On January 22, 1973, the United States Supreme Court issued its controversial Roe v. Wade decision legalizing abortion. This decree virtually dismantled the customary social standards by which Americans lived, and ushered in an era of social divisiveness.
I. How Did This Happen?
Roe v. Wade was adjudicated under the guise of the “right to privacy”1 doctrine that previous Supreme Courts had devised in Meyer v. State of Nebraska (1923)2 and subsequent cases. Additionally, the Roe Court opined that unborn human beings may not be considered constitutionally protected “persons” because, in its opinion, the wording of the Constitution—especially the Fourteenth Amendment—does not explicitly include the “unborn” under the umbrella of the term “persons.”3
The “right to privacy” doctrine, in its original context, seems to have pertained only to secondary or auxiliary rights and freedoms that are extrinsic to a human person’s actuality or being—such as education4; primary or unalienable rights and freedoms that are intrinsic to a human person’s actuality or being—such as life—were deemed “self-evident” and, therefore, implicit in the customary social standards by which civilized humanity lived. The 1973 ruling, however, broadened the “right to privacy” doctrine by exploiting the “right to marital privacy” doctrine—previously developed in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)5—as a stepping stone toward its extrapolation of the “right to abortion” doctrine. Roe v. Wade thereby effectuated a diametrical social revision by inferring the “right to life” of a pre-born human person—a heretofore intrinsic right—to be subordinate in law and in kind to the “right to privacy” of a pre-born person’s mother—an extrinsic right.
In regards to when human persons might be considered “formed” or recognizably human and thereby constitutionally protected “persons,” the Court surmised that human conceptions become infused with a “soul” or “animated” at some point between conception and live birth, and only after such occurrence might the “unborn” be considered constitutionally protected “persons.” To be infused with a “soul,” however, requires influence or infusion from some external source, and no such source was presented by the Court. To alleviate this omission, the Roe opinion relied on an ancient theory that human conceptions begin as vegetable substance that transubstantiate first into animal substance and subsequently into rational substance6—a self-transubstantiation from vegetable substance into rational substance. (Note: Transubstantiation is “the changing of one substance into another.”7 Self-transubstantiation is used in this essay to denote the 1973 Supreme Court’s inference that human conceptions begin as non-rational substance that transubstantiate their selves into rational substance sometime during pregnancy or thereafter.)
II. Is There Objective Evidence Regarding the Matter?
Notwithstanding the compassion held for mothers who want to terminate their pregnancy, it seems each human conception is an individualized, living human person—a living person that exists in a state of being and of becoming, i.e., becoming that what it is, from its first moment of conception until death. First, each human conception has a unique DNA code that differs from that of its mother or its father; this establishes each human conception to be an individualized human person. Second, each human conception begins to grow— cell division and multiplication—immediately after conception and before the embryo attaches itself to its mother’s body for nutrition and shelter (verified by in-vitro fertilization); this establishes each human conception to be a living human person at the moment of conception. Third, it is a matter of medical record that children are frequently born prematurely and as such continue their human development into adulthood in the same manner as term-born children; this establishes each human embryo or fetus to be a human person before birth. Fourth, each human conception has (a) a blood type that can differ from that of its mother, (b) a gender that can be either male or female, and (c) a fetal heartbeat that is different from and asynchronous with that of its mother; these establish each human conception to be a separate and independent living entity from that of his or her mother.
In present-day knowledge, each and every inorganic or non-living thing is that what it is, whereas each and every organic or living thing is that what it is, and is becoming that what it is, and is that what it is becoming from its first moment of life until death. Consider a bird that hatches from a shell-enclosed egg where nothing is added to or subtracted from the shell-enclosed egg between fertilization and the hatchling. Also, consider that all living cells are born from pre-existing parent cells8 where the nature and substance of the descendant cells exude from their parent cells and, therefore, the nature and substance of a living thing must be intrinsic to its primal parent cell; as the progression of cell division and multiplication proceeds during the development of a bird from a shell-enclosed egg, the nature and substance of each successor cell and their combination exudes from predecessor cells until, ultimately, from the fertilized egg—likes come from likes. Thus, the nature and substance of a bird must be intrinsic to its fertilized egg—its primal parent cell; scientifically, a shell enclosed fertilized egg that makes of its self a bird must have intrinsic to its self the nature and substance of that bird. More universally, a living creature that makes of its self that what it is must have intrinsic to its self the nature and substance of that what it makes of its self. It seems to be a Principle of Nature, then, that every living creature is that what it is, and is that what it makes of its self, and is that what nature and substance it exudes. And, if biological and evolutional sciences are true, then the nature of each human person must be as true in his or her conception as the nature of a bird is true in its conception; personhood must be intrinsic to the human conception.
Because nothing is added to or subtracted from the formulation of a human being after conception, personhood must be intrinsic to the human conception; something—personhood—cannot come from nothing. Or, as the noted Roman poet and philosopher Lucretius (circa 95-50 BC) observed and wrote regarding “Nature’s aspect and her law,” “Nothing from nothing ever yet was born.”9
That is, not even nothing was ever born from nothing.
A corollary to Lucretius’ observation is thus: Creatures that lack a specific nature and substance cannot—by their own doing—beget or transform their selves into creatures that embody that specific nature and substance; that is, some external influence or infusion is necessary for creatures that lack a specific nature and substance to beget or to transform their selves into creatures that embody that specific nature and substance. Thus, inorganic substance cannot—by its own doing—beget or transform its self into vegetable substance, nor can vegetable substance beget or transform its self into animal substance, nor can animal substance beget or transform its self into rational substance, i.e., a human person. Now, because the amniotic-sac-enclosed, embryonic human conception grows into an amniotic-sac-enclosed, developed human person, just like the shell-enclosed embryonic bird grows into a shell-enclosed developed bird—without any external influence or infusion—the human embryo must have intrinsic to its self the specific nature and substance of a human person, and, therefore, the human embryo must be a human person; it is a human person that is conceived. This self-maturation of an embryonic human person into a developed human person—a transformation within the-one-and-the-same DNA and the-one-and-the-same nature and substance—plus the observation that creatures that lack a rational nature and substance cannot self-transubstantiate into creatures that embody a rational nature and substance, counters the self transubstantiation inference ventured by the 1973 Supreme Court.
Consider that among the effects and consequences of humankind are their natural and unalienable rights and freedoms of life, liberty, and property. The greatest of these is life, without which the others are muted; without the right and freedom of life, all other human rights and freedoms become superfluous and, therefore, expendable; they can be dismantled and abolished or, more simply, ignored and unprotected. It is for this reason that life must be considered the foremost unalienable right and freedom of every human person beginning with his or her first moment of conception until death; there can be neither liberty of thought nor possession of property without first having life. Furthermore, it is our blessing in the United States that the life of every human person is constitutionally protected by the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.10
Because the text of the Constitution does not explicitly include the “unborn” under the umbrella of the term “person,” the 1973 Supreme Court opted to selectively exclude unborn persons from constitutional protection. Notwithstanding this Court’s opinion, or that of previous courts, it seems that because the text of the Constitution does not restrict, modify, discriminate, or qualify the term “person” in any manner, constitutional protection should be granted universally and unequivocally to include each and every person—and each and every law or adjudication that pertains thereto—regardless of a person’s size, age, gender, race, color, sensibility, cognition, culture, citizenship, or any other human characteristic or development. The key phrase in Amendment IV, then, comprises the words: The right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . shall not be violated. In Amendment V, the key phrase comprises the words: No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. In Amendment XIV Section 1, the key phrases are: nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. It is particularly noted that Amendment V and Amendment XIV Section 1 explicitly require due process of law— adjudication—before taking the life of each and of any human person whether citizen, alien, slave, traitor, felon, embryo, fetus, or whomsoever. Although the due process of law clause—no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law—is constitutionally inviolate, implementations of Roe v. Wade seem to be in disregard thereof. After all, abortions—regardless of the manner by which they might be administered—are not life-saving pediatric procedures; abortions are life-terminating execution procedures.
III. What Has Been Shown?
The foregoing evidence shows that (a) legalized abortion under the guise of Roe v. Wade is an aberration of human reason, of biological science, of philosophical analysis, and of the Constitution of the United States, and (b) no pre-born person—or any other person—may be deprived of life without due process of law.
1. Roe v. Wade, Opinion of the Court, Section VIII, including notes, http://cdn.loc.gov/service/ll/usrep/ usrep410/usrep410113/usrep410113.pdf (Accessed June 8, 2016).
2. Meyer v. State of Nebraska, Opinion of the Court, https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/ usrep/usrep262/usrep262390/usrep262390.pdf (Accessed June 8, 2016).
3. Roe v. Wade, Opinion of the Court, Section IX A, including notes.
4. Meyer v. State of Nebraska, Opinion of the Court.
5. Griswold v. Connecticut, Opinion of the Court, https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep381/usrep381479/usrep381479.pdf (Accessed April 24, 2020).
6. Roe v. Wade, Opinion of the Court, Section VI 3 The common law, including notes.
7. Dictionary, Transubstantiation, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/transubstantiation?s=t (Accessed May 2, 2020).
8. Cell Division and Growth, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., https://www.britannica.com/science/cellbiology/Cell-division-and-growth (Accessed June 20, 2016).
9. Lucretius (Titus Lucretius Carus), On the Nature of Things, Book I Substance is Eternal, trans. William Ellery Leonard, http://classics.mit.edu/Carus/nature_things.1.i.html (Accessed July 8, 2016)
10. Constitution of the United States, Amendment IV, Amendment V, and Amendment XIV Section 1, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/ (Accessed April 19, 2020).