


the HUMAN LIFE REVIEW



SUMMER 1980

Featured in this issue:

Tom Bethell on.....The Family Conference

Ellen Wilson on Home Truths

Allan C. Carlson on.....The Liberal Agenda

Michael Novak on Freedom and the Family

William B. Ball, Esq., on Whose Right to
Educate?

Prof. Ian Hunter on.....The Canadian View

Also in this issue:

Rep. Henry Hyde and the Arguments *Re* Tax-Funded Abortions

• An Anonymous Memoir • Judy Mann on Abortion *Chic* •

David Farrell's Clinical Report

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
The Human Life Foundation, Inc.

New York, N.Y.

Vol. VI, No. 3

\$3.00 a copy

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Published by THE HUMAN LIFE FOUNDATION, INC. Editorial Office, Room 540, 150 East 35th St., New York, N.Y. 10016. The editors will consider all manuscripts submitted, but assume no responsibility for unsolicited material. All editorial and subscription inquiries (and all requests for reprints and permission) should be sent directly to the editorial office. Subscription price: \$12 per year; single copy, \$3. Bulk prices on request.

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. . . FROM THE PUBLISHER

In this, the 23rd issue of *The Human Life Review*, the emphasis is on the family, but any extended discussion of family matters automatically raises a host of related questions, so the reader will find that we have not in fact strayed from our usual "life issues" — there is, e. g., plenty on abortion and the countless problems *it* raises.

From the beginning, this review adopted an editorial "mix" that we think has proved both useful and effective: we have printed a great deal of fresh material, but have not hesitated to include much that was already printed or available elsewhere. The effect, we hope, has been to provide more balanced treatment of the often-complex issues involved. This issue probably contains more reprinted material than any previous one. Following our usual custom, we provide here relevant information about the sources used.

Mr. Michael Novak's contribution was excerpted from a (much longer) article first published in *Harper's Magazine*, which, we regret to note, will cease publication shortly (it began in 1850). The abortion-funding discussion (Appendix A) is the transcript of a television program ("The MacNeil/Lehrer Report") that is widely-known, certainly to viewers of the public broadcasting system. We should note that such transcripts are unedited, either by the broadcaster — who of course tries (as accurately as possible) to transcribe exactly what was said — or by us; we assume no right to take liberties with the original. This preserves the feeling of the live-debate original, but it can also cause some obvious problems. Thus at one point Mr. Hyde says that "It's always cheaper to let them live than to kill them" — he meant to say just the opposite (as the context clearly shows).

Another source may be less well-known, which is too bad: the article by Mr. Allan Carlson was originally published by *The Public Interest*, a small-circulation but highly-influential quarterly published by National Affairs, Inc. (10 East 53 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022). Once more we remind our readers that *all* previous issues (and bound volumes of the years 1975-9) remain available; see the inside back cover for full information.

EDWARD A. CAPANO
Publisher

INTRODUCTION

“PARENTS ARE ENGAGED in the enormously-difficult enterprise of making wholes. They spend years trying to unite bundles of conflicting aims and emotions, needs and desires, into integrated personalities. While they are occupied with this struggle with each member of the family, they are also trying to create another kind of whole: to unite varied and at times antagonistic personalities into a family. They are synthesizers; their great assignment is to bind, unite, participate in that secondary act of creation which Genesis describes as bringing order out of chaos.”

Surely that description (quoted from our Miss Ellen Wilson’s article in this issue) will strike any parent as all too accurate: “parenting” (to use the awful current jargon-word), still the most-chosen vocation, produces few successful practitioners — never has, never will. Yet the majority of those who take on this impossible job stick to it — indeed, the *size* of that majority (which ebbs and flows through the generations) is probably the most accurate indicator of any society’s health at a given moment.

In this issue we continue, as promised, our series of articles on the current state of the American family. Our interest is of course long-term, but happens also to be especially timely just now, in the midst (as this is written) of the long-awaited series of White House Conferences on families. It will be recalled that, in 1976, Mr. Jimmy Carter made a campaign promise to convene such conferences (at the suggestion, we’re told, of our contributor, Mr. Michael Novak) without delay. As President, he *did* delay; another example, no doubt, of the office making the man prudent. Perhaps Mr. Carter came to realize that a government-sponsored effort to solve family problems would be seen by the vast majority of those same families as a symbol of the *problem*, not the solution: as Miss Wilson also

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makes clear, bureaucrats exist to apply comprehensive rules to *individuals*, which is roughly the antithesis of what families exist to do.

Being a quarterly journal, we are ill-equipped to handle current events, unless of course the “news” strays onto our long-term turf — as any conclave on *families* must. So we seized the opportunity to do something unusual: bring you a piece of on-the-spot *reportage* which is different from our usual fare and thus, we hope, just the thing to open this issue. In our judgement, Mr. Tom Bethell is one of the finest reporters around today. He sees clearly, and writes well — so well that his reports remain important reading long after the event has faded. We asked him to go to the first White House family conference in Baltimore for us. He did, and found it most interesting, as you will, we’re sure, his report.

It wouldn’t be fair to keep you waiting any longer for Miss Wilson’s usual “she’s got it just right” essay, reminding you of what families are all about, so we run it next (even though you might want to savor it *after* all the others, for it is a fine summary as well). Then you should be ready for the next three articles which, we think, comprise a remarkable whole. All have appeared previously elsewhere, but this review has from the beginning been determined to present what we consider the best available material (*sans* editorial vanity), and we are happy to be able to reprint them here.

The first, by Mr. Allan Carlson, goes right to the heart of the matter: not *should*, but *can* the state have effective family policies — effective being here defined as policies that are overall beneficial rather than detrimental to the true best interests of families? As Mr. Carlson makes clear, this is *not* a new question, and the historical record is also clear: woe to that society in which the state attempts to do the “parenting,” rather than stay out of the way of the only ones who *can* do it.

Next Mr. Michael Novak, one of America’s best-known writers (as theologian, philosopher, teacher — and even political speechwriter and newspaper columnist); he muses incisively — just the accurate contradiction, we think — and in depth, on the same kind of thing Ellen Wilson discusses, but with greater emphasis on how it all works out in politics and policies, trends and tendencies, from the economic and social to the religious and cultural. For instance, is Black Teenage Unemployment merely an unfortunate statistic? No, says Mr. Novak, it is a disaster, the root causes of which are little understood by the “officials” charged with lowering the percentages. We should note that this essay is part of a more extended treatment (the other half, roughly speaking, appeared in the Winter, 1980 issue of this review) he wrote in 1976 — presumably about the time he was counseling Candidate Carter to promise those family conferences. Obviously, had they turned out to be an exegesis of what Novak was *really* talking about, the meetings (which have, to nobody’s

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surprise, come out in favor of abortion, homosexuality, the ERA, and other such “family” issues) would have turned out quite differently.

The third piece provides what seems to us the perfect missing link in the chain of argument as to *why* the State (*qua* state) and the Family are *natural* enemies: both have a vested interest in what our children *learn*, and the two interests are bound to conflict at precisely the essential points. The Good Society, Mr. William Ball argues eloquently, is that which helps families produce Good Citizens. But the Modern State — alas — would like to do things the other way around. Thus, inevitably, education is the crucial battleground, on which almost all the artillery belongs to the State — except when Mr. Ball is there to spike the guns, and lead the club-and-pitchfork parents to victory. A favored phrase of mail-order salesmen is “read and act on this message without delay” — we hope Mr. Ball’s article will produce that kind of effect on parents, by the millions.

Then back to abortion, a primary concern of ours. In our final article, Mr. Ian Hunter writes from Canada, reminding us that abortion is an international plague (but one that particularly devastates “our” world). Thus much of what he says will be familiar, but his different viewpoint is illuminating. Our regular readers will also note that Mr. Hunter himself is today far more passionately against the evil of abortion than he was when he first reported in these pages (back in our Winter, 1976 issue).

Which brings us to a series of fascinating Appendices, also on abortion, and also showing that the issue, and those passions it inspires, grow steadily hotter. As we go to press, the U.S. Supreme Court is about to hand down its long-awaited ruling on the so-called Hyde Amendment. Who can better tell us about what is involved than Mr. Hyde himself? So we reprint, in Appendix A, the transcript of a recent television discussion in which Mr. Hyde tangles once again with a frequent opponent (and the leading pro-abortion spokesperson around, probably), Mrs. Harriet Pilpel. But note too the eloquent testimony of Dr. Jasper Williams, a black doctor who struggles daily with the *realities* behind the public debate.

Appendix B is the latest example of a literary *genre* that has grown out of the abortion dilemma: an account by an erstwhile “potential mother” who would exorcise the experience by writing a “true confession” story. This one, as did others before it, appeared anonymously, but the author writes so well (there is of course no reason why she couldn’t be a professional writer) that we would not be surprised to hear more from her in the future.

From time to time we reprint something simply because this review, so far as we can tell, is the *de facto* “journal of record” for the abortion issue — we neither chose nor won that distinction, we simply don’t have any competition — and certain things ought to be put on the permanent record, so to speak. We were reminded of what appears in Appendix C by

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Mr. Bethell, who quotes from another Judy Mann column in his article, and decided we'd take the opportunity to record her impressionistic portrait of a highly-symbolic event.

Our final item (Appendix D) represents yet another story-type that has become a routine by-product of abortion literature. Mr. David Farrell, a well-known political writer, for some reason turned reporter again, producing a striking article that "compliments," in a grotesque way, those just preceding it. Thus, taken together, our appendices become facets producing a single image. The epitome of this kind of thing was, most would agree, the explosive series of articles ("The Abortion Profiteers") published by the Chicago *Sun-Times* in 1978. But that epic ran (when reprinted *in toto*) to almost 50 closely-spaced tabloid pages, far more than we were able to handle. However, we did get a number of copies, and if you would like to assure yourself that Mr. Farrell's report is a mere synopsis of the ghastly facts available, we'll be glad to send you a copy of the *Sun-Times* collection with our compliments (while our supply lasts). Just drop us a line.

As noted, we write just before the Supreme Court's *Hyde* decision, which will be known to you by the time you read this. We expect that it will be of great import *re* the future of the abortion controversy, and thus we wouldn't have attempted a hasty treatment of it even if the Court had obliged us by beating our deadline. But do recall that the basic issues were presented (in depth, we'd say) in our penultimate (Spring) issue, and of course expect our best efforts to explain what it all means in our *next* issue, coming soon.

J. P. McFADDEN
Editor

The Family Conference

Tom Bethell

IN THE END I decided to go to the Baltimore Conference on the Trailways bus. The geography of Washington is such that you move quickly from high-class areas where well-dressed bureaucrats are promenading, to dingy neighborhoods where morose males stand on street corners. As I looked out of the bus window at the bored faces of these unemployed, I kept thinking of the point that George Gilder makes in his book *Visible Man*: that their nearly invisible problem is that they are most likely to be living with women who are on welfare — women who are thus paid more by the state than the men can hope to earn in unskilled jobs.

This accounts for their demoralized condition, for the dangerous condition of city ghettos, and for the fractured state of families at the lower end of the socio-economic scale. The man knows that if he fails to marry the woman he impregnates, then she will become eligible for welfare. On the other hand, if he is married but yields to the temptation to desert her, he knows that the state will assume his responsibilities. Thus the sense of responsibility that normally would restrain him is undermined.

Anyway, these seemed to be appropriate reflections, since I was headed for the first of three White House Conferences on Families (the other two are to be held in Minneapolis and Los Angeles). As far as I could tell from the reading I had already done, the conferences would prove to be little more than a veiled attempt by the White House and the bureaucracy to drum up support for more governmental involvement in areas of national life hitherto cordoned-off from state intervention. Such intervention would be justified as “helping families.” But as the welfare case has already shown, government “help” often turns out to be harmful.

Well, I arrived at the Baltimore Convention Center, and I immediately knew I had come to the right place, because there was a sign saying: *Bienvenidos a la Conferencia de la Casa Blanca Sobre las*

Tom Bethell, a well-known journalist, was the Washington editor for the just-demised *Harper's* magazine; he is also a columnist for *The American Spectator*.

TOM BETHELL

Familias. Inside there was a *Centro de Mensajes*. I checked, but there were no messages for me.

It is worthwhile to pause for a moment and think about the meaning of this bilingual business, because it is ultimately of the greatest importance, and perhaps relevant to the broader inquiry now being undertaken (by, among others, this review). It is clear, surely, that there is something more fundamental at stake than the mere extension of courtesy to recent, non-English-speaking arrivals in the United States. What we are witnessing, I believe, is something far less auspicious: another testament to the national demoralization. (Incidentally, that word has a nice *double-entendre* to it: When we abandon our former morals, or de-moralize ourselves, then we become demoralized.) Americans who want to put up signs in Spanish will tell you that they have become "sensitive" to the needs of other people. What they really mean, however, is that they no longer believe in themselves. The sign I saw at the front door was a sign of weakness, a sign of self-doubt, not a sign of "sensitivity." Newcomers to this country will be bound to take note of this weakness on display. They will not feel grateful for the alleged "courtesy." On the contrary, they are likely to feel either contempt or pity for such a diffident host.

The main entrance hall at the Convention Center seemed to be deserted. Then someone told me that the 700-odd delegates to the convention were in Hall B listening to a speech by George Gallup, the famous pollster, so I decided to take a look myself. The place was big enough for four indoor tennis courts, and the delegates, seated eight or ten to a table, had just finished lunch. They somehow brought to mind a convention of the National Education Association which I was once privileged enough to observe as a bystander. Then again, I once also attended a convention of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, and if this was not an AFSCME gathering then my eyesight was failing me. Indeed, if the great majority of the delegates to this convention were not AFSCME members, I would be much surprised.

This might be the place to say something about the way the delegates were selected — a tricky topic. The goal of the conference organizers seems to have been to create the illusion of democracy by permitting the election of *some* delegates. Thus the convention bosses — "Chairperson" Jim Guy Tucker, former Arkansas congressman, and executive director John L. Carr, board member of Amer-

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icans for Democratic Action — would be able to claim that this was no Houston-like “International Women’s Year” jamboree, but was Democracy in Action — the will of the people would be expressed. But in most of the fifteen states represented at this conference, a majority (seventy per cent) of the delegates were not elected, and in many of the states it is not clear that the candidates from whom the thirty per cent *were* elected were anything other than reliable shills for the social welfare lobby.

In Virginia, as is fairly well known, a conservative, pro-family delegation arrived at the convention, led by Connie Marshner of the National Pro-Family Coalition and Lawrence D. Pratt, a Republican member of the Virginia legislature. And in one or two of the other states, early organizing by conservatives resulted in the election of some delegates who were not simply committed to massive new state intervention in the economy, ERA, abortion, and homosexual rights. Such people are nowadays called “right-wingers,” I notice.

But these few were soon swamped under the deluge appointed by the governors or by the White House. I tried to find out from John Carr, a roly-poly twenty-nine-year-old, exactly how many of the delegates were federal, state, county, or municipal employees. He said he didn’t know: they had failed to ask the delegates that question — a significant omission. All he would say was that forty per cent of the delegates were “family professionals” involved in “delivering services to families.” Since this could be narrowly defined, the number of government employees present was definitely higher — sixty per cent according to one estimate.

A friendly conference “observer” who came along with the New York delegation, a fellow named James Hurtgen from the State University of New York, told me that his delegation “was heavily stacked with people from the New York State human services agencies.” Similarly, I spoke briefly to Barbara Kerovac, a pro-family delegate from New Hampshire. She told me that in that state four out of the twelve delegates were elected (all pro-family), eight were appointed by Governor Hugh Gallen. “The eight were all professionals,” Barbara Kerovac told me, “employed one way or another through the expenditure of state or federal dollars.” She added that Gallen had been Jimmy Carter’s campaign manager in New Hampshire. (The conferences will end up costing the taxpayers \$3 million, incidentally.)

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You get an idea, then, of who the delegates were as they sat around their luncheon tables, munching slices of cream-filled cake and pouring out the coffee — as broad-rumped a gathering as you would ever want to encounter, plainly accustomed to sitting through endless hours of union-organizing, rap-sessions, committee meetings, and community-interfacing. With a practiced, stolid patience they sat there, lending half an ear to George Gallup, who was reading a speech from the podium. Gallup, born 1901, is one of the very few living Americans to be listed in the American Heritage dictionary (“American statistician”).

Now I want to say something about this dubious figure and household word. I have my doubts about his role at this conference. It is quite an easy matter to camouflage and legitimize ideology by dressing it up as a message from the people to the leadership. That Gallup himself is a man motivated by covert ideology I have suspected ever since I picked up for \$2 a second-hand copy of his book *The Miracle Ahead*, on the fly-leaf of which was inscribed, “For John Gardner, with my highest respects, George Gallup.” This strange book, published in 1964, saw any number of tremendous “breakthroughs” on the (then) horizon — to be achieved above all by *collective effort*. Gallup here revealed himself as a collectivist Utopian.

In any event, Gallup was commissioned to conduct this poll on the family, and here he was reading out his findings. The audience stopped munching cake and started ritually applauding when Gallup said: “There are family mandates people are placing on government. We found the following to be the five most basic mandates:”

The government should be providing health care assistance to elderly people living at home or with their families . . .

Parents of handicapped children living at home should receive tax credits for the extra cost they incur.

There should be child care assistance available to working mothers.

Government help should be provided to assist poor families.

Government should become overly (sic) aware (?) of its own impact upon families, and act with that in mind.

After Gallup read out each item, the well-fed payrollers delivered up a round of applause. Gallup continued to read out a much longer list of ways in which “Americans call for federal assistance.” Each was applauded.

So here is how it works. The White House calls a conference on

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families (significantly pluralized). An integral part of this conference turns out to be George Gallup, who conducts a poll, and who also interprets the results of this poll in terms of a "mandate" (from the same dictionary: "An authoritative command or instruction; the wishes of a political electorate expressed by election results to its representatives in government"). Gallup's press release is then transmitted to the newspapers, and in this instance, the good old reliable *Washington Post* ran a front-page story about the sore need for aid to families — a good instance, incidentally, of the way in which the *Post's* front-page turns out to be a bulletin-board for statist activists.

The *Post* story, By Victor Cohn, was headlined "Americans Favor Extensive Aid to Buttrass Families," and it was published the day before the conference began — thus transmitting a nudge to the ribs of any Congressman who happened to be reading the paper that day. ("Hey, Congressman, see what Gallup has found? The family needs your help.") This *Post* story was in turn xeroxed by the conference organizers and included in all press kits and handouts in Baltimore.

What is particularly worrisome, however, is the possibility that Gallup himself misrepresented the findings of his own poll in his speech to the conference. When one turns to the full Gallup report itself, "American Families — 1980," one finds the following words on the opening page, headed "Overview." What follows is the complete text of the first six paragraphs of the Gallup report:

OVERVIEW

Any belief that Americans do not place top priority on the family and family life is completely refuted by the results of this survey. The findings represent a ringing endorsement of the importance of the family in American life.

No fewer than eight in ten persons interviewed say their family is either the "most" or "one of the most" important elements of their lives. Only seven percent say the family is only a "fairly unimportant" or "very unimportant" element.

Solid and similar majorities of women and men, whites and non-whites make the Family the centerpiece of their lives. Nor is there much difference by education level, region of the nation, age or income.

Furthermore, an earlier Gallup survey showed an overwhelming majority (91 percent) of Americans saying they would welcome more emphasis on "traditional family ties" in the coming years.

Among the most satisfying things about marriage to most people are children, closeness, caring, companionship and a loving atmosphere.

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Those who feel that being part of a family is unnecessary and even impedes personal development will find few who agree with them among the populace as a whole. Americans as a whole appear to have a keen awareness of the fact that families are more than merely a group of people living together to serve mutual interests, but that a true family must be a loving and sharing family. Seen as most likely to improve family life (from a list of nine items) is "shared family needs," "shared recreational activities" and "shared family chores." The importance of sharing is a theme that appears throughout the survey.

Even so, Victor Cohn's *Post* story, after a cursory paragraph acknowledging that most Americans "think their families are the most important part of their lives," swiftly changed the subject and established its *raison d'être*:

Yet most Americans also think that U.S. family life is deteriorating, George Gallup, Jr. will tell the White House Conference on Families, and most favor multiple forms of public and private intervention to shore up the family and protect it from problems ranging from violence to inflation, unemployment and drinking and drugs.

Perhaps what is really misleading about this poll (as with so many others) is the assumption that interviewees can reasonably be expected to answer "disapprove" when questioned about "proposals for helping working mothers of small children." Such questions are bound to intimidate people into believing that they would appear churlish or uncompassionate if they replied that they "disapproved" of such proposals. In this way, then, highly suspect or outright illusory "mandates" are elicited from "the nation" on such issues as "direct government funding of day care centers" — approved by fifty-six per cent on Gallup's survey; only thirty-five per cent had the temerity to seem tough-minded by saying "disapprove." But does this mean there is a real "mandate" for a federal day-care program? I doubt it.

After Gallup's speech, Chairperson Jim Guy Tucker (he's no sexist, he wants you to understand), a smiling, dimpled, ever-so-lovable, ingratiating fellow who somehow tells you with every facial expression that he *may* have a Southern accent, but he isn't one of those old-fashioned racist rednecks *either*. Nossir. And if any of those Harvards he went to school with — the ones who are so *liberal*, and so *progressive* — think that they can out-liberal Jim Guy Tucker, why, they had better come on up to the microphone this very minute and he will prove it to them otherwise . . .

Then at that moment there did come storming up onto the po-

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dium some kind of a hell raiser . . . Larry Pratt from the Virginia delegation, who started bellowing out into the cavernous space of the hall. But Jim Guy cannily kept the microphone out of his reach, so all we heard were occasional reverberating words — “conference a sham . . . rigged . . . walkout.” One of those damnable right-wingers! Within the hour he and Connie Marshner led a walkout from the convention, in which they were joined by an undetermined number of delegates (perhaps fifty).

Connie Marshner, a delicate-looking lady dressed in a bright red two-piece suit, stood on a chair outside the press room and explained that the pro-family people were walking out because “the operation was rigged by the White House to ensure that key pro-family positions were not allowed.” Reporters and cameramen crowded around her, while one or two of her allies stood behind her holding up signs that read: “Not Fair To The Natural, Traditional Family” and “Unfair To Traditional Family.”

The reporters listened to Mrs. Marshner and they scribbled in their notebooks. A young woman standing next to me in the crowd, a reporter for the Baltimore *News American*, seemed genuinely puzzled by what Marshner was saying, perhaps could not comprehend that it was even possible for enlightened people to differ on such matters as greater government intervention in the economy. “Are you against *guaranteed jobs*?” she asked Connie Marshner, as twenty years ago one might have asked: Are you against motherhood? Connie tried to explain to the young reporter that this was the “same old tired liberalism” — one of the sackful of remedies that had been tried and failed.

With all the talk about intervention, I decided to intervene myself. The young lady seemed unconvinced by Mrs. Marshner’s reply. So I asked her if she had a guaranteed job. She said she didn’t. I told her that only the government could guarantee a job; only a government job was guaranteed. And so the slogan turned out to be a disguised appeal for massive government intervention in American life; and that was why people like Connie Marshner were opposed to it. “I never said I was for it,” the reporter quite reasonably replied.

Meanwhile Jim Guy Tucker and John Carr were holding a press conference upstairs. George Gallup sat shamelessly at the same table with them, thus transferring to them (I suppose that was the idea) the seal of approval of the American people. Tucker was on the defensive because of the walkout, and so he said: “The very first

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story I ever saw in the New York *Times* on this conference quoted a woman as saying they were going to take over the conference and if they couldn't, they were going to say the conference was rigged." Tucker denied that it was rigged. And no, John Carr didn't know how many of the delegates were government employees.

Someone dared to ask if Gallup had been co-opted by the White House into asking questions designed to get the desired answers. What an indignant huffing and puffing ensued! Collapse of Stout Parties! Are you suggesting, sir, that George Gallup . . . George Gallup . . . ? But I have to report that that Household Word sitting at the table took it all very much in stride and reassured the company that, of course, no such thing could even be contemplated.

Tucker told another questioner that he had never suggested, as he was quoted as saying by the *Child Protection Report* in April, 1979, that a family should be defined as "one or more adults living together, with or without children." Tucker's full answer to this question was odd, however, suggesting at one point that he had been "unethically" quoted when he thought he was speaking off the record. What, then, was his definition of the family? Well, you should have seen the old charmer wiggle and squirm and flash his dimples. But finally he said he was "sorry," but darned if he didn't have a traditional view of the family, consisting of a Mommy and a Daddy . . . Yes, but why did Jim Guy have to say he was sorry?

By now the "Topic Groups" were holding *sesiones de topicas* in various rooms. I went into room C where the subject was *Familias y sus Necesidades Humanas*. There was an "observer" section at the back, from which I observed an intimidating-looking AFSCME lady gavelling through various recommendations with tremendous efficiency and dispatch. I felt a sense of dislocation, as though perhaps a public employee's union meeting had been for some reason convened at the United Nations by mistake.

Then I went out into the hall and some people were talking about the abortion recommendation that had just been voted through. This was the wording of the resolution:

We support policies which preserve and protect basic legal and human rights of all family members.

To guarantee these rights we support:

1. Ratification of the ERA.
2. Elimination of discrimination and encouragement of respect for differences based on sex, race, ethnic origin, creed, socio-economic status, age,

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disability, diversity of family life and size, sexual preference or biological ties.

3. Protection against violent and abusive action.

4. Right to open, accessible, accountable and responsive government at all levels.

5. Right to decide whether or not to bear a child including access to the full range of family planning services, abortion, and maternal and infant care.

I was pondering this document — especially the remarkable contradiction in item two, in calling simultaneously for “elimination of discrimination” and “encouragement of respect for differences” — when my attention was distracted by a dispute nearby. Abortion was the topic.

“The conference has gone on record as being pro-abortion,” someone was saying.

“Pro-choice,” responded a woman wearing a press badge. (These people are not neutral, believe me.)

“Pro-abortion.”

“Pro-choice.”

I thought about that for a while and then went downstairs to the press room. There I encountered another press representative, a young woman whose name tag revealed that she worked for a very likely pro-abortion publication. (It was something like “Voluntary Families” but I can’t be sure.) I asked if the journal was indeed “pro-abortion.”

“Pro-choice,” she said.

“Pro-abortion,” I replied.

“Pro-choice. . .”

I felt a rising sense of anger. “Come on,” I said, “Be proud of it. If you think it’s such a good thing then you should stick up for it. Don’t be ashamed of it.” Her head was hanging down and she turned away.

I think I realized then that the pro-abortion people are in the end going to lose on this issue. In fact, if they had any sense they would cut their losses and abandon their defense of the issue right now. Ever since the civil-rights movement of the early 1960’s, liberals in the United States have grown accustomed to the idea that they command a moral monopoly. (I am indebted to Washington attorney Michael Horowitz for this excellent phrase.) Vietnam and Watergate then seemed to further cement this moral monopoly. But then came the abortion issue, and unless I am much mistaken, here the liberals have stumbled badly. If they try to maintain a defense of this manifest evil (as I am sure they will, rather than face the specter of fallibility) they will put at risk all of their carefully-accumulated

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moral capital. And of course this is already happening, perhaps more rapidly than many of the liberals realize.

What I suddenly realized, in the brief repetitive dialogue quoted above, is that the liberals, when pushed to the wall, really don't believe in their own position. Their use of language shows this clearly. They must fudge it, call it *pro-choice*, as though the act of getting pregnant did not entail choice. They don't want to hear that horrid word abortion any more than they have to. They will in the end run away from the word. They will thus leave the field to the anti-abortionists, who *do* really believe in their own position. Liberals know in their hearts that the defense of abortion turns out to be nothing more moral or noble than the claim to an unrestricted right to sexual pleasure (since pregnancy is not compulsory), a pleasure that should not have to be circumscribed by any consequent responsibilities arising from that indulgence.

Of course, to turn the tide, the anti-abortionists will have to persist with an unremitting militancy, just as the civil-rights people were militant, and the anti-Vietnam War people were. There could be no greater mistake than to imagine that reason will in the end prevail. On the contrary, the voice of reason is easily perverted and twisted. It is the voice of reason that is current law. Justice Blackmun spoke with the voice of reason, after a fashion, in the Supreme Court decision legalizing abortion. It is only the voice of conscience that cannot be twisted (although it can, unfortunately, be stilled entirely). If it cries out loudly enough, my brief encounter at the Baltimore conference reassured me, it will not be resisted by a morally aroused counterpart. In the end, the liberals will turn and run.

On the following (and final) day, the conference did the expected thing, endorsing ERA, non-discrimination against homosexuals, national health insurance, a guaranteed annual income of \$13,000-a-year for a family of four, in addition to the right to abortion (which passed 383-202). Most of the 57 resolutions, as James J. Kilpatrick noted, "were whooped and hollered to approval by overwhelming votes." Spencer Rich, writing in the *Washington Post*, had the grace to describe the recommendations as "a laundry list of liberalism."

One interesting final development: Reading one or two of the liberal columnists on the conference a day or two later, I noticed that an effort was made to (as it were) rake sand over the footprints — to pretend that what had emerged at the conference was not ideology so much as "ideas." It is important to be alert to this

development. Liberal strategy today, in seeking to implement its agenda of social change, deploys a good deal of *covert* ideology. Put another way, the ideology of liberalism is forever trying to hide from view, to affect a stance of open-mindedness, to masquerade as the faculty of sweet reasonableness applied on an issue-by-issue basis.

The news media themselves are so suffused with the successful outcome of this strategy that hardly anyone is paying attention to what is going on. Senators Jesse Helms and Gordon Humphrey, for example, are described as “right wing” senators. When was the last time you saw Senators George McGovern, John Culver, or Edward Kennedy described as “left wing”? The liberals have not only done a brilliant job of pinning the “ideology” label onto conservatives (interesting to consider incidentally, why ideology itself should be seemingly discreditable and therefore *taboo*), but have cleverly taken steps to avoid any counter response.

Consider, for example, a post-conference column in the *Washington Post*, by Judy Mann. Although not well-known, her column is worth watching, since it is so doggedly, undeviatingly faithful to the latest twists and turns of liberal ideology. So put yourself in her position: the conference is over; the liberals have got what they want, although the conservatives have messed things up slightly by walking out, thus threatening to draw attention to the extremism of the allegedly “liberal” majority at the convention. And, on the National Desk, Spencer Rich has gone and put his foot in it with a front-page story calling the recommendations a “laundry list of liberalism.”

Here then is a challenge for Judy Mann, very *parfait* liberal. Here’s what she tapped out: The delegates “spent a lot more time agreeing on the importance of old fashioned family togetherness than they did on anything else,” she reassured us in placating tones, “And they found out that there are still ways to compromise — even on abortion . . . People in the coalition wanted a conference of ideas, not of ideology, and in the end, that is what they got.” That was a nice spadeful of sand over the conference footprints. She then invoked a Rev. Thomas D. Weise, Catholic, of Mobile, Alabama, as her authority for claiming that the conference “endorsed a moderate agenda for strengthening families.” (Nothing here but us traditionalists, you see, meanwhile don’t let on that the big idea — the ideology, if you will — was really to strengthen the government, not families.)

Now, what about that “compromise” on abortion that Mann referred to? It turned out that Weise and Betty Friedan, feminist,

agreed on an “amendment that never mentioned the word abortion.” Weise seemed thrilled to be in agreement with Betty Friedan on the matter of phasing out not the horrid *deed*, but the horrid *word*. “I complimented her on the wording,” Mann quotes Weise as saying, “and said I had no problem with that, because whenever she mentioned choice she followed it with choice to have a child. I told her, ‘Congratulations, that could have been written by the Conference of American Bishops.’ She said, ‘My goodness, is it that moderate?’”

Judy Mann has this to say about the “compromise,” which turned out to be nothing more than an agreement to use a word other than “abortion”: “It shows that with the exception of a strident minority, Americans who have made up their minds about something like abortion can still engage in dialogue and find areas of agreement.” She concluded her column by saying that the “strident minority” — the Pro-Family Coalition — “ended up being isolated and neutralized at what turned out to be a very pro-family conference . . . They couldn’t win, because *they were not able to find new ways of talking about old problems*” (italics added).

This is the most corrupt doublethink imaginable, very close to 1984, and it is in a way a comment on our times that such debased thought can readily find space in a major American newspaper. Judy Mann is saying that the liberals — not being ideologues, not being “strident” — can work together and compromise, Catholics and feminists in concert; and they can agree to call abortion something else: choice. But the anti-abortionists are so inflexible that they can’t manage to achieve such compromises. They couldn’t find new ways of describing abortion. And that is why they “lost,” Judy Mann tells us.

But that is not why they lost. The real reasons were, first, that the delegate selection process ensured that they remained a small minority. But more importantly, even if they had been in a majority, the anti-abortionists have not yet lost sight of the simple truth that even if you call abortion something else, the act of abortion is unchanged.

The liberals in the 1960’s knew that when the Pentagon claimed it was merely engaged in “pacification,” the reality was bombs and napalm dropping onto villages — in which *someone was getting killed*. In the same way, in Baltimore in 1980, the strident minority knows that when abortion is called “choice,” the reality is unchanged: *someone is getting killed*.

Home Truths

Ellen Wilson

THE WHITE HOUSE Conference on Families is the most recent — and perhaps most visible — attempt to “redefine” the family into meaninglessness. If any voluntary association of people can constitute a family, as conference organizers imply, then hospital and prison inmates are the only obvious outsiders. Now, the mass of humanity realizes that family means something different, something more specialized. But often we do not verbalize the difference, do not spell out the kinds of things the traditional family *does*, which other “voluntary associations of people” cannot do, or do so well. I want to draw out some of the distinguishing characteristics of the family, as they would be understood by a son or daughter, mother or father. And in the process of showing how the family serves its members and society, I hope to demonstrate that it offers us, not luxuries or idiosyncratic benefits, but necessities.

Consider for a moment the role of religion in a society. Even under governments officially agnostic, churches are looked upon to serve an important “secular” purpose. They provide a view from another dimension — in fact, they *add* another dimension. They are the vertical to the horizontal axis of secular life. They appeal to an external standard by which they can judge society’s performance; they remind the body politic of duties and responsibilities which may be arduous, or inconvenient. They reprimand, they offer perspective, they expose the temporal world to the view of eternity. Though states and governments are often unhappy with church pronouncements, traditionally only the most revolutionary or totalitarian of them have denied a role for religion in maintaining national health.

The traditional family provides an analogous kind of perspective on a lower plane, by exposing the present to the past and future. It is a vertical (past-present-future) to the horizontal (present) of society. The family, literally as well as figuratively, places its members within history.

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One of the personal bonuses of this service is that it preserves individual histories, creating a sense of continuity. The family is there from the beginning — *your* beginning. And whatever additions or subtractions, births, deaths, or changes of residence, it is there, even when you are not. This is a rapid-transit society, where transcontinental moves are common, where changes of job, marital status, standard of living, can threaten our sense of identification with our past selves. Very little of that “past self” may seem to carry over into the present.

But family offers reminders. Relatives remember you as a child. They show home movies, and tell stories of your childhood to your more recent friends. They keep alive family jokes, family recipes, family Christmases. The family provides the pattern within which each member can find his place throughout a series of metamorphoses. The body, we are told, replaces its cells once every seven years, but it is identifiable as the same body because it produces and distributes those cells according to its original genetic code. So each individual, throughout the many changes which are a natural part of life, recognizes a continuing family stamp on his psyche.

That stamp reassures in another way. For the family helps explain its members to the world outside. To a certain degree it accepts responsibility for its own. The family likeness goes far towards explaining the individual to himself — and to others. On the most superficial level, families “explain” and justify one’s looks, particularly when we can enlist the help of the extended family. David may not look like his father or brothers, but perhaps he resembles pictures of his grandfather, or perhaps he will father a child who will defend the family pedigree. Because almost everyone is vulnerable on the subject of appearance, such resemblances are reassuring. The familiar cannot be ugly — and that which resembles *ourselves* possesses a special charm.

Physical likenesses are not the only kind, of course. All sorts of personality traits own pedigrees, too. Bad temper and easy tears, thrift and industry, shyness and geniality — any family member can see his personality traits reflected, mirrorlike, in those related to him.

And surely the comfort we derive from being *like* others, and hence assimilable, explainable, lovable, partly explains the child’s preoccupation with establishing beyond doubt his claim to family membership. This is one reason, I think, why children examine

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themselves and their siblings anxiously for signs they may have been adopted. The child who compares his blond hair with his mother's dark, or struggles against interests or temperament that set him at odds with the rest of the family, wants not only to belong by title-deed, but to be the same. He is relieved when he discovers a relative whose looks or behavior correspond to his own, because he may thus share responsibility for them. So much is said about the need to be recognized as a unique individual that this other, equally-pressing need to be assimilated into a group of people like oneself, is often obscured.

And that brings us to the "nurtured," learned family likenesses, which we may group under the heading of family style. As immigrants from the Old Country often brought with them ethnic costumes, so family members carry with them a family style, though teenagers may rebel against it, and subsequent generations make substantial alterations. Family style is developed by the clothing stores you shopped in, the foods you favored, the timing of meals, the allotment of T.V., the living room furniture and the flavor of a birthday cake. Gradually experience, individual temperament, and compromise with others will modify the original style you inherited. But still there will be opportunities for the protest, "But *we* always did it this way." Life introduces us to options, and suggests a prudent tolerance of the choices of others. Family teaches us that no choice is insignificant, no option without consequences, and that there is a right way and a wrong way of doing everything. It introduces us to a sacramental universe in which actions bear a significance beyond themselves, uniting the participants in special Monday-washday bonds of family custom. America, perhaps more than most countries, needs the resemblances, the identifications which only families, by their unique combination of nature and nurture, can offer. America, which harbors so many ethnic styles, so many rough-edged national heritages, needs to offer its people the pockets of security which families provide so well. In this sense the United States is less a Melting Pot than an international cookbook.

I have been discussing ways in which families offer security, allay fears, and calm anxiety. But the family also goads and provokes and encourages its members to achieve. Self-ambition can be dissipated by hard work, disappointment, or the absence of people with whom to share success. But a family's ambitions for its members are almost limitless, and constitute a tremendous natural energy source. The

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family provides its offspring with a standard of achievement to match and perhaps excel. In particular, the American immigrant tradition places added pressures on the second and third generations to justify the initial sacrifices, the expectation being that each generation will jump another economic grade, or take home a higher educational degree. The measure of how far your father outdistanced his father is a measure of the task before you.

But of course the immigrant pattern is not the only formula for encouragement of achievement, since some families have not seen the Old Country for centuries, and families do not march neatly up economic ladders from generation to generation. A family history is like a nation's history. It charts failures to avoid as well as successes to emulate. A parent's list of financial do's and don'ts is usually founded as much upon What Happened to Uncle-So-and-so as upon his own experiences. Don't speculate. Save money. Invest in land. Don't buy on credit. Commonplaces such as these, enlivened by stories of wastrel ancestors or grandparents who made good and then lost it all in '29, probably account for more of our worldly wisdom than we would like to admit. Home-taught economics lessons, absorbed over the years, are likely to be remembered when Paul Samuelson's *Economics* fades from memory.

I said the family inspires as well as teaches. The sacrifices parents make for their offspring, and the hopes they invest in them, encourage achievement. This is different from the love and encouragement that a friend or teacher, however influential, may offer: the frustrating of a parent's dreams is in one sense a repudiation of the line of descent, a checkmating of his influence on future generations. That is perhaps why one of a parent's greatest temptations is to expect too much from his children, or make his expectations too specific. The doctor who feels a failure unless his son, too, becomes a doctor, or the plumber who wants "something better" for his son, are responsible for the frustrating of two generations' sense of accomplishment. This is the other, potentially dark side of parental influence, and it shows how potent that influence may be. For enforced similarities — or dissimilarities — are a perversion of the family's nurturing function, and its gradual tolerance of independence.

I have stressed the family's reassuring role of legitimizer, a sort of multiple living mirror, reflecting aspects of each member which the world may deem odd, unorthodox, and perhaps unacceptable. Balancing this sense of familial similarity is a celebration of differences,

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oddities, eccentricities. Friends are chosen at points of congruence; like responds to like. But, as the old proverb points out, you can't choose your relatives. Siblings bicker from the playpen on up; spouses spend whole marriages trying to remake each other in their own image; children and parents disagree on where to spend a vacation, what radio station to play, to say nothing of more critical differences as the years go by. Yet, if for no better reason than preservation of sanity (and there are usually more potent ones, such as love), family members usually respect, in a rough and ready fashion, each other's oddities. Custom engenders its own tolerance: within family limits, familiarity seldom breeds contempt. Even in cases where sympathy is lacking, a minimal acceptance is usually extended. Robert Frost's lines were destined for *Bartlett's Quotations* from first writing: they repeat the reassurances we recited to ourselves as children:

"Home is the place where, when you have to go there,
They have to take you in."

"I should have called it
Something you somehow haven't to deserve."

This was the comforting assumption of all those family situation comedies of the 50's and 60's. No matter how outrageously Beaver or Wally acted in "Leave it to Beaver," no matter how trying Fred MacMurray's three sons, love — bemused, uncomprehending endured. "All in the Family," although pioneering in other ways, was in this respect very traditional. The true innovation occurred in the 70's, in shows like "One Day at a Time," which all too often portray family unanimity at the expense of principle. (Mom tags along in trendiness.)

There is a deeper, more metaphysical level on which the family enlightens its members, as I suggested in comparing its role in society to that of religion. The family is the conductor of time and time's effects. It is biological, acting as an agent of generation and decay. Time *grows up* children, ages parents into grandparents, births babies. It confronts us with life and death; those sleek peak years in between can be better lived and better understood in view of those parameters.

But family life is not merely a show-and-tell of birth and death. It is also an *involvement* in time, in past and future. It offers, as we have seen, a sense of continuation for the individual, most of whose

other ties with his earlier self may have been snapped. But in addition it imposes an obligation upon family members to . . . continue continuity, become their own bridges between past and future. In other words, they are bearers (often in a double sense) of tradition. That is why Plato's ideal Republic provided for the separation of children from parents. Plato was blue-printing a revolution, and fathers and mothers are notoriously poor conductors of revolutions. Tradition requires a handing over of the baton from one generation to another. And unless we have confidence enough to jettison the past, we should not lightly abandon the vehicle of continuity, the time machine through which we import the past and influence the future.

This brings us to the special pedagogical function of the family. Here there is a fairly clear distinction between *generational* groupings and *peer* groupings. Peers teach you what you wish to learn — what, therefore, you are likely to learn, one way or another. They initiate one another into conformity, and they encourage one another's interests and ambitions. By and large, people can be trusted to seek out those, of whatever age, who will teach them what they want to know. But the family, eclectic in ages and interests, teaches you what you might not willingly have chosen to learn.

Among these lessons is the truth of that great Chesterton axiom, "If a thing is worth doing, it's worth doing badly." Left to ourselves, we specialize, concentrate only upon what we can show off, what we have a flair for. The family, though it assigns roles, yet assigns them irrespective of our ability to excel in them, and asks us to do many things which we can only do badly. The busy executive or absent-minded professor is to trim lawns, attend a daughter's dance recital, teach a child how to tie a shoe. The secretary or account executive or interior decorator is to change diapers, make morning sandwiches, mind adolescents' privacy and tread softly on multiple egos. We are all called upon to be daughters or sons or parents or sisters or brothers, no matter how badly we perform. Not only does this encourage humility, it broadens the mind, like a liberal arts education. For like great literature, family life both delights and instructs, teaching us much about our own limitations, and something also, perhaps, about catharsis.

But now let us turn for a moment to what a family does for those outside it, for society as a whole. Are the family's benefits to its members reason enough for states and governments to recognize it,

and favor it above other lifestyles? Do families so manifestly serve the national interest?

It is not at all self-evident that governments are always served by strong families, but that does not mean *nations* do not depend upon the health of the family for their own well-being. First, as Michael Novak pointed out in "The American Family: An Embattled Institution," families perform *gratis* the kinds of social services — child-care, aid to the infirm, and the aged — which would cost the state billions of dollars to provide. There are still no labor unions for parents.

Second, as we have seen, families create diversity through a variety of family "styles," and they tolerate it within their ranks. In this way they complement private school systems, offering alternative readings of history and politics. If, *a la* Plato's *Republic*, entire generations were bred into a single official culture, the end result would resemble a community which, through isolation, had become chronically inbred. We have to enlarge the intellectual and imaginative gene pool, lest a sort of conformist national idiocy result. Msgr. Ronald Knox once described a country area in England where, though the upper and middle classes had inherited the usual disapproval of the medieval monks whose monasteries Henry VIII disestablished, the illiterate common laborers of the district handed down an opinion of them as "good men" who shouldn't have had their lands taken. In this century many people have parents or grandparents who counteract accepted political myths. When I was in grade school, for example, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was depicted as a national leader who commanded the trust and loyalty of the vast majority of Americans throughout his presidency. From my grandmother ("I only voted for him once, in 1932, when everybody did"), I know this isn't true. Whatever his merits, he was not universally beloved. That is the kind of refreshing "other side" which diversity of upbringing may offer. Families create their own myths, but they can also debunk the myths of others.

There is another "national" service provided by the American family, and that is the encouragement of national identity, in the very act of handing on an ethnic identity. A knowledge of one's "roots" is a knowledge of ways in which you differ from your neighbors, but it is also an understanding of how these differences came to be, and when they cease to be important.

The second or third or fourth generation American inherits not

only his parents' Old Country, but their decision to leave it. He learns what his immigrant ancestors found lovely in America — whether they came as early as the Mayflower or as recently as the Boat People. Thus a family is a transatlantic cable between the Old World and the New, teaching its members that the discovery of roots in the old is a discovery of their immense stake in the new. To repudiate the immigrant's choice would be as great an act of rejection as to disparage his ethnic background. Polish-Americans are Poles who chose to be Americans. This is an important distinction — one that should encourage patriotism, and deepen one's sense of identity as an American. For, lacking common ancestors, that is all that unites us — a common choice. Of course, like infant baptism, the choice has usually been made for us by our parents. But it is valid nonetheless, and most children growing up in American families are taught, directly and indirectly, to understand why.

Granted the importance of the family for nations and individuals, where does that leave those who, for one reason or another, do not form families, or come from them? What role are the non-familial to play, and how far from the mainstream should we place them? The situation is complicated because the non-familial fall into several different categories: there are the single career men and women, or those (widows and orphans, for instance) who find themselves without families through no choice of their own, or those who choose permanent community life (e.g., in religious communities).

In part the answer depends upon their attitude toward the family. But the simplest answer is that family exists whether or not this or that individual has one — or wants one — to call his own. Almost all people come from families, and a majority of adults still make them. The decision of some to forego family or replace it with community or a more solitary life need not be a political statement or cut these people off from their fellows. Though family is the norm, that may make other ways of living abnormal only in the statistical sense. Homosexual couples and monks, to take two examples, both eschew traditional family living, but to identify them on that basis alone as either equally healthy or equally perverse would be to surrender the effort to abstract meaning from raw data. The homosexual "marriage" is denied general approval because *homosexuality* is unnatural/abnormal. This has little to do with the question of family living at all. It is not the departure from the mother-father-child pattern that upsets people. It is the relatively recent attempt of

homosexual couples to form "families," as a challenge to the preeminent role of the traditional family. It is their claim to equally acceptable "families" that puts them outside the traditional structure.

It is at least a good sign, then, when "extra-familials" acknowledge the family's preeminent role as the normal social unit in society. This is one rudimentary way of distinguishing between, for instance, a traditional religious community, and various social or political experiments in communal living, which have as their ultimate goal universal implementation. Vocabulary tells part of the story. Compare French-revolutionary era "Citizen" or Russian-Communist "Comrade" or contemporary experiments with "persons" with religious communities' "Father," "Mother," "Sister," Brother." Monastic relationships are expressed in family metaphors because the family is seen as the earthly expression of the richest, most basic and procreative kinds of relationships. Family relationships, in fact, are chosen as most nearly corresponding to man's relationship with God: so in Judeo-Christian language, God is a Father, and in Christian theology, Jesus is Son. No fear of such communities setting themselves apart from or conspiring against the family, as long as they are responding to a God they call Father.

There is another kind of challenge which families face today — a challenge not to their *existence*, but to their *authority*. I refer to the self-appointed role of a variety of family experts in the rearing of other people's children. The wedge, as always, is the Difficult Case: the victim of child abuse or neglect, whose plight, we all agree, warrants outside interference. But improved opportunities for interference in the child's upbringing have tempted the experts and social planners to prepare large social experiments while settling for piecemeal implementation for the time being. Previous ages, unequipped for such programs, have had to entrust childrearing to childbearers. Today the task is seen as a joint effort between parents and — the experts. With varying success, for instance, the state has taken to court parents who wish to instruct their children at home, or forbid them abortions, or modify or remove sex education or various versions of values-modification from their schools. Parents are increasingly treated as amateurs in the business of childrearing, who should leave the difficult questions to the "professionals."

But professionals in what? We are not discussing professional *childrearsers*: Dr. Mary Calderone of SIECUS did not trace her authority from her experiences as a baby sitter or mother's helper.

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Any mother or father, no matter how green, soon acquires as much professional expertise in the business of living with and bringing up baby as a roomful of sex education experts. It is not necessarily children that these professionals are qualified to manipulate, but at *best*, information about children, and at worst, simply information. The sex education teacher knows a lot about sex, and even more about approved methods of passing along his information in the classroom. But there's no guarantee he knows all that much about children, especially *your* children, especially what your children should and shouldn't do. Many sociologists and social workers know how families behave in a variety of environments. But they may not be equally knowledgeable about how to make them behave one way rather than another, or how to determine what behavior codes to follow.

Of course, the experts may know about childrearing also. But there's no licensing procedure for parenting, and there is no guarantee that they are more expert than the mass of parents whose children they wish to tinker with. And that brings up another point: if information is the key, why do the child-care people find so much work to be done in this of all generations, and particularly in the middle class? At no other period in history has a society existed with as great a percentage of educated parents. Even modern-day ghetto parents are better-qualified than the overwhelming majority of past parents, if degrees and courses completed are to be counted as qualifications. If the experts are right, surely we should already have seen a general improvement in the quality of our young even without the fully-implemented social programs. Educated parents, with a library-full of "How to" books, should be turning out more "successful" children. But that doesn't seem to have happened.

Perhaps we can explain it this way. Parents are engaged in the enormously-difficult enterprise of making wholes. They spend years trying to unite bundles of conflicting aims and emotions, needs and desires, into integrated personalities. While they are occupied with this struggle with each member of the family, they are also trying to create another kind of whole: to unite varied and at times antagonistic personalities into a family. They are synthesizers; their great assignment is to bind, unite, participate in that secondary act of creation which Genesis describes as bringing order out of chaos.

The child-care "professional" on the other hand, sees a unit, the family, which is the result of effort, compromise, and loving inten-

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tion, and he proceeds to "break it down" into its "constituent parts." In a sense he is perfectly justified; this is the only way to study the family, to understand it as human beings understand things. The mind is complex, not simple, and it cannot absorb entities at a gulp. It must digest, and digestion is a process of breaking down. But if the analytic method is an acceptable way of understanding families, it is a disastrous way of creating them, or of treating already-existing families. Like running a film backwards, it undoes the parents' work, and the people responsible do not know how to go about redoing it.

Of course, what I have been doing here is "breaking down" the family into some of its constituent parts. But I am not giving advice on childrearing, or family counseling. I have been trying to explain and defend that deep-rooted sense that families, as traditionally understood, do something special. More than that, families tend to do the same sorts of special things, though they differ widely from one another in membership, lifestyle, age distribution, and so on. Rather than invent a substitute or supplement which may or may not prove as effective, rather than include within the term a number of "alternative life styles" which have never qualified as families, I am stepping back a bit the better to take in the full ramifications of the job families now do. And "ramifications" is the appropriate word, since the family, by pre-White House Conference definition, sinks roots into the past and stretches branches into the future. My advice to the makers of White House Conferences, and planners of social blueprints, is to be wary of substituting synthetic constructions for a natural biological organism. For if they have difficulty recognizing a family when they see one, how would they know a good replacement if they saw one?

Families, Sex, and The Liberal Agenda

Allan C. Carlson

THE CONCEPT OF “family policy” has attracted unprecedented attention within liberal political circles over the past four years. This attention, in turn, has generated numerous proposals aimed at strengthening American family life through government action.

The arguments of family-policy advocates follow a fairly standard analytical line. They begin by calling for a new emphasis, which Kenneth Keniston described for the Carnegie Council on Children as “abandoning the tendency to deal with children in isolation from their families or the society they live in. . . .” This change, advocates continue, involves a whole new perspective on public policy. The 1978 report by the National Commission on Families and Public Policies of the National Conference on Social Welfare (NCSW) suggests that the family-policy concept “may well provide fresh insight into social welfare, new perceptions of the individual’s relationship to society, [and] a new formulation of the role of government in human affairs. . . .” The analysis then commonly turns to a presentation of statistics reflecting family stress, break-up, or change — such as a rise in the number of single-parent families, the growing percentage of working mothers, the swelling divorce rate, illegitimacy figures, rising welfare dependency, figures on teenage pregnancies, suicides, and runaways, and the number of unmarried, cohabitating couples.

Assessments of cause for this evident stress in American family life usually follow. The Carnegie Council’s report faults in part the “American myths” of family independence, personal responsibility, technological advance, economic growth, and *laissez faire*. In addition, the report points to “the broad ecological pressures on children and their parents,” chemicals in food, nuclear power, the unplanned nature of broadcasting, and “the economic drain of children” on parents, as forces undermining families’ “capability to perform.” The NCSW group cites the rigidification of the nineteenth-century

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American family ideal around a work-devoured, paycheck-oriented male tied to an economically and socially dependent woman and a brood of children, who are isolated from traditional sustaining institutions such as the extended family, neighborhood, and community. The Advisory Committee on Child Development of the Assembly of Behavioral and Social Sciences of the National Research Council (NRC), in its 1976 report *Toward a National Policy for Children and Families*, sees family difficulties related in significant degree to poverty, racial and sexual inequality, the decline of cities, poor housing, unemployment, inadequate health care, lack of transportation, the deterioration of the environment, and poor education. Every source agrees that existing governmental programs supporting children and families are totally inadequate and often destructive of family life.

In developing their family-policy proposals, advocates posit two principles: comprehensiveness and pluralism. Concerning the first, the Carnegie group argues for a United States family policy "as comprehensive as its defense policy," involving "coherent" social and economic planning, a multitude of services, and a multifaceted approach to the issues. As for "pluralism," advocates all agree that it requires recognition of "the many life-style choices that may produce a wide range of family forms." "Life style" choices with some legitimate claim to family status are said by some to include "child free" couples, unmarried couples, single-parent families, "single persons" families, homosexual pairings, communal arrangements, and — to fill in the gaps — assorted "minority life styles."

While varying in emphasis, specific family-policy proposals tend to include the following:

Income security. All family-policy proponents agree that family income in the United States remains significantly maldistributed. They support establishment of a guaranteed annual family income, or "decency standard," representing half of the U.S.'s median income. Means to that "family stabilizing" goal vary. The NCSW group advocates a taxable federal family allowance of \$750 per dependent (to replace the personal income-tax deduction), at a cost of approximately \$70 billion. The Carnegie group proposes a comprehensive "credit income tax" scheme, granting households a refundable \$1500 tax credit for each family member, tied to an adult work requirement (no work, no credit) and a straight 50-percent tax

on all income above the credit line. The NRC report leans toward an unspecified "negative income tax."

Full Employment. Joseph Califano stated in his widely praised September 1976 memo to Presidential candidate Jimmy Carter on American families: "The most severe threat to family life stems from unemployment and lack of an adequate income." Most other advocates agree, and call for legally guaranteed jobs to all heads of households, tied to more and better central economic planning.

Affirmative Action. Given particular emphasis by the Carnegie report is the belief that current efforts at eliminating racial, sexual, and other forms of discrimination are moving with intolerable slowness. Equality of opportunity, many contend, is not enough to insure a stable basis for family life among minorities, women, and the handicapped. Greater affirmative-action effort is needed.

Health Care. Citing the American preoccupation with individuals, the relatively high infant-mortality rate among minorities, and the lack of pre- and post-natal maternity care for the poor, family-policy advocates call for a national health policy emphasizing preventive health care for all children. Their means to better health include "integration" of the health-care-delivery system with other family services, public accountability, more research, and national record keeping and monitoring of children's health.

Social Services. Finding the existing 280 federal programs aiding families and children to be "inadequate, uncoordinated and patchwork," the NCSW, and the NRC and Carnegie groups as well, support the creation of integrated family-support services funded at appreciably higher levels.

Day Care. All family-policy advocates agree that the government has a responsibility to ensure that families needing child care during working hours have available a wide range of substitute choices.

Sexual Law. While avoiding most references to sex, family-policy advocates do tend to cite the need for more sex education and wider availability of contraceptives to reduce teenage pregnancy. Many support widening access to abortion.

Family Law. While emphasis varies, family-policy supporters tend to argue for stronger legal supports for families (including guaranteed due process in child-removal situations), greater legal autonomy for children, and reform of such abuse-prone areas of government involvement as foster care.

Work Law. All advocates support changes in work laws and new

government incentives to accommodate the child-care needs of working parents.

Government. All sources agree that the government should be more aware of its impact on families. Most advocates support the idea of requiring that "family impact statements" be attached to proposed legislation and regulations.

In sum, family-policy advocates offer, as the way to reinvigorate American family life, virtually the entire liberal agenda: greater income redistribution, guaranteed minimum incomes, full employment policies, more social and economic planning, more and better integrated social services, reorganization and public funding of health care, more affirmative-action programs, better sex education, increased availability of contraceptives and abortion, government-funded day care, an emphasis on legal rights, work-law reforms, and a more sensitive, activist, and reorganized government.¹ They are focusing their attention on the scheduled 1980 (formerly 1979) White House Conference on Families. A "Coalition for the White House Conference" was organized in 1978 with a membership list "representing dramatically different family life styles and values" and including — together with more traditional family advocates such as the U.S. Catholic Conference and the YWCA — such reform-oriented groups as the American Association of Sex Educators, Counselors, and Therapists, the Child Welfare League of America, the National Council of Churches, the National Gay Task Force, the National Organization of Non-Parents, Women's Action Alliance, and Zero Population Growth.

What is a Family?

Family-policy advocates are certainly correct in their perception of stress and basic change. For though several recent studies — notably Mary Jo Bane's *Here To Stay* — have argued that American families are adjusting well to current social pressures, statistical evidence reflects fundamental alterations in the nation's family life. The divorce rate, for example, rose 150 percent between 1958 and 1974, with the annual number of divorces climbing to nearly 1 million. The number of children affected by divorce each year rose from 379,000 in 1957 to 1.1 million in 1974. The fertility rate (births per 1,000 women aged 15-44) has fallen from 122.7 in 1957 to 66.7 in 1975, reflecting a major retreat from child-bearing. The illegitimacy ratio (illegitimate births per 1,000 live births) has tripled in less than

two decades, reaching 142.5 in 1975. The percentage of single-parent families, relative to all families with children under age six, rose from 8 percent in 1960 to 17 percent in 1974. In 1977, nearly 18 million U.S. children lived with only one parent — a 100-percent rise since 1960. Yet despite their appropriate emphasis on such changes, family-policy advocates have stumbled into definitional, attitudinal, and analytical errors that compromise their proposed policy response.

First, while paying deference to a "pluralism of family forms" may appear to reflect a sound liberal principle, the refusal of most family-policy advocates to set any identifiable norms at all leaves critical policy-related issues begging the question: What exactly is a "family"? If there can be no definition that excludes any form of human cohabitation, then what is a family policy trying to save, or restore, or strengthen, or help? And if all forms of human cohabitation are essentially equal, why have an expensive policy aimed at no particular goal? Inflation alone will ultimately compel most people to live with others. The "pluralism" school of family sociology, when translated into public policy, flounders on the hollowness of its basic concept.

Second, many family-policy advocates appear to be ambivalent toward birth and children. All Western European family policies developed in the 1930's and 1940's were predicated on pro-natalist sympathies. The state enthusiastically welcomed babies and encouraged parents to bear larger families. This gave some logical coherence to efforts to socialize child-rearing costs and justified the clearly stated policy preference for traditional nuclear families. However, many American liberals are now committed to a version of neo-Malthusianism that emphasizes over-population as a national threat and a relatively high birthrate as a cause of continuing poverty and ecological distress. Births — especially of third or later children, or among teenagers or the welfare population — are not particularly welcomed. In line with their ideological commitment, family-policy advocates usually buttress support for family allowances and the like with evidence that such measures will have no pro-natalist effect. Rhetorical support for infants and children, it would seem, has a somewhat airy core.

Third, family-policy activists have built their reform proposals on misinterpreted statistical evidence. The most significant and startling change — revealed by virtually every measure of family stabil-

ity (divorce rate, number of children affected by divorce, illegitimacy ratio, fertility rate, juvenile-delinquency rate, or percentage of single-parent families) — is from a remarkable health and vitality for the American “nuclear” family in the 1946-60 period, followed by a striking shift toward marked instability *after* 1960. This historical shift of bewildering proportions has been ignored by most family-policy advocates, because their analysis of the causes behind contemporary family problems cannot explain the extraordinary change from evident family vitality in the late 1940’s and 1950’s to accelerating instability after 1960.

Examine, for instance, the “poverty argument”: that poverty and low incomes create family stress and instability. Personal income, in fact, was everywhere rising and poverty progressively declining throughout the 1960’s, and at rates far more rapid than during the 1950’s. The percentage of children below the poverty line actually fell from 27 percent in 1959 to 15 percent in 1968. Yet at the same time, families clearly began to fragment.

Or take the “jobs argument”: that unemployment is a chief cause of troubled families. During the 1960’s unemployment rates for white and black workers progressively declined to levels equal to or below those achieved during the 1950’s. Yet family disintegration in the post-1945 era began to accelerate only after 1960.

All other explanations similarly fall short. The 1960’s experienced unprecedented advances in incomes, jobs, and status by racial minorities and women. Inflation remained at tolerably low levels from the early 1950’s through the late 1960’s. The movement of women into the post-World War II labor market began during the late 1940’s, not the 1960’s. Medicare and Medicaid extended health coverage in the 1960’s to many of the aged and poor, part of an extraordinary nationwide expansion of quality health care. Social services grew dramatically during the 1960’s under the auspices of hundreds of new federal and state programs. The number of social workers tripled in that decade alone. The presumed pressures of technology — television, nuclear power, processed foods — had their counterparts in the 1950’s without appreciable results. The “myths” of technological advance, economic growth, family independence, personal responsibility, and *laissez faire*, all existed with equal or greater virulence in the late 1940’s and 1950’s without apparent effect on families. In fact, under the causal analysis and policy recommendations advanced by recent family-policy advocates, the 1950’s should

have been marked by family turmoil and instability, while the 1960's should have evidenced a new blossoming of family life. But exactly the opposite happened. Why?

Three Developments

The instability characterizing American family life since 1960 results from the interplay of three developments: one demographic, one physiological and attitudinal, and one broadly ideological. None is amenable to intervention by a democratic state.

1. *The Demographic Bulge.* The very success of family life in the 1940's and 1950's generated the occasion of subsequent turmoil — a vast age cohort that began reaching adolescence in the early 1960's. The most unstable stage of an individual's life, adolescence is characterized by confused emotions, rebellion against parental and other authority, and the questioning of values and ethical constraints. To deal with adolescents, parents and other responsible adults require confidence in their own values, personal strength, and willingness to administer discipline tempered by understanding and love. Yet, apparently overwhelmed by the surging numbers of youth during the 1960's, American adults and the institutions they controlled collectively showed few such qualities. Only now is the last of the "baby boom" generation passing into the more stable young-adult years. In a complex manner, this demographic bulge certainly conditioned, and to some degree caused, the other two developments.

2. *The "Second" Sex Revolution.* Historian Edward Shorter argues for the existence of two sex revolutions in Western history: The first occurred in Europe between 1750 and 1850 (the United States, he suggests, was "born modern"), and was marked by the initial incursion of premarital sexual intercourse into the lives of the unmarried. The second, says Shorter, began between 1955 and 1965, and saw the generalization of intercourse among the majority of unmarried.

In the United States, the evidence reflecting major discontinuities after 1960 in the erotic life of the average young, white, unmarried woman seems conclusive. Among unmarried white women, ages 15 to 19, the illegitimacy rate was relatively stable through the 1950's — rising from 5.1 per 1,000 in 1950 to only 6.5 in 1962. Thereafter — and despite the spread of "the pill" and the widening availability of abortion — it climbed steadily, and reached 12.1 in 1975. A series of surveys from the 1960's shows as well startling increases in Ameri-

can "nonvirginity rates." Within a typical group of adolescent women questioned in 1971, nearly half had experienced intercourse by age 19, compared to only 17 percent in Alfred Kinsey's study during the 1940's. And the pace of this change is accelerating: A recent study found a 54-percent jump between 1971 and 1976 in the number of 16 year olds having had intercourse at least once. Interestingly, the illegitimacy rate among non-white females rose through the 1950's in conjunction with the surge of marital fertility, but began to *fall* in 1961. In many respects, the "second" sex revolution was a white, middle-class phenomenon.

It soon spread from youth to other parts of the population. In a major 1972 statistical study commissioned by the Playboy Foundation, Morton Hunt discovered that all Americans in the early 1970's — young and old alike — were having more sex, doing it in different ways, with a greater variety of partners, and feeling less guilty about it afterwards, than did their Kinsey-survey counterparts. Whereas 41 percent of married females ages 35 to 44 had experienced premarital sex, 81 percent of married females ages 18 to 24 had. While only 14 percent of Kinsey's "adolescent to age 25" group of white males had used cunnilingus in premarital foreplay, 69 percent of the same age cohort in 1972 said they had. Kinsey reported a median weekly marital coitus figure of 2.45 for persons ages 16 to 25; Hunt found a median of 3.25 for the 18-to-24 age group, with similar increases for all older cohorts.

Even more striking are the shifts in sexual attitudes evident in the period after 1960. Opinion surveys among college students show that virginity was still a mythically prized virtue in the late 1950's; a poll in 1970 found that three out of four students thought it unimportant whether or not they married a virgin. Whereas legal and easy abortion had been unthinkable in the United States in 1963, by 1972 it was legal, subject to certain limitations, in half a dozen states and was to be legally available everywhere only one year later. In the 1973 "Sorenson Report," researchers described the growing predominance of situation ethics in the sexual liaisons of young people. Rejecting laws or religious dogma as irrelevant to the problems of sexual partners, distrusting lifelong monogamy, suspicious of the restraints of fidelity, and believing "family" to interfere with sexual fulfillment, a growing number of youth placed sexual satisfaction at the center of their personal relationships.

What caused this upheaval in American sexual actions and atti-

tudes after 1960? Among background factors were advances by the biological sciences, such as oral contraceptives; physiological changes such as earlier menstruation and later menopause; the dramatic growth in higher education, which drew together large numbers of unmarried youth; and changes in the national mood, including the decline in religious values and a new emphasis on "rights" which led to an obsession with self. Sexual researchers, from Freud through Kinsey to Masters and Johnson, moved emphasis ever further away from the idea of the sex act as an expression of human love toward preoccupation with the nature of the physiological release and "health" of the sex organs.

Perhaps more critical was what Vance Packard calls "the crumbling of traditional controls" over youth sexuality. The decline in parental authority over the awakening process, the decrease in community scrutiny, and the rise of a youth subculture, made it vastly more difficult to assure female virginity until marriage. Surveys from the 1940-to-1960 period show a clear correlation between religious devoutness and abstinence from premarital coitus. Yet with the apparent American retreat from religious belief starting in the late 1950's, church leaders grew pliable and non-judgmental in matters of personal morality. In addition, the spread of "the pill" and waning concern about social stigmatization led to a decline in the fear that sexual activity might lead to premarital pregnancy.

Allan Sherman — in his episodic, rude, but nonetheless insightful *The Rape of the A*P*E* (*American *Puritan *Ethic)* — offers a "conspiracy" theory of the sexual revolution. Sherman traces the sexual revolution's origins to the social upheaval of World War II, follows it through an underground existence in the 1950's, to its full-blown emergence after 1963 and final victory in the 1973 Supreme Court abortion decisions. Led by scattered members of the generation reaching adulthood in the 1940's who were bent on the "obscening of America," the attack centered on the sexual restraints imposed by nineteenth-century bourgeois culture — such as the repression of obscenity, pornography, indecent exposure, nudity, premarital sex, extra-marital sex, abortion, divorce, desertion, perversion — and on the whole "incredibly clean-cut and impossibly wholesome" American world of Disney, church socials, Shirley Temple, the YMCA, Blondie and Dagwood, *The Saturday Evening Post*, Motherhood, miniature golf, Coca-Cola, Apple Pie, and Hot Dogs. By the late 1960's, writes Sherman, "Legions of Lolitas joined the

battle with battalions of Babbits and platoons of Portnoys. Manners and morals and great institutions bit the dust. Waterbeds splashed and vibrators jiggled. And when the air was cleared . . . the world was never going to be the same again. No one knew exactly how, but Western Civilization had been caught with its pants down."

And the impact of the sex revolution? Sherman suggests that it "removed America's backbone and revealed our awful secret: Stripped of the Puritan ethic, we have no morals at all." He adds that "nothing was reduced to less recognizable rubble than the revered . . . Institution of Marriage." Edward Shorter, a less euphoric coroner, considers the nuclear family of the 1970's wracked by some form of final tubercular spasm.

The institution of monogamous marriage is clearly in trouble, for the sexual revolution has made it vastly more difficult to retain monogamy's monopoly on sex. Marriages predicated mostly on sexual capability and erotic arousal prove fragile. Parents abandon and adolescents reject all sense of lineage, which monogamy alone can provide. The latter turn instead to peer groups and their own subculture in search of values and sexual gratification. As Pitirim Sorokin once observed: "A sex revolution drastically affects the lives of millions, deeply disturbs the community, and decisively influences the future of society." Families, simply put, were major casualties of the Western world's "second" sex revolution.

From "Father Knows Best" . . .

3. *Collapse of the Nuclear Family Norm.* The emergence of industrial capitalism and bourgeois society in the period from 1750 to 1850, according to Shorter, was tied to a dual revolution in "sentiments": heightened sexuality and gushing maternal love. The former change, rising among men and women of the European industrial class who were newly liberated from the sexual restraints of traditional agrarian communities, produced the "first" sex revolution referred to above. The latter change in sentiment welled up among the bourgeoisie, for economic growth had liberated women from other labor and allowed them to devote more time to better mothering and infant care.

Family life took shape about the home. The vital center of this new domesticity was the infant. An emotional web was spun around mother and baby, predicated on a new sense of the preciousness of infant life. Lloyd de Mause has compiled a large body of evidence

showing the sweeping improvement in child-care practices that accompanied the rise of the bourgeoisie. Shockingly widespread practices of swaddling, child beating, infanticide, wet nursing (virtually an institutionalized form of infanticide), abandonment, sexual abuse, and even the sale of children, gave way to a surge of parental affection, as demonstrated by the rising popularity of maternal nursing, dramatic drops in infant-mortality rates, a new popular emphasis on the joys of domesticity and family life, and recognition of the priceless importance of infants and children. This valuation spread even to prenatal life. Nineteenth-century campaigns against abortion were largely a bourgeois phenomenon.

Girded by this value structure, the bourgeois nuclear family emerged as the Western family norm. Its characteristics were a stable heterosexual coupling based on love, the exclusiveness of the male-female sexual bond in marriage, the primacy of family attachments, the expectation of children, economic security for women and children, the obligation among family members for mutual support in crises, the acceptance of sex-determined roles within the family, and the prolongation of childhood. There was as well a linkage to bourgeois values of hard work, delayed gratification, and self-imposed restraints on personal behavior. The bourgeois nuclear family certainly never extended to a majority of American households. But like any social or cultural norm, it stood into the twentieth century as the ideal form of American family life, as the measure of normality or deviance, and as the mark of responsibility and respectability. It drew support from most other American social institutions — including law, government, organized religion, neighborhood, the media (such as it was), and the educated elite.

The American nuclear family first ran into trouble during the late nineteenth century, as evidenced in rapidly rising (although still relatively low) divorce figures and falling fertility. A retreat from parenthood grew more evident in the interwar period, primarily in the form of a significant rise in childless marriages. This apparent decline of family life led to the pessimistic sociological formulations of the 1930's which described the family's loss of function and approaching demise.

The post-1945 era, however, witnessed a remarkable and totally unexpected surge of familism and re-emergence of the belief that a family was incomplete without children. Fueled by the flood of GI's returning home to build normal lives, the period was marked by a

dramatic rise in the marriage rate, a downward movement in average marriage age, swelling fertility among the married, increasing remarriage, and even higher fertility among the remarried. Sociologists now gave optimistic, supportive assessments of American family life. Capping this genre was William Goode's *World Revolution and Family Patterns*, which argued (with a heady dose of New Frontierism) that the "conjugal family" found in the industrial West — and linked to an ideology first shaped by Protestant asceticism — was the emerging norm among virtually all developing peoples.

. . . To "Three's Company"

In the mid-1960's, however, the nuclear family came under sustained ideological attack. The New Left revived the Marxist critique of the bourgeois family, viewing it as predicated on property relations, male supremacy, and the boredom of domestic bliss. Bourgeois marriage represented the crassest prostitution of both men and women and the domestic slavery of wives. Inspired by Friedrich Engels, the left stressed the relationship between heightened sexuality and the approaching demise of bourgeois family values. Unrestrained sexual intercourse and "true" sexual love demanded the dissolution of the "home," the transformation of housekeeping into a social industry, the collectivization of child care and education, and elimination of the concept of "illegitimacy."

For their part, radical minority spokesmen derided the "racist cultural imperialism" of the white middle class in imposing its family norms and supposedly alien morality on blacks, Hispanics, Native Americans, and other ethnic groups. Feminists drew on the Marxist analysis, arguing that the purpose of the family had been to secure men's ownership of women and children and to sustain male domination over women deprived of any life other than a restraining and debilitating motherhood. "Populationists" resurrected the Malthusian fear of resource shortages and economic decline arising from overpopulation, and opened their assault on the reproductive energies of the nuclear family. Casting parenthood in a negative or, at best, ambivalent role, they argued for "micro" or "childfree" families to save the world from disaster.

In face of this onslaught, institutions once sustaining the nuclear-family norm either proved crippled themselves, or deserted to the other side. Remnant white ethnic groups, which once served a supportive function for families in European immigrant communities,

came under regular government and media attack during the 1960's as racist and reactionary. Minority groups found their destinies tied to federal power and the schemes of intellectuals. Neighborhood communities were broken apart by federal urban-renewal and housing programs, and by court-ordered busing.

Many churches, once supportive centers of nuclear family life, shifted ground. By the early 1970's, liberal Protestant and Jewish groups had abandoned many traditional moral and social precepts, including normative support for the nuclear family. For instance, a panel representing one large Protestant body affirmed in 1976 that "there is a diversity of types or forms of family existing in modern American society." Defining family as "a relationship community of more than one person," its list of variant forms includes two-parent, one-parent, childless, parentless, and "single persons" families. The traditional norm found occasional support and sustenance only among culturally-derided Roman Catholic, Mormon, and scattered evangelical Protestant and orthodox Jewish groups.

The media, attracted to protest and evidence of unsettling change, wandered from the nuclear-family norm it had supported in the 1950's. Documentaries probed the failings and pathologies of the American family. Newscasts riveted attention on the New Left, youth culture, minority protests, and the dissolution of old values. *Father Knows Best*, *Leave It to Beaver*, and *I Love Lucy* gave way to *One Day At a Time*, *Three's Company*, and *Miss Winslow and Son*.

The corporate world followed the lure of money and struck its Faustian bargain with the anti-nuclear-family cause. Large corporations proceeded to publish books and magazines, press records, produce motion pictures, and sponsor television shows that struck at the heart of middle-class family values.

Legal institutions began to be reshaped. Research showed that most state marriage laws presumed lifelong commitment, a first marriage, procreation as an essential element of marriage, some division of labor in the family, middle-class status, and the Judeo-Christian ideal of a monogamous, heterosexual union. Stripped of their normative character — and portrayed as elements of bourgeois cultural imperialism — these family laws came under challenge; many have already been changed. In its 1973 *Roe* and *Doe* decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down existing state abortion statutes that sustained the bourgeois belief in the sanctity of prenatal infant life. The Court's 1976 *Danforth* decision denied that abor-

tion was in any sense a "family issue" and prohibited interference by a husband, or by a parent of a minor, with the absolute right of a woman to undergo an abortion during the initial three months of pregnancy.

The Desertion by the Professionals

The abandonment of the nuclear-family norm was most dramatic among family counselors, social workers, and sociologists. Articles appearing in the mid-1960's exposed and critically dissected the nuclear-family mythology encrusting family sociology and family counseling. Authors termed this mythology dangerous, arguing that because it served as the standard used by marriage and family counselors in judging family health it led to culturally biased advice. Starting in the late 1960's, a veritable flood of sociological books and essays attacked all aspects of middle-class family life. One searches in vain during this period for an authoritative voice defending the rapidly collapsing nuclear-family norm.

Revealing evidence of desertion from the old normative family concept comes from a comparison of successive editions of family-sociology textbooks. Those published before 1972 continue to view the middle-class nuclear family as the American norm. Those appearing after 1972 abandon normative concepts altogether.

For instance, Ira Reiss's 1971 text, *The Family System in America*, stresses the continuity and stability of the nuclear-family model, which he terms a system undergoing only "moderate change," not radical transition. The nuclear-family norm forms the book's ordering principle, and is used to identify deviant behavior such as premarital pregnancy and homosexuality. Reiss then saw the rest of the world as moving toward the American model.

In his 1976 edition (revealingly pluralized as *Family Systems in America*), however, Reiss emphasizes that "choices in all stages of the family are now legitimate far beyond what they were just five or ten years ago." The nuclear family no longer serves as the ordering principle of his text. In fact, there are no longer any family norms: "We are now involved in a society with a variety of life styles that necessitates that people be able to feel that their life style is proper to them, even though it may not be a proper life style for other people."

Bert Adams, in his 1971 text, *The American Family: A Sociological Interpretation*, essentially describes an American nuclear-family norm that "Barring a major historical upheaval . . . is likely to

persist over the next generation." Such an upheaval apparently occurred, for his 1976 edition, *The Family: A Sociological Interpretation*, stresses alternatives to the old nuclear family and the need for personal choice of an appropriate family life style.

Gerald Leslie, in his 1967 edition of *The Family in Social Context*, clearly states that the "white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, middle-class family is a kind of prototype for the larger society Its patterns are 'ideal' patterns for much of the non-white, non-Anglo, non-Protestant, non-middle-class segment of the population. . . . In twentieth-century America, however, *an increasing proportion of the population is achieving the ideal*" (emphasis added). Among the values found in this ideal family are: marriage as the dominant life goal for men and women; marriage based on love and free choice; the expectation that marriage should produce happiness for both partners; the belief that life has much to offer the young; the idea that childhood should be protected and prolonged; the confinement of sexual relations to marriage; the belief that husbands and wives have some traditional roles to play; and the idea that individual fulfillment should be sought in family living. This family model is clearly the classic bourgeois family.

Yet Leslie's 1976 edition not only discards the "middle class" family as the cultural norm (he finds it rejected by, among others, blacks, Chicanos, Indians, and Jews who are fighting "forced cultural homogenization"), but even attributes new values to the middle-class family that are radically different from those in his 1967 list. These are: equality of the sexes, including a flexible division of tasks between men and women; democracy in all status and power roles among and between parents and children; permissive, person-centered mate selection, including free sexual experimentation for youth and the right of men and women to enjoy sex, including premarital liaisons; a strong emphasis on sexual and conjugal companionship, tied to continuing functions such as child bearing, socialization, and economic cooperation; the professionalization of marriage and parental roles, including counseling and classes on marriage, childbirth, and parenthood; and a turn to divorce if counseling and classes fail.

Given the startling changes to be found in sociology textbooks, one might assume that the number of nuclear families fell dramatically in this period. But the proportion of nuclear families relative to all households in fact remained relatively steady through 1970. Prevailing family structures were not radically altered; but *the norma-*

tive concept of the nuclear family — attacked from many sides in the 1960's and abandoned by most theretofore supporting institutions — effectively collapsed in the early 1970's.

Cultural and social norms provide a civilization with its ordering principles, its measures of morality and deviance, and its legacy to subsequent generations. They define for individuals the nature of responsibility, the ultimate purposes of social life, and the proper basis for human relationships. Nuclear families, now deprived of such a normative nature and the support thereby entailed, have fallen progressively into disarray.

In place of the nuclear family, the dominant voices in sociology and family-counseling professional journals are now describing the emergence of new normative concepts to define acceptable family life in the post-bourgeois era. While varying their emphases, such professionals cite certain values with regularity:

1. *Mutability*. There are no constants in moral questions nor in personal relationships.

2. *Choice*. There should be no bias towards marriage and children. Everything is open. All habitual and cultural attitudes may be questioned. All values are on trial.

3. *Experimentation*. Since there are no family or sexual norms, no traditions worthy of universal emulation, and no restraints, persons must be free to experiment with a variety of sexual partners and practices to find the sexual and family life styles appropriate for themselves.

4. *Self-fulfillment*. Morality demands freedom for people to realize their own potentials — and their own needs, desires, and tastes — with a minimum of social rules and regulations. Relationships should last only so long as they are mutually self-fulfilling.

5. *Uninhibited Sexuality*. Sexual gratification represents one of life's ultimate values. Access to regular sexual satisfaction should be viewed as a basic human right. There is no true humanness devoid of sexuality.

6. *The Problem of Children*. Sexuality must be viewed as totally separated from procreation. Parenthood should be undertaken only after a careful weighing of social, cultural, and economic costs. The burden of social proof is shifted away from the right of persons to remain "childfree" to questioning the right of persons to procreate. Given the problem of overpopulation, reproduction may have to be

viewed as a privilege granted by a government working towards the goals of decreasing the quantity while increasing the quality of humankind. Unwanted pregnancies should be aborted.

In sum, any human relationship involving cohabitation that produces self-gratification and sexual fulfillment has some claim to valid family status. "Human actualizing" contracts, progressive monogamy, group marriage, polyandry, polygyny, communal arrangements, homosexual pairings, open marriage (involving group sex, swinging, or revolving mates), heterosexual and nonmonogamous cohabitation, "singlehood," and the old nuclear family, are all legitimate family "life styles." "Immorality" in sexual matters or "deviance" in family structure have become empty concepts.

Such new values are supported by and particularly evident among elements of the college-educated upper-middle class. While reassuring voices are correct in arguing that most Americans still live in traditional nuclear families, post-bourgeois family norms are starting to make a statistical dent. In 1970, for instance, there were 1,046,000 unmarried adults sharing living quarters with one person of the opposite sex; by 1977, the figure had swelled to 1.9 million. While such households still form only 2 percent of all "couple households," the 12-percent figure now found in Sweden may suggest the immediate American future.

The Helping Hand That Harms

American family life is being fundamentally altered by two forces: from within, by the impact of the "second" sex revolution on male-female ties and on the linkage of generations; and from without, by the cultural abandonment of the nuclear-family norm and the normative embrace of amoral family and sexual ethics by elements of the educated upper-middle class. Even if a majority of Americans thought it desirable, a democratic government could not check or reverse these trends. On the one hand, the state cannot undo the sex revolution. It might as easily try to reverse the Industrial Revolution or any other nexus of social change that has substantially altered our national evolution. On the other hand, while the government of a free people may reflect a social norm and give it legal recognition and support, it cannot create such a standard, nor long sustain a normative concept devoid of cultural recognition.

Nor will state intervention on behalf of families succeed. Full-

employment policies might achieve sound economic goals, and a national health-insurance program could democratize the provision of health care. Day-care subsidies would certainly ease the financial costs of single-parent or two-earner families and free more women for paid labor. Family allowances might help many children, and legal reforms could secure more legally enforceable rights for families and children. *But these measures will not strengthen families.*

The results, in fact, would probably be the opposite. In his review of Soviet attempts to strengthen family life in the Stalinist era, Lewis A. Coser was led to the conclusion that the state, by its very interference in the lives of citizens, must necessarily undermine the parental authority it seeks to restore. Recent research on the effects of Sweden's 1937 marriage-loan act — which was intended to encourage earlier marriage and more children per family — shows that the couples participating had *fewer* children than the unbenefited control population. And while defensive explanations abound, the fact remains that U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare experiments with income-maintenance programs have seen divorce, separation, and desertion figures significantly higher among families receiving a guaranteed federal income than among control families receiving no benefits. *The disconcerting reality appears to be that state social intervention on behalf of families actually weakens or destroys families.*

Harvard sociologist Carle Zimmerman concluded his massive 1947 study on the relationship of family and civilization by predicting that the final collapse of the traditional Western family would occur before the end of this century. "The results," he added, "will be much more drastic in the United States because, being the most extreme and inexperienced of the aggregates of Western civilization, it will take its first real 'sickness' most violently."

Can this reckoning be avoided? Viable family life may somehow survive in a normative vacuum. Or, echoing the experience of the 1950's, certain bourgeois family values — now enjoying something of an underground existence in little-noticed movements such as Le Leche League International — might re-emerge as normative guides. Or, a new legitimate ordering principle for family life could evolve. The one certainty, though, is that the liberal family-policy agenda cannot overcome — for in some ways it actually reflects — the shallowness and confusion of prevailing cultural norms and the personal hedonism dominating American life.

ALLAN C. CARLSON

NOTES

1. The political strategy being followed by American family-policy advocates has historical precedents. European social democrats have regularly used "family policy" as a potent argument, attracting conservative backing for a variety of welfare-policy proposals designed to save the family from dissolution or sterility. Swayed by the pro-natalist arguments of the 1942 Beveridge report, a number of British Conservatives lent their support to social-welfare policies such as children's allowances and creation of a national health service. They hoped such measures would stabilize family life, raise the United Kingdom's birth rate, and continue to people the Commonwealth with British stock. When Alva and Gunnar Myrdal advanced a sweeping pro-natalist family policy in 1934 that involved the socialist reconstruction of Swedish society, even the veteran conservative economist Gustav Cassel had to acknowledge the strength of their arguments and the need for some state intervention to support families.

Freedom and the Family

Michael Novak

THEORIES OF LIBERATION deserve to be studied in the light of flesh, absurdity, and tragedy. There is a pervasive tendency in Western thought, possibly the most profound cultural undercurrent in 3,000 years (compared to it, C. S. Lewis said, the Reformation was a ripple on the ocean), in which liberation is imagined as a breaking of the bonds of finiteness. Salvation comes as liberty of spirit. "Don't fence me in!" The Fall results from commitments that "tie one down," that are not subject to one's own controlling will. One tries to live as angels once were believed to live — soaring, free, unencumbered.

The jading of everyday, the routines of weekdays and weekends, the endless round of humble constraints, are, in this view, the enemies of human liberty.

In democratic and pragmatic societies, the dream of the solitary spirit often transfers itself into a moral assault upon institutions, traditions, loyalties, conventions. The truly moral person is a "free thinker" who treats every stage of life as a cocoon from which a lovely moth struggles to escape the habits of a caterpillar. This fuzzy sentiment names each successive breakaway "growth" and "development." It describes the cumulative process as "liberation."

There is, of course, a rival moral tradition. I do not mean the conventional variant, which holds that fidelity to institutions, laws, conventions, and loyalties is sufficient. The more compelling alternative — call it "realist" — differs from the romantic undercurrent by associating liberation with the concrete toils of involvement with family and/or familial communities. The romantic undercurrent takes as the unit of analysis the atomic individual. The realist alternative takes as the unit of analysis the family. To put it mythologically, "individual people" seek happiness through concentration upon themselves, although perhaps for the sake of service to others.

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MICHAEL NOVAK

Most television cops, detectives, cowboys, and doctors are of this tribe. The "family people" define themselves through belonging to others: spouse, children, parents, siblings, nieces, cousins, and the rest. For the family people, to be human is to be, so to speak, molecular. I am not solely I. I am husband, father, son, brother, uncle, cousin; I am a family network. Not solitary. On television, both *All in the Family* and *Good Times* have as a premise the molecular identity of each character. The dramatic unit is the family.

There is, beyond the simplicities of half-hour television, a gritty realism in family life. Outside the family, we choose our own friends, like-minded folk whose intellectual and cultural passions resemble ours. Inside the family, however, divergent passions, intellections, and frustrations slam and batter us. Families today bring together professions, occupations, social classes, and sometimes regional, ethnic, or religious differences. Family life may remain in the United States the last stronghold of genuine cosmopolitanism and harsh, truthful differences.

So much of modern life may be conceived as an effort to make ourselves pure spirits. Our meals are as rationalized and unsensual as mind can make them. We write and speak about sexual activity as though its most crucial element were fantasy. We describe sex as though it were a stage performance, in which the rest of life is as little as possible involved. In the modern era, the abstract has grown in power. Flesh, humble and humbling, has come to be despised.

So it is no surprise that in our age many resistant sentiments should war against marriage and family. Marriage and family are tribute paid to earth, to the tides, cycles, and needs of the body and of bodily persons; to the angularity and difficulties of the individual psyche; to the dirty diapers, dirty dishes, and endless noise and confusion of the household. It is the entire symbolic function of marriage and family to remind us that we come from dust and will return to dust, that we are part of the net of earth and sky, inspirited animals at play for our brief moment on this planet, keeping alive our race. The point of marriage and family is to make us realistic. For it is one of the secrets of the human spirit that we long *not* to be of earth, not to be bound by death, routine, and the drag of our bodies. We long to be other than we are.

A generation ago, the "escape from freedom" was described in terms almost the reverse of those required today. In those days, as writers like Erich Fromm rightly worried, many persons were afraid

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of risks and responsibilities; many sought shelter in various fixed arrangements: in collectivism, in religion, in family. But dangers to freedom change with the generations. In our own time, the flight most loved is flight from flesh. The restraints Fromm worried about have proven, under the pressures of suburbs, automobiles, jet planes, television, and corporate mobility, all too fragile. Today the atomic individual is as free as a bird. The threat to human liberation today is that the flesh, the embodied psyche, earthy roots, bodily loyalties, will be dismissed with contempt.

The consequence of this freedom is likely to be self-destruction. Whoever nourishes spirit alone must end by the ultimate denial of the flesh. A flaming burst of destruction and death is the image that fascinates us (as in *The Towering Inferno*), that most expresses our drift of soul. For fear of the flesh is fear of death. A love for the concrete and humble gestures of the flesh meant, even in the concentration camps, spiritual survival.

A return to the true conditions of our own humanity will entail a return, on the part at least of a dedicated few, to the disciplines and terrors of marriage and family. Many will resist these disciplines mightily. (Not all, of course, are called to marriage. The single life can have its own disciplines, and celibacy its own terrors. What counts is the governing cultural model. The commitment of "the family people" to the demands of our humanity provide a context within which singleness and even celibacy have a stabilizing strength; and the freedom and dedication of the single, in turn, nourish the family.)

People say of marriage that it is boring, when what they mean is that it terrifies them: too many and too deep are its searing revelations, its angers, its rages, its hates, and its loves. They say of marriage that it is deadening, when what they mean is that it drives us beyond adolescent fantasies and romantic dreams. They say of children that they are piranhas, eels, brats, snots, when what they mean is that the importance of parents with respect to the future of their children is now known with greater clarity and exactitude than ever before.

Marriage, like every other serious use of one's freedom, is an enormous risk, and one's likelihood of failure is rather high. No tame project, marriage. The raising of children, now that so few die in childbirth or infancy, and now that fate takes so little responsibility out of the hands of affluent and well-educated parents, brings

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each of us breathtaking vistas of our inadequacy. Fear of freedom — more exactly, fear of taking the consequences — adds enormously to the tide of evasion. The armies of the night find eager recruits.

It is almost impossible to write honestly of marriage and family. Who would like the whole world to know the secret failures known to one's spouse and one's children? We already hate ourselves too much. Given our affluence and our education, we are without excuses. We are obliged by our own vague sentiments of progress and enlightenment to be better spouses, better parents, than our ancestors — than our own parents, or theirs. Suppose we are not? We know we are not. Having contempt for ourselves, we want desperately to blame the institution which places our inadequacy in the brilliant glare of interrogation.

Still, just as marrying and having children have today the force of public political and moral statements, it is necessary to take one's private stand. Being married and having children has impressed on my mind certain lessons, for whose learning I cannot help being grateful. Most are lessons of difficulty and duress. Most of what I am forced to learn about myself is not pleasant.

The quantity of sheer impenetrable selfishness in the human breast (in *my* breast) is a never-failing source of wonderment. I do not want to be disturbed, challenged, troubled. Huge regions of myself belong only to me. Getting used to thinking of life as bicentered, even multicentered, is a struggle of which I had no suspicion when I lived alone. Seeing myself through the unblinking eyes of an intimate, intelligent other, an honest spouse, is humiliating beyond anticipation. Maintaining a familial steadiness whatever the state of my own emotions is a standard by which I stand daily condemned. A rational man, acting as I act? Trying to act fairly to children, each of whom is temperamentally different from myself and from each other, each of whom is at a different stage of perception and aspiration, is far more baffling than anything Harvard prepared me for. (Oh, for the unselfconscious box on the ears used so freely by my ancestors!)

My dignity as a human being depends perhaps more on what sort of husband and parent I am, than on any professional work I am called upon to do. My bonds to them hold me back (and my wife even more) from many sorts of opportunities. And yet these do not feel like bonds. They are, I know, my liberation. They force me to be

a different sort of human being, in a way in which I want and need to be forced.

Nothing, in any case, is more poignant and private than one's sense of failing as a father. When my own sense of identity was that of a son, I expected great perfection from my father. Now that I am a father, I have undergone a psychic shift. Blame upon institutions, upon authorities, upon those who carry responsibilities, now seems to me so cheap. Those who fail in their responsibilities have a new claim upon my sympathies. I know the taste of uncertainty. To be a father rather than a son is to learn the inevitability of failure.

Family Politics

It would be a lie, however, to write only of the difficulties of marriage and family, and not of the beauty. The joys are known. The more a man and a woman are in love, the more they imitate the life of husband and wife; long, sweet affairs are the tribute romances pay to matrimony. Quiet pleasures and perceptions flow: the movement of new life within a woman's belly; the total dependence of life upon the generosity and wisdom of its parents; the sense that these poor muscles, nerves, and cells of one's own flesh have recreated a message to the future, carried in relays generation after generation, carried since the dim beginnings. There may not be a "great chain of being." But parents do forge a link in the humble chain of human beings, encircling heirs to ancestors. To hold a new child in one's hands, only ounces heavy, and to feel its helplessness, is to know responsibilities sweet and awesome, to walk within a circle of magic as primitive as humans knew in caves.

But it is not the private pleasures of family life that most need emphasis today. Those who love family life do not begrudge the price paid for their adulthood. What needs elucidation is the political significance of the family. A people whose marriages and families are weak can have no solid institutions.

In intellectual terms, no theme is so neglected in American life and thought. The definition of issues given both by our conservatives and by our liberals is magnetized by two poles only: "the state" and "the individual." Both leave the family out. Emphasis on the family appears to conservatives a constraint upon the state, and to liberals a constraint upon the individual. Our remarkable humanitarianism holds that attention to family weakness will stigmatize those who suffer. No concept in the heavens of theory is as ill-starred. Turning toward the family, our minds freeze in their turning.

The time to break taboos in our minds must surely come. Every avenue of research today leads to the family. Do we study educational achievement? nutrition? the development of stable and creative personalities? resistance to delinquency and violence? favorable economic attitudes and skills? unemployment? sex-role identification? political affiliation? intellectual and artistic aspiration? religious seriousness? relations to authority and to dissent? In all these instances, family life is fundamental. A nation's social policies, taken as a whole, are most accurately and profoundly to be engaged by their impact upon the families that make up that nation.

There are three critical points in American political life today at which a more profound consideration of the politics of the family is closer to the essence than in any previous era: among white ethnics (some 70 million); among blacks (some 22 million); and among upper-class "opinion leaders" of all races (perhaps 10 million).

The meaning of Left and Right has, in recent years, come to be defined according to the tastes, interests, and prejudices of the upper 10 percent that has a four-year college education, an annual income over \$20,000; and professional standing, so as to be paid monthly (not weekly), to possess travel privileges and expense accounts, and a considerable degree of control over the conditions of their work. Thus, Left and Right are now defined by culture rather than by economics, by attitudinal issues salient to those whose economic needs are well beyond the level of survival. The governing language of upper-class attitudes, therefore, distorts the true political struggle. The competition between the left and right wings of the upper 10 percent is interesting and important. It hardly begins to touch the restlessness of the bottom 90 percent.

In this context, the true political leanings and energies of "the white ethnics" are consistently misperceived. Richard Hamilton, in *Restraining Myths*, for instance, describes related gross distortions in the conventional wisdom. Suffice it to say that white ethnic voters, traditionally more Democratic than the national average and now more independent, are economic progressives. But in matters touching the family, they are fiercely traditional. The bulwark of conservatism in America is the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant — 68 percent for Nixon in 1972; 16 percent for Wallace in 1968 (compared to 7.7 percent of the Catholic vote). Slavic-Americans gave George McGovern 53 percent of their vote in 1972 (down from 80 percent for Lyndon Johnson, and 65 percent for Hubert Humph-

rey). The white ethnics are becoming increasingly impatient with both Republicans (their traditional opponents) and Democrats (their former allies). Neglect of the politics of the family is the central issue. It is on this issue that "a new majority" will — or will not — be built.

For a thousand years, the family was the one institution the peoples of Eastern and Southern Europe, the Irish, and others could trust. The family constitutes their political, economic, and educational strength. The public schools of the United States failing them, they reached into their families and created an astonishingly successful system of parochial schools. Hardly literate, poor, and diffident peoples, they achieved something of an educational miracle. Economically, the Jews, the Greeks, the Lebanese established one another in as many small businesses as they could open. The Italians, the Poles, the Slovaks, the Croatians gave each other economic help amounting to two or three thousands of dollars a year per family. Cousin Joe did the electrical work; Pete fixed cars; Emil helped paint the house; aunts and uncles and grandparents canned foods, minded the children; fathers in their spare time built playrooms, boats, and other luxuries in the basements of row houses.

The family network was also a political force in precinct, ward, or district. People of the upper classes could pass on to their children advantages of inheritance, admission to exclusive schools, and high-level contacts. Children of the immigrants also made their families the primary networks of economic and political strength. Kinship is a primary reality in many unions and in all urban political "machines." Mothers and fathers instructed their children simultaneously, "Don't trust anybody," and "The family will never let you down."

In contemporary conditions, of course, these old family methods and styles have atrophied. There is no way of going back to the past. (Not everything about the past, in any case, was attractive.) Education media help children to become sophisticated about everything but the essentials: love, fidelity, childrearing, mutual help, care for parents and the elderly. Almost everything about mobile, impersonal, distancing life in the United States — tax policies, real-estate policies, the demands of the corporations, and even the demands of modern political forms — makes it difficult for families that feel ancient moral obligations to care for their aged, their mentally disturbed, their retarded, their needy.

It is difficult to believe that the state is a better instrument for

satisfying such human needs than the family. If parents do not keep after the children to do their schoolwork, can the large, consolidated school educate? Some have great faith in state services: in orphanages, child-care centers, schools, job-training programs, and nursing homes. Some want the state to become one large centralized family.

Such faith taxes credulity. Much of the popular resistance to federal child care arises from distrust of social workers and childhood engineers who would be agents of state power. Families need help in child care, but many distrust the state and the social-work establishment.

Almost everything about both "liberal" and "conservative" economic thought neglects, ignores, or injures family networks. It is not benign neglect. Millions of dollars are spent on the creation of a larger and larger state apparatus. Resources are systematically taken from the family. Is this an accident? One by one, all centers of resistance to the state are being crushed, including the strongest, family. The trend does not augur well for our liberties.

An economic order that would make the family the basic unit of social policy would touch every citizen at the nerve center of daily life. No known form of social organization weds affect to efficiency in so powerful a way. The family is the primary teacher of moral development. In the struggles and conflicts of marital life, husbands and wives learn the realism and adult practicalities of love. Through the love, stability, discipline, and laughter of parents and siblings, children learn that reality accepts them, welcomes them, invites their willingness to take risks. The family nourishes "basic trust." From this spring creativity, psychic energy, social dynamism. If infants are injured here, not all the institutions of society can put them back together. Familial arts that took generations to acquire can be lost in a single generation, can disappear for centuries. If the quality of family life deteriorates, there is no "quality of life." Again, emphasis on family life is politically important because it can unite people of diverse religious, ethnic, regional, and racial traditions. Families differ in their structures, needs, and traditional inclinations; but they share many basic economic and political necessities.

A politics based on the social unit of the family would have a revolutionary impact on the sterile debate between Democrats and Republicans, and between libertarians and socialists. To strengthen the family through legislative reform is, indeed, a social interven-

tion, but one which creates a counterpoise to the state. It is the forgotten lever of social change.

In particular, a fresh approach here promises unparalleled gains for blacks. "The repair of the black condition in America disproportionately depends upon the succor of strong families," Eleanor Holmes Norton told the Urban League in Atlanta last year. "We must make marriage and family life unabashedly a tool for improving all our lives." The stunting of black progress in America, she held, was done most effectively through tearing asunder the black family both in slavery and by discrimination. No institution, she observed, had so nourished blacks in the darkness of slavery; none had helped them to joy, laughter, and affirmation through the bitter days, as had the family. No institution is so beloved in black consciousness. None is more at the heart of social hope. "Were it not for law-enforced slavery and discrimination," she said, "our families would have thrived like most others and our time in America would have waxed into prosperity as for all other immigrant groups." She told the assembly, in sorrow, that the percentage of black households headed by women increased to 35 percent in 1975. (By the age of sixteen, two-thirds of all black children have spent some years without a father. In 1973 46 percent of all black children were born outside of wedlock.) The psychological and economic penalties, she argued, are immense. She called for a resurgence of the love and loyalty that had carried blacks in America through the centuries.

Such a call instantly makes possible alliance between the white and black working class. The families of both are in trouble; the difference in degree does not remove the similarity in root and remedy. Our media exalt the flashy, the hedonistic, the individualistic; they dwell upon the destructive orbits of the doomed; James Bond and Patty Hearst. Destruction, hustling, and defiance — one side of the Black Panthers — is picked up; the feeding of children and the nourishing of families receives no public praise. Love between a husband and wife, discipline in children, virtues of work, effort, risk, and application — these now visibly embarrass, as pornography once did. Yet these are the substance of working-class morality. They are the base of all advantage.

A Choice For Survival

Why does the preferred liberal solution for the sufferings of blacks look to every avenue of approach — school buses, affirmative action, welfare — except the family? Could it be that the family is too

truly at the center, and is the one thing that liberals themselves cannot supply? That the family is the one social standing place for independence?

Economic and educational disciplines are learned only in the home and, if not there, hardly at all. Discipline in black families has been traditionally severe, very like that in white working-class families. Survival has depended on family discipline. Working-class people, white and black, cannot count on having their way; most of the time they have to be docile, agreeable, and efficient. Otherwise, they are fired. They cannot quit their jobs too often; otherwise their employment record shows instability. Blacks as well as whites survive by such rules, as long as authority in the home is strong. From here, some find the base for their mobility, up and out. Without a guiding hand, however, the temptations to work a little, quit, enjoy oneself, then work a little, are too much encouraged by one's peers on the street. *Either* the home, *or* the street: This is the moral choice. Liberals too seldom think about the economic values of strong family life; they neglect their own source of strength, and legislate for others what would never have worked for themselves.

Consider the figures for unemployment for teenagers. The figure frequently given for blacks in New York is 40 percent. The huge number of female-run households among blacks correlates with the unemployment rates. The rough discipline of Slavic, Italian, and Irish fathers regarding the employment of their sons is an economic advantage. One of the requirements for obtaining and holding a job, especially at the unskilled level, where jobs abound, is a willingness to accept patriarchal discipline. Many young black males find such disciplines both unfamiliar and intolerable. Many will not take available jobs; many others quit.

Consider, as well, the educational preparation of black children as they leave their homes, before they enter school. Among successful blacks, patterns are like those among whites. Parents watch over their children. Books and papers are available in the home. Where the parents take education seriously, there is high probability that children will. Where the parents do not, schools cannot reasonably be expected to reach the psyches of the young. Why, then, do we habitually try to help schools, but not families? For both blacks and whites of the working class and all the more for the still more needy "underclass," the provision of books and newspapers to the home,

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and sessions to assist parents in teaching their children, might be more profitable than efforts in the school.

In a word, a politics aimed at strengthening families, white and black, would be a politics of unity rather than of division. It would also have higher prospect of success. The chief obstacle in its execution is the mysterious contempt liberals unthinkingly manifest toward their own greatest source of advantage.

As Jean-Paul Sartre has taught us, it is bad faith to plead "to each his own," to permit intellectual laissez-faire. Actions speak louder than shrugs of the shoulder. To marry, to have children, is to make a political statement hostile to what passes as "liberation" today. It is a statement of flesh, intelligence, and courage. It draws its strength from nature, from tradition, and from the future. Apart from millions of decisions by couples of realistic love, to bring forth children they will nourish, teach, and launch against the void, the human race has no future — no wisdom, no advance, no community, no grace.

Only the emptiness of solitary space, the dance of death.
It is the destiny of flesh and blood to be familial.

Family Freedom in Education

William B. Ball

THE WARFARE, proceeding here openly, there silently, aimed at the dissolution of the United States is hard to grasp as an entirety. It is a warfare proceeding against every aspect of strength in American life. Our national defense, our constitutional system of government, the basic mode of our economy, the concept of work, the arts, the family and education all represent areas in which the dissolution of American society is taking place.

I am very privileged to be speaking to a meeting sponsored by The American Family Institute, whose aim is to ensure that the interests of the American family are protected in the formulation of public policy in our country. My sense of this privilege is increased when I speak of a national "dissolution."

I have used the word "dissolution" rather than "defeat" or "destruction," because those latter words suggest climactic events, such as a battle or a conquering invasion or a swift and violent annihilation such as the Third Reich suffered. Our country, in the grip of utterly lethal forces, has not risen to do battle with anyone; nor is it about to be destroyed by some sudden, catastrophic blow. Rather, our situation is more like the impending chaos envisioned by Yeats:

Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.¹

Now, at what may be an eleventh hour for the freedoms Americans have known, we observe two opposite but widespread attitudes toward the state of our affairs. The one is held by those whom I shall call the "Progressives," the other by people who may be called the "Doomsayers." These are not opposite in all respects. Each is pos-

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essed of infallibility. Each is impervious to reason. And both end up ratifying the national dissolution that is proceeding apace.

I denominate as the "Progressives" the believers in "progress," those who share the view of the late H.G. Wells that "clumsily or smoothly, the world, it seems, progresses and will progress."² The Progressives never fully disclose to us what we are progressing from, or into. When we try to pin them down, the task becomes, in the wonderful phrase of Pastor Daniel Carr, of Winston-Salem, "like trying to nail jello to a tree." Obviously the Progressives don't want to talk about "progress" these days, in terms of war or Gulags. They point instead to chemotherapy, the electric toothbrush, new abortifacients, thermal underwear, and other undeniable evidences that mankind "progresses and will progress." There is another group of Progressives of whom mention must be made: the religious Progressives. Under a false concept of the providence of God, these, with fixed smiles, brush aside the common American's concerns about world Communism, governmental intrusions upon individual liberty, the growth of sex-related evils in our society. If we will, they say, but seek disarmament and reject free enterprise, all will be well. Thus would both sets of Progressives, secular and religious, anesthetize our minds and wills from halting our dissolution.

What, then of the Doomsayers? They see, often with crystal clarity, the dangers which are here. My mail each day contains their alarming literature. Some of this goes into my "What Next?" file: What next will the regional planners do to us? What next will the Soviets threaten us with? What next will the sex educators try on public school children? What next will happen when the economy goes bust? What next evil will be part of television fare? These are not foolish, but important, questions. And the Doomsayers are not wanting in answers as they unmask horror after prospective horror about what is bound to happen, likely will happen, or can happen.

Sometimes one detects a note of relish as the Doomsayers say our doom. They become impatient with anyone who dares to express hope. The Doomsayers have a *faith* in doom, almost a comfort in the belief that evil will surely prevail. And they are angered by the common American who is too dumb to accept their pessimistic faith. Doomsayers feel they would violate their own convictions by working for practical responses to the dangers. Thus it is that they, too, aid in the dissolution of our society. Norman Cousins has recently restated a principle long known: that a sick person may be

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physically helped by his own courage and will to live, and that, conversely, he may make himself worse — even hasten his death — by embracing pessimism.³ That, I think, is relevant to the American situation today.

Happily, there is a force at work in America today, in the all-important area of family life, which consists neither of Progressives nor of Doomsayers. It is my point to tell you about that force, how it has come into being, how it has (incredibly) been persecuted, what triumphs it has had, what dangers it faces, and what its future may be. The force consists of fighters for religious liberty in education. I think I can best describe it by telling you a story as true as it is bizarre. It is a story of innocent family folk being hounded by government, threatened with fines and jail, grossly caricatured, put to years of litigation and then — after their total and shining vindication by the courts — made the objects of hysterical denunciation by the government and organizations tied to the government.

My story begins in mid-summer 1977. The fundamentalist school movement had reached Kentucky, and a handful of small Christian schools had sprung up. The State Board of Education demanded that the schools be State Board-“approved” before opening. The State Board’s “approval” requirements meant that these completely non-tax-supported schools would come under *total* State control. That is, the State would determine the qualifications required of their teachers, choose their textbooks, and prescribe their curriculum. The State Board also produced several sets of other regulations and demanded that they, too, be obeyed. The Chairman of the State Board, a Reverend Bob Brown, made it clear, moreover, that more than just teachers, books and course titles were involved. On July 14, 1977, he complained to the media that the Christian schools taught that “everything in the Bible is literally true.” This but emphasized what all understood: philosophy and life values were much on the mind of the State Board in its demands against the schools.

By August it was plain that the Christian schools had no thought of capitulating. On September 19, the State Board directed school district truancy officers statewide to list each parent who had enrolled a child in a “non-approved” school and to prosecute those who persisted in this criminal misconduct. In some districts this was carried out with special relish: for example, bringing an *added* criminal charge that a pastor was “engaged in an unlawful transaction with a minor,” a phrase publicly suggesting immorality. A major

newspaper of Louisville, the *Courier-Journal*, joined the wolf pack in shrilly denouncing the parents and solemnly predicting the doom of universal free public education if the parents and pastors were not brought to heel.

Faced with an immediate blackout of their personal freedom, the parents and pastors went to court, seeking emergency relief and then a preliminary injunction against the State. Franklin County Circuit Judge Henry Meigs felt that serious First Amendment issues were involved. He held the matter over for full trial in June, 1978.

The unhappiness which the State Board had initially felt over the deviationist tendencies of the dissident pastors and parents now mounted incredibly. Not content with the publicly funded services of the Attorney General and his staff, the State now retained former Kentucky Governor Bert T. Combs as a special counsel to handle the case. Combs had also been a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. His firm, Tarrant, Combs and Bullitt, one of the largest in Kentucky and representing a range of major interests, seemed ideally equipped to pursue a case in which the parents and pastors would be properly disciplined, public education saved from disaster, and the Commonwealth of Kentucky rescued from ruin. Kentucky's Governor, Julian Carroll, soon thereafter added his weight to the offensive against the fundamentalist schools, professing to wonder over "their reluctance at being regulated."

In June, 1978, trial opened at Frankfort. As we had framed the case, it was our job (for the parents and pastors) to show that religious liberties, the right to know, parental rights, and educational freedom were being threatened by the State. It would then be the State's job either to disprove those claims or else to show that the violations of these freedoms were justified — not by just a public interest, but by a *supreme and extraordinary* public interest, or what the Supreme Court has called "a compelling state interest."

Parents, children and pastors gladly took the stand. Judge Meigs was later to describe the testimony of the parents as "radiant." Indeed, it was, not only in terms of the religious conviction it manifested but in terms of knowledge and sensibleness. These were all middle or lower income people, all making heavy sacrifices, in the teeth of taxation and inflation, in order to have a Christian education for their children. The State had evidently stereotyped these parents as red-neck folk, tainted with a fanaticism not unlike the Jonestown zeal, which was blinding them from seeking the true

welfare of their children. The State's cross-examination of the parents backfired. The State was examining imaginary witnesses — stereotypes who weren't present in the courtroom — while the answers were being fired back by real-life people — earnest, intelligent, experienced, loving, committed, commonsensical, mature. These parents knew exactly why they had their children enrolled in Christian schools and exactly what their children were getting there. They were all familiar with public education; they had chosen against it. They wanted their children to succeed in life, and therefore they thought it better to have them educated rather than to risk their being semi-literate. They did not want their children to join the American Mob they believed was emerging from many public schools — largely undisciplined, unskilled and ungodly.

The youngsters who took the stand did equally well. And it was a joy to have young people speaking English instead of "Like-you-know." They *preferred* the drug-free, booze-free, rock-free, no-cheating, no-vandalism, tranquil Christian school. The pastors made it perfectly clear that the schools were pervasively religious, an integral part of a religious ministry, that the schools had no "secular" component, that they would not exist except for that ministry, and that the schools would accept no public aid directly or indirectly. They also disclosed a remarkable picture of State harassment of the fundamentalist schools and State administrative confusion and bungling in its effort to raise the schools to the alleged levels of perfection of the public schools. The pastors showed, furthermore, superior achievement by Christian school children on nationally standardized basic skills tests. Prosecution efforts to show the schools as racially discriminatory fizzled.

Expert witnesses strongly substantiated the case of the parents, children and pastors. Dr. Paul F. Schmidt, a child psychiatrist testified that the children in question were psychologically helped by the environment of the schools and would be harmed by a school environment in which religion was omitted. Dr. Donald Erickson, the renowned educator whose testimony in *Wisconsin v. Yoder*⁴ was approvingly noted by the Supreme Court, demolished Kentucky's claim that only by imposing State control could good education be achieved. Why, he wondered, had not the State achieved good education in the public schools which it controlled one hundred percent? What possible right did the State have to violate intellectual freedom by prescribing what books private school children should

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read? He testified eloquently on the shoddiness of the State's claim that only State-certified teachers were fit to teach in private schools, exposing certification processes as largely a sham which does not guarantee competence. (Under Kentucky law, we pointed out, a teacher must hold a bachelor's degree in order to be accredited; and in Kentucky, one can get a bachelor's degree in, for example, "Motel Management.") Erickson hammered away at a basic point: "The proof of good education is in results, not in methods. If the results are good, the education is good."

Two famous authorities in the field of religion, Dr. George H. Williams, of Harvard Divinity School, and Dr. Rousas Rushdoony, provided testimony contradicting the State's claim that "religion" is to be narrowly defined, or confined (in the phrase of John Courtney Murray) "to the sacristy." The State had persisted in arguing that surely the schools, if State-regulated, "would not teach less religion" than they would if not State regulated. It was an interesting effort to quantify religion, to give it "its place," and to render it discrete from the "secular" endeavors of the school. It laid open to view a phenomenon which many suppose to have disappeared in our enlightened times: the persistence of the *Kulturkampf* and of the French *laicism* of 1904, that "religion" is limited to worship, liturgy, and, as government attorneys are forever repeating, belief (inside one's head) as contrasted with "action." Williams and Rushdoony left nothing of these presumptions standing. Rushdoony, prophet-like in appearance, proceeded then to instruct the State on the respective claims of Caesar and of God.

There is sometimes a pathetic ignorance in governmental malevolence. The State health, education and welfare bureaucracies are often guided by secularist elites: militants who envelop legislatures and agencies in programs which in purpose and effect erode religion and personal liberties. The legislatures and agencies, often less sophisticated, then express these programs in statutes and regulations as part of their usually sincere efforts to serve society. But in this day of declining literacy and low intellectual discipline, the language sometimes does not come out too well, is unintelligible, or just plain spacy. The administrators are surprised and offended when the consumers (those who are to be regulated) object to their commands or can't understand them.

At the Kentucky trial, it was necessary to look at the regulations a

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bit more carefully than the State was wont to. One was worded as follows:

Major safeguards for quality education are a well-designed master schedule, effective administrative routines, adequate undisturbed class time, and *profusion for a high degree of self-direction on the part of students.*

I commented, upon oral argument, that this was pretty bad English. My opponent responded, with what I took to be sarcasm, that the regulations were sound even if not all of them "came up to Mr. Ball's standards of classical English." The above provision indeed did not come up to Mr. Ball's English standards. But that was scarcely Mr. Ball's point. Mr. Ball was unhappy that good people could be accused of forcing their children into bad education and threatened with prison for failure to comply with education regulations which themselves had been drafted by people who handled English like an orangutan playing a violin.⁵ But I felt sorry for the good natured State official whom I examined as to the meaning of that and other such impenetrable prose in the "Standards." The poor fellow could but guess at what it meant: he was stuck with it.

The administrators sometimes react with petulance, sometimes with forgiveness, sometimes with both, when they must defend the regulations.⁶ It was this mosaic of reaction which sorely puzzled the Kentucky Christian school leaders. During the trial, the State education hierarchy vigorously disclaimed any desire to infringe religious liberty or to harm anybody. They, in fact, wanted to "help" the Christian schools, "bring them along," up the path to "approval," "cooperate" with them. Here was the State Benign. But before smiling back, it occurred to the fundamentalists to ask: "Then why is it that we were threatened with jail and the extinction of our schools?" The State Benign hadn't been in sight the previous September when the draconian decree had gone out: "Get the fundamentalists!" September had seen the pronouncements of the Reverend Bob Brown, the stiff-arming of the pastors, the State Righteous in angry feather. We decided to explore this ambivalence.

It came out that the State administration approved or disapproved schools according to the State's subjective estimate of the "intent" of the school. This amounted to a personal judgment as to whether the school was "making a good faith effort" to comply. We asked the State's chief of accreditation what percent of failure by a private school to meet the mandated ("shall") Standards would re-

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sult in a denial of approval. His responses in the ensuing colloquy are interesting in light of the State's insistence that the Christian parents had to obey *the law*:

Q. . . . if I asked you how many failures result in denial of approval, what would your answer be?

A. Are you speaking of percentage-wise?

Q. I'll ask you — yes. Let's take it in terms of percentage.

A. I would have to know, basically, what you're talking about, to which area. You've mentioned several areas. If you go percentage-wise, I would explain to the Court what the mandated programs are. We feel like those would have to be brought into compliance. But other things I would say somewhere in the thirty or forty percentile.

Q. I'm talking only about the "shalls."

A. Well, I'd say thirty or forty percent.

Q. Thirty or forty percent? Now, how do you come by that answer?

A. Well, that's just off the top of my head.

As can be seen, the sacrosanct "Standards" were no iron rule for the protection of good education at all: they were more like a toy accordion which could be expanded or contracted at the will of the public servant.

Related to this is the concept of "homemade law" — law that is an agency's invention and is not found in any statute, law which anybody is free to dream up. When two civil servants have mutually exclusive dreams, the intended regulatee is faced with the fascinating task of having to obey both (and thus to disobey both). For example, the Standards required private schools to develop a plan reflecting interaction with "the community" and responsive to "community" needs. The schoolmasters found it hard to imagine that a non-tax-supported religious school had to involve the neighborhood or the city in its planning. Did "community" therefore not mean the school's own faith community? The State's accreditation chief testified that that was exactly right: "community" meant "the Church." The Chairman of the State Board of Education, however, when asked the same question on the stand (in the absence from the courtroom of the accreditation chief), solemnly stated that "community" meant "the geographical settlement or area in which the school is." Which version was "the law"?

The mischief of "homemade" law is, of course, that it gives us a government of men, not of law — precisely the thing that the Constitution was intended to prevent.

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On October 4, 1978, Judge Meigs held resoundingly for the parents, pastors and schools. He found baseless the State's claim of authority to impose its regulatory scheme on the Christian schools and declared that the scheme had created "a quite direct interference" with religious liberty. Not content with justice at the Circuit Court level, the State then appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court. That Court, on October 9, 1979, also upheld the Christian school interests, declaring that the State's attempt to dictate curriculum, teacher qualifications and textbooks violates that provision of the Constitution of Kentucky which provides that no one may be compelled to send his child to any school to which he may be conscientiously opposed.

Thus after living two years under the threat of jail, fines and the denial of their religious and familial freedoms, the liberties of the Kentucky fundamentalists were given final declaration.

Aftermath

The Commonwealth of Kentucky and its allies in the public school lobby now cried foul and demanded a rehearing. Noting that the Kentucky Supreme Court had favorably referred to the Christian schools' use of nationally standardized tests (and with full knowledge that the public schools have not risked employing such tests), the Kentucky State Education Association oddly blasted their use, stating that "achievement tests used to monitor progress have not received the sanction of *the educators*." The Kentucky Association of School Administrators, with impressive candor, stated that "the heart of education is curriculum and faculty" and made no bones about who, it thought, owns the heart. The State and its allies professed to foresee that the decision of the Court will result in "pervasive and irreparable damage to the public" and "shattering education into segregated pockets." Similar expressions ensued after their pleas for rehearing were flatly rejected.

The Christian schools, perhaps conscious of the Churchillian maxim "in victory magnanimity," have not responded to these excited charges and frenetic predictions. Their preoccupation is with providing Kentucky with good citizens, truly educated. Unhappily, however, the Kentucky story is not an isolated happening. The dynamic thrust of American bureaucracy appears to be fueled by the principle, "Expand or Die." Government agencies everywhere seek more and more subjects to regulate, in order to sustain, though

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not justify, the agencies' existence. The year 1979 witnessed moves by the Bureau of the Census, the National Labor Relations Board, the U.S. Secretary of Labor, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Internal Revenue Service, and state education offices in at least a dozen states to aggressively intrude upon private, including religious, education. Most of these moves were without statutory authority and all without constitutional right. These trespasses continue to the hour.

As might be expected, compromisers have appeared in the private sector ranks: timid "negotiators" who debase the currency of everyone's liberties by "complying under protest," or even without protest. Not so our Kentuckians! And they are the reason we can close their story on a note of cheer and hope.

NOTES

1. William Butler Yeats, "The Second Coming."
2. H. G. Wells, *The Outline of History* (1921), p. 1100.
3. Norman Cousins, *Anatomy of an Illness as Perceived by the Patient: Reflections on Healing and Regeneration* (1979).
4. 406 US 205 (1972). This was the Supreme Court decision holding that Amish parents were not required to obey Wisconsin's law requiring compulsory attendance at high school.
5. The simile is de Maupassant's, not mine.
6. Or "standards," "rules," "guidelines," "criteria," or whatever else they may be called.

Why It Won't Go Away

Ian A. Hunter

HOW IS IT THAT the issue of abortion, which was supposed to have been decisively resolved in Canada by the 1969 amendments to the Criminal Code and in the United States by a Supreme Court decision — how is it that this issue has not gone the way of fluoridated water and recognizing Red China and simply evaporated from public concern? After all, fluoridation, gun control, Watergate, recognition of Red China, the SALT agreements — all these were highly controversial and bitterly contested public issues for a time; each one divided people into opposing camps; each brought forth countless letters to the editor and lobbying and marches and protests — yet they have faded from the scene. Abortion has not.

Abortion was effectively legalized in Canada in 1969, but today it is a more divisive, contentious and *political* issue than ever before. Why is this? What makes abortion unique? Why is it alone, among all the other pressing and divisive issues of our time, the one issue that will not go away?

To try to answer the question, one must look back to the two critical dates for legalized abortion in North America: to the decision of the Canadian Parliament in 1969 and to the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in January 1973.

Prior to 1969, abortion had been a criminal offense in Canada since the pre-Confederation *Offences Against the Person Act* of 1841. But in 1967, Canada's centennial year, at the very moment when long lines of children were to be seen tripping after the Pied Piper Bobby Gimby playing "Ca-na-da we love you," in that same year Pierre Elliott Trudeau became Minister of Justice and immediately announced his intention to proceed with a sweeping package of criminal law "reforms" including liberalized abortion. Whether Mr. Trudeau did this from personal conviction or from political expediency — to ensure that when the mantle of leadership fell from

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Lester Pearson's shoulders it would alight on his — is of no importance now.

It was then that Pierre Trudeau popularized the phrase: "The state has no place in the bedrooms of the nation" in connection with a related Criminal Code amendment legalizing homosexuality between consenting adults. This dictum, a jurisprudential absurdity (the state has an equal and legitimate concern with any activity which threatens fundamental values upon which public acceptance of authority rests) soon became a kind of secular dogma, a genuine article of received Canadian truth. It also became a literal "give me liberty and give them death" rallying cry of the militant Canadian pro-abortion groups. To invoke the Trudeau dictum in the early days was to silence all apprehension about easier abortion — although to my knowledge no abortion operation was ever found with its headquarters in the nation's bedrooms. Incidentally, the linking of the two contentious issues, abortion and legalized homosexuality, along with other relatively less-obnoxious matters like gambling and lotteries, in a single omnibus Criminal Code amendment was, on Pierre Trudeau's part, cynically deliberate. This is evidenced by his statement to the *Calgary Herald* on December 20, 1967: "... The abortion amendments will have a better chance of passing if they are included in a bigger, diverse bill with its obvious advantage of psychological inertia."

So it proved, for in 1969 Section 251 was added to the Criminal Code allowing therapeutic abortions if three physicians on a hospital committee were prepared to certify in writing that "... continuation of the pregnancy would or would be likely to endanger [a pregnant woman's] life or health. . . ."

The word "health" was left conveniently undefined and the then Justice Minister, John Turner, resisted all attempts by M.P.'s to insert a statutory definition. Turner's position was that the word "health" should be "... left to the good professional judgment of medical practitioners to decide." Still, Turner left no doubt that he and the government he represented envisaged the exception as allowing abortion to be strictly controlled and sparingly invoked. In the House of Commons he stated: "The Bill has rejected the eugenic, sociological or criminal offense reasons. The Bill limits the possibility of therapeutic abortion to these circumstances: it is to be performed by a medical practitioner who is supported by a therapeutic committee of medical practitioners in a certified or approved hospi-

tal, and the abortion is to be performed only where the health or life of the mother is in danger. The word endanger imports or connotes the elements of hazard, peril or risk. . . ."

In 1970, the first year of the new legislation, the life or health of pregnant women was apparently endangered in more than 11,000 pregnancies. By last year that figure had risen to well over 60,000.* So despite all modern medical advances, if the criminal law were being complied with, one could only conclude that pregnancy is more than six times as dangerous in 1979 as it was in 1970.

The reality, of course, is that the 1969 amendments effectively legalized abortion on demand — at least in major metropolitan hospitals. In fact, in several centers, the number of abortions exceeds the number of live births. In the provinces of Ontario and British Columbia, it has been estimated that there are 40-50 abortions for every 100 live births. Today, the ostensible criminal law restrictions on abortion are no more than legislated hypocrisy. Let us be honest about it: Canada has a system of abortion on demand although its parliamentarians lack the courage to say so openly, and therefore have sought to disguise it in the language of criminal prohibition.

Now, what about our neighbor, the United States. Prior to 1973, the criminal law generally, and abortion in particular, were matters on which each state could legislate, and most had legislated to prohibit, or at least severely restrict, abortions. Then, on January 22, 1973 — Black Monday as it is still called by American anti-abortionists — the U. S. Supreme Court decided two cases, *Doe v. Wade* and *Roe v. Bolton*, both by 7-2 decisions — which effectively invalidated the laws of 50 states regulating abortion. In the seven years since that decision, abortion has divided American public opinion like no issue since slavery.

The common feature in both countries, you will notice, is that the issue was supposed to have been finally resolved. But the Canadian parliament and the U. S. Court misjudged the depth of public commitment to the principle of respect for life. The 1969 amendments to the Canadian Criminal Code sparked the conscience of Canadians who had hitherto kept silent and the great grass-roots pro-life movement began. A decade after the Criminal Code amendments, abortion remains an even more divisive public issue than it was then.

*The most recent 1979 estimates of Canada's population lists it as 23,597,600 — approximately 11% of the population of the United States.

Similarly in the United States, every year some 100,000 people gather in Washington, D.C. on January 22, the anniversary of the Court's legalization of abortion, to march on Capitol Hill demanding legal protection for the unborn. And for the last four years, Congress has spent more time debating abortion, in the context of the Hyde amendment limiting public funds for Medicaid abortions, than on any other issue. Not content with their victory on abortion, pro-abortionists have gone on to demand public funding. Now the practice of abortion itself is repugnant, but to compel you and me, as taxpayers, to finance it is simply intolerable. Intolerable, perhaps, but this is exactly what happens.

In the United States, two Roman Catholic organizations have challenged the validity of the *Pregnancy Discrimination Act*. This invidious law requires employers to pay for time off work of employees who have left to have an abortion, including abortions that are strictly non-therapeutic. The Act also requires employers to pay all medical and hospital costs of the woman having an abortion if she can find a doctor prepared to attest that continuing the pregnancy would "endanger her life." In today's climate, finding such a doctor is not difficult.

The Catholic organizations argue that this legislation violates the "... free exercise of religion" clause of the American Bill of Rights. It compels employers to treat abortion as a mere fringe benefit, like overtime, coffee breaks, vacations, etc.; in other words, it equates the life and death of an unborn child with employment benefits which are negotiated around a collective bargaining table. It compels employers, whatever their private convictions about abortion may be, to pay for it; and it compels employers (in George F. Will's phrase) "... to participate in the trivialization of abortion" by providing an economic incentive to a woman to have one.

What chance of success these lawsuits have against this Orwellian law, I would not care to speculate. But given the pro-abortion mind set of the American courts to date, I am not optimistic.

Nor is there any room for complacency in Canada. The fact is that, at this very moment, every Canadian taxpayer is forced to shell out to support abortion. Planned Parenthood, the largest single abortion referral agency in Canada, receives 90% — that's right, 90% — of its income from federal tax dollars, including the tidy sum of \$600,000 annually from the Department of Health and Welfare. Well might one ask: Whose health? Whose welfare?

So, abortion, which means killing, the taking of innocent life, has itself become the one issue that will not die. Why is this?

First, because it is an issue on which no compromise is possible. One side is right and the other side is wrong. If abortion advocates are correct and the procedure is no more than medical excision of inanimate protoplasm, then abortion is of no greater significance, morally or medically, than a tonsillectomy, and there is nothing to fret about. The trouble is that few if any honest, medically-trained abortionists actually believe this. Nor, in fact, do many of the women who seek their services, as the incidence of post-abortion trauma demonstrates.

If, on the other hand, the pro-life spokesmen are correct and abortion is the deliberate taking of innocent, albeit unborn, human life, then our hospitals have been transformed into charnel houses with vacuum aspirators, syringes and scalpels engaged in human slaughter on a scale unprecedented in peacetime history.

Malcolm Muggeridge has pointed out that there have been more deaths from abortion in England in the decade since the English *Abortion Act* than there were deaths in the First World War. He once said: "I was brought up to believe that one of the great troubles of our Western world was that in the First World War we lost the flower of our population. Well now we have destroyed an equivalent number of lives in the name of humane principles, before they were even born."

Second, abortion will not go away until the two fundamental questions that it poses have been clearly asked and answered: (1) Does abortion involve taking human life? (2) If so, in what circumstances is this morally justifiable?

In both Canada and the U.S., the legislatures and courts have avoided these two underlying questions. In Canada, the federal government sought to quietly shunt these decisions off to local abortion committees, where doctors could decide who shall live and who shall die, and why, in comfortable anonymity behind closed doors, away from public scrutiny. True, the law contained a paper safeguard; the provincial Minister of Health may order any therapeutic abortion committee to provide information in order to satisfy him as to the reasons for an abortion. However, despite the tens of thousands of abortions annually, I have been unable to find a single recorded instance in which this power of ministerial review was exercised.

In the U.S., it was the Supreme Court which ducked the two central questions. The majority in *Roe v. Wade* pronounced themselves unable to decide when life begins, and dismissed the fetus as "potential life." This phrase "potential life" is both fatuous and malicious. Fatuous, because that which is alive and not dead, cannot by definition be potential life — and even the U.S. Supreme Court is possessed of sufficient acumen to distinguish a live fetus from a dead one. Malicious, because it is by such verbal sleight-of-hand that people are kept distracted and bemused while the merchants of death make their appointed rounds.

George Grant has pointed out that "beings with only 'potential life' do not suck their thumbs in the womb in preparation for the breast. It makes perfect sense to say that we are all potentially dead, but it does not make any sense to say that the fetus is 'potential life.'"

Another reason why abortion is an issue that will not go away is that advances in medical knowledge and recent developments in the science of fetology periodically introduce new controversies. Test tube babies, artificial insemination, the spectacular reduction in infant mortality and the constant advancement in methods of sustaining life in premature babies — all these developments keep abortion in the forefront of public discussion as well as posing difficult questions of medical ethics.

And abortion remains not only a topical issue, but also a deeply divisive one. Public opinion polls in Canada and the United States consistently show a population more deeply divided on abortion than on almost any other public issue; on any given poll, the majority is usually determined by the way in which a question is phrased. But though the public is deeply divided, the national press are not: with rare exceptions, they are solidly pro-abortion. As a result, the hundreds of thousands, in fact now millions, of committed anti-abortionists across North America are consistently under-represented or misrepresented in the daily press. Never was this more starkly apparent than on May 29, 1975 when the largest petition in Canadian history, signed by over one million Canadians, was presented to parliament. The petition, calling for greater legal protection of the unborn child, was virtually ignored by the mass media. Here and there, there are honorable exceptions: the magazine *National Review* in the United States, perhaps the *Toronto Sun* here. But the vast majority of the daily press, and radio and television commenta-

tors, through editorials and slanted news stories, are unrelenting advocates of legalized abortion.

Why is this so? Well, this is a very difficult question and I can do no more than hint at one or two possible explanations. First, journalism is an urban profession — the daily newspapers and large circulation magazines are put out in, say, three or four major metropolitan areas, cities where abortion rates are high. And journalists, as a group, are inclined to faddishness, they are followers of trends who only rarely hold strong, fixed moral positions. Also, journalists are enormously susceptible to fabricated stories about the bad old days before legalized abortion — to the specter of the “back-street butcher” and the “rusty knitting needle.” And, of course, abortion is the kind of issue which provokes such deep emotions that once one has taken a public stand on it it is painful to have to re-examine and change. Most Canadian newspapers and periodicals took a stand in favor of liberalized abortion back in 1969; now, ten years later, it is easier to shut one’s eyes and ignore the grisly realities of what has happened since, than to admit that one was wrong and go through the agonizing process of reappraisal.

Consequently, the press almost invariably apply a double standard. Women’s groups and other advocates of abortion are given a respectful, sympathetic audience; anti-abortionists are written off as fanatics and religious nuts. Let me give you one small example. Last July, I heard a BBC radio program on which Dr. Wendy Savage, a rather fittingly-named pro-abortion physician, dismissed concerns about late-term abortions — specifically, cases in which the baby survives the abortion but is then set aside in an incubator to starve — she described these as follows: “They [anti-abortionists] are very exercised about these late-term abortions and yet it’s only a matter of about 200 babies a year.” Now suppose the topic had been capital punishment: same program, same network, same participants. Would Dr. Savage come on the air and say: “I don’t know what all the fuss over capital punishment is about: It’s only a matter of about 200 mistakes a year”?

The abortion debate, you see, goes to the very core of our civilization, Christendom. In a purely mechanical or technical sense, the history of our civilization has been written in attempts to emancipate ourselves from dependence upon nature; extending the frontier, subduing the elements, planting, cultivating, extending man’s dominion and authority. Step by step we have won an ever greater

degree of conscious control over our lives and over our natural surroundings. And in this century our control has reached its apogee so that there is almost no corner of the natural kingdom where we think we cannot intervene at will to reorder and reshape its processes to our own convenience. Since we have come to place such a high valuation on our ability to control nature, it is hardly surprising that we should now seek to control the reproduction of our species. We have sought to "plan" the pattern of our reproduction much as we have sought to "plan" the previously haphazard and organic development of our cities. And when the main planning control of contraception has failed to produce the desired result (just as urban planning has largely failed to produce safer, more congenial, more aesthetically pleasing communities) we have found more and more acceptable the second line of defense, to simply abort the child which has been conceived.

Yet the more we embrace this mechanistic, egocentric "planning" philosophy, the more we discover that we have not yet eradicated those moral imperatives that are the ethical heritage of twenty centuries of Christendom. So that however much we try to ignore or repress these ethical scruples, these twinges of conscience, the more insistently we hear a still small voice sounding in the dark shadows of our unconsciousness: "Thou shalt not." And here is the epicenter of the struggle — within ourselves; the conscious, mechanistic, rationalist side of us says go ahead: a baby exists only when it is born, and if it interferes with your plans, abort. But in the unconscious, instinctive, ethical part of our being we know that life is present from the moment of conception, that it is a gift in trust from a creator beyond time and human mortality, and to tamper with it, to suit our tiny egos, is to place our very soul in peril.

It is because there is no bridge between these two parts of our being, no accommodation between the rationalist and mechanistic, and the moral and instinctive, processes of human understanding, that abortion is the issue that will not go away. Christopher Booker recently wrote these words:

In our attempts to escape from unconsciousness, from nature, and ultimately from our own nature, we have tried in recent times to re-order the world and reality to suit our own convenience on an unprecedented scale. With every step we take, the consequences become more horrific, the more we are removed from direct contact from that thing we claim to prize more than anything — life itself. And few groups in our contemporary society bear more poignant witness to the appalling tragedy which is overtaking

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mankind than those haggard-faced flocks of women, possessed by their *animus*, who have lately become obsessed by the 'right' to destroy unborn life to the exclusion of almost all else. For thousands of years, as our civilization has inched its way upwards from the state of nature, women have been the supreme guardians of that most precious thing we possessed — the link with our deeper instinctive selves. As our destructive, Luciferian consciousness drove us ever upwards, ever onwards, it was the feminine alone which kept us in touch with the inner reality of the earth. And now, so beguiling is the deadly power of ego-consciousness, that even the women have been sucked up into it, pouring such contempt on their instinctive, unconscious selves that they deny such things ever existed. Like the very worst of men through history, they no longer wish to give life but only to fantasize about destroying it.

To make points like these is to make points that the mass media cannot understand because they cannot understand one simple fact about those who oppose abortion: we regard unborn children as human beings, equal participants in the inestimable gift of life, and so naturally we get concerned and upset when their lives are being taken. The press see only our concern, label *it* hysteria and *us* "fanatics" which in turn has the effect of making all of us more suspicious about the press.

Since legislators, judges, and the press have assiduously avoided the fundamental questions which abortion raises, it should not be surprising that individuals who feel strongly have organized themselves into loud, opposing groups. And the battle that has been joined will intensify. The fact is that the pro-abortionists are running scared. In Canada, I am convinced that their public support crested years ago — perhaps about 1969 when the Criminal Code amendments were passed — and it has been on the wane since. This does not mean that their cause is lost. In fact, just the opposite: their cause is already won — sixty thousand abortions in Canada last year are grisly evidence of that.

Abortion happens to be one issue that wins through inertia. If we all do nothing, just look the other way, follow all our customary rules and manners, abortion will triumph. Let me give one small but pointed example. Two years ago, Coalition for Life conceived a poster, had it professionally designed and painted and intended to place it on the subways where it could be seen by Toronto commuters going to and from their work. To their astonishment, the subway authorities refused to sell them the space to display it. Why? It was, they said, "too controversial." Amidst posters advertising the latest violence and horror movie, underarm deodorants, lower-tar cigar-

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ettes, new cars, liquor, and sanitary products, this poster was "too controversial." What was it? It depicted a child standing next to its pregnant mother with the words: "Respect Life." That's all. Too controversial.

This example of one tiny skirmish in the abortion war actually speaks volumes. Nothing so clearly signifies a society in collapse as the inversion, the reversal, of its moral precepts. Planned Parenthood gets your money and mine, dragooned through the central taxing authority, to counsel what to you and me may be indistinguishable from murder. Private citizens, at their own expense, wish to rent advertising space to say "Respect Life" and they are turned down. "Too controversial."

I have outlined some of the reasons why abortion has become the issue that will not go away. But, there is one more reason, and this reason is most important of all. Abortion will not go away because it relates to the very nature of our human existence, that is, it poses the question: What is life about? What is the nature of our existence? Is human life, in all circumstances, worth preserving? This same question permeates the debate about euthanasia and the other life-and-death issues of our time. Ask yourself this question: Why is it that through two thousand years of Christian civilization these questions were resolved in favour of the sanctity of human life? And why is it that all are being questioned anew today? Is it simply because we now have the available medical technology to terminate or prolong life at will? Or does it go much deeper than that?

I wish to suggest to you that we are witnessing exactly what those who resisted abortion from the very beginning foretold, namely, that once you start to take cheaply the life of an innocent unborn child, once you start to say that a woman may, for reasons of social convenience, abort her own child, then society truly does unleash the most primitive and barbarous instincts of mankind which it has been the achievement of twenty centuries of Christendom to restrain. In his poem "The Second Coming" W. B. Yeats foretold the coming of the abortion era very well: He wrote:

Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned.
The best lack of all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.¹

Pro-abortionists often assert that our opposition to abortion is

simply a question of religious faith. In one sense, this is true. The practice of abortion forces each person to decide for himself or herself: Is life worth preserving? Is life sacred? When you ask that question, you ask yourself a question not susceptible of answer by reasoned analysis, but only by faith. The only honest answer one can give is that life is worth preserving because it is the most primordial, the most fundamental of human experiences, because in short it is life. To attempt to answer such a question in other than spiritual terms is to trivialize it. In the end life is important because it is a gift of God, because all of us are made in the image and likeness of God.

The abortion argument, the argument about deformed, retarded, and mongoloid children, in the end comes back to this fundamental question: Is life man's to give and to take? Or is life a gift from God? Are we like animals and the world a huge factory farm where children are to be eugenically bred and destroyed when they fail to come up to the mark? Or are we to live as a family, with one father, treating all — the aged, the infirm, the mongoloid, the retarded, the unborn and the unwanted — as brothers and sisters. This is what the abortion argument is all about. This is the battleground on which everyone must choose their side. We have chosen our side and we must have the courage to stay with it through thick and thin, whatever the outcome. It is our responsibility — and our high privilege — to ensure that abortion remains a practice that is not condoned, a cause that is not abandoned, and an issue that does not go away.

APPENDIX A

[The following discussion of "Medicaid Abortion" is the transcript of "The MacNeil/Lehrer Report" (Show #5212) which was provided to public television stations ("air date" April 22, 1980). This "Report" is a co-production of WNET and WETA, and was produced by Shirley Wershba. It is reprinted here with permission. (All rights reserved. ©1980 by Educational Broadcasting Corporation and GWETA.)]

Medicaid Abortions

ROBERT MACNEIL: Good evening. In 1973 the United States Supreme Court declared that abortion was legal in this country, but that by no means settled the matter. One way or another, it keeps coming back to the high court, and yesterday the justices heard oral arguments on whether the government can refuse to pay for abortions for poor women. At issue was the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment which banned the spending of Medicaid money for abortions. Last year federal courts in New York and Chicago said that was unconstitutional. Now the federal government and anti-abortion forces are asking the court to uphold the Hyde Amendment and to rule that Congress can decide what medical services the government will pay for and which it won't. While the decision means victory or defeat on a matter of principle for many aroused Americans, it will make a practical difference for an estimated three million women on welfare. Essentially, will they be able to make the decision, the same decision about having an abortion or keeping a baby, as a woman who can pay for it herself? Tonight, those who think they should and those who don't. Jim?

JIM LEHRER: Robin, for four years now, passage of a new and slightly different Hyde Amendment has become an annual congressional event. It's always as an amendment to an appropriations bill, and it always restricts the use of federal money to finance abortions for women on Medicaid. It was first passed in 1976. The last time, this past November. There has been some variance in the four versions. The current one is considered the most restrictive and it is the one under court challenge. It makes only two exceptions to the federal money for abortions ban: when the life of the mother is in danger, or when the pregnancy is the result of a promptly and officially reported act of rape or incest. Robin?

MACNEIL: The suit challenging the Hyde Amendment was originally brought by Planned Parenthood and the American Civil Liberties Union, along with a group of women and doctors. Co-counsel on the case is Harriet Pilpel, who does work for Planned Parenthood, the American Civil Liberties Union, and for a law firm in New York City. Miss Pilpel, I

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know, having just argued this yesterday before the Supreme Court, how hard it is to condense it into a few minutes, but what, very briefly, why do you think the Hyde Amendment is unconstitutional?

HARRIET PILPEL: I didn't argue it except in the brief, but I strongly believe that it's unconstitutional. It's unconstitutional because it makes medically necessary abortions unavailable to poor women. That is a discriminatory act. All other medical procedures are now available for Medicaid except this one. It is unconstitutional because the standard of life endangerment, the only basis on which you can deny abortion, you can fund an abortion, is life endangerment, is impossible to understand. It's what we call vague. It violates the due process clause. And finally, it foists the opinion of certain religious groups onto the rest of the population which does not agree with those religious groups and violates the First Amendment's guarantee of the separation of church and state.

MACNEIL: Why should the Congress not be able, competent to decide what medical procedures should be funded with federal funds and what should not?

PILPEL: It can make discriminations and distinctions if there is a rational basis for them, but in this situation, they have singled out one medically necessary procedure, abortion, and said that that alone is not available for Medicaid funding. The only ground which has been advanced to support this out-and-out discrimination is the theory that a fetus is a human being, a theory which was disapproved of by the United States Supreme Court in 1973, as you said. I do think it should be made clear that this case does not involve the legality of abortions. Abortion of a woman with her doctor's consent is a right, a constitutional right of all women, and this really means that only middle class and upper income women can exercise that right, because Medicaid, which is what the Congress has determined is necessary to protect poor people, is not available for medically necessary abortion. The other thing that this case does not involve are elective abortions. We are not contending that a woman has the right just to decide whether or not she wants to have an abortion. What we are contending is, that since Congress has decided to fund all medically necessary services, they may not discriminate against this one medically necessary service without violating the equal protection clause.

MACNEIL: Your argument would be that it's discriminating against a particular group of people, women, in the society?

PILPEL: Well, if men became pregnant, I suppose it would discriminate against them. But this discriminates not against only women, but only against poor women for whom Medicaid is not available for medically necessary abortions.

MACNEIL: Why does the Hyde Amendment, in your view, violate the doc-

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trine of separation of church and state? Surely there are lots of people with no particular religious affiliation who are against abortion.

PILPEL: The theory that separates church and state under our constitution is that everyone has the right to follow his own conscience, and freely exercise his own religion. There are certain religious groups, such as the Roman Catholic Church, which disapprove abortion. There are other groups, the mainstream of Protestantism, the mainstream of Jewish thought, which not only does not disapprove medically necessary abortion, but takes the position that in some instances, for a woman to have a child which is medically contra-indicated, violates her religious obligation. In other words, what we're saying is that the Congress, by taking the views of one religious group and making them mandatory on all poor women, has established a religion to the disadvantage of the other religious groups that don't believe that. What we believe is that every person has the right to freedom of exercise of her own religion, and that the government must not adopt one religious belief to the exclusion of others.

MACNEIL: Thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: The Hyde Amendment draws its name from the congressman who authored and pushed it through that first time. He's Congressman Henry Hyde, Republican of Illinois. Joined by many others, he has continued to get the amendment enacted each year since, as well. Congressman, does your amendment discriminate against poor women?

REP. HENRY HYDE: No. The only discrimination is against the unborn of the rich. A human life is at stake, and if we can save the unborn child of a poor woman, why, I think that's a good, and not an invidious discrimination.

LEHRER: What about Miss Pilpel's argument that under Medicaid other medical services are available to be funded by federal money, but this makes an exception and as a result, that is then discriminating against people in this one way?

HYDE: Well, even Mrs. Pilpel doesn't claim that Medicaid is a comprehensive health insurance program for all illnesses for all people who qualify. It just isn't so. Congress still controls the purse strings. There are certain things Congress does not fund, for example, cosmetic surgery. And it is up to Congress to decide whether, with the limited tax dollars that are available — to tell the truth, there aren't tax dollars available, we borrow for these things — that Congress shall set the priorities as to whether to fund this and not to fund that. Congress has done that. We have decided not to fund abortion because it's the killing of an innocently inconvenient pre-born child.

LEHRER: All right. Now, the second major part of the argument is that it's unconstitutional on separation of church and state grounds, that — well,

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you heard what she said. It imposes the religious views of a minority on a majority.

HYDE: Well, that's the most insidious and really dangerous argument that I've ever heard in this arena. For example, if you know history as most people do, you'd know the Abolition Movement was religiously motivated. The Civil Rights Act, the clergy that marched at Selma, the Fathers Berrigan spilling duck's blood over draft records, all of these things have had religious motivation and they were all not objected to. My lord, picket and boycott lettuce, that's wonderful, let the clergy do that. But as soon as they get in the way of the sexual revolution, as soon as they stand between exterminating a whole class of people — we give snail darters more value than unborn children — why then it becomes a violation of church and state. I suggest to Mrs. Pilpel and those who think like she thinks, that if you take morality out of law, you're left with force. And how many holocausts do we have to endure on this planet to know that force is a terrible way to judge right from wrong? Morality belongs in the law, and we're not going to be barred from the political process because she doesn't agree with the point of view that we are offering. The majority of Congress, the majority of the state legislatures, agree. Her quarrel is with the democratic process, not with the position that we opt for.

LEHRER: Is it a religious issue for you?

HYDE: Oh, certainly not. Dr. Bernard Nathanson, who was a founder of the National Abortion Rights Action League and an atheist, has come to the position that I'm in through the clinical study of the data. There are people who are not — there are many prominent Catholics who don't agree with my position. I'd be happy to name them. But why get politics into this? But, I don't deny that I believe my religion. I'm not going to apologize for that, but there are biological reasons, not theological reasons, for protecting the defenseless, unborn life.

LEHRER: Thank you. Robin?

MACNEIL: Miss Pilpel, the Congressman says it is good discrimination because it will protect the unborn of the poor.

PILPEL: The Supreme Court of the United States has already decided that Congressman Hyde is wrong when he says that an unborn fetus is a human being. That is the only basis on which he really is proceeding, and that's why the amendment is unconstitutional. There is no consensus in this country that the unborn fetus is a human being, and the Supreme Court has said that it is not. What Congressman Hyde is doing, is saying that, solely because of this belief, which is a religious belief, the Hyde Amendment becomes constitutional. There are no secular justifications for this point of view. Obviously, many things that we're all in favor of have a religious backing as well as a moral backing. But this particular amend-

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ment rests only on the religious view that a fetus is a human being. Furthermore, Congressman Hyde said that we were — that the state could discriminate against elective procedures like cosmetic surgery. I agree with that. But Medicaid is a comprehensive system of entitlement to necessary medical care, and we are talking here not of elective abortions, but of necessary medical care in the form of abortions. And finally, when he refers to tax dollars, he knows as well as I do that abortion is far less expensive than carrying pregnancies to term in situations where a medically necessary abortion is denied. There are complications, there is illness, there may be grave threat to the fetus if it is actually born, so that no one can reasonably state that this in any way saves tax dollars.

MACNEIL: Congressman, a lot of different points there, in that rebuttal. Let me take one first of all. Miss Pilpel says that Medicaid is comprehensive in providing for necessary medical care, and she believes abortions fall under that.

HYDE: Well, that's an interesting comment, because when that phrase was used when the Medicaid act was passed in 1965, abortions were criminal in most of the states of this union. So, hardly could the intent of Congress be interpreted to be providing for the payment of abortions. And whether or not they are a good thing, Congress still controls the purse strings. Now, necessary medical care has been interpreted by the pro-abortionists as every abortion that a woman wants. Therefore, there's no such thing as a non-therapeutic abortion, they're all therapeutic because a woman wanting an abortion is under stress if she doesn't get it. That makes the Congress a cash register. The doctor, who has a conflict of interest, I might add, decides the woman should have an abortion, we just hit the cash register and pay for it. That's nonsense, that's not the democratic way. But let me add this. This isn't a religious issue. Here's the book, *Aborting America*. I'm sure Harriet has read it. It's an atheist who says "protect innocent human life." Here's Planned Parenthood. I've got their brochure from 1964, and they used to say, "Is it an abortion? Definitely not. An abortion kills the life of a baby after it's begun." I always ask Mrs. Pilpel what medical discoveries have occurred since then to disavow the statement that even Planned Parenthood used to admit to. Lastly, the grotesque argument that it costs more money to bring these children into the world than to kill them — that is certainly true. Same thing is true with people in nursing homes, and the elderly, it's always cheaper to let them live than to kill them. But that's an outrageous argument in support of abortion.

MACNEIL: Well, thank you. I think we've come back on most of these points, but I'd just like to give you an opportunity to respond to the remarks about Planned Parenthood's position.

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PILPEL: I also want to say that I did not bring up the question of the tax dollars, and I agree that that is not a basis. I just want to make clear that Congressman Hyde was not saving any tax dollars.

MACNEIL: But could you just confine yourself to that one point? Because, we must move on.

PILPEL: As far as the Planned Parenthood statement is concerned, that was a statement made in one pamphlet in a context that has nothing to do with this, at a time before the United States Supreme Court had declared that a fetus is not a human being and indeed has never in legal parlance been considered a human being. A human being is a person who has been born alive, and that person, the woman, who is in need of an abortion on medical grounds is entitled to have one.

MACNEIL: Thank you. Jim.

LEHRER: Yes. Congressman Hyde, d'you want one quick answer on that and we gotta —

HYDE: Mrs. Pilpel said the court said a fetus is not a human being. The court said we don't decide when human life begins. They didn't say it's not a human being.

LEHRER: All right. We're going to leave it there. A crucial part of this argument, the practical argument over the Hyde Amendment of course, has to do with the term "life endangerment." Doctors disagree over what it means and how to interpret it. Dr. Jasper Williams is involved in the Supreme Court appeal from the anti-abortion side. He's the former president of the National Medical Association, and operates a clinic in Chicago where 60 percent of its patients are Medicaid recipients. Doctor, do you believe life endangerment is a legitimate exception to be made for abortions, for the federal payment of abortions?

DR. JASPER WILLIAMS: I believe that true life endangerment could be. The question is, who defines life endangerment? And many people take very minor conditions and consider them as life endangerment. I've been practicing now since 1957. I've lost two patients who were mothers delivering babies in that period of time. One from a pulmonary embolism, one from an amniotic fluid embolism. Neither of these patients could have foreseen that that was what was going to happen to them, nor could any physician have foreseen. I know of no condition at the present time where true life endangerment with adequate care, from the kind of medical treatment that's presently available and the kind of physicians who are out there able to help, that would require abortion.

LEHRER: Do you believe that there's ever a reason to perform an abortion?

WILLIAMS: I have not encountered such a reason.

LEHRER: Have you ever had a patient that — where you felt that the

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mother's health was in jeopardy, not necessarily in terms of losing one's life, but just it was going to have bad health as a result of being pregnant and giving birth to a child?

WILLIAMS: I have seen people like that, but medicine has made lots of progress, and we're able to handle most of those problems.

LEHRER: What is your view? As you say, 60 percent of your patients are people who are women who are on Medicaid. Do you feel that the Hyde Amendment as written and passed by the United States Congress and interpreted at the state level in Illinois, discriminates against poor women?

WILLIAMS: I do not believe it discriminates against them in a way that hurts them. The thing that discriminates against my patients, the poor women in Chicago on the South Side, is offering them the placebo of abortion instead of the therapy of jobs, education, housing, and other social items which create a situation in which a woman becomes desperate and believes the Supreme Court when it says abortion is all right. Actually, it is not all right, and it doesn't solve any problems, and most of these people come back with the same problem over and over again. The statistics indicate now that many of the abortions being done are No. 2 and No. 3 for the same patient.

LEHRER: Is your opposition to abortion, period, Doctor, based on religious grounds or as a result of your being a doctor, or what is the genesis of it?

WILLIAMS: It is not based upon religion. I spent years getting my training, learning how to improve life and how to recognize life, and how to take care of it. And my specialty is obstetrics and gynecology. As such, I learned when life begins and how to protect it within the uterus. And by ability, because of our increased ability in medicine and advances in science, has been backing up. When I was, started medical school, 30 weeks was considered viable. Now there's a baby alive that was born at 10 ounces, which is somewhere around 16 or 18 weeks. So, you can't even judge, make a decision on viability. The necessity, the needs of my people, the needs of poor people, are not abortions. That's really getting rid of them for the reason that the attorney just stated. It's cheaper to do it that way.

LEHRER: Thank you. Robin?

MACNEIL: New Jersey is one of 28 states which cut back on payments for Medicaid abortions after the Hyde Amendment was passed, but which is paying for them now, after the federal court decisions last year, pending the decision on yesterday's cases in the Supreme Court. Dr. Michael Burnhill is a professor of obstetrics and gynecology at Rutgers Medical School in New Jersey, and is a trustee of the National Abortion Federation. Dr. Burnhill, medically, do you think — why do you think the Hyde Amendment is wrong?

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DR. MICHAEL BURNHILL: I think it's wrong because it does not allow for the medical profession to properly take care of the health of pregnant women. And I say that, because in my quarter of a century of taking care of pregnant women, I have seen hundreds of them whose health was ultimately destroyed by having their pregnancy. Whether it was a wanted pregnancy or an unwanted pregnancy, there is ample opportunity for the obstetrician and the woman to look forwards and to determine whether or not that pregnancy is going to destroy her life. Now I listen to Dr. Williams, and I listened very carefully to Dr. Williams, and I must say that perhaps the inner cities where I practiced are a little different than the inner cities where he's practiced. But I've seen Class 4 cardiacs who we kept alive through a pregnancy. I don't disagree with him. They didn't die at the eighth month. Medical science triumphed. But after the delivery, when the stage lights go out, and everybody's lost interest, that mother wheezes home to her bed where there's nobody to help her, and attempts to take care of that baby, and gradually loses steam. And if she has any more children at home, she's grinding out her life. Now, if Dr. Williams wants to define life sort of on a Quinlan basis, it's breathing and eating and having bowel movements, he can. But I think we have to offer our patients, at least I've always tried to, to give them something in life, some ability to cope with life, some ability to love and take care of their families, and if they're sick, they can't do that. And pregnancy makes some people sicker and makes them ultimately have a virtually slow death.

MACNEIL: What about the medical endangerment, life endangering standard that is presently applied? Is that definable?

BURNHILL: No, I don't think it is. Not on a firm explicit basis, not by congressmen, who have the fortune or misfortune to be ex-officio —

MACNEIL: Let me ask you this way. Could you perform the abortions that you think, that you believe are medically necessary under a standard that calls it life-endangering?

BURNHILL: Yes.

MACNEIL: You could?

BURNHILL: Yes.

MACNEIL: And do, presumably?

BURNHILL: Yes.

MACNEIL: Yes. So, you could live with that aspect of the amendment as it stands?

BURNHILL: Yes. I don't know that everybody would define life endangering the way I see life endangering, but I certainly could live with that.

MACNEIL: What do you think the standard should be?

BURNHILL: To preserve the health of the mother.

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MACNEIL: And how do you define health? Not just her survival, but more than that?

BURNHILL: Yes, certainly, on above survival standards. I think health is a condition in which one can actively participate in one's total life, that you are not a cripple or an invalid.

MACNEIL: Well, thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: Dr. Williams, would you agree that preserving the health of the mother is a very important factor?

WILLIAMS: I certainly do, but the doctor there was disturbed about the mother who goes home and has no one to help her, and slowly dies. I'm worried about her, too, but the baby didn't kill her. He just admitted what killed her was nobody to help her. Our social system is what's wrong. We've got to be able to take care of those deficits. I'm sure the doctor's seen a lot of people die from heart attacks, men, they weren't pregnant. Slowly die. We as physicians despite the progress we've made, we can't cure everything, and people will die. And it may be that they might die a week earlier, a month earlier, if they have a baby, but by and large, we are capable of handling most of the complications which arise in pregnancy. And the people he's seen destroyed didn't die because of pregnancy. They died because they didn't have the right people taking care of 'em.

LEHRER: Is that true, Dr. Burnhill?

BURNHILL: They died because we don't have enough resources in our society to take care of everybody.

LEHRER: But did they die of being pregnant? He says they did not.

BURNHILL: Their life was shortened and their health was impaired by that pregnancy.

WILLIAMS: By the shortage of the things he says he didn't have, not by the pregnancy.

BURNHILL: We live in a real world.

WILLIAMS: And so there's no just — there's no reason for killing the baby because he doesn't have enough people at New Jersey who know what they're doing and have the equipment to take care of these people. Put 'em on a kidney, if they've got a bad kidney. A lady recently had a baby with a transplanted kidney. She and the baby are fine. You would have aborted that woman.

LEHRER: Would you, doctor?

BURNHILL: If that woman sat and talked to me and we discussed what it meant to have failed kidneys, and if she made the choice that she thought she would rather not take that risk, I certainly would abort that woman, and I sure wouldn't want anybody telling me how my health is gonna be run, especially if I was poor. I would be just absolutely flabbergasted that

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someone was telling me, I don't have the same health options as a rich woman.

LEHRER: What would you have done in that situation, if the patient had said to you, I don't want to go on the kidney machine in order to have the baby. I do not want to have the baby? What would you have done, Dr. Williams?

WILLIAMS: I would have told her, "my dear, we can bring you through this pregnancy. I will not abort you. If you wish to be aborted, you'll have to find somebody else."

LEHRER: Finally, very quickly, Congressman Hyde and Miss Pilpel. Congressman, if the Hyde Amendment is declared unconstitutional, what do you and your folks do next?

HYDE: Well, of course, we're not going to stand by and be accessories to the elimination of hundreds of thousands of unborn children. We'll study the opinion and try to find some solution and new approach to the thing, but I'm not that pessimistic. And I might say, listening to the doctor, Mother Theresa he's not. Abortion is terminal to every unborn child. And talk about cripples, I dare say he must know plenty of cripples who lead very useful lives. The suicide rate among handicapped people is virtually zero.

LEHRER: I want to ask Miss Pilpel finally, what does your side do if you lose?

PILPEL: I don't think that there's a possibility of our losing because it is clear that there has to be some rational basis for discrimination in funding. Otherwise, Congress could pass a statute which would say, "No blacks shall be entitled to medical reimbursement under Medicaid". I mean, that clearly would be unconstitutional.

LEHRER: We have to leave it there. Miss Pilpel. Robin?

MACNEIL: Yes. Thank you, Dr. Williams, Congressman Hyde for joining us tonight. Dr. Burnhill, Miss Pilpel. Good night, Jim.

LEHRER: Good night, Robin.

MACNEIL: That's all for tonight. We'll be back tomorrow night. I'm Robert MacNeil. Good night.

APPENDIX B

[The following article first appeared in the Providence, R. I., Evening Bulletin on April 23, 1980, and is reprinted here with permission (©1980 by the Providence Journal Co.).]

An Apology to A Little Boy I Won't Ever See

One in every five pregnancies in Rhode Island ends in an abortion, according to the state's hospitals. This is the story of one of those abortions. The writer wishes to remain anonymous.

The first thing you have to understand is that I'm a nice person. Really. I have a good, responsible job; I'm polite to people, I hold doors and say please and thank you. I don't spend my time hanging around bars trying to get picked up. I call my mother every week. I keep a nice house, and I'm a good cook, and I pay my debts. I'm a nice person. You'd like me.

That is why it was so awful when it happened. You grow up with certain pictures in your mental photo album of what has been and what will be: *Me with the Girl Scouts. Me at the beach with my friends. Me in cap and gown at graduation. Me on the job. Me getting married.* Among the pictures for which I never prepared myself was *Me having an abortion.*

But I did. And this is why I had to.

One of the reasons why I never prepared myself for it was that, of course, it would never happen to me. I knew that. Smart, aggressive, upwardly-mobile young women do not have unwanted pregnancies. Everybody knows the only women who need abortions are stupid little high school girls and welfare mothers. I knew that.

Sure.

I knew about birth control. I'd been on the pill for nine years, since I was 21, and I knew the basic stuff everybody knows about loops and coils and diaphragms and foam. I mean, I was no slouch. I'd been around. I was a modern, liberated woman in charge of her own body. I would never get pregnant unless I wanted to.

And if, somehow, I did find myself unexpectedly pregnant? *Well*, I used to tell myself, *well, if I found myself pregnant, I would just have an abortion.* Just. Simple and easy. You just go to Planned Parenthood or you look up the abortion clinics in the Boston underground papers, and it's all very clean and legal and enlightened, and there's no guilt about it any more, no dirty little secrets; 20 minutes and it's all over.

It is never really all over.

I went off the pill that spring because I was so terribly lonely.

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I'd started a new job a few months before, a tough, challenging job and a big step forward in my career, but difficult and lonely, and day after day I'd go home practically in tears, wishing it was six months from now so I'd finally know what I was doing.

Things weren't much nicer at home. I lived by myself; my best woman friend had moved away at the end of the previous summer, and I didn't really have anyone to talk to. I wasn't going out with anyone. There just wasn't any area of my life that provided support and comfort and relaxation and good times. It was a tough winter.

Every night when I went to bed I'd punch out a birth-control pill from the blue-and-silver card and swallow it, thinking, "I hate taking these things and I'm probably going to get cancer from them in 15 years." And taking them night after night, without even a glimmer of a possibility of a sexual encounter in sight, made me feel sad and silly. All dressed up with no place to go.

That's finally why I stopped taking them. I know a lot of men; I have a lot of friends who are men; but I couldn't even get somebody to take me out for coffee that spring. The subconscious rejection finally got to me, so I decided to take the upper hand. *If I go off the pill, my reasoning went, then I won't be able to have sex by my own choice — not because all those men rejected me by not asking me out, by not expressing any interest in me. And then I'll be in charge of the situation, not them.* And I stopped taking the pill.

Then I met Bill.

Nice guy, lives in Boston, friend of a friend, you two must meet, his number, my number, don't hesitate, call him next time you're up there, you'll really like him, in the same business, he really wants to meet you, told him all about you. So I called. And we agreed to meet for dinner.

What a nice man! Everything my friend had said. Smart, personable, good-looking, nice manners, serious enough, funny enough, absolutely worth waiting for, worth the long lonely winter and the cold thin spring. We talked. We laughed. He thought I was terrific. I thought he was terrific.

We had dinner. We had a drink after dinner. We talked about coffee. We decided to go back to his place for coffee. We made the coffee. The coffee got cold. We had something else to do.

I left Bill late that night, with my life looking much happier than it had in months. I came back to Providence and waited for him to call.

I was a little worried because I'd never before slept with someone without using some form of birth control, but in a couple of weeks, true to form, I had my period. Lighter than usual, for fewer days than usual, but (with a sigh of relief) a period.

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And I went back on the pill. Now I had a reason. Bill hadn't called me, but he was busy, and I was busy, and it was just a matter of time.

Another month went by, and night after night I faithfully popped my pill and waited for Bill to call.

But he didn't call. And this month there was no period.

Well! I thought. *That's certainly odd. I can't be pregnant, because I had a period before I went back on the pill, but something's going on here.* I called my gynecologist, and the nurse suggested that, for openers, we'd better rule out the possibility of pregnancy. The next day I took my urine sample to the laboratory. I was to call my doctor's office late in the afternoon for the results.

I remember that afternoon so clearly. It was a long warm afternoon in May, and the circus was in town. I remember that because the man at the next desk told me he was leaving early that day to meet his wife and little boy and take them to the circus. I remember that my hands were sweaty most of the afternoon and I had a lot of trouble concentrating on my work and I kept watching the clock for it to be late enough in the afternoon for me to call. And finally it was.

"Why, congratulations," caroled the nurse, "you're pregnant!"

For me that moment is frozen in time: the way the sunlight slants through the office window late in the afternoon in spring, the low buzz of chatter around the room, the occasional telephone, the burring of a typewriter. I am sitting at a desk, holding the phone, everything in the office going on around me as it always does, but at that moment my life is turning, turning.

"Oh," I said, feeling as if I'd been hit. There was a long pause. "Ah, that's not real good."

"Oh," said the nurse, probably more accustomed to dealing with these things than she would want to admit. "Is this the sort of thing you'd like to terminate?"

Terminate.

"Well, yes, actually," I said calmly. I was numb.

"Okay, dear, then you want to call Planned Parenthood or the special procedures clinic at Women & Infants Hospital. Why don't you try Planned Parenthood first? Okay?"

"Okay."

I hung up. I sat for a moment in the filtered sunlight. I was absolutely astonished.

I call Planned Parenthood. They are very helpful. A woman asks for some basic information, name, age and so on. Date of my last period.

My last period. That funny light period. I am in a daze. I give her a date.

Okay, she says. That means you're about six weeks pregnant now. The

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best time to do a termination is in the eighth week. So we'll schedule you to come in . . . she names a date two weeks hence.

I relax a little. This is going to be okay. Help is on the way. Now I just have to make it through those two weeks and it's going to be all right.

What is not going to be all right is the next two weeks. I am so tired I can hardly move. My breasts are sore and swollen. Sometimes I have an achy feeling on the left or right side of my pelvis. I can't tell anybody; at work I have to carry on and be as energetic and cheery as ever. At home it is another story.

At home I sit in the rocking chair in the living room and cry. For two weeks. My face is chapped from tears. I am rigid with tension. *How can I do this?* I demand of myself. *I am going to kill this innocent unborn child because it is inconvenient for me to have a baby. Inconvenient! It is pretty damned inconvenient for that child to have to die. The ultimate selfishness! Child-killer!*

I am haunted with guilt. I drive along Route 95 with tears pouring down my cheeks. I cannot look at babies on the street. I look in the mirror and I hate what I see.

I am surprised that I feel that way. I know that my baby, at this moment, is a mass of cells the size of my fingertip, scarcely differentiated from a baby chick. I do not believe that this being is a real person yet. I believe, unshakably, that it is my right to do what I am going to do. And yet I know that what I am going to do is murder, and I cannot forgive myself that.

I give serious thought to having this child and raising it alone, and I face the fact that I am not the person to meet that challenge, that burden. Call it selfishness. Call it quality of life. Call it caring about what you can offer the children you have. *Oh, baby, I think to myself, I love you so much that I want everything to be perfect for you. I want to be able to give you everything. I want you to have all the things, all the opportunities. I can't give you those now. This isn't the right time for you, baby.*

And I am angry. I am angry at Billie Jean King and Gloria Steinem and every woman who ever had an abortion and didn't tell me about this kind of pain. There is a conspiracy among the sisterhood not to tell each other about guilt and self-hatred and terror. Having an abortion is not like having a wart removed or your nails done or your hair cut, and anyone who tells you it is is a liar or worse. To decide to have an abortion is to make a life-and-death decision, and most people I know don't make those casually. Yes, it is convenient and legal and a subject for polite conversation these days. And yes, a part of me is dying too.

I know — don't ask how — I just do — I know that my baby would be a boy, a little kid in short pants with straight brown hair and his father's

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wonderful eyes. That is the image in my mind as I sit on these late-spring evenings and rock myself and cry. That is what I am murdering.

And what about Bill? In my more rational moments I see this whole situation as a giant contemporary cliché. I am an unwed mother, abandoned by her man. Bill has not called. Occasionally the friend who arranged our meeting mentions him. I am unable to call him. I fantasize that I will go and have the abortion, call him the next day and invite him to lunch, and just casually mention somewhere along the line that, Oh, by the way . . . But I know I will never do this. I will never tell him. *What am I protecting him from? Why should he escape all this? I didn't get pregnant by myself!*

Finally it is the day for me to go to Planned Parenthood. By now I have unbent enough to confide in my best friend, Mary, and she comes in from out of town to be with me. I am one of a group of six women who are there for terminations this day. We sit, waiting for a counselor. I am nervous, but I know the end is in sight. At the end of today it will all be over.

One of us is about 18, with a round, freckled face and huge vacant eyes. "This is the second time for me," she says matter-of-factly. "The first time I knew exactly when I got pregnant and how it happened and all, but this time . . ." she shakes her head.

We are to go, one by one, for a private interview with a counselor, and I am the first. We go over the information they have about me. Name. Age. Date of last period.

"Well, about that last period . . .," I say. And I explain about going off the pill, the night with Bill, that light period, going back on the pill, no period.

The counselor, a woman about my own age, looks concerned. "If that's right, then you're a lot more pregnant than you think you are, and we may not be able to do you," she tells me. She explains that sometimes women have one or several light periods after they become pregnant. "We only do terminations up to 12 weeks. After that you have to have them done at Women & Infants."

We may not be able to do you. Now I'm really up against it. I have waited two weeks for today and now I'm too pregnant? I have to start all over again?

The counselor leads me into an examining room. "I'm going to have the doctor examine you right away and find out how far along you are, so we get you lined up with somebody else if you have to," she tells me. She hands me a paper sheet, tells me to take off all my clothes and leaves.

I get undressed. I am huddled under a paper sheet in an office on Westminster Mall at 9 o'clock in the morning, and I am shivering. Suddenly I am nauseated. I leap off the examining table, head for the sink at

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the other end of the room and stand there, naked, vomiting. *Congratulations! You're pregnant!*

I am examined, and it is the worst possible news. I am approximately 12½ weeks pregnant — too pregnant to have a first-trimester procedure performed at Planned Parenthood.

When Mary and I leave Planned Parenthood, we are clutching a card with the name and address of a gynecologist who performs abortions under general anaesthesia at the special-procedures clinic at Women & Infants Hospital. We call. We make an appointment.

There is canned music playing in the gynecologist's office as we enter. *What do you get when you fall in love? You only get lies and pain and sorrow, so for at least until tomorrow, I'll never fall in love again . . .*

I go in to talk to this strange doctor. He stares at the forms I have filled out. "Why don't you want it?" he barks.

I start to explain the reasons: I cannot be a single parent. I couldn't support this child. I did not want to be pregnant in the first place. "Okay," he cuts me off. "Let's examine you and see how far along you are."

The examination is incredibly fast, and the doctor is rough and hurts me. Dressed again, I am back in his office. "You're too far gone," he tells me. "You're more like 13½ weeks pregnant. It's too late for a suction abortion. You can only do those in the first 12 weeks, when the fetus is small. You're going to have to wait till you're 16 weeks pregnant and then we'll do a saline."

A saline? Oh, my God! All my rigidly enforced composure is gone. I am in helpless tears. This man does not offer me a handkerchief; I have to walk across the room myself to the shelves behind his desk and get a Kleenex from the box there.

"So what's the matter? You're going to get rid of it, no problem," he says. "You're too big for a suction and too small now for a saline. That's why we have to wait. It's just a matter of a couple more weeks."

A couple more weeks! Do you know what they do in a saline abortion? They inject your uterus with saline solution and you go into labor and deliver a dead child, that's what they do. And this guy thinks that's just fine? Oh, my God!

"Look," he says, "your uterus is actually still pretty small. Why don't we do this. We'll schedule you for next Monday at Women & Infants, and once you're under the anaesthetic I can examine you really carefully, and if you're small enough, I'll do it then. If not, we'll bring you back in a couple of weeks."

"But I won't know until I wake up whether you've done it," I say weakly.

"No, but relax, I *will* do it, whether next Monday or in a couple of weeks," he says.

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It is the best we can do.

Monday morning. You have to be at the special procedures clinic by 7 a.m. We have to get up terribly early. Mary drives. We don't say very much on the way. She leaves me at the clinic, kisses me goodbye and goes off to wait downstairs.

There are seven or eight of us. We do not introduce ourselves. We don't really look at each other. We put on funny foam duck slippers and a skimpy gown and a cap over our hair, and we wait. My doctor arrives. I will be the first of us this morning. I walk down the hall to the operating room, and the nurse beside me slips a supporting arm around my waist. It is the most comforting gesture I can imagine, and I need it.

Up on the table. The nurses are cheery, we say good morning, they explain about the I.V. (intravenous injection) they're about to slip into the back of my hand. My doctor comes in and gives me a pat. "This'll be over soon."

I am gazing straight up at the ceiling of the operating room. Someone has stuck a bright blue plastic seahorse to the ceiling — probably one of those things you stick in the tub so you won't slip — and I stare at that. *Soon it will all be over.*

I am still staring up at the ceiling. I am exhausted. I am so tired I will never get enough rest. I'm going to go home when all this is over and take a nap the rest of the day. I'm just exhausted. I look up at the ceiling and the seahorse is not there, and I am vaguely aware of music in the background: my favorite song, "You Are the Sunshine of My Life." I am in the recovery room, and it is over. I am exhausted because I am crawling out from under the anaesthesia.

It is done. I have had the abortion. I am not pregnant any more.

After a while I am well enough to go back to the lounge, where there is coffee and orange juice and cookies to give us some energy, and we are allowed to get dressed and sit and rest until the nurses are sure we're well enough to leave. I chat with one of the other women. She has three kids under the age of three, the youngest two months old. She and her husband slept together without birth control shortly after the birth of the youngest baby. She thought she couldn't get pregnant because she was nursing. She was wrong.

The television set is on in the lounge, tuned to one of the early-morning wake-up shows. The hostess tells us it is just after 8 o'clock on Monday, June 21, the first day of summer, the longest day of the year.

It was over. I knew I had been tense and anxious and on the edge of hysteria for several weeks, but sometimes you don't know how far out you are until you come back in. My relief was palpable. I felt years younger. Mary and I left together, smiling. We went out for lunch. We went shop-

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ping and Mary bought a dress. We came home and took naps. We went out for dinner at a restaurant on Narragansett Bay. It was over.

A few days later my mother called. I had never told her what was going on. She reminded me that I had not sent a gift to my sister-in-law when her baby was born the month before. "After all," my mother chided me, "if you were having a baby, you'd want people to send you presents." *Mother!* I want to cry. *I was having a baby, and I didn't get any presents.*

A month later I turned 30. My mother called me again to wish me a happy birthday and to tell me, "The day you were born, I was so delighted that I had a beautiful baby girl." I put down the phone, and I was distressed, because I will never know: I will never know for sure whether my baby was a boy or a girl. I will never know what he or she would have been like, what my child would have said and done, what he would have liked to do, whether my child would have liked classical music like me, or would have preferred sports, would have liked to read, would have been better at math than I am. *I will never know.*

It was winter again, six months since the day I killed my baby.

It was Dec. 21, and I knew — don't ask how, I just *did* — I knew that if I had had the baby, that was the day it would have been born. This was self-punishing and histrionic. I know that, too.

I could not pretend that this was a day like any other. It was a day to note and remember, a special day, not a day to overreact with pain and guilt, but a day to recall what I had done and what might have been. I went to the florist on the way to work and bought three pink rosebuds and put them in a vase on my desk. "Special day?" people asked. Uh-huh. "Your birthday?" people asked. Not mine. Somebody else's.

We had an enormous crisis at work that day, a special project that turned up suddenly and required everybody's extra effort, overtime, pull out all the stops. One of the men stopped at my desk, tired and worried. "I really want to stay here and do a better job on this," he said, "but it's my daughter's third birthday, and her party's tonight at dinner, and I have to be there." I watched him struggling with his choice — this man loves his work and loves to be in the thick of disasters, but he loves his children too.

I smiled at him. "Here," I said. "Take these home to your little girl for her birthday." I put the roses back in their tissue paper and gave them to him, knowing it was right for the flowers to belong to the child who was loved and wanted and who lived. *If things had been different, I thought, at the end of this day I would have been a mother, and that would have been my satisfaction. Instead, I am here at work in the middle of this disaster, and at the end of the day I will have completed this project, and that will be my satisfaction.* And I knew I had made my choice a long time ago. It was Dec. 21, the first day of winter, the longest night of the year.

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[The following feature article first appeared in the Washington Post on May 2, 1980, and is reprinted here with permission (©1980 by the Washington Post).]

Pro-Abortion League Starts Playing Rough

by Judy Mann

This was hardly your usual Washington press corps briefing. For one thing, it was held over a four-course luncheon for 48 at the F Street Club. For another, it was presided over by Robin Chandler Duke, a socialite-activist whose interests have graduated from high fashion and decorating to Third World population problems and legalized abortion.

The whole thing, said one reporter, smacked of money and power. It was the kind of luncheon the anti-abortion forces could never have brought off in Washington. They don't have the connections. Everything was exquisitely orchestrated — all the way from the invitations to the floral centerpieces, to the perfect asparagus and finger bowls on lace doilies. You knew straight off, from the moment Robin Chandler Duke stood up before dessert and tapped her goblet for attention, that she was rich. And connected. You knew it even before she started name dropping.

Wednesday's lunch was definitely on the high chic side of the abortion controversy, but by the time the waiters and waitresses took away the dessert plates (fresh strawberries, vanilla ice cream and finger cookies) it had become obvious that a class act in the pro-choice forces has decided to play rough.

Robin Duke is president of the National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL), which claims 88,000 members and which has concentrated since 1973 on lobbying Congress to preserve legalized abortions. That has not been terribly effective. "What's not coming through is . . . we are speaking for the mainstream," said Duke. Vulnerable members of Congress who are pro-choice in their hearts are afraid to vote that way because they will be targeted for defeat by anti-abortionists, she said.

NARAL's genteel approach to lobbying Congress has not worked. Congress has voted repeatedly to prohibit the use of federal funds for indigent women's abortions. It has been far more responsive to the anti-abortion forces that have deluged Congress with mail, targeted pro-choice members for defeat, staged huge rallies every year, and indulged in outrageous behavior such as labeling their opponents "baby killers" and invading abortion clinics. Now, NARAL is taking off the white gloves.

It is, said Duke, going to "identify politically active pro-choice citizens and alert them of the threat." She said, in effect, NARAL is going to borrow a few pages from the opposition. It already has given over \$100,000

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to pro-choice congressional candidates this year. It has hired nine state organizers to train pro-choice volunteers in effective campaign work. It has raised a \$250,000 war chest to fight the anti-abortion forces who, to hear the NARAL people tell it, are poised on the right wing of the political spectrum ready to descend and destroy Life As We Know It.

Karen Mulhauser, NARAL's executive director, told the press that if more people understood what the anti-abortionists were up to, more people would be up in arms about it. Not only do they want to ban abortions, she said, but they also want to ban the use of some oral contraceptives and intrauterine devices that prevent fertilized eggs from attaching to the uterine wall. Spontaneous abortions would be suspect, she said. Women and doctors would face murder charges. The anti-abortionists are pushing hard in Congress and in state legislatures to secure passage of a constitutional amendment banning abortion except to prevent the death of pregnant women. If the anti-abortionists have their way, goes NARAL's new message, things won't be as bad as they were before the Supreme Court legalized the procedure in 1973. They'll be worse.

To prevent this, NARAL is mounting a campaign to help pro-choice legislators, to make themselves as powerful a force as the anti-abortionists have made themselves. NARAL is going to give campaign contributions, and it is going to swamp Congress with 1.5 million postcards saying "I'm pro-choice and I vote," and it is going to drum up volunteers for pro-choice candidates. It is going to be doing all the things a political movement under attack should have been doing all along.

It has not had the manpower to do it, and it's stayed ahead in the abortion fight only because the courts have been running interference for it against legislative efforts to limit access to abortions.

So NARAL is taking up accepted political strategy. But that's not all. The organization also has developed a series of radio spots about illegal abortions that Mulhauser played on a tape recorder while the waiters cleared the dessert plates and served demitasses of coffee. Here, things got a little bizarre.

The radio spots featured the voice of a male announcer who sounded as if he might have understudied for "Reefer Madness." Women's voices described illegal abortions being performed on tables covered with old newspapers and in back alleys. One woman described the death of her own mother from an abortion. She said her mother's body rested in a casket in the family living room for three days. The speaker said her little sister crawled into it. The message in the radio spots is of coat hangers, knitting needles, infections and death.

Mulhauser said later that there was a lot of internal discussion within the organization about the media campaign and tone. A poll showed them that people who are strongly pro-choice are motivated by the fear that, "if

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abortion is illegal again, women are going to die.” That led to the conclusion that, “once they get alarmed enough, they will want to get involved.”

The ads are certainly alarming. They are also disturbing. In addition to having anti-abortionists hollering “baby killers” across the political scene, we are now faced with the prospect of having the pro-choice people abandoning their more reasonable ways in favor of alarmist “women killer” ads on the air waves.

“It’s ironic,” said Mulhauser, “that in order to get abortions out of politics, we have to get political.” It’s ironic, she said, and they may be going too far. Without giving the more accepted political campaign approaches a fair chance, NARAL has bought into the grim reaper hysteria of the anti-abortionists through their ads.

And hysteria is tough to take seriously, no matter how nicely it’s served.

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[The following article first appeared in the Boston Sunday Globe on June 8, 1980, and is reprinted here with permission (©1980 by The Boston Globe).]

Two 'procedures' that went wrong

by David Farrell

The first detailed glimpse of how one Boston abortion clinic functions can be ascertained through the court testimony, depositions, affidavits and medical records taken in connection with malpractice suits filed by two women against the clinic and a former Newton doctor who is now on the West Coast and the subject of a show cause investigation by the state Board of Registration in Medicine.

The litigation against Dr. James Edward Egan, now of Redlands, Calif., and Charles Circle Clinic has resulted in verdicts and settlements totaling more than \$325,000 for the women — a 33-year-old Medford mother and a 31-year-old North Shore woman. Atty. Joseph I. Mulligan Jr. of Boston represented the plaintiffs.

The Medford woman, who was referred to the clinic by the Planned Parenthood Assn., was awarded \$176,000 plus four years of interest against Charles Circle Clinic by a jury after Dr. Egan settled with her for \$60,000. The clinic plans to appeal.

There was testimony in the trial that after Dr. Egan perforated the woman's uterus during a suction curettage abortion, he left her in the care of nurses at the clinic's recovery room and went back to the "Procedure Room" where he continued to perform abortions on other women while she lay in shock with her blood pressure falling rapidly.

Subsequently, she was rushed to the Boston Hospital for Women where she was seen two hours later by Dr. Egan. After she had lost more blood, Dr. Egan attempted to tie off her hypogastric arteries in order to remove her uterus. Instead, he ligated her right common iliac artery and her left external iliac artery, shutting off the blood supply to her legs.

After he sewed her up, she began complaining about pains in her legs, according to the court testimony. Then Dr. Egan called in another doctor who examined her and thought that the external iliac arteries were either tied or had gone into spasms. She was then rushed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital because there were no facilities for doing the necessary arteriogram at BHW. Dr. Egan did not accompany the Medford housewife to St. Elizabeth's. Later he went there and an arteriogram was taken.

"And what did the arteriogram reveal?" Dr. Egan was asked by Mulligan during his deposition (Egan did not appear at the trial earlier this spring, and his deposition was made part of the trial record). "Showed

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occlusion in her right common iliac artery and left external iliac artery," Egan admitted.

Following corrective surgery and treatment, the woman was hospitalized in intensive care for nearly a month. "Her post-operative complications that she developed," Dr. Egan testified, "were: shock lung syndrome; she developed pulmonary emboli; she developed a wound infection; she developed a peripheral neuropathy and she had a flare-up from her asthma that she had for years."

When she was released from the hospital five years ago, she was unable to walk. The court was told that she suffers from permanent loss of her uterus and right leg neuropathy, walks with a limp and cannot move the toes on her right foot. Two doctors testified for her, contending it was negligent for the clinic, which is run by a New York-based abortion chain, to delay transferring her from Charles Circle Clinic to BHW for an hour during which she was in shock due to the perforation of her uterus and the laceration of her uterine artery.

The physicians also pointed out that the woman could and should have been transferred to the more handy Mass. General Hospital; and that it was negligent of the clinic not to have any blood on hand to transfuse the patient.

The litigation brought by the North Shore woman was settled for \$50,000. In that proceeding, Mulligan contended that Dr. Egan "either did not recognize at the time or in the immediate post-operative period, the laceration of the artery and the perforation of the uterus had occurred, or, if he recognized it, he chose not to treat it at that time. The failure . . . resulted in the patient becoming hypotensive and necessitating her transfer to BHW and her ultimate hysterectomy."

"Even after the patient had had her slacks soaked with blood from the crotch to the ankles, the personnel at Charles Circle Clinic had intended to wash and dry her slacks and send her home, and it was only after the plaintiff had her final blood pressure taken, had become hypotensive and passed out, that the personnel at the clinic took the steps to order an ambulance. By the time the exploratory operation could be performed at the BHW, the patient had extensive hematoma involving the broad ligament and her lacerated right uterine artery was pumping freely. Dr. Finlayson was unable to save her uterus and estimates her blood loss was 2000 cubic centimeters.

"The plaintiff contends that Dr. Egan was negligent in not recognizing the perforation of the uterus and the laceration of the vaginal artery and leaving the clinic and the patient before she had recovered."

Since the post-abortion complications suffered by the two women, Charles Circle Clinic has moved from West Cedar Street to 711 Boylston St. in Boston.

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Meanwhile, the inquiry by the state Board of Registration in Medicine into Dr. Egan has been proceeding on schedule, according to Atty. Ken Phalen, chief complaint counsel for the board. Following the filing of a complaint against Dr. Egan, the board last year issued a show cause order why the doctor shouldn't be disciplined. Through his attorneys, Dr. Egan has filed answers to the complaint. Public hearings may be held later this year, Phalen said.

The coldness of the mass production abortion line at Charles Circle Clinic (from 25 to 30 abortions a day in 1976 to 50 to 60 a day in 1978) comes through in the many documents filed in connection with the two cases. They reveal that many of the doctors who perform abortions at CCC are moonlighters who augment their income by working morning and/or afternoon shifts at the clinic a couple of days a week.

In the mid to late 1970's, doctors like Egan were paid a flat \$200-per-shift for performing as many abortions (the doctors and clinic prefer to describe them as "procedures") as the 3½-hour morning or afternoon sessions would allow. There was nothing personal in the relationship between the doctors and the patients, the court testimony showed. The women, at the time, paid \$175 or \$150 for their "procedures," depending on how much medication they wanted. And the first time they met the doctor who performed their abortions, was moments before.

Typical of the dialogue between doctor and patient was the greeting attributed to Dr. Egan when he met his patients: "I'm Dr. Egan and I'm going to do the procedure." The court testimony and related documents also revealed that the abortionists and the Charles Circle Clinic always referred to the unborn fetuses in the patients' wombs as the "products of conception" or "the contents" of the womb.

If there was one revealing aspect to the big abortion business carried out by Dr. Egan et al at CCC, it is that the doctors and the clinic make no pretense about the fact that they are out to grab a slice of the \$500 million-a-year abortion industry spawned by the 1973 *Roe vs. Wade* Supreme Court decision legalizing abortion on demand in the US. And CCC does not bill itself as a non-profit charitable clinic, as other clinics do.

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