others, though they tend to be ambivalent or to impose conditions. Thus Fay Weldon, writing in the *Evening Standard*, insisted changes in the adoption laws should accompany the Alton Bill: “Pass your bloody Bill, Mr. Alton, and with my blessing, but look to the consequences or you’ll go to Hell.” Indeed the claim that the right to abortion is a woman’s issue is not backed by such evidence as we possess. A recent *Guardian* survey showed that a substantial majority of women, young and old alike, favoured changes on the lines of the Alton Bill. In any case, the feminist notion that only women should determine this issue is easily refuted. Writing in the *Daily Mail*, George Gale pointed out: “Men are as entitled as women to argue the matter, not because as fathers they have property rights in the foetus—the child is no more the property of the father than it is of the mother—but because it is a moral issue.” According to Gale, the notion

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of the mother's right to kill is "a modern obscenity." He added: "The very last thing a woman has the *right* to kill is the child she carries in her womb. But that child has a right, a very natural right, to enjoy the care and protection of its mother. It is the duty of men, as well as women, to assert that right."

The Decline of Personhood

John Wauck

SOMETHING IS WRONG WITH PERSONHOOD in America. Seldom more discussed or less clearly understood, it is becoming detached from biological humanity and from the legal protection it is thought to confer. The blame must fall upon the Supreme Court's *Roe v. Wade* decision, for in *Roe* the "uncertain" personhood of the fetus served to suspend judgment about the morality of abortion—to suspend the conscience of the nation—while the demand for abortion was satisfied. The reasoning behind the decision was that, while we may not know if abortion is right or wrong, we do know what some women want; a woman's desire for abortion, unlike the immorality of abortion or the personhood of the fetus, is an unquestionable fact.

But the Court's question about personhood turns out to be, depending upon one's interpretation, either meaningless or irresponsible. It is a red herring from legal and moral points of view. It has confused the public debate on abortion and undermined the traditional relationship between human persons and rights. And the suspended judgment about what is a person and what is not—about what is right and wrong with regard to human life at any stage—has been difficult to retrieve.

Although legal personhood is commonly thought to reflect some essential personhood that is immune from the vagaries of legislation (we would not, for example, trust legislation which denied that mailmen are persons), the *Roe* court claimed that the personhood of the fetus was undecidable, and yet went on to decide the case. The rights of the fetus were not judged according to its personhood, but according to its mother's privacy. Avoiding a definition of "person," the court tried to skirt the personhood of the fetus and the morality of abortion by placing them in the realm of privacy, beyond the reach of any law. But personhood has never really been a matter of a definition (neither agreed upon nor even debated) but an unspoken understanding embodied in a common praxis. And this the court trampled. Because the majority refused to say anything clear about the object of the legislation

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(the fetus), it demonstrated only the Court's willingness to allow abortion, and the nature of the fetus became merely a matter of what the law allows.

The Court's decision exposed a disturbing truth: a substantial part of our society no longer trusts the old understanding, with its theological "baggage," and the traditional practice. The Court lost confidence in the tradition's persuasive power and drew back from expressing it in the law. But without agreement on what a person is, we find ourselves unsure of what we are protecting and why. The consequences of the old view, the superstructure and trappings of the old ethical edifice, are still with us, but they are like standing facades on a Hollywood back-lot. They are only as convincing as our willing suspension of disbelief makes them. It suits our purpose for now to live *as if*: as if, for instance, we believed that God created men equal, though, in fact, whether any God created anything at all is very much a matter of opinion today. All men may still be equal, but most men would be hard-pressed to offer a rational explanation why. We have what amounts to a taboo against denying equal rights to persons—but haven't we outgrown taboos?

And now, more than ever, we need solid criteria to judge not only abortion but also all the "life issues" that clamor for guidance: euthanasia, surrogate motherhood, genetic manipulation, fetal cell transplants, etc. But without a clear understanding of the human person and its rights, bio-ethics is adrift, pushed along by technological developments and inevitable human drives for profit, power, and pleasure—facts of nature that are, like a woman's desire to abort, less debatable and more substantial than our qualms. It will be difficult to regain our moral footing, for it will require that we rethink the foundations of our human rights: What is a human person and why does anything deserve rights?

In its *Roe v. Wade* decision, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: "If . . . personhood is established, the appellant's case [the woman's demand for abortion], of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the (14th) Amendment." This statement seems to reveal the basis for the Court's eventual decision to strike down all state laws against abortion: we cannot say that the fetus has rights because we do not know if the fetus is a person. As a consequence, the strategy of the anti-abortion movement has been to argue

that the fetus *is* a person, and is thus protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

But what exactly did the Court mean when it said that “personhood” had to be established before rights were recognized? And how would it be established? Perhaps the Court meant simple legal personhood by which a person is a subject with rights before the law. But then the rationale behind the decision is this: we do not know if the fetus has rights because we do not know if it is a subject with rights—a tautology masquerading as an argument. Such personhood is a legal artifact; it is not proved, a legislature makes it.

No one is bashful about defining legal personhood. It is routinely defined to designate which subjects will have legal standing in certain cases. For example, the New York Penal Law simply defines “person” to conform to the legislature’s intentions. Under the section on general criminal law, the penal code reads, “a person is a human being”; under the section on homicide, it reads, “a person is a human being who is born and alive”—a qualification which, if it is not completely gratuitous, suggests that the unborn are, generally speaking, human beings.

Before the law, a legal person is not logically prior to rights; the two are synonymous. Legal personhood is established by the recognition of rights. Strictly speaking, all the state sees when it looks at what it calls a legal person is a collection of rights and responsibilities, as is obvious in the case of corporations, which are also legal persons. The only way the state can decide a question of legal personhood is by recognizing or not recognizing rights. The Supreme Court claimed to be unable to answer the vexing question of fetal personhood, but if it was referring to legal personhood, its refusal to recognize rights for the fetus was an unequivocal answer—to a question that did not need to be asked.

Shortly after *Roe v. Wade*, John H. Ely, then dean of Harvard University Law School, wrote:

the argument that fetuses lack constitutional rights [the legal personhood issue] is simply irrelevant. For it has never been held or even asserted that the state interest needed to justify forcing a person to refrain from an activity, *whether or not that activity is constitutionally protected*, must implicate either the life or the constitutional rights of another person. Dogs are not “persons in the whole sense” nor have they constitutional rights, but that does not mean the state cannot prohibit killing them in the exercise of the First Amendment right of political protest. Come to think of it, draft cards aren’t persons either.

To the argument that the fetus is not a person protected by the Fourteenth Amendment there are many objections, and one irrefutable response: So what? It does not have to be. There are numerous protections that do not depend upon personhood. Turning the tables on those who would find a right to abort in the fertile “penumbras” of the Fourteenth Amendment, Archibald Cox recently observed:

Respect for the paramount sanctity of human life lies at the center of Western civilization. However narrowly one defines life itself—however uncertain one may be about the correct definition—protecting the penumbra, “near-life” or “life-becoming,” would seem to promote that central public purpose.

Of course, the protection of life in the womb is hardly penumbral; it stands upon the entire medical and religious tradition of the West, as well as upon volumes of legal precedent. The Supreme Court prematurely threw the abortion debate into the court of last resort, the strongest protection our law knows: the protection due to persons. But if the Court meant legal persons, this is redundant, for legal personhood is not a source but a consequence of personal rights.

So what sort of personhood did the Court find so problematic and crucial to the abortion decision? Perhaps the Court was referring to the broader, essential personhood, “full humanity,” the quality of being a “someone” rather than a “something,” that is commonly supposed to precede legal personhood. But it would be disingenuous for the Court to ask that this personhood be established without offering a definition (imagine the Court demanding that “snooplehood” be proved—obviously an impossible task without a definition of “snooplehood”). The dictionary will tell you that a person is an individual human being, but once you have said that the fetus is a being and is human—an argument that has not swayed the Court—what more proof can be offered?

In fact, this essential personhood, the quality of being a human being, has never been an issue in American law—not even in the case of slavery. Blacks were always assumed to be persons in this sense. The Constitution repeatedly refers to blacks as “persons”: “no person held to service of labor”; “three-fifths of all other persons”; “the migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit”—these phrases all refer to black slaves as “persons.” The question was whether this personhood always and every-

where involved legal rights, whether the basic and undeniable personhood of blacks was, as Justice Taney argued in *Dred Scott*, somehow “inferior.”

The Fourteenth Amendment was an attempt to equate this essential personhood, basic humanity, with the strict legal personhood of citizenship. The Amendment uses the word “person” in the same loose way that the Constitution does, not arguing but simply assuming that blacks are persons: “All persons born or naturalized in the U.S. and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the U.S. and the state wherein they reside.” It does not discuss the essential or legal personhood of blacks *per se*; instead it refers to all people as if everyone’s citizenship were equally in question. Its language simply transfers a Federal protection already in the Fifth Amendment to the state level. Likewise, the Thirteenth Amendment, which outlaws slavery in the United States, does not mention any human or legal persons; it does not mention blacks at all. It simply forbids slavery, as if abortion were outlawed—as it always was outlawed—without any reference to the personhood of the fetus.

There is no legal argument that will prove that blacks are “person enough” to have rights, that the obviously human black slave must be a legal person before the state. The question was not whether blacks are men, but whether, in fact, all men are created equal. This is why Abraham Lincoln had to appeal beyond the Constitution to the Declaration of Independence. It was democracy itself—the equality of all men in society—that was at stake. And the question was settled, as it had to be, out of court—on the battlefield. The answer was never *proved* at all; the nation stopped asking the question. As in the American Revolution, the establishment of full democratic rights in the Civil War required that the principles of strict self-determination, pluralism, and rights based on the mutual consent of free individuals be set aside in favor of a little *real politik*; and so genuine democracy had to be forced upon the South.

Although our Declaration of Independence is clear about where the rights of men come from—“endowed by their Creator”—there is no attempt to prove this theological premise. Neither deduced nor derived from authority, it is simply asserted. It is “self-evident.” The day-to-day

workings of our democracy depend on respect for this self-evidence. Fundamental doubts about it—are men really *created* equal? what if it is not convenient to live *as if*? why protect human life in the first place?—cannot be raised at a socially significant level without serious repercussions. In the past it has taken more than sound arguments to restore lost self-evidence. Now, when many would reject the Declaration’s theology, it is more important than ever to respect its self-evidence, to avoid stirring up the fundamental doubts that do exist, lest we find ourselves, without any justification for our freedoms, at the mercy of sundry powers: the ideology *du jour*, the majority, the courts, the money that can influence them.

A sure sense of human dignity must come before democracy. Likewise, a common understanding of personhood must precede any attempt to legislate rights for persons. One must know what a person is before knowing what the Fourteenth Amendment means. But how do we establish this personhood? We do not ask if a newborn baby is a person; it is presumed to be a person, because it has always been considered a person. For personhood, we rely upon our civilization’s traditions, precedent. It is our only real criterion: what has been treated like a person—the minority opinions of tyrants and racists notwithstanding—will be a person.

To speak of this essential personhood is to appeal beyond and before the law, to the authority of a tradition which our legal system usually respects. This tradition is invoked, for instance, when the Supreme Court wants to invalidate laws against contraception because they violate the “sacred precincts” of the marital bedroom and (in the words of Justice Douglas) “a right to privacy older than the Bill of Rights.” How ironic that this appeal to our sense of the sacred beyond the Constitution, to privacy, should make abortion legal, while an appeal beyond the Constitution to the “sacred precincts” of the womb would be unacceptable in court, though surely the right to life in the womb (“older than the Bill of Rights”) has been as respected as any right to privacy.

By common understanding, a newborn baby is a person. It can’t drive; it can’t drink; it can’t speak, assemble, or vote—but it has this one right: the right to life. Later it will enjoy other rights, but for now it has only one inviolable possession that is all its own, its life. And if this traditional recognition of a single right, the right to live, in newborn

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babies, is enough to render their legal personhood inviolable (here, in an especially stark way, legal personhood, essential personhood, and the single right to life are synonymous), why can we not apply the same test to the fetus, which traditionally enjoyed the same right to live? True, sometimes some nations have been less opposed to abortion, but then some nations have killed newborn babies, Jews, and black slaves—minority opinions.

The tradition of respecting life in the womb is as old as Western civilization itself. For thousands of years, doctors took the Hippocratic Oath, which explicitly forbids abortion. The earliest Christian code of morals, the *Didache*, written around the year 100, states plainly: “Thou shalt not kill the fetus by abortion.”

Far from casting doubts, biological discoveries strengthened the protection of the fetus. After von Baer’s 1827 discovery of the ovum, for instance, the American Medical Association decided that abortion laws needed to be stricter, to reflect our fuller understanding of conception. An AMA report in 1859 condemned abortion, referring to the “slaughter of countless children,” the “sanctity of fetal life,” and the “unjustifiable destruction of human life.” (One would suppose that if the Supreme Court can unblushingly wrap condoms in a “sacred” right of privacy, the AMA can speak with equal authority—and, one hopes, more experience—of the “sanctity” of fetal life.) There is no hint that abortion was being condemned, as some have since argued, because it is a hazardous procedure. On the contrary, the AMA perceived abortion’s “true nature, as no simple offense against public morality and decency, no mere misdemeanor, no attempt upon the life of the mother, but the wanton and murderous destruction of human life.” Note the interchangeability of “fetal life,” “human life,” and “children.” And note the absence of the word “person.”

Has there been medical evidence since 1859 to contradict the AMA report? Has the fetus become less human, or did we discover that it is permissible to destroy “fetal life” when it is not a “person”? Until recently, the more the doctors knew, the less acceptable abortion became. In 1893, the British Medical Association’s President Dr. James Murphy condemned abortion, saying: “We are not now justified in destroying a living child.” The developments of science in this century have merely increased the certainty that the fetus is one of us. We can

watch it growing; we can hear its heartbeat, see its fingers and toes; we can diagnose its ailments, and even perform operations to heal it inside the womb. In the Middle Ages, when scholars thought the fetus, in its early stages, was a shapeless blob, abortion was still a grave sin, and after “quickenings” it was murder. Now when embryology and genetics show that the product of conception is no blob but a distinct, individual human life, a male or female of our own species, marvelously designed for adult life from the first instant—*now* we have doubts about protecting it.

Only after *Roe* could we say that as we grew more certain of its humanity we were less sure of its worth. Perhaps there is something about our science that diminishes the object of our knowledge, making humanity, for instance, a biological happenstance, so that the more we know, the less it means to us. Science will never discover, on the back of some obscure gene, a metaphysical price-tag, or rather, “pricelessness tag”: this is invaluable humanity, handle with care. It is fine that the Japanese are discovering brainwaves at ever-earlier stages of fetal life, but early brainwaves are at best a complement to a theory of human worth; they can’t provide its basis.

Protecting the fetus must be history’s only example of an excessive reverence for life. In the world according to Planned Parenthood, mankind has been overdoing its care of fetal life for millennia. And now, when world wars, genocide, and terrorism have inured us to the death of innocents by the millions, we have dispensed with this archaic reverence. In the century that coined the expression “the banality of evil,” there will always be room for one more statistic: American doctors have aborted 20 million fetuses since 1973. Does that figure leave you cold? In 1972 it would have been the biggest mass-murder ever. Today . . . we are grown-ups and we know better.

With regard to fetal life, the Court simply overruled the verdict of Western civilization, which was the only generally-accepted criterion about the only sort of personhood that a fetus can have: its own life.

But is personhood necessary to condemn abortion? The Hippocratic Oath makes no mention of personhood, nor does the commandment “Thou shalt not kill.” From the *Didache* until today the Catholic Church has condemned abortion. Vatican II labels abortion an “abominable crime.” Yet even Catholic theology, supposedly so confident

about its definitions, does not claim to know when the fetus becomes a person. The traditional definition, devised by Boethius and elaborated by Aquinas, of the person as “an individual substance of a rational nature” does not take biological development into account, or even refer specifically to human life; it applies equally to God, angels, and men. The Church recognizes a human person when the body is informed by the soul, which simply means that the Church makes no distinction between being “human” and being a “person,” for humanity itself depends upon having a rational soul. Before the soul’s arrival, the body is neither truly human nor a person; afterwards it is both. For the Church there can be no such thing as humanity without personhood.

But the Church does not say when the soul is infused into the body. Most theologians would reasonably point to the moment of conception, but others point to a later date—perhaps the moment when the fertilized egg is implanted in the uterine wall. Only God knows for sure, yet the variety of opinion has never affected the Church’s condemnation of abortion. It was a sin and a crime long before any embryology was known. The Vatican’s 1974 “Declaration on Abortion” explained the Church’s position: “From a moral point of view this is certain: even if a doubt existed concerning whether the fruit of conception is already a human person, it is objectively a grave sin to dare to risk murder.”

Even allowing that humanity without personhood is possible, and—for the sake of argument—allowing further that it could be proved that the fetus lacks personhood, abortion would not be justified. It would be difficult to contend that the *only* criminal destruction of humanity is murder—short of which anything goes. Without a “pre-personal” respect for what will be a man, the sudden, towering respect for “persons” must seem arbitrary and inexplicable. The obvious and inevitable developmental difference between life in the womb and life in the cradle would seem a poor excuse for state-sanctioned and state-funded destruction of humanity in the womb. In the past, the fetus was protected not because it was a person but because it was simply what it was, a human fetus. Abortion was wrong not because it is murder, which is self-evidently wrong. It was wrong because killing a human fetus was self-evidently wrong. As in most heresies, the need for strict definitions did not arise until an implicit understanding had been con-

tradicted; the need to define the fetus's personhood arose only after the self-evident wrongness of abortion had been lost.

The Church sees the importance of personhood, but perceives in its very mysteriousness a further reason for condemning abortion, lest we sanction murder. After all, we do know what the fetus is. Science tells us more about it than our ancestors—from the first bio-ethicist Hippocrates to Abraham Lincoln—knew about the adults they considered worth protecting. Yet we do not fully understand human existence, for biology cannot tell the whole story. We know human life is of special value, and because it is unique, valuable, and beyond our grasp, we treat it not with violence but with special care.

Other Christian views of abortion show even less regard for the intricacies of the “personhood” question. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the famous Lutheran theologian who was killed by the Nazis, addressed the question early in this century. “Whether we are here concerned with a human being or not,” he wrote, “is merely to confuse the issue. The simple fact is that God certainly intended to create a human being and that this nascent human being has been deliberately deprived of his life. And that is nothing but murder.” Near the end of the second century, Tertullian made a similar argument, in the same rather awkward way: “To prevent birth is anticipated murder The one who will be a man is already one.” Of course, if he is already a man, then it is not “anticipated” murder, it is murder plain and simple; and, if Bonhoeffer speaks of “murder,” then he *is* talking about a human being. But both Tertullian and Bonhoeffer are laying bare the essentially murderous desire to thwart God in a matter of life or death. To dare to risk murder—to destroy a life begun—is to be willing, in the event, to have committed it. They argue that the fruit of conception is in God's hands, and it is not up to men to destroy it. Our ignorance about personhood is no license to kill.

The Court's use of “personhood” in *Roe* has separated part of humanity from automatic legal protection. It contradicts the conventional understanding that rights follow from humanity. Now we sometimes think of the human fetus as “someone” (a person), and sometimes as a killable human thing (not a person)—*personish* perhaps, but not too personish to kill. The doublethink and ambiguity have caused what might be called a decay of personhood. The trend was already clear in

Judge Charles Breitell's 1971 decision for New York state's highest court. He wrote that while the fetus is "human" and "unquestionably alive," nevertheless it is "not true that the legal order corresponds to the natural order." In other words, personhood in the natural order is *not* the source of rights in the law. This is the pure contractual-liberalism that was tempered until recently by the lingering understanding that rights *do* follow from the natural order.

Since *Roe v. Wade* that lingering understanding has been increasingly subverted. In the New York *Times*, Mt. Sinai Hospital runs an advertisement that shows a newborn baby boy dangling from a doctor's gloved hand. The umbilical cord has not yet been cut. The doctor had performed a blood transfusion while the boy was still in the womb, or, in the words of the advertisement, while "he" was still a fetus. The ad refers throughout to the "unborn baby." In bold letters it boasts: "We saved his life 3 months ago." But if another procedure had been performed, and the unborn baby had emerged in bloody scraps, would Mt. Sinai have had the candor to say, "We just took his life"? On Labor Day last year the *Times* ran an editorial entitled "Loving Babies Before They Are Born"—the slogan of a city-sponsored obstetrics program the *Times* was applauding. Pregnant women are encouraged to feel responsible and protective toward the fetus in their womb. But they are also told that they can kill it if they please. (Don't hurt it, mind you—but go ahead and kill it.) What can it mean to "love a baby before it's born" while you hire a doctor to destroy it?

Every morning on the subway I read a poster that informs me: "A baby needs love and care before birth." Now "baby," as everyone knows, is a loaded word to which pro-abortionists used to object, because babies are persons, and persons are supposed to have rights—and not just the right to the salutary neglect that lets nature take its course: "A baby needs *love* and *care* before birth." Are we expected to believe that abortion is a form of love and care? Do we protect the baby's future by erasing it?

One wonders how many people read the poster on the subway, appreciate its sentiments, and yet persist in the belief that these "babies" who "need love and care before birth" can be aborted with impunity. In the mind of city policy-makers, in the editorial mind of the *Times*, the duty to protect no longer contradicts the freedom to kill. The fetus

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is once again a baby, and babies are supposed to be persons, but these persons—the post-*Roe* breed of fetal persons—aren't like the rest; these are killable persons.

The new “baby talk” is a reason for hope and horror, for it means two things which—alas—are not incompatible: we are more aware of the fetus as a possible patient, less distinguishable from a newborn—more of a *baby*, more of a “person”; at the same time, we are less sensitive to the idea of killing what we call babies, what we thought of as persons.

The baby-ness of the fetus was never really lost. Only when a woman wants to abort a child is it considered “something” rather than a someone-in-progress. When abortion is the goal, then the fetus must “become” a person; but when a man looks back at his life he never asks the question that provides the crucial pro-choice obfuscation: when did *it* become “me”? It was never anyone else. The fate of that fertilized egg was his fate. It had his parents, his biology, his sex, his genes, and his future. Wasn't “he” in his mother's womb for nine months? Isn't that what a mother and father think when they look at their newborn child? Didn't the doctor at Mt. Sinai Hospital save the baby while, in the ad's own words, “he” was still in the womb? Looking backwards, life is an unbroken continuity. It was up to the *Roe* majority to break it with the strategic doubt: . . . Is it a *person*?

Another sign of the lurking suspicion that the fetus is really a person is the way society balks at calling the fetus “property,” although that is exactly how it is treated when it is aborted: as a woman's disposable property. There is still something repugnant—the echoes no doubt of slavery—about speaking of the fetus as human property. The language of “owner” and “property” does not adequately express the relationship between a mother and her unborn child. A fetus isn't really *owned*, is it? There are other living things (wild animals, for instance) that aren't owned either, but that is only because they haven't been claimed. But the fetus isn't waiting to be claimed. It is without an owner because it doesn't seem ownable. The gut feeling is that, because of what it is, the fetus cannot be property. And of what else do we say that it cannot, by its very nature, have a rightful owner, except of a subject with its own rights? And a human subject with its own rights can't be killed. It is a person.

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Now we are even calling the fetus a “baby” again. But something has changed. In 1970, the California Medical Association wrote:

Since the old ethic has not yet been fully displaced it has been necessary to separate the idea of abortion from the idea of killing, which continues to be socially abhorrent. The result has been a curious avoidance of the scientific fact which everyone really knows, that human life begins at conception and is continuous whether intra- or extra- uterine until death. The very considerable semantic gymnastics which are required to rationalize abortion as anything but the taking of a human life would be ludicrous if they were not often put forth under socially impeccable auspices. It is suggested that this schizophrenic sort of subterfuge is necessary because while a new ethic is being accepted the old one has not yet been rejected.

The word “baby” was suppressed while we were changing our ethic to include legal abortion (it wasn’t a “baby,” it was a *fetus* that was being aborted), but “baby” is no longer a dangerous word. It is not necessary to “separate the idea of abortion from the idea of killing” because, for many people, the old ethic *has* been rejected. It has ceased to be compelling. The idea that “babies” are being aborted provokes little horror, no shock. Ask yourself: Don’t you wish you were a bit more appalled that 20 million American babies have been aborted in 15 years?

The new “baby” must fit into the same picture with legal abortion. Society is not about to reconsider abortion because the fetus is now a “baby”; it has already rethought “baby” in terms of legal abortion. What the fetus really *is* does not even enter the picture. It is not, as it might seem at first, a matter of subjective perception. A genuinely subjective perspective would include the view of the fetus, for it would be odd to suggest that the mother’s subjective view determines what the *fetus* is (unless the fetus is not a subject, i.e., not a person—but that is begging the question), or that her subjectivity is any more authoritative than anyone else’s. Regardless, the mother’s perspective is not the determining factor. Post-abortion psychological trauma suggests that many women abort what they believe are babies that deserved to live. But justice under *Roe* doesn’t depend on the mother’s belief. It depends only on what she *does*; and if she does it, it’s right. If the doctor kills the fetus, it is not murder. Why? Because he killed it. If, like the doctor at Mt. Sinai Hospital, the doctor saves the fetus, he is saving someone’s life—a triumph! Morality follows the action, with a rubber stamp of unprincipled approval.

Neither the old language nor even the old laws that remain on the books can offer any rebuke to the new ethic. Early in 1987, the state of California charged a woman with a misdemeanor because she not only ignored a doctor's order to refrain from sexual intercourse and drugs while pregnant, but when she began to hemorrhage failed to notify the doctor for six hours. Her son was born severely brain-damaged, with amphetamines and barbiturates in his blood. He died two months later. The California statute under which the mother was charged makes it a crime to "willfully omit" necessary medical attention for a child, and explicitly defines the fetus as a person. The old law (it dates from the '20s) flatly contradicts *Roe v. Wade*. The judge threw out the case. He claimed that the law was designed only to force fathers to support their dependent children within the womb. The judge did not think it strange that when the fetus needs financial support it is a person, but when it needs life it is not.

And our semantic reticence about "human property" does not prevent people from either killing fetuses or buying and selling them through surrogate motherhood. In fact, the new birth technology, which makes the child a product of anyone's sperm, plus anyone's egg, and a team of scientists, raises serious issues. Do this biological artifact's rights come from the parents (which one?), the scientists, God, or biology itself? Do we really want to hear the words "It's my baby—I *paid* for it"? (Come to think of it, why *don't* parents own their own children?) Yet whose baby is it if it does not belong to the one who paid for it? Does it belong to the state?

To be sure, there are some signs of hope. There are those for whom the old ethic still lives. Last November, the *New York Times* reported on the increasing frequency with which courts are ordering care for unborn children against the wishes of the mother, ordering for example Caesarean section to save the life of the baby. Not only the *Times* reporter but also the judges in the cases seemed to make no distinction between "baby," "fetus," and "unborn child." And one judge, Richard Levie of the District of Columbia Superior Court, wrote: "It is one thing for an adult to gamble with nature regarding his or her own life; it is quite another when the gamble involves the life or death of an unborn infant"—a shockingly "unenlightened" slice of pre-*Roe* rhetoric, not just the old language but the old ethic as well.

Medical technology is also working against the logic of abortion. The fetus's life is increasingly independent from the mother's; its social visibility, so to speak, is rising. In her dissent in the *Akron* case, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote:

The Roe framework is clearly on a collision course with itself. As the medical risks of various abortion procedures decrease, the point at which the state may regulate for reasons of maternal health is moved further forward to actual childbirth . . . As medical science becomes better able to provide for the separate existence of the fetus, the point of viability is moved further back toward conception.

Not that the viability criterion made any sense in the first place. O'Connor pithily observed: ". . . potential life is no less potential in the first weeks of pregnancy than it is at viability or afterward." And Justice Byron White added: "The specific interest the Court has recognized as compelling after the point of viability—that is, the interest in protecting 'potential human life'—is present well before viability, and the point of viability seems to bear no discernible relationship to the strength of that interest." Sophisticated neo-natalogy should make it more difficult for the medical community to sustain the contradiction of killing in one ward what it treats as a patient in the next. As birth becomes a less dramatic moment in the development of the human embryo, the fetus's *in utero* condition can neither hide abortion's violence nor seem especially relevant to its morality.

On the theoretical level, a purely biological view of humanity and the origin of rights would seem to strongly favor rights for the fetus, if one assumes that humans *must* have rights. For if our long-standing respect for human life derives from what we are, and we are unwilling to accept the various "theological" definitions of what we are, then we must rely on science. But biological science (like theology, in this sense) makes no distinction between "human being" and a human "person"; personhood has no biological significance whatsoever. And if humanity is simply a matter of uniquely human genes, then the fetus must be entitled to that respect.

The medical profession's traditional dedication to the preservation of human life at all costs—without much reference in practice to the technicalities of personhood—would also seem to offer protection to the fetus, but the medical profession is becoming ambivalent toward the simple preservation of life. There was a time when nature brought

death despite the doctor's best efforts. But as medical technology has progressed, the doctor's once-straightforward adversary relationship with death has inevitably become more complex. Life-prolonging equipment can now sustain the faintest "lives" almost indefinitely, to the point where death itself can be a complicated diagnosis.

It seems that death sometimes needs a little medical assistance. At first, it is decided that certain patients are not benefitting from continued existence; yet no one wants to actually *kill* them, so they are deprived of artificially-supplied food and water. But there is a pernicious dynamic by which this "passive" euthanasia becomes active. By all accounts, starvation/dehydration is a horrible way to die. So would it not be more *humane* to give the vegetative patient a lethal dose of drugs rather than let him waste away in torment for up to three weeks? Indeed, it would be (it is one reason why we do not starve criminals on death row). There are degrees of cruelty, and as long as we are trying to avoid prolonging a painful life, it might as well be done quickly and gently. Once passive euthanasia is permitted, decency demands active euthanasia, and soon the doors are open for a sentimental slaughter—what Malcolm Muggeridge calls the "Humane Holocaust." The argument that patients in a coma or defective newborns are in every sense *persons* now carries little weight. Their rights are not being judged on the grounds of personhood at all.

Because those to whom society entrusts the battle against death are those to whom death can be most routine, it is always worthwhile to reinforce doctors' hatred of death and devotion to life, to prevent any mingling of the power to heal and the power to kill. To compromise this vital separation of powers—to tell a doctor that he can kill and heal the very same thing—obscures his orientation toward life.

Of course, doctors who have performed abortions have already compromised their bias toward life. Many people are alive today thanks to their local doctor, but no one is alive thanks to the local abortionist. Whatever one thinks of the morality of abortion, it must be admitted that the abortionist is engaged, at the very least, in the prevention of life. That is the best face that can be put on what he does: he "prevents" life. But is life-prevention the task of a medical doctor? Ideally, a doctor heals when nature fails, but in abortion nature is the enemy. Abortion is a service of sorts, and it is now performed by doctors, but it

is no more a *medical* service than is a haircut. Nature has not failed; it is doing exactly what it is supposed to do—in this case, something inconvenient. The body does not need healing, it needs thwarting. The beginnings of new life need stifling. Abortion puts a doctor in the very *un-Hippocratic* position of trying, as it were, to “kill it while he can.” He must kill the human fetus before it becomes a legal person, before abortion becomes murder.

Whether contemporary medicine’s strange embrace of healing and killing, of care and carnage, is a product or a source of the same confusion throughout society it clearly reveals a terrible flip-side to the fading of the phony distinction between the fetus and the baby. Instead of a steady increase in respect for fetal life, the end result may be a decrease in respect for all babies. After all, a fetus is a baby now, and we kill fetuses, so why can we not kill other babies? In a notorious 1982 case in Bloomington, Indiana, a retarded infant born with a correctible defect (spina bifida) was not only refused treatment for the defect but also denied food and water. The baby boy was denied treatment not because of the spina bifida—that’s what treatment is for. He was denied treatment because he was retarded. While dozens of couples offered to adopt him, the child—not a fetus, just a retarded baby boy—was starved to death at his parents’ command. Although he went by the generic name of Doe, the baby had a real name and real parents; he was a “someone” not a “something”—clearly a person. But a court agreed that he was better off dead.

The Supreme Court’s “personhood” hurdle has produced the first *homo sapiens* that does not have its own right to live. The Supreme Court made no attempt to demonstrate that the fetus is less human than we always believed it was. If anything the fetus is now more clearly human than it was when abortion was illegal. The fetus has not changed. The only change is that now something new can be done to it: it can be killed. Whatever was once unkillable about the fetus is still present in the fetus, just as it remains unquestioned in adults. And to override it in the case of the fetus is to jeopardize it in us all.

If “babies” and the personhood implicit in that word no longer convey an automatic right to live, where do our adult rights come from? The Supreme Court kicked from under us the reliable foundation of tradition and precedent. It began an era when this fundamental ques-

tion must be answered by theory rather than precedent, but in the same breath the Court declared that we have no theory that we trust to answer this question for the whole society. To call the matter “theological” is just a coy way of taking the question out of play. No one seriously believes that the Justices think that their own—or anyone else’s—personhood is a “theological” conundrum. But the Court went on passing judgment as if nothing were changed by the unanswerability of “personhood.” It discovered a “right to privacy,” as if you could have privacy without knowing what a person is or when it begins to exist. Privacy for what? How, without determining the absence of personhood in the fetus, could the Court know that the fetus did not enjoy this same right to privacy?

The *Roe v. Wade* decision exposed the absence (at least among jurists) of a generally accepted theory of why the law must protect persons, the basis for our rights. As George Parkin Grant wrote in his book *English-speaking Justice*:

What is it, if anything, about human beings that makes the rights of equal justice their due? What is it about human beings that makes it good that they should have such rights? What is it about any of us that makes our just due fuller than that of stones or flies or chickens or bears?

This is the next step in the decay of personhood: Why protect persons? If a “person” is not *ipso facto* unkillable, where might its protections come from? And where must the new “killability” stop? In a way, we are back to the Civil War’s question: Must the loose personhood that the Constitution always saw in blacks, the loose personhood that the word “baby” gives the fetus—must it always and everywhere be synonymous with rights? Does society have to protect such “persons”? The question in 1865 was not answered by a theoretical explanation. The affirmative answer was made law by the will of a nation.

There must be something about persons that makes them worth protecting. After all, “person” is not a talisman. It is just a word, taken from Latin, that we use to refer to those whom we treat as human beings with rights to equal justice. It is subsequent to the right to live. It depends on an experienced truth, an understanding, that is prior to our words. It is an explanation of why we do not kill Bobby, and Susan, and Grandma Jones—of why we did not kill the fetus. We refrain from killing the infant not because we judge it to be an “individual substance

of a rational nature” or a person according to the Fourteenth Amendment which guarantees the right to life of persons (though that seems to be *Roe*’s derivation of the right to life—as if, before that Amendment, the only obstacle to a law legalizing murder had been the sanguine mood of every state legislature), but because it is an infant. It was wrong to kill a person long before the Fourteenth Amendment spoke of the rights of persons. The Amendment was the description, not the origin, of an ethic, and the word “person” happens to be part of that description, but what if the Amendment had read “human being” instead? The Amendment does not use “person” in the strict legal sense; it might just as well have said “anyone.” But now the word “person” is being used to cut the human fetus off from the rights which the rest of our species enjoys.

To many people, the word “person” suggests free moral agents with various rights and duties, who make choices, sign contracts and have mature personalities. That is the common use of the word. One does not, in the course of the ordinary day, think of, say, the neighbor’s baby as a such a *person*. It’s just the neighbor’s baby. And the claim that a tiny cluster of cells in a woman’s womb is a “person” is *prima facie* somewhat counter-intuitive. But the claim that a human life in the womb deserves to live is not. (In reality, the claims are identical, but that fact requires a reasonably complicated explanation; it is not self-evident.)

It seems to me that outlawing abortion by establishing the personhood of the fetus is growing less feasible. Legal personhood will only come about as an expression of a legislative intention to outlaw abortion—obviously a worthy goal, but legal personhood is a consequence of that intention, not a means to it. And the other personhood, the essential human personhood, was made a prerequisite by the *Roe* majority precisely because it knew that such personhood cannot be proved in a court. To raise the question, like raising the specter of “theology,” is to leave the legal arena. It is prior to all law. Though the law depends on it, “What is man?” is not a legal question, and the Court—quite rightly—had no intention of answering it; and, for the same reason, it had no business asking it.

It would be a mistake to ignore the continued strength—witness Judge Levie—of the argument that a right to life must follow from the

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personhood of the fetus. It is the common-sense view which, while not explicit in our constitutional law (as it is in the Declaration of Independence) and denied in some contemporary jurisprudence, still enjoys the assent of the legal laity. It rests upon a healthy respect for the mystery of human existence, the mystery of man that begins in the womb. In the hands of strong-minded and articulate leaders it could once again shape the law of the land. But it would be foolhardy to argue as if our common understanding of “personhood” had not been radically compromised in the last 15 years and the already weak link in our political theory between persons and rights had not been further attenuated. After all, the acceptance and perpetuation of the Supreme Court’s ghastly decision depended on the confused and passive consciences of many Americans—lawyers and doctors first.

With technology’s advances and the law’s retreat, it is the will of the individual that makes its own way amid new goods and new evils. The conscience of today’s American, for all its vaunted independence, stands meekly aside—a senile spectator mumbling with vague apprehension about an ethic it only half recalls. Meanwhile, modern science makes the continuity of a human life from conception to the grave virtually undeniable. And as the old taboos grow less persuasive, and courts pass judgment in the dark, it is an open question whether respect for life will return to the womb, or abortion’s contempt for life will continue to creep from the womb into nurseries and nursing homes.

Should We 'Harvest' Fetal Tissue?

Joan Frawley Desmond

LAST SUMMER, A MEDICAL ETHICIST received an unusual phone call from a woman whose father suffered from Alzheimer's Disease. The woman presented the ethicist with a startling scenario. She had heard about a new experimental technique that used fetal brain tissue implants to help victims of Alzheimer's Disease. She wanted to become artificially inseminated with her father's sperm so that she could abort the resulting fetus and use its brain tissue to help her father.

The ethicist told the woman that her proposal was technically impossible and morally wrong. However, both of the ethicist's judgments could be challenged by medical innovation, desperate patients, and accommodating physicians. Neurosurgeons in Mexico are ready to attempt a transplant of fetal neural tissue into the brain of a patient with Parkinson's Disease.

The viability of the transplant procedure will not be known for several months. Nevertheless medical researchers throughout the world, especially in the U.S. and Sweden, are optimistic that the special properties of fetal tissue will not only help patients with Parkinson's, but also people with a host of other incurable diseases, including diabetes, Alzheimer's, Huntington's chorea, leukemia, and hemophilia. Radiation sickness and spinal cord injuries may also "benefit" from the implants.

Fetal neural, pancreas and liver-cell implants could effect otherwise-impossible recoveries for adults and children suffering from crippling illnesses and injuries. However, the moral, ethical, and legal questions posed by the "harvesting" of fetal tissue leave even aggressive American researchers uneasy about the long-term implications of this new medical development.

The obvious worry is that a society which permits abortion on demand and does not protect the unborn child against attacks on its life and human dignity, may be unable to distinguish between the moral and immoral uses of fetal tissue, or to establish tough safeguards against

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abuses by researchers, doctors, businessmen—or women.

The once-unthinkable story cited above illustrates the most persistent concern about the medical use of fetal tissue: Will women purposely become pregnant for the sole purpose of producing fetal cells for a relative who needs them? There is the added concern that women will produce fetal organs for profit. Because most fetal tissue presently used for research and implant treatments comes from elective abortions, this new medical technique is directly tied to the availability of abortions. Accordingly, opponents of abortion worry that the good achieved by donating fetal tissue for implantation may help to alleviate guilt about the *means* used to produce the tissue. The procedure could actually help to legitimize abortion.

Yet for all the questions raised by the new procedure, there are many reasons to applaud what could be a major advance for millions of Americans suffering from blindness, senility, nerve, blood, and kidney disorders, and paralysis. The fetal implants would build on the recent gains already made in treatment of individuals suffering from nerve disorders. Patients with Parkinson's have improved dramatically after tissue from their own adrenal glands was implanted in their brains. Live fetal cells, however, are viewed as even more beneficial for implantation than adult tissue because they grow faster, and they are more adaptable. Indeed, the negative reaction of some abortion-rights groups to this new technique suggests that it highlights the human development of the unborn—a fact that many prochoice groups have sought to *suppress* ever since *Roe v. Wade*.

Given the tremendous potential of fetal-cell surgery, even ethicists who oppose abortion are not ready to categorically reject fetal implant treatments. Though wary of this new technique, they await answers to some key concerns: the means of “harvesting” the tissue, informed consent, and safeguards against coercive or commercial arrangements that encourage women to abort their unborn children. An important question is whether spontaneously-aborted fetuses, who often have anatomical defects, could be used in place of deliberately aborted fetuses.

Waiting for the outcome of the fetal-cell surgery in Mexico, some U.S. physicians want to put off addressing the moral and legal obstacles until the technique moves beyond the experimental stage. Other physicians and ethicists believe that American society cannot afford to stand

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still until “progress” forces the government, the courts, or the medical profession to issue guidelines. Indeed, unfolding events in the fast-moving world of medical innovation may well decide the question in the next year.

Right now, the entire field of fetal implants is posed for a major explosion. The most prominent experts in the United States include Dr. Kevin Lafferty, Ph.D., an Australian immunologist and research director of the Barbara Davis Center for Childhood Diabetes in Denver, and Dr. Robert Gale of the University of California at Los Angeles. Dr. Lafferty has already begun to graft cultured cells from fetal pancreas tissues onto the kidneys of adult patients with Type 1 (insulin-dependent) diabetes.

In the seventies, attempts to cure Type 1 diabetes with fetal-cell implants failed because the fetal islet cells that produce insulin were rejected by the recipient’s immunological system. But in 1980, after Lafferty developed a culturing method to resolve the problem of rejection, islet cells were implanted successfully. A recent progress report published by the Children’s Diabetes Foundation in Denver stated that following transplantation of a high dose of undifferentiated cultured tissue, half of Lafferty’s patients have reduced their insulin requirements by more than 30 percent. The ultimate goal is to end the patients’ dependence on insulin.

In 1986 Dr. Gale of UCLA made headlines when he surfaced in Chernobyl after the nuclear disaster to treat victims of radiation sickness with fetal liver implants. The liver cells came from fetuses aborted in the first trimester. It was hoped that the liver implants, which generate bone marrow, would build up the blood-forming tissues in Gale’s six patients. In fact, the patients died, but Gale is continuing to pursue this path of immunological research, one of the newest areas in fetal-cell surgery.

The special regenerative powers of fetal tissue also offer hope to victims of paralysis. Though fetal-cell surgery to repair damaged nerves has been limited to animals, the results are encouraging. Recently, Dr. Jerry Silver of Case Western Reserve in Cleveland and Dr. Michel Kliot of Columbia Presbyterian Hospital in New York, successfully implanted a “living bridge” of rat fetal cells to stimulate and guide the

regrowth of damaged nerves in rats' spinal cords. While this work will be limited to repairing damage from certain kinds of accidents or ruptured disks, scientists hope that more typical injuries to the spinal cord can be treated in the future.

For the moment, however, the most promising work has been initiated in Mexico. There, patients with Parkinson's Disease were first treated with tissue implants from their adrenal glands. Since then, about 100 U.S. patients have undergone the adrenal-to-brain transplant operation. Some have benefited from the treatment and some have not. In the United States, immunologists and neurosurgeons at Vanderbilt University, New York University Medical Center and other key hospitals have halted the transplants, using the time to examine the reasons for the patients' inconsistent responses.

Meanwhile, though scientists at Sweden's Karolinka Institute and the University of Lund have been preparing the way to conduct the first fetal brain cell implant in a patient with Parkinson's, a surgical team in Mexico is likely to take the honors.

In Mexico, teams performing the fetal-cell surgery operate under strict standards. First, tissue can only be retrieved from fetuses that have been spontaneously aborted. Second, to avoid a possible conflict of interest, the woman's obstetrician must have no relationship with any group seeking or performing transplants. Some American physicians like Dr. Abraham Lieberman, Professor of Neurology at New York University Medical Center and Chairman of the Medical Advisory board of American Parkinson's Association, would like to have similar standards adopted in the United States. Dr. Lieberman has provided Parkinson's patients with adrenal-to-brain transplants and has worked closely with the Mexican scientists planning the fetal brain cell surgery.

By March, the success or failure of the Mexican effort will be confirmed. And if the surgery works, doctors like Lieberman will not have much time before American patients demand the treatment for themselves. However, many American experts doubt whether Mexico's strict limitations are possible in a country that permits legalized abortion. The American Parkinson's Association has already reported widespread interest in the technique by patients who do not care about the moral implications of using fetal tissue to cure their disease. Indeed, for the majority of doctors in the field, using tissue from aborted fetuses poses

no special problem. "All of us who work in fetal research feel that if someone has decided to have an abortion and gives permission, it is all right to use that tissue to help someone else," Dr. Gale of UCLA told the *New York Times*.

Some experts even dispute the need for broad limits on the harvesting of fetal tissues. Recalling previous public fears about the commercialization of human organ donations, they note that such fears were proved to be unfounded. Why would fetal organs and tissue face different treatment? Yet fetal implants do pose special problems. For example, unlike most families who surrender a relative's organs, mothers of aborted fetuses are directly involved in the cause of death.

Noting the complexities involved, most medical ethicists believe a number of key issues must be carefully weighed before a moral judgment of the treatment can be reached. First, respect for the dead has always required scrutiny of any effort to dispose of human remains. While the therapeutic use of cadavers has not been judged as a violation of human dignity, any human tissue must be used and treated with utmost care.

Given the present climate of hostility toward the unborn child, there is good reason to question whether the means used to harvest fetal tissue will satisfy this concern. Potential for the mistreatment of human fetuses is especially real because only the freshest tissue can be used for the implants.

And some ethicists are worried that removal of the organs may occur while the fetus is still *alive*. According to present clinical studies, the optimal age for tissue retrieval is 12 to 16 weeks. Beyond that age fetal brain cells may not have the ability to regenerate. Some fetuses may briefly survive outside of the womb at four months. Accordingly, laws concerning organ transplants and informed consent should be strengthened to protect the unborn at every stage of development and to safeguard, in particular, the rights of anencephalic newborns, who run a special risk of having their organs removed before vital functions cease.

Another serious concern for physicians and medical institutions which oppose abortion is the fact that miscarriages will produce only a tiny proportion of fetal cell tissue. Miscarriages are unpredictable and they often occur at home where tissue cannot be retrieved. Further, most miscarriages occur because the unborn child has serious genetic

problems. In the U.S., virtually all the fetal tissue used in research laboratories and clinical studies is removed from aborted fetuses. Thus, by meeting the demand for fetal implants, physicians and hospitals could also be encouraging the deliberate abortion of fetuses to maintain a ready supply.

But should we even consider using tissues taken from a fetus that has been voluntarily aborted by its mother? Answering this question is especially important because of the direct potential for abuse. If raising the alarm seems like a scare tactic, consider that legalized abortion and the growing acceptance of reproductive technologies in this country have already altered the public's understanding of the relationship between marital love and procreation. Fetuses are now being produced for commercial gain. When fetuses are viewed as *products* rather than persons, any kind of treatment can be justified. Some women could well believe that the use of fetal tissue to cure fatal or debilitating diseases would offer a solid reason for a pregnancy and subsequent abortion.

Acknowledging the problem, a panel of medical professionals at a 1986 conference at Case Western Reserve University suggested that anonymity be maintained between donor and recipient, and that the donor could not be related to the recipient.

Nevertheless, even the Catholic Church has not automatically ruled out the use of tissue from deliberately-aborted fetuses. Catholic ethicists compare such fetuses to adults who have died of a violent crime—because such victims are *not* rejected as organ donors, aborted fetuses need not be. Yet the analogy does not hold up completely because the accessibility of abortion poses a real risk of abuse not only by women, but also by obstetricians and fetal-research teams, who might work together to increase the supply of tissue. For this reason, cautious experts in the field believe that obstetricians, gynecologists, and geneticists counseling pregnant women must be completely separate from researchers seeking fetal tissue.

Prohibiting the sale of fetal tissue would also help to limit the potential for abuse. At the moment, non-profit groups distribute fetal tissue to designated research groups. However, a California-based company, Hana Biologics, plans to market the tissue when fetal-cell surgery takes off and the demand escalates.

While some ethicists question whether fetal tissue should be marketed, many applaud the work of companies like Hana Biologics. The company's culturing process allows the original number of fetal cells to grow and multiply so that more people can benefit from fetal cell implants. A Type I diabetic, for example, would require cells from five to twenty donors, but since Hana is able to effect a 20-fold increase from the original tissue, fewer donors are needed. Ethicists believe that the culturing process will help provide an adequate cell supply and thus discourage the use of selective abortion for the purpose of harvesting fetal tissues.

But where does the law stand on the use of fetal implants? Most legal experts say that few laws directly apply. Laws now on the books, however, suggest that there are *no* current legal prohibitions on using tissue from dead fetuses for transplant purposes. However, state laws prohibiting fetal experimentation may block largescale research and surgery in this area.

In the early sixties, most states passed some version of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act which made it possible to donate fetal tissue from any source. Later, after *Roe v. Wade*, some dozen states passed statutes prohibiting or restricting fetal research. Now, according to Patricia King, associate professor of Law at Georgetown University Law School and a specialist in bioethics, there is a growing debate over the legal status of the "nonviable living fetuses"—newborns who can survive outside the womb only for a brief period. If their status is changed, then their organs could be "retrieved" before they are legally dead.

The law presently treats a live fetus outside the mother as a child who is subject to all the legal protections that have been established for any living human donors. In the case of living adult donors, organs cannot be removed without their informed consent. When children are asked to donate organs, such as a kidney for a sibling, a court agreement is required. In the case of living anencephalic newborns, transplant teams hope to establish new criteria that would allow the removal of organs before the child is legally brain dead.

Once the demand for fetal tissue begins to escalate, there will be strong pressure on the courts and state legislatures to relax legal protections for "nonviable living fetuses." This very real threat, combined

with the possibility that fetal-cell surgery may encourage elective abortions, are reasons enough to adopt a cautious attitude toward what will be widely embraced as a “miraculous” cure for many—perhaps millions?—of Americans.

However, it would be precipitous to automatically reject what could be a life-giving breakthrough. Given the many variables, it is still impossible to issue a final ethical judgment on fetal tissue implants. Rather, there should be detailed study of all the acts related to the procedure, and all the moral and social implications of harvesting tissue from deliberately-aborted fetuses.

The study would determine the nature and the extent of the threat that fetal transplant technology poses to the unborn. The study might conclude that the procedure should be completely outlawed, or it might suggest that only the tissue of spontaneously aborted fetuses should be used for implants. Given the problem of informed consent in the case of deliberately aborted fetuses, it is difficult to see how their rights could be protected. Finally, if the technique was found to be morally acceptable in certain cases, the study would attempt to outline solid standards for fetal cell surgery and organ removal.

The American public is likely to be primarily concerned with “results.” But before physicians, researchers and patients celebrate the miracle of fetal-cell implants, they must be confronted with all the implications of turning yet another—possibly radical—corner of medical innovation and man’s treatment of his most defenseless brothers and sisters.

What Can Allan Bloom Teach Us?

Tina Bell

The Closing of the American Mind has made Allan Bloom the first philosopher-millionaire in history and probably raised the blood pressure of scores of university professors. For this, we should be grateful: first, because the book's amazing success (over 30 weeks on the New York *Times* best-seller list) may mean that we are *not* a nation of dead-heads after all, and, second, because Bloom's *point* is that our universities have been poisoning the nation's moral bloodstream with virulent skepticism for decades. How fitting that their intellectual bankruptcy be exposed by one of their own (go get 'em, Al!).

But it is curious that a book about philosophy should excite the public mind, and even curiouser that it should be addressed to the public and not the academic community. For the book is not merely a critique of moral and intellectual degeneracy in our universities, but rather a work similar to Plato's *Apology*, a discourse on the relationship between philosophy and the political community.

Bloom's answer to the problem posed by the book's title—the closing of our “modern” minds—is to re-open them by introducing us to the living questions of philosophy. He would have us reintroduce into the college curriculum the great books of the western world. The universities, Bloom suggests, can return to philosophical inquiry in the spirit of the ancient Greeks only if they allow life's fundamental questions about the good, the soul, virtue—and the great man—to be introduced as questions we must ask if we are to counter the current philosophical crisis of the West. Contrary to the current wisdom, Bloom is not telling us that we ought to understand our culture better. If he were, the book would be nothing more than a curriculum proposal. He is saying something about the nature and purpose of education: that it ought to show us that the old questions are still living questions, that there are answers to those questions, and that a man who never grapples with them in all of their immediacy has not lived a full life.

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This is why the reader must be cautious in applying Bloom's proposal—which is really a philosophical assertion—to moral problems. Bloom is very deliberately not telling us how to solve our moral problems. Nowhere in the book does he speak in strictly moral terms (the closest he comes is to say that a sense of good and evil is necessary to man). His frequent use of the word "virtue" does not refer to moral virtue but rather virtue in the context of ancient Greece, where it meant an inborn excellence or superiority. It would be a mistake to understand *The Closing of the American Mind* as an exhortation to return to traditional values; nor ought one understand it as a tool which will enable us to sharpen our youngsters' wits. That is what E. D. Hirsch does in *Cultural Literacy*, a value-free book which claims that an acquaintance with Western culture makes one more "effective." (One example Hirsch uses was the ability of members of the Black Panther Party to quote Jefferson!)

In fact, the careful reader of Bloom's book will himself get an education—about the *nature* of education.

The problem, which we can characterize as the essential modern problem, is succinctly stated in the book's first sentence: "There is one thing a professor can be absolutely certain of: almost every student entering the university believes, or says he believes, that truth is relative. If this belief is put to the test, one can count on the students' reaction: they will be uncomprehending." The results of this false "openness" (as he calls it) are frightening: students lack a sense of good and evil, and cannot judge actions within a moral context. They are, rather, paralyzed into inaction. If they can be said to sin, they sin out of inertia. They believe in the phenomena but not in causality. Reality is constantly shifting, and they are carried away by the shifting tides of their instincts, but prevented from responding to the promptings of those instincts. Psychology has reduced their emotions to insignificant twinges. No wonder their lives are tedious, their minds empty.

This familiar situation was addressed by Paul Vitz in *Psychology as Religion* ten years ago. Vitz attributed the disintegration of the modern soul to "selfism"—modern psychology's pseudo-scientific religion. Vitz's solution was, ultimately, conversion to a true religion. Bloom is addressing a different aspect of the same problem, challenging skepticism head-on, forcing it to make an account of itself.

Whether a return to genuine philosophical inquiry in our universities will inspire a return to morality or even, perhaps, to religious faith, rests on many factors: university education is only one among them. But the university *is* the American mind, and the university's crisis is also philosophy's crisis. And the philosophical crisis is also a political one. The "openness" Bloom decries denies the primacy of reason, but "The United States is one of the highest and most extreme achievements of the rational quest according to nature." If we abolish reason's role in education we will perish as a political entity. And insofar as we are a political entity we depend on morality, founded on human nature, for our stability and identity. This might be the closest connection one can make between Bloom's philosophical goal and a moral one; but it is sound.

Morality is concerned with human actions within a system of fixed principles. Bloom does not espouse or condemn any system except as it conflicts with the spirit of free inquiry. This is not to say that he espouses nothing—inquiry must have an object to be significant. The object of philosophical inquiry is the good; that of political philosophy, natural law. *The Closing of the American Mind* is about the delicate tension between the university, where truth is freely pursued, and the political community, which of necessity obeys fixed natural laws.

Bloom argues that the real community of men (and the one he belongs to) is the "community of those who seek the truth." The political community is, for Bloom, lower than the community of philosophers. Man is a permanent duality—body and soul—and this duality is reflected in the tension between philosophy and the political community. The university is properly that place where men seek the higher things, the city is where the social order is not sought so much as defended. Some critics have faulted Bloom for leaving any discussion of divine revelation out of his book, and this may indeed be a deficiency insofar as his thought in general is concerned. But he is talking primarily about *education*: the case could be made that education, even the education of believers, begins with questions and answers. The give-and-take between the men who wrote the great books would give the members of Bloom's university-community the chance to speculate freely about the crucial human questions within the protected—and

separate—confines of the university without interfering with the functioning of the political community.

What, then, can he offer social conservatives like me? We are necessarily activists. We concern ourselves with the problems besetting the political community. But we too are concerned with the truth. The political crisis—the prevalence of abortion, the disintegration of the family, our national lack of will—has provoked a philosophical response on our part: the defense of the rights of unborn children, and an affirmation of the nature and purpose of the family. We share, with Bloom, citizenship in a regime he describes as philosophical, a regime consequently vulnerable to the current ideological tyranny of the academic community over the political. And although our goals are political ones, we must beware lest they become *merely* political. It is too easy, in the service of a noble cause, to become prey to a host of temptations: the hunger for power, a disregard for the principles of our government, contempt for the law. Bloom's philosophical posture is thus of some importance to us. He reminds us that our cause has its roots in man's obligation to live by rules established according to reason. Finally, his book is addressed to *us*, not to the professors.

Under the best conditions, the American university can provide the foundations upon which moral reasoning rests. But today's are not the best conditions. The university no longer fosters pursuit of the truth—is not, in fact, truly open. As Bloom says, "To deny the possibility of knowing good and bad is to suppress true openness." The university depends for its identity on its function. It must be committed to knowledge for knowledge's sake. Philosophy can exist in the city only if it is independent. Bloom said as much in his commentary on Plato's *Republic*. Plato's duality of body and soul, according to Bloom, is mirrored in the relationship between philosophy and the state: ". . . knowledge as knowledge does not effect desirable political change, and knowledge disseminated is no longer knowledge." This is an extreme characterization of what I believe to be Bloom's understanding of the purpose of philosophy, and its apolitical nature. After all, he lives in and espouses the aims of the American regime. But I think he would insist that the American system is not an attempt to re-make man according to philosophical abstractions; man's higher nature is untouched.

At the start of the book we are presented with a problem: learning

doesn't *happen* in American universities. Instead of seeking knowledge, students pick up half-baked nihilism along with degrees in business and other practical pursuits. They then foist themselves, empty of head and heart, upon society. But the incongruity of comfortable bourgeois Americans spouting the buzzwords of sour German nihilism ("lifestyle," "identity," "value") has its roots in the university's adoption of the aforesaid nihilism, at the cost of its own intellectual integrity. The modern ideologies—psychological, philosophical, political—were welcomed with open arms by American naivete, and then packaged by the academic community for mass-consumption.

It is impossible to do justice to Bloom's discussion of the origins of "Nihilism, American Style." Its scope is immense, its format a kind of travelling back and forth between the most significant modern thinkers. But not referring to it would mean leaving out the meat of his argument. What Bloom wants to do with the middle of the book is to start a discussion—or many discussions—about education and human nature. Bloom himself is setting forth the old questions and showing us that they are still living, even as he describes nihilism's attempt to stifle them.

How did we come to stop asking them? Well, you ask a question only if you presuppose the existence of an answer. You may not get an answer if you're asking a philosophical question, but you know (or you ought to know) it's out there somewhere. But the teachers—who ought to be asking these questions of their students—are themselves intellectually atrophied. They are too comfortable with dessicated half-truths, which they can parrot with little intellectual labor—and a great show of weary sophistication. They can do this because they espouse, consciously or not, nihilism. Nihilism is a negative doctrine—that's what my dictionary says, anyway. The intent of nihilists is to break down or destroy whatever *is*, in order to create new values. Americans have a comfortable, down-home brand of nihilism because we are in fact a comfortable people. Our political and economic stability—even our technology—can be attributed to the great achievements of the men of the Enlightenment.

The Enlightenment (usually associated with thinkers like Descartes, Hobbes and Locke) changed the focus of philosophy from what is good and universal to what is useful and possible. Men who had gazed

upwards in the search for truth began to look around, and they found a way to harness nature's power to man's advantage. This new power was exhilarating, and provided men with scientific and mathematical achievements as well as ensuring the common good through regimes based on natural rights. The cost, however, was great. Because man was now studied the way nature was, he became a phenomenon. Men thought less about higher things and more about lower things, and they themselves became lower things. The Bourgeois Man, whose main concern was comfortable self-preservation, was born.

And something happened to philosophy. Knowledge was now measured by our ability to predict our own behavior and to change the physical world. The search for truth was the search for utility, and the tension between the philosopher and the city slackened. The duality between body and soul, the essential *tension* between body and soul, was lost. The study of man no longer included any discussion of the soul.

Rousseau was reacting to the Enlightenment—to the bourgeois, its creature—when he tried to replace our lost longing for the good with a longing for untarnished Nature. To do this it was necessary to re-create man. Bloom says elsewhere of him that “Rousseau was at the source of the tradition which replaces virtue and vice as the causes of a man's being good or bad, happy or miserable, with such pairs of opposites as sincere/insincere, authentic/inauthentic, inner-directed/other-directed, real self/alienated self.” Psychology was born.

Because the physical world is always in motion, knowledge of the physical world is also in flux. Psychology is modelled on the physical sciences. If our components—physical and psychological—are in motion, self-knowledge has to change fundamentally every time we look at ourselves. If I have no soul, no essential nature, I am different today from what I was yesterday. In the modern context, today really *is* the first day of the rest of your life. In the religious scheme of things this can happen only by the grace of God; nowadays it happens all the time. There is no human nature. Therefore the study of man could *effect* change. The next step was to create values: as Bloom says, “we do not love a thing because it is good, it is good because we love it.”

How did the university fit into this picture? The objects of philosophy had fallen from the sky, and the falling stars were just rocks. Man

had subordinated himself to culture (the acquired) over nature (the inborn). Thought was slave to action because, as Plato's Socrates said, an account is only as accurate as its object. Not only was philosophy a servant of the "culture" man created (this was especially obvious in Nazi Germany) but historicism—the inevitable result of giving culture precedence over unchanging human nature—saw the past as nothing more than the repository of dead cultures. The study of the ancient philosophers ceased to be significant to scholars who understood the ancients only in a historical context. Knowledge for knowledge's sake was simply not aspired to. The universities—as exemplified by the German universities which, under Heidegger's leadership, subordinated their philosophical function to the political aims of the German culture—were utterly dependent on the surrounding culture. The tension between the philosopher and the city was no more, and the old questions were laid to rest.

We imported German nihilism—an irony, as Bloom says, because the Germans held our bourgeois culture in contempt. But what they lost on the battlefield they gained in the universities. During the Sixties the universities' final abdication to nihilism was accomplished when the universities absorbed radicalism's hatred of both the truth and the philosophical principles of American society and government.

The lesson Bloom wants to teach us about education is clear: a university which serves any end other than the truth is on the path to its own destruction. Worse, it will bring the political community down with it. Perhaps Bloom is appealing to the public in his book because he despairs of being heard in the universities? Perhaps he thinks shame will force them back into the practice of genuine education.

The great-books solution is a radical one—why not teach summarized versions of Plato, or Thomas Aquinas, and be done with it? Because it is necessary to make the objects of philosophical inquiry immediate to us. Philosophers should long to know the truth, should, if I read Bloom correctly, be in love with the truth. There is always the danger that a university will only impart a particular doctrine, and turn the students into parrots, not thinkers. Bloom really loves teaching, and he really loves to make his students think. In order to do that you have to present them with questions, not about the content of a specific text, but about its truth.

It is vital that we rekindle our interest in questions about good and evil, justice, the soul. We know very well that doctors are often materialists and, worse, relativists. A doctor killing an unborn baby knows by the evidence of his own eyes—not to mention his extensive medical training—that he is killing a living human being. He must have an “inkling” that it is wrong—but he is no longer sure that doing something wrong will make any difference to his life. It is often said that there is no longer any moral consensus—but on what ground will we build it? Enlightened self-interest can’t give anyone a motive for overcoming the temptation to break a moral law for profit.

A good parent knows that he is not meant to care for an older child the same way he cares for an infant, and that dependence is not the appropriate outcome of a good upbringing. The most astonishing irony of American education—university or otherwise—is that our highly-vaunted skepticism begets slavishness. We do not encourage intellectual independence here, only acculturation. But a student who tries to understand Plato will find it impossible, if he reads Plato and not a commentary on Plato, to avoid thinking.

One of Bloom’s critics—a former student of his—suggested that novels, not philosophy, would better rekindle noble passions. *Anna Karenina* was suggested as suitable for the purpose. But as Bloom pointed out, *Anna Karenina* couldn’t be written nowadays. The central conflict of the novel would resolve itself in an amicable “no fault” divorce, with joint custody of the children.

We haven’t entirely lost the capacity for philosophy, of course. Otherwise we couldn’t talk about *Anna Karenina*, or Plato, at all. The nature of truth is that it is self-contained, independent of our attempts to re-fashion it. A lot of people talk about man’s capacity to destroy the created world. While I don’t wish to argue about that one way or another, I will say that we can’t *uncreate* it. Nor can we unmake the laws according to which it was fashioned.

The Closing of the American Mind allows one to make some crucial distinctions between the various roles of the university, society and the family. The University ought to enclose within its walls men who are engaged in speculation; the political community needs to apply fixed principles to public behavior through laws—which in our political sys-

tem are arrived at through rational debate. The family embodies and asserts a tradition which provides the foundation for political stability and the transmission of moral values.

One can see how ideas are transformed as we go from the higher sphere of the university, where freedom is absolute, down to the state, where debate results in action, finally to rest on the solid ground of the family whose role is simply to assert and support. All of these institutions need to be connected but distinct, like the several parts of the body. The turmoil of the Sixties happened precisely because political nihilism challenged the university's speculative role and the university, radicalism's slave, subverted the functions of the family and the political order.

One might argue that the establishment of colleges and universities which simply serve the cause of traditional morality and piety are sufficient to restore health to our ailing regime. But it is not the university's role to assert morality or revealed truth. Those are the work of the family and the church, respectively (at least insofar as their political roles are concerned). There is nothing wrong, and much that is good, about a college curriculum which rigorously imparts doctrines mirroring a traditional and religious interpretation of Western thought. But when one reads Aristotle with the purpose of discovering whether or not his books are *true*, one is engaging in the pursuit of the truth—in the *activity* of philosophy. That is an activity which, in the case of America, was meant to be mirrored in the political process. And we, especially, have suffered politically because the truth is not thought worthy of pursuit.

Only a Kid

Nika Hazelton

ITALIANS LIKE CHILDREN, and like having them around. In Italy, you see burly men keep a child amused while the mother shops, or pays a gas bill, or has to go to the bathroom in a filling station. I speak from experience: when my son Julian was two years old and his brother Tony nine, I was so surprised at the willingness of the shop assistant, the gas office employee, and the station's gas pumper to mind my unruly youngsters while I attended to my chores. All the more so since I had just come from England, where well-dressed men did their, alas, successful best to keep me and my kids off busses.

Italian children do not have to sit still through an interminable grown-up meal. They can roam around the restaurant during the various courses. They can approach strangers who will talk to them nicely and who will not even shy away from sticky little fingers. If they don't, the whole restaurant will be against them, visibly so.

Italians almost always say, when explaining and excusing a temper tantrum in a child, "he is little, he's only a kid." But in real life, they will treat a child as if he or she were a grown-up. Children's worlds, pastimes, shops, in fact the whole business of children is not a native Italian concept. Italians, young and old, have always belonged to a family, and were treated accordingly.

Children were treated like any family member, petted and cursed like any grown-up. Anybody familiar with Italian life will have heard mothers, aunts, grandmothers and family friends curse the young with colorful, largely-unprintable expressions. The language gets more and more colorful as you go south in Italy, where the natives are much less inhibited (if they are inhibited at all) than in the country's northern parts. Strangers have been known to try to save the children from the horrors that will befall them, according to their elders, only to be vilified in their turn by the child's keeper, while the howling youngster clings to the keeper. Of course, neither side understands what the fuss is all about.

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Alas, even in Italy things are changing. And not for the better, to my mind. When I was a child in Rome, Christmas was a religious holiday, and not an orgy of present-giving. Christmas trees were largely unknown, and the Befana, a *nice* witch, brought gifts to the kids. How well I remember the great Befana market in Rome's Piazza Navona, on the 6th of January, with the marvelous handmade toys, the dolls, horses, carts, and similar wooden objects, festively displayed under the sputtering bright carbon lights! How I wanted at least to touch the objects my heart pined for! But touching anything was *streng verboten*, and it was left to the Befana to bring your heart's desire. Today, the toys are plastic and shoddy, and the market is no longer *the* festive occasion it once was. Plastic has taken over in all of the Italian street markets. In Tuscany's Cortona, where I had a house once, the weekly street market is now filled with cheap, mainly plastic things and cheap crockery. When I complained at the largest stand in the market, the owner pointed out to me that "Italy is a modern country" and that "plastics are wonderfully simple to keep," meaning that they can be easily disposed of. She added kindly that if I wanted to buy an honest coffee pot, or a wooden rake made by hand, or a ceramic plate, I would find these things in the "artisan shop" in our nearby town.

The invasion of modern life, *via* the telly, women's rights, etc. and etc., is dividing the world into grown-ups and children. In the old days and, I am happy to say, to *this* day in large parts of rural Italy and among the humbler classes in the cities, children and grown-ups inhabited the same world. There were no separate rooms for the kids, they were not gotten rid of at the Saturday movies and in summer camps. People used to curse their children for driving them mad, but in practice they put up with being driven mad.

In fact, I remember how terrible-tempered children used to be admired by their betters for being exceptionally bright. The most outrageous behavior of ill-tempered, obnoxious and spoiled youngsters would be met with the gentlest possible (and this was very gentle indeed) "they're only children, *poverini*, poor things" who could not help their behavior. I have yet to meet an Italian grown-up man or woman who has ever admitted to shaping his offsprings' behavior. Ah well.

NIKA HAZELTON

When I was young in Rome, a long time ago, two events glorified children above daily life. At Christmas time, in the Church of Santa Maria in Aracoeli, which lies two-thirds up on the left side of the long staircase that leads to the Capitol in Rome (as you come from the Piazza Venezia and the rest of Rome), little girls used to recite suitable poetry to the assembled faithful. I can see them now, dressed up in fanciful, elaborate dresses, with enormous hair-ribbons on the top of the head (a fashion still worn by little Soviet girls) spouting words without hesitation. How I admired the children!

I also remember Carnival time, when the children of Rome's lower and middle classes paraded their costumes in the street, before going to one of the famous Children's Balls. How I envied the Pierrots, Columbines, the ancient Roman soldiers, the shepherdesses, and how I would have given my life to be allowed to go to one of the Balls!

Foreigners are apt to regard Italian children as beautiful, bright, and as terribly spoiled. And who is to blame them after hearing a mother shrieking at her offspring who refuses to walk, or seeing a child tear his mother's flowered hat to pieces in a restaurant, and similar unseemly youthful behavior? However, in the end, these obnoxious youngsters are the ones devoted to their parents and wives, sisters and aunts, whereas the well-behaved kids of the foreigners leave home—and their parents—for good.

I think that the Italian love for children has a great deal to do with Italy's Catholic tradition. In the Rome of my childhood, there was still a tradition of taking Baby Jesus to the dying. This was done as follows: in the Church of Santa Maria in Aracoeli (which I mentioned before) the faithful venerated a statue of "Gesù Bambino," the Child Jesus. The statue was known as being a miraculous one, and held dear especially for the help it gave to people on their deathbeds. A message sent to the friars who ran the church would bring Gesù Bambino to your home, accompanied by one or two friars who also carried with them the Last Ointment.

Naturally, the miraculous statue was much in demand in Rome. I remember seeing the friars and their precious cargo rushing by, one summer evening, as my parents were taking me to see the changing of the guard at the Quirinale Palace, where once the King of Italy (and now, the country's President) carried out his official functions.

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In the fifties, I happened to be in Santa Maria in Aracoeli, prior to going back to Milan, where I was visiting some friends. I got into a friendly conversation with one of the friars, who was readying the church for the evening service. Naturally, I asked him if he and his brother friars still took Gesù Bambino to the dying in Rome. This is what he said and I do remember his very words, in Italian, of course: “Nowadays, Signora, the Gesù Bambino rarely leaves this church. We only take Him out when we know the people who asked us to bring Him to their house. We have been told by the authorities that He would cause disorder and embarrassment.”

All of us have always celebrated the birth of Jesus, the coming of a child that will redeem the world. And consequently, the birth of a child is a happy, wonderful event, even when we know that the child will not be a savior, to put it mildly. Despite Italy’s modernization, the birth of the child and the child’s mother deserved to be praised and honored. I shall always remember the pride of a young salesman in the Tuscan village where I had a house, when he fondled his wife’s pregnant belly and spoke of the child to come with such joy. He invited the whole village, all 500 souls, to help him celebrate the child’s christening—and they all came, oohing and aahing over the dolled-up babe in his great-grandmother’s arms.

Italy’s Catholic tradition has always influenced the Italian male’s attitude to women and children. You cannot see, wherever you go, famous and not-so-famous pictures of Mother and Child without being influenced in your behavior to women and children. And where else but in Italy do pop songs so often contain the word “mamma”? And where else in the world are male and female porn and pop stars insisting that they be shown with their children in the popular illustrated weeklies? Thank heaven, Italians still function as a family unit, and the men still consider themselves as “padri di famiglia,” fathers of a family, as a policeman and a farmer described themselves in the Italian newspaper I bought the other day.

If it were not for the family, Italy could not exist, let alone function. Italian governments come and go, corruption is rife among people who do not earn enough to feed their children, such as state employees, but the family holds together as a unit. Why? Because Italians like children, and like to have them around.

APPENDIX A

[*The following is the full text of President Ronald Reagan's Proclamation declaring January 17, 1988, as National Sanctity of Human Life Day.*]

A Proclamation

by the President of the United States of America

America has given a great gift to the world, a gift that drew upon the accumulated wisdom derived from centuries of experiments in self-government, a gift that has irrevocably changed humanity's future. Our gift is twofold: the declaration, as a cardinal principle of all just law, of the God-given, unalienable rights possessed by every human being; and the example of our determination to secure those rights and to defend them against every challenge through the generations. Our declaration and defense of our rights have made us and kept us free and have sent a tide of hope and inspiration around the globe.

One of those unalienable rights, as the Declaration of Independence affirms so eloquently, is the right to life. In the 15 years since the Supreme Court's decision in *Roe v. Wade*, however, America's unborn have been denied their right to life. Among the tragic and unspeakable results in the past decade and a half have been the loss of life of 22 million infants before birth; the pressure and anguish of countless women and girls who are driven to abortion; and a cheapening of our respect for the human person and the sanctity of human life.

We are told that we may not interfere with abortion. We are told that we may not "impose our morality" on those who wish to allow or participate in the taking of the life of infants before birth; yet no one calls it "imposing morality" to prohibit the taking of life after people are born. We are told as well that there exists a "right" to end the lives of unborn children; yet no one can explain how such a right can exist in stark contradiction of each person's fundamental right to life.

That right to life belongs equally to babies in the womb, babies born handicapped, and the elderly or infirm. That we have killed the unborn for fifteen years does not nullify this right, nor could any number of killings ever do so. The unalienable right to life is found not only in the Declaration of Independence but also in the Constitution that every President is sworn to preserve, protect, and defend. Both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life without due process of law.

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All medical and scientific evidence increasingly affirms that children before birth share all the basic attributes of human personality—that they are in fact persons. Modern medicine treats unborn children as patients. Yet, as the Supreme Court itself has noted, the decision in *Roe v. Wade* rested upon an earlier state of medical technology. The law of the land in 1988 should recognize all of the medical evidence.

Our Nation cannot continue down the path of abortion, so radically at odds with our history, our heritage, and our concepts of justice. This sacred legacy, and the well-being and the future of our country, demand that protection of the innocents must be guaranteed and that the personhood of the unborn be declared and defended throughout our land. In legislation introduced at my request in the First Session of the 100th Congress, I have asked the Legislative branch to declare the “humanity of the unborn child and the compelling interest of the several states to protect the life of each person before birth.” This duty to declare on so fundamental a matter falls to the Executive as well. By this Proclamation I hereby do so.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, RONALD REAGAN, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, do hereby proclaim and declare the unalienable personhood of every American, from the moment of conception until natural death, and I do proclaim, ordain, and declare that I will take care that the Constitution and laws of the United States are faithfully executed for the protection of America’s unborn children. Upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind and the gracious favor of Almighty God. I also proclaim Sunday, January 17, 1988, as National Sanctity of Human Life Day. I call upon the citizens of this blessed land to gather on that day in their homes and places of worship to give thanks for the gift of life they enjoy and to reaffirm their commitment to the dignity of every human being and the sanctity of every human life.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this fourteenth day of January, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-eight, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and twelfth.

—RONALD REAGAN

APPENDIX B

[The following column was published in *Catholic New York* (December 3, 1987) and is reprinted here with permission (©1987 by Catholic New York).]

Commonsense Language and Abortion

Cardinal John J. O'Connor

Hooray to Tamar Lewin! I have never met Tamar, but if everything she writes is as straightforward as her article in the Nov. 23 issue of the *New York Times*, I intend becoming one of her regular readers.

Tamar reports on a 19-year-old woman two days in labor when arriving at the hospital. After another 18 hours the doctors decided she needed an immediate Caesarean section, because, Tamar says: “the baby’s likelihood of developing a fatal infection was already rising.” The *baby*, Tamar calls the unborn; not the *fetus*. She uses the same term any woman uses even in the very earliest days of learning she is pregnant: “I’m going to have a *baby*.” No “fetus” language here. A real live human being, commonly called a baby, inside or outside the womb, before or after birth.

Tamar goes on, this time quoting the judge who issued a court order authorizing surgery against the mother’s wishes: “It is one thing for an adult to gamble with nature regarding his or her own life; it is quite another when the gamble involves the life or death of an unborn infant.” Thus decreed Judge Richard A. Levie, using the same straightforward terminology. No fetus here, folks; an *infant*, as in, “When I was an infant . . .” Quite human, the term *infant*, not at all impersonal, not at all an “appendage” or a “piece of tissue.”

Back to Tamar, who tells us of the problems such court fights pose for lawyers and doctors, “forcing them to balance a woman’s right to refuse treatment against society’s desire to protect babies only an operation away from birth.” There we go again: *babies* must be protected; babies still in their mothers’ wombs. Referring, then, to the *New England Journal of Medicine* article on the subject, she talks about “the fetus” inside the womb, but quickly returns to Judge Levie and tells us that in all but three of the 21 cases, the courts granted decrees “deciding, as Judge Levie did, that they could not ‘indulge the desires of the parents’ when there is ‘substantial risk to the unborn infant.’”

A ruling by a District of Columbia Court of Appeals is cited next, and we are told the decision in the case of a pregnant woman dying of cancer: “. . . the court was correct to place the interests of the unborn child over (the mother’s) right to avoid bodily intrusion.”

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And so the article goes, with “fetus” used interchangeably with child, infant and unborn baby in instance after instance, and in many cases without even a reference to the term favored by abortionists, *fetus*. “. . . I think it’s silly to say women have no obligation before the baby is born,” says Prof. John Robertson of the University of Texas Law School. “If a woman refuses medical help, and her child is born damaged as a result,” maybe she should be punished. “Maybe she should be turned over to child abuse authorities, who could punish prenatal child abuse just the same as postnatal abuse.”

The decision of Civil Court Judge Margaret Taylor of New York City is presented at some length in Tamar’s article. Judge Taylor is reported as turning down a request from St. Vincent’s Hospital in Manhattan to order a Caesarean section in the case of a pregnancy in which “the umbilical cord,” says Tamar, “was wrapped around the baby’s neck.” The judge refused to grant the order, the account reports, stating: “I really sweated it out, but I felt comfortable with the decision even when I accepted the doctor’s assessment that there was a possibility that the baby would die.” And again, arguing in support of her decision, Judge Taylor is quoted as saying: “It’s absolutely clear that cigarettes and liquor are harmful to babies, that bad nutrition brings brain damage. So do you prevent a woman from doing those things the minute she gets pregnant? And as a practical matter, how is the judge going to enforce the orders? If a woman says a month before her baby is due that she won’t have a C-section, do you put her in jail or chain her to a hospital bed until it’s time to deliver the baby?”

My interest here is not to argue with Judge Taylor’s decision, although I cannot begin to accept the analogy attributed to her in Tamar’s article, in which she compares requiring a woman to have a Caesarean in order to save her baby with requiring a man to undergo surgery in order to donate a kidney to his child. My interest, rather, is in the terminology used throughout the article, by the author and a number of those she quotes. The primary reason it fascinates me is that for years and years now, those pressing to facilitate and support abortions have been meticulously careful never to refer to the preborn as a baby, an infant, a child or by any other title that immediately reveals that we are talking about human beings, however tiny. They have taken their cue well from the California Medical Association Journal which stated back in 1970:

Since the old ethic has not yet been fully displaced it has been necessary to separate the idea of abortion from the idea of killing, which continues to be socially abhorrent. *The result has been a curious avoidance of the scientific fact which everyone really knows, that human life begins at conception and is continuous whether intra-or-extra uterine until death.* The very considerable semantic gymnastics which are required to rational-

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ize abortion as anything but taking a human life would be ludicrous if they were not often put forth under socially impeccable auspices. It is suggested that this schizophrenic sort of subterfuge is necessary because while a new ethic is being accepted the old one has not been rejected. [Emphasis added.]

I am happy to see the return of commonsense language. It makes the meaning of abortion crystal clear: we are destroying a baby, an infant, a child before delivery from its mother's womb. If we delayed for a split second until after delivery, we would call the same destruction of the same baby, infant, or child "infanticide." That sounds much more repugnant because it's what we used to attribute to "heathen Chinese." Commonsense language also makes clear that when any government—federal, state, county or city—funds abortions, it is funding the destruction of babies, infants and children. To do so because the denial of funds would make abortions the "right" of the wealthy, and deny them to the poor, may make a very persuasive political argument, but doesn't change the nature of what's happening, even if one can find a Catholic theologian to support it.

There's another reason that straightforward language is refreshing. It requires us to say: "Yes, I know that I am destroying (or assisting in the destruction of) a human being, a baby, an infant, a child, but I believe that doing so is the lesser of two evils. If I don't destroy this particular human being here and now, he or she is going to suffer later in life—through poverty, retardation, or some kind of grave handicap. The amniocentesis test tells me so." Or, "If I don't take the life of the baby, the mother's rights will be violated—her right to privacy, or to peace of mind, or to avoid the inconveniences or the burden of a child, or to conceal having been pregnant."

This is something, it seems to me, that society should be able to come to grips with much more effectively than with justifying abortion on the grounds that the preborn is a "fetus" in the sense of being a piece of tissue or appendage, inhuman, not a baby, an infant, a child.

It seems to me that the Supreme Court that handed down the 1973 decision effectively denying the basic human right of life to the preborn would have been much more courageous had it said: "Society must make a choice. There are two human beings immediately involved, a mother and her baby. If society wants to establish laws which allow a woman to kill her baby in order to avoid what she considers an evil in bearing and delivering her baby, then let society know what it's doing, and not pretend otherwise."

Of course, the court would then have had to go on to say: "Our entire history and all our ideals are rooted in protecting the most vulnerable among us and recognizing the sacredness and worth and dignity of every human life,

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but nevertheless a mother's right must be considered absolute until her baby is actually born. Then and only then can the government protect the baby."

Is all this too harsh and cruel to suggest? What else was the 1973 Supreme Court really saying? What else do successive ratifications of its edicts really mean?

The offer of the Archdiocese of New York is as firm today as when I made it first on Oct. 15, 1984. No woman in need, whatever her religion, race, ethnic background or any other characteristic, need be "forced" to have an abortion. We are prepared to meet all expenses—medical, hospital, legal, counseling, etc.—and to help her keep her baby or offer it for adoption. And all will be handled with complete confidentiality, and with condemnation of no one.

We who oppose abortion are told incessantly that we don't understand—we don't understand the needs of the poor, the teenager, the parents, the married, the single or anyone else. I answer that we understand that the question is *always* one of the sacredness, the worth, the dignity of human life. Because we understand that, we are desperately committed to help those in need of help, the mother, the baby and everyone else involved.

And we want to help those who, for whatever reason, have had an abortion. Life must go on. *Nothing* is beyond God's gentle mercy and forgiveness. *No one* is beyond His love. Those who, in any way, have suffered the tragedy of abortion can find peace in the arms of Almighty God. We want to provide all the support and love that we can as the journey of life begins anew.

We are *so* glad to hear a columnist talk about unborn *babies*, and even more excited to hear such words from a judge. Who knows where such common sense could lead?

APPENDIX C

[*The following column appeared in the New York Post (January 6, 1988) and is reprinted here with the author's permission.*]

Dr. Mengele, Call Your Office!

Patrick J. Buchanan

If memory serves, the abortion issue moved to center stage in America's consciousness three decades ago. An Arizona woman, who had taken thalidomide, suspected the child she was carrying would be born deformed. Would it be wrong to have an abortion?

The country was divided; and the woman terminated the debate, and her pregnancy, by flying to Sweden for the abortion, then illegal throughout the U.S.

What a distance we have traveled since that innocent age. Abortion has become the most common surgical procedure in America; 1.5 million are performed yearly, 99 percent of them for social or economic reasons.

Since 1973, more than 16 million of the unborn—roughly Australia's population—have been destroyed.

Now, America is advancing on a new frontier. Medical laboratories have discovered that the tissues of these unwanted babies, especially their brain cells, have wonderful medical properties. Lo and behold, these tiny infants may be wanted after all—for their organs!

Fetal brain transplants, to cure Alzheimer's and Parkinson's diseases and other neural disorders, can become "to medicine what superconductivity is to physics," exults Dr. Abraham Lieberman of the NYU Medical Center. The *New York Times*, with an uncommon enthusiasm, heartily concurs, "Some of the prospects are enticing."

So long as abortion remains legal, runs the argument, why not use the fetal organs gained thereby for social benefit? Yet, the argument is not far removed from that made by the German doctors of the early Reich, who said that since euthanasia was state policy, why waste the vital organs of its victims?

From there, it is no great moral leap to picking gold out of the teeth of Holocaust victims—after all, they won't be needing it anymore.

Doctors enthusiastic about capturing the fetal tissues of aborted infants find Holocaust analogies offensive and outrageous. But it all comes down to the same fundamental question, does it not? Is human life sacred, or is it not?

If the fetus has no more inherent value than a removed appendix or a pair of tonsils, why not use fetal tissues for everything from organ transplants to

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improving the quality of facial creams? Sweden now uses most of its discarded fetuses for medical research; why not create a new industry of raising and farming fetuses for their organs?

“Growing fetuses for spare parts—I think it can be done,” says Dr. Antonin Scommengna of Chicago’s Michael Reese Hospital. “It’s not a technical question; it’s a moral question.” Yes, and we all know how moral questions get decided these days, don’t we?

As the best (i.e., the most useful) brain tissues are best taken, doctors contend, later in the pregnancy, when the fetus is more mature, how best to capture them—for transplantation?

The obvious answer: Encourage the woman to postpone the abortion until her baby is more fully formed, then remove the fetus whole, so the organs can be carefully removed while still active, intact and useful.

To save something as delicate and fragile as brain cells, quite obviously, is going to require a high degree of coordination between the pregnant woman, her abortionist and the medical researcher.

Dr. Curtis Willkie, national leader of Right to Life, describes how, thanks to Prostaglandin, a product of the Upjohn people, unborn babies are being literally “driven” out of the womb:

It induces hard-driving labor and delivers the baby at whatever stage of pregnancy . . . The baby is usually killed by this process but is sometimes born alive. Such “specimens” have been reported to have been immediately iced and their body temperatures cooled to preserve the tissues. The dead (or not quite dead) baby has been hurried to the surgeon, who then removes the organs and transplants them into the adult recipients.

If, as *Blackmun & Co.* ruled from the high bench in 1973, the unborn child is the property of the mother, to be disposed of as she wishes, upon what ground do we stand to tell women they cannot conceive for pay, and abort for profit? What argument is left against the “farming” of fetuses?

The day of the abortionist-entrepreneur may be at hand, yuppie doctors who not only get rich doing abortions but do a lucrative side business taking orders for the organs of the unborn children they have destroyed.

The good news is, we are no longer on the slippery slopes, we have just about reached bottom. One is reminded again of the retort the old priest made to Whittaker Chambers, when the latter, on his deathbed, was talking about the necessity to save the West.

“What makes you think the West is worth saving?”

APPENDIX D

[The following column appeared in the New York Post (Nov. 9, 1987) and is reprinted here with permission (©1987 by the New York Post).]

1.2 million child victims go unmourned

Ray Kerrison

Seldom has the city been united in such profound dismay and grief as over the fate of Elizabeth Steinberg, the battered victim of diabolical parental abuse. That a child so tender and sweet could be so cruelly used is almost too painful to contemplate, yet the tearful outpourings of distress and sympathy for her is testimony to how deeply her plight touched millions.

Lisa, as she was called, is one of several small children whose prospects for life and survival have riveted public attention in the past few weeks.

Less than a month ago, the whole world waited breathless as 400 volunteers drilled their way through the Texas earth to rescue 19-month-old Jessica McClure from an abandoned well. It took them nearly 60 hours to get her out of her terrible prison, but they made it, to the vast relief of everyone.

Then came Tabatha Foster, a beautiful child just 3 years of age, who underwent a five-organ transplant, only the third operation of its kind. Tabatha received a new liver, pancreas, small intestine and parts of a stomach and colon in a marathon 15-hour surgical procedure in Pittsburgh as the world prayed for her.

These events, disparate though they may be, have at least one common denominator. By evoking so vast a public response, they affirm the inestimable value of human life, no matter what the circumstances or conditions, no matter what the cost to rescue it, protect it, preserve it.

Millions of us did not know Lisa Steinberg, but we weep for her. We did not know Jessica McClure yet we suffered with her and her parents through all those terrible hours. We do not know Tabatha Foster but we yearn for her survival and recovery.

Underlying these emotions, however, is a grievous paradox. If life is so infinitely precious for these children outside the womb, why is it not equally so for those within the womb?

Did these children assume their worth only at the moment of birth?

Why do we become distraught over the abuse of one child but condone and legally sanction the destruction of 1.2 million children in the womb every year? Why do we suffer excruciating anguish in the rescue of one tot, but shrug as hundred of thousands of infants are disposed of as if they were Klee-

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nex tissues? Why do we marvel at the five-organ transplant to save a toddler but permit suction and knife to destroy the perfectly formed organs of those unborn?

When Robert Morgenthau, the Manhattan district attorney, made a rare public comment on the Steinberg case, he used a legal term as precise as it is horrendous. He charged Lisa's adoptive father with displaying "a depraved indifference to human life."

There is a case to be made that modern society, by approving abortion, is guilty of a similar indifference to human life.

A couple of years ago, a woman, 8-and-a-half months pregnant, was involved in a car accident in St. Paul, Minn. She survived but her baby was stillborn. The state's supreme court ruled that the baby was not a "human being."

Any woman who has given birth to a premature baby, anyone who has seen such a baby, knows that an 8-and-a-half-month-old fetus is in every way a human being.

It is on this battleground that America's next big human rights campaign will be fought. The division will not be between liberal or conservative, but between life and death. No nation can go on indefinitely mourning its young while simultaneously destroying them.

The issue played its part in the rejection of Robert Bork and the withdrawal of Douglas Ginsburg in the fight over the vacancy on the U.S. Supreme Court.

As things stand, the U.S. has abolished all laws protecting the lives of unborn children. Out of that has come a reign of violence and a casualty toll such as we have never seen, not in revolution or war.

This weighs heavily on the conscience of millions of Americans. If we will move heaven and earth for a child 6 years of age, 3 years of age, 19 months old, should we not do as much for a child six months old in the womb?

APPENDIX E

[The following syndicated column was released October 22, 1987, and is reprinted here with permission (©1987 by the Scripps Howard News Service).]

Dealing with those ‘raging hormones’

Thomas Sowell

The latest fad in discussing teen-age sex problems is to say it’s just not “realistic” to expect adolescents to abstain, because of their “raging hormones.” This is often said with great airs of superiority, which seem to be the real reason some people discuss issues at all.

Despite the self-congratulation of the anointed, it is hardly a modern discovery that teen-agers have hormones. Surely such old-fashioned practices as chaperones and separate dormitories for college men and women represented a keen awareness of this fact, whatever the merits or demerits of these practices themselves. In some cultures, early marriage was another form of recognition of the facts of life.

Those preoccupied with self-congratulation and with being one-up on the rest of us often fail to see how their own past crusades have contributed to present trouble. Teen-age pregnancy, venereal disease and abortion have soared in the wake of the “sexual revolution” promoted by the same people who now tell us it’s not “realistic” to expect the kind of self-control that existed for generations before they came along.

The anointed have contributed to current sexual problems in another way. Their crusading zeal for keeping ever-larger numbers of people in school for ever-longer numbers of years has artificially prolonged adolescence throughout the society. For that half of the young adult population which goes to college, about a decade elapses between the onset of puberty and the time when they can become self-supporting and able to establish their own families.

With the average age of first marriage now in the mid-20s, it is usually more than a decade between puberty and marriage. This not only creates serious stresses and dangers during that period, it often creates adolescent attitudes that too often persist into the 30s and 40s, or for life.

No one familiar with what actually goes on in classrooms across the country can seriously believe that most young people are thirsting for knowledge—or that most of what is spoon-fed to them in schools and colleges constitutes real education. Much of it is glorified baby-sitting or warehousing young people for several years to keep them out of the labor market.

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This exercise in self-deception costs the taxpayers billions under the label of "education." Its costs to the young people left in limbo for years between childhood and adulthood cannot be measured in money. Sexual frustration is only part of it.

Doing all sorts of silly things to show symbolic independence is part of adolescence. But symbolic independence is a high priority only for those who are in fact dependent. Self-supporting adults with their own homes and raising their own families do not need wierd hairdos or shouting matches with their parents to show that they are independent.

Today, dependence on parents is greater than ever and lasts longer than ever. Even married children often milk their parents in ways that would have been considered unthinkable by both just a generation ago. Affluence makes this possible; deteriorating values make it happen.

While an affluent society can afford to keep people in adolescence longer, there is no reason why it should. Adolescence is the most unrealistic period of life.

In childhood, dependence on parents and the serious limitations of the child's knowledge are well-understood by all concerned. In adulthood the inescapable realities of economics and personal responsibilities are sobering factors promoting maturity. Only in adolescence are illusions given their freest rein.

Whole industries cater to and exploit the illusions of adolescents. Rock bands are only one example. There are writers, college presidents and political movements that do the same.

Sex problems are not going to be solved in isolation. A restoration of parental authority over adolescents is essential, even if this means creating unemployment among the "experts." It would also mean scrapping many of the legal reforms of the past generation which have facilitated irresponsibility. (For example, abortion is the only medical operation that can be performed on a minor legally without parental knowledge or consent.)

More than anything else, adolescence itself needs to be shortened.

It won't be easy. There will be fierce and vocal opposition from the self-congratulatory anointed, who are themselves among the prime examples of lifelong adolescents.

APPENDIX F

[The following is the full text of an article which appeared in the *New York Daily News* (Dec. 13, 1987) and is reprinted here with permission (©1987 *New York News Inc.*.)]

State Probers Eye Abortion Clinic

Heidi Evans

Jane Torres can't forget the woman who was given an abortion she didn't need.

It was Torres' third day working at a drab Manhattan clinic when the woman, a single mother afraid she was pregnant, walked in. Torres remembers performing a standard urine test and concluding it was negative.

Still, Torres says, the woman was told she was pregnant. And within an hour she was brought into an operating room, put to sleep and subjected to an abortion.

While the woman was still unconscious, Torres placed the contents of her emptied uterus into a specimen jar for a required analysis. It was then, Torres remembers, that she saw the jar contained only pink-colored water—and no sign of fetal tissue.

Disturbed, Torres tried to tell the groggy woman she wasn't pregnant, but, Torres says, she was stopped by the clinic's owner, Isaac Chalbani.

Told Not to Talk

"He yanked me out by the arm and told me not to talk to the patient," she said. "He offered me \$200 and told me, 'Forget about what you just saw. Pour the specimen down the drain.'"

Torres refused and quit. As she fled the office in tears, Torres says, she told prospective patients in the waiting room: "Get out! Because they just finished giving this lady an abortion with no baby inside her stomach."

Later she said: "It's like a house of terrors, a sickening place."

Four flights up off a hallway at 37 E. 28th St., the door opens on a six-room, no-frills, all-cash abortion clinic called I.C. Medical Building Associates LTD.

Its clients are generally young, low-income women. Some come certain that they are pregnant and of their decision to have an abortion. Others arrive unsure even whether they've conceived.

Clinic Visits

For more than a month, after receiving complaints from clinic staff members, the *Daily News* studied the workings of I.C. Medical. Four female

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reporters visited the clinic posing as prospective patients, and employees and patients were interviewed.

The employees, most of whom have quit, included Torres, 22, a Bronx mother; Lillian Henry, 31, who lives with her husband and children in Queens; Anna Gonzalez, 19, of Brooklyn, and four others who didn't want their names published.

What emerged were serious questions about quality of care at the clinic, as well as strong suggestions that women who are not pregnant are being subjected to abortions there. The *News* look at I.C. Medical disclosed that:

Pregnancy tests done at the clinic often show positive results when women aren't pregnant. The four reporters who visited the clinic submitted urine samples for testing—including one who submitted a male's sample for her own.

The clinic's test indicated he was expecting.

Positive Results

Overall, the clinic reported positive test results for three of the four reporters. Urine specimens from the same three were then tested by Planned Parenthood. The tests were all negative.

In addition, two former employees said that while working at the clinic they tested themselves using chemicals and equipment supplied by Chalbani. Although they were not pregnant, they, too, tested positive. "We couldn't believe it," said one.

Once a pregnancy test is positive, Chalbani often pressures women to have abortions on the spot.

Moments after a reporter walked into the clinic Oct. 20 and asked for a pregnancy test, Chalbani barked: "Are you ready to have an abortion now if it's positive?" He scowled when the reporter said she needed time.

That same morning, a Brooklyn student, 21, said she told Chalbani she was short \$15 on the clinic's fee and would have to return the next day. She said that Chalbani then badgered her: "Let's do it and finish today," and he took her gold ring and bracelet as collateral.

'It Was Dirty'

The woman, torn over her decision to have an abortion, wound up jumping off the operating table in tears before the procedure was done. "It was dirty. I hate that place," she said, once outside the clinic.

Dr. Justin Charles Terra, a physician who performs abortions at I.C. Medical, acknowledged he does the procedures even without complete evidence of pregnancy. He said he does so only if the women "insist" and sign a consent form.

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Clinic staff alleged Chalbani didn't provide adequate equipment or supplies.

The workers interviewed by the *News* said that Chalbani held back sanitary napkins unless patients asked repeatedly for them, ordered staff to wring out bloodied operating room mops with their hands, allowed the use of unsterilized instruments and provided patients with soiled gowns.

Anna Gonzalez, a receptionist who quit last month, said Chalbani wouldn't let her clean the bloodied seat of the wheelchair that carries unconscious patients from surgery to the recovery room.

'Waste of Time'

"When I would try to clean it in the middle of the day, he would say, 'It's a waste of time. You have other things to do,'" Gonzalez said. "So the next girl would bleed on top of the old blood."

"He's taking advantage of other people's misery," added Henry. "All he sees is dollar signs and he doesn't care how he gets it."

I.C. Medical is operated without a state license.

Under state law, abortion clinics must be licensed by the state Health Department if they are run by a corporation rather than a physician. That appears to be the case at I.C. Medical, where, a state Health Department investigator said, Chalbani pays the rent, salaries and expenses.

Licensed clinics must meet specific health and safety standards and are subject to annual inspections.

Approximately 100,000 abortions are performed annually in the city. They are done in hospitals, doctors' offices and clinics at fees ranging from about \$80 at cash-only clinics to \$800 in a doctor's office or hospital.

12 Licensed Clinics

The middle ground includes 12 state-licensed clinics, such as Planned Parenthood, which charges \$285, and The Center for Reproductive and Sexual Health, where women pay \$215.

Both of those offer counseling by a social worker, monitoring by a registered nurse in the recovery room and an emergency agreement with nearby hospitals.

Health professionals said that since abortion was legalized in 1972, allegations such as those raised about I.C. Medical are rarely heard.

"I'm not aware that there are a substantial amount of complaints in this area," said Sue Kelly, assistant director of health-care surveillance for the state Health Department. "But there are really not sufficient resources to be roaming the streets and detecting these places on our own. We really do rely on complaints from the public."

Barbara Clayton, a supervisor at Planned Parenthood, added, "Most places

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you encounter now are reputable. It's shocking to think women are exposed to this kind of health care today."

I.C. Medical was opened last January by Chalbani, 62, a gruff former jewelry salesman who lives in Staten Island. He is there six days a week and can be found hovering around the cheaply furnished waiting room ready to collect the clinic's fees—\$80 for an abortion with local anesthesia and \$135 with general anesthesia.

If women are short of cash, Chalbani demands they give him their jewelry until they return with the money. He also performs pregnancy tests, sonograms and, according to clinic staff, pressures women to have the more expensive abortion under general anesthesia.

The office is busiest on Saturdays, when, according to former employees, as many as 26 abortions have been done in one day. Patients are also given a followup examination two weeks later.

Chalbani's staff includes Terra, part-time nurse anesthetists and office assistants, such as Torres, Henry and Gonzalez, who were hired to do clerical work but were asked to do pregnancy tests, hold a patient's hand during the procedure and mop floors.

In a brief interview in front of the clinic, Chalbani said, "Why are you here? I don't understand. Am I a thief? Did I kill somebody?" He offered to sit for a subsequent interview but later refused. Numerous attempts to discuss allegations about the clinic with Chalbani were unsuccessful.

Terra—a 1955 graduate of the University of Rome—said he went to work for Chalbani because it was the only full-time job he could get when he returned in July from Europe.

During a 40-minute telephone interview, Terra, 61, said Chalbani pays him \$25 or \$35 per abortion, depending on whether the patient is awake or put to sleep.

"It's terrible—I can't take it anymore," said Terra, who lives three blocks from the clinic at a transient hotel. "I had to survive. This was the first thing that came along."

Asked about the frequency of positive results when Chalbani performs pregnancy tests, Terra said: "I am always extremely suspicious of him (when he does the tests).

"But all patients who come to me have a positive pregnancy test. I examine them. If there is any doubt, which there often is, I explain that the uterus has not grown in relation to the date of the pregnancy tests. But in some cases, the patient insists on having it done.

When that happens, Terra said, he proceeds if the women sign a form

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stating he has told them of “their small uterus”—an indication they may not be pregnant or in such an early stage that pregnancy is impossible to detect with a manual exam.

‘Simple Procedure’

“Then I don’t see anything wrong with going ahead and doing it,” he said. “After all, I’m not removing an organ. This is a simple procedure.”

Medical experts said it is possible for a urine test to give false results, particularly in the early stages of pregnancy. In such cases, doctors said they recommend more reliable tests, such as blood work and sonograms.

In all cases, they said, doctors should do an internal exam to confirm pregnancy.

“If a patient’s uterus doesn’t feel pregnant to me, I would take a blood test. That would tell me for sure,” said Dr. David Roth, an obstetrician-gynecologist who directs the teen pregnancy clinic at New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center.

“Even if I determine they are pregnant through a blood test and a manual exam, I never sign them up for the same day,” he added. “There is no reason to hurry in the early weeks.”

‘I Am Angry’

When told by the *News* she hadn’t been pregnant, the 27-year-old woman who underwent the unnecessary abortion said, “I am angry. If that was true in my case what can I do now? I wanted to be sure I wouldn’t have a child.”

The woman, who asked that her identity not be revealed, added: “He (the doctor) could have told me to wait, though, and he didn’t . . . It will rest on his conscience.”

According to a lab report obtained by the *News*, the woman’s specimen contained only “bits of cervical tissue.” Medical experts said that means there was no evidence of pregnancy.

Terra refused to discuss the lab’s findings. Clinic records, however, show that following the abortion, he noted on the woman’s chart “possible ectopic pregnancy” and referred her to a hospital.

An ectopic pregnancy occurs when the fertilized egg embeds itself in the Fallopian tubes rather than on the uterine wall. Surgery is usually required quickly to prevent the embryo from rupturing the tube as it develops.

The woman, who lives with her 3-year-old son in Astoria, said a checkup after the abortion showed no signs of ectopic pregnancy.

The state Health Department and Office of Professional Medical Conduct are now investigating the clinic and Terra.

APPENDIX G

[*The following column appeared in National Review magazine (Dec. 18, 1987) and is reprinted here with permission (©1987 by National Review, Inc.)*]

The War Against Reason

Richard John Neuhaus

It seems a cruel trick of history that we are being asked these questions just when we have lost our capacity to answer or even discuss them. Should we permit the farming of fetuses for neural tissue? Ought we to allow the use of laboratory-produced human embryos in medical experimentation or in the testing of drugs? Why not declare the comatose and terminally ill to be legally dead so that they can be used for spare parts to help others? Since courts are now allowing the withdrawal of food and hydration, would it not be more humane to take quick and direct action to bring “wrongful life” to an end? Given the scarcity of resources and the senseless increase of chronic diseases, would it not be advisable to decide that people of a certain age, say 85, will no longer be given life-extending care? These and many questions like them are now, or soon will be, in political play. They are called the “life questions,” and most politicians are terrified of them because they are inescapably moral questions, and nobody wants to get entangled in that can of worms. About morality we are, or pretend to be, tongue-tied and stammering, lest we be suspected of attempting to “impose our values” on somebody else.

Better, say the politicians, to leave these questions to the courts. The courts have the competence to settle them, as was so famously demonstrated in the 1973 abortion decision. And, of course, the courts are quietly deciding such questions today, although every once in a while such decisions break out of the courtroom and appear on the front page. As when a New Jersey court rules that a woman must surrender her baby because a stranger had paid for it with a dollop of semen and ten thousand in hard cash. As when an Indiana court permits parents to starve to death their handicapped infant, even though dozens of couples want to adopt it. As when a Michigan court decides that it is in the “best interest” of a middle-aged patient to die, even though evidence suggests that he wanted to live. Such grotesqueries are today’s “hard cases”; tomorrow, by benefit of precedent, we will find them ever so much easier.

Again and again we are told that such decisions are forced on us because of a technological breakthrough. More often they are indulged because of a cultural breakdown. It is generally acknowledged that these decisions involve a “moral component.” But to deal with that we have a growing cadre of “medi-

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cal ethicists,” who, with notable exceptions, produce ever more sophisticated rationalizations for turning the unthinkable into the routinely doable. The prohibited becomes the permissible becomes the expected. “But that would be murder!” is an objection that loses its force the second time around. It’s much harder to say it later if it wasn’t said earlier. A hit man for Murder Inc. was on trial once and the DA asked him how he felt about what he did. He in turn asked the DA how he had felt the first time he tried a case. The DA allowed as how he was nervous but he got used to it. “It’s the same with murder,” said the defendant. “You get used to it.”

In 1984 the Warnock Commission, asked to address these life questions, made its report to the British government. More important than its recommendations was its rationale and what it says about moral rationality (as distinct from rationalization). Dame Mary Warnock, herself a moral philosopher at Cambridge, says the commission operated on the premise that “nobody is an expert in morality.” In matters of life and death, of birth and family, there is no right and wrong. “These are areas which are central to morality, and everyone has a right to judge for himself,” writes Dame Mary. There is neither moral truth nor moral reason nor binding communal tradition, there is only individual moral preference. That idea perfectly exemplifies what Alasdair MacIntyre calls “modern emotivism” run amok. Dame Mary’s insouciance is unruffled by the awareness that “both medical science and opinion within society may advance with startling rapidity.” What will be permitted is what the market will bear, and the market is determined by technology and those who control it—tempered only by the marvelously malleable moral authority that is public opinion.

Little wonder that the Vatican’s recent instruction on artificial reproduction and related matters met with such hostility. In truth, it was more respectfully received by the general media than by most of the makers of progressive Catholic opinion. The *New York Times* and others said that the Vatican had raised a useful alarm about ominous developments that call for a more informed public discussion. But finally, it was said, Rome has little to contribute to that discussion, despite the fact that its statement is determinedly public in nature. The offense of the Vatican instruction is not so much in its conclusions as in its premise [that] preference is subordinate to truth and truth is accessible to reason. Reasonable people may disagree about the truth, but the reality of disagreement does not imply the unreality of truth. The Vatican report invites rational deliberation; the Warnock report invites resignation to the vagaries of opinion. The war against life was first a war against reason, and it continues as a war against life because it is a war against reason.

APPENDIX H

EDITOR'S NOTE: a friend of ours, Dr. Laurence Murtaugh, who does "medical mission" work along the Texas-Mexican border, recently sent us a clipping from the Mexican journal *El Zocalo* (Oct. 13, 1987) headlined "The Song 'Goodbye Mama' Has Impact in Mexico," along with his own (he says roughly literal) translation of the article, which we print here:

MEXICO CITY, Oct. 12 (*Excelsior*): "Goodbye Mama" is a song that has caused a real impact in the last few weeks, curiously without causing either euphoria or happiness, nor even optimistic comments, but rather on the contrary when people young and old hear it they are deeply affected, saddened and not a few with tears in their eyes and a contrite heart.

The song is performed by Gloria and Noemi Gil (sisters) who have also made a rather well-done Video of the song as well.

Here we are not engaged in publicising the song but rather in explaining how such a hit is based on such sadness.

It is the story of a baby . . . but this baby is a baby in the womb who speaks to its mother about the joy of living, of the feelings it receives through the senses of its mother.

The baby can speak and talk about its growth and about its love of life and the depth of its love for its mother. It feels the sun, the heat, the warm hands that try to touch it with gestures of love . . . with incomparable love.

Then one day it hears a discussion between its mother and someone with a rough and hard voice. There are shouts, threats and sobs. It does not understand what is happening but it feels that it is serious because the mother is inconsolable, and because of this the baby sends a message of love to the mother to make her tranquil.

Another discussion ensues between its mother and the owner of the strong voice, and then the baby understands . . . it will never be born. Full of sorrow and full of love the baby forgives its mother and father and until the last instant of its passing existence it shows for them this profound love.

It is enough to say that Gloria and Noemi have done a magnificent job in their presentation, placing this song Number #1 in the charts.

We wrote to the good doctor, asking if he would send us a copy of the record itself, which in due course he did. We asked another friend to translate the lyrics, which we print on the following page.

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[The song Adiós Mamá is by Ignacio de Pablo; it is the final song on the LP recording Gloria y Noemi which was produced by Compañía Fonográfica Internacional, S.A.]

Adiós Mamá

Thank you Mom and heaven, for letting me live in your womb,
And then be born and love you outside like I do inside.
You know, Mom, today I heard you argue with someone with a
stern voice,
And then you cried for me, and said that I would be a burden
for the two of you.

How are you, Mom? It's me again. I heard you argue again
with him,
But this time without crying, and I'm beginning to think
You two agree, and I won't be born.
Perhaps you're right, Mom. You know about such things.
You've lived and I haven't. I am not going to bother you.
Mom, I swear I'll love you both the same.

I believe, Mom, I believe in God and you.
But I felt something strange hurt me and I know that in the end
I won't be any trouble, and I will never see you.
I know I'll be gone, without ever meeting you.

Bye, Mom, I'll pray for you. From here I forgive you,
Although I never met you. I'm not going to cause a fuss.
I'm leaving, Mom. I know I won't be able to talk to you
anymore, anymore, anymore.

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
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Special Notice: we also have available copies of *Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation* by President Ronald Reagan, which has been published in a hardcover book by Thomas Nelson Publishers. The book includes the complete text of the President's essay (which first appeared in the Spring, 1983, issue of this review), plus "The Slide to Auschwitz," by Dr. C. Everett Koop, and "The Humane Holocaust" by Malcolm Muggeridge (both essays also first appeared here). To order send \$7.95 per copy; we will pay all postage and handling. *The Human Life Review* is available in microform from both University Microfilm International (300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106) and Bell & Howell (Micro-Photo Division, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691).

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