the
HUMAN LIFE
REVIEW
SUMMER 1985

Featured in this issue:

Steven Mosher on ........... Forced Abortions and Infanticide in China
Allan Carlson on .......... The Malthusian Deficit
Joseph Sobran on .......... New Law, New Order
Susan Austin on ................. Making Pictures
Eileen Farrell on ............... Abortion in Literature
James L. Buckley on .... Sound Doctrine Revisited
Francis Canavan on ........ Pearls in the Garbage

Also in this issue:
Professor Yale Kamisar • Gary L. McDowell • James Dempsey

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FROM THE PUBLISHER

What do we do for an encore? We've had such a tremendous response from our 10th Anniversary issue that we were given pause as to how we could possibly follow it up. Well, if you keep reading, I think you'll agree with me that we have managed to do it—the Mosher article is a blockbuster—a fitting introduction for the many new readers that have come on board since the anniversary issue.

Mr. Mosher's article "Forced Abortions and Infanticide in Communist China," was written after he spent a year traveling through China, compiling data. His new book, Journey to the Forbidden China, was just published by the Free Press, and is now in good bookstores.

Another frequent contributor (and a member of our editorial board), Francis Canavan, S.J., has recently had a book published also. Freedom of Expression: Purpose as Limit is available from Carolina Academic Press, P.O. Box 8795, Forest Hills Station, Durham, NC 27707. Hardcover edition: $19.75; paperback: $9.95.

Dr. Allan Carlson asks us to note that the convention address (from which his article is adapted) was sponsored by the Illinois Right to Life Committee, whose former president, Mrs. Marcy Cavanaugh Sneed, helped bring the economic effect of abortion to national attention last year when she testified before the Democratic Party's Platform Committee.

And to all our new readers: Welcome. We ordered extra copies of our special 10th Anniversary edition and if you missed that big double issue or would like extra copies to send some special friend, relative, student, etc., they are available for $7.00 each from the foundation. You will find information about previous issues, plus our fully-indexed bound volumes—how to order, etc.—on the inside back cover.

EDWARD A. CAPANO
Publisher
THE HUMAN LIFE REVIEW

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INTRODUCTION

Fifty years ago, G. K. Chesterton (that good man) wrote: "Now a child is the very sign and sacrament of personal freedom. He is a fresh free will added to the wills of the world; he is something that his parents have freely chosen to produce and which they freely agree to protect. ... He has been born without the intervention of any master or lord."

We happened on those lines shortly after first reading the lead article in this issue. The author, Mr. Steven Mosher, is himself a controversial writer now, willy-nilly: an anthropologist who managed to spend a year in the forbidden hinterlands of Communist China, Mosher had the temerity to report what he found there. He gives you his own description of the result. Having read it, we think you'll agree that Chesterton was exactly right: what is now under assault by the totalitarian regime in China is the last bastion of personal freedom.

If the reader finds Mosher's description of forced abortion, infanticide et al horrifying, be sure that in fact he is a model of restraint compared to the "official" information that has recently come to light—largely because Mosher himself has made it world news. One example should suffice. We write while staring at a tabulation which appeared in the Peking China Daily (April 26, 1985); it is euphemistically labeled "Birth Control Operations in China, 1971-82"; if it is to be believed, the total number of Chinese humans involved over those dozen years was a staggering 294,235,078! Nearly half (some 143 million) evidently received the now-infamous IUD, an intrauterine device so dangerous (when not deadly) that a U.S. version was withdrawn from the American market a decade ago (the company that produced it recently "set aside" $615 million to settle legal claims from women users).

Another 53 million or so "had" (or else?) vasectomies or sterilizations. Over 77 million women likewise had abortions: a mere 3,910,110 in the initial statistical year (1971), and only nine and one-half million in 1980 (the year Mosher was there); by 1982 the total had reached 12,419,663 (what fastidious counters the Communists are!). Projecting such rates, the abortion body-count may be 20 million a year by now.

Staggering stuff. And yet for years our media have accepted the Communist holocaust with considerable equanimity. Earlier this year, one Lester R. Brown (president of Worldwatch Institute, a part of the international anti-
population *apparat*) wrote an Op-Ed article for the New York Times (May 8), stating that “The main difference between China and other densely populated developing countries . . . may be that the Chinese have had the foresight to make projections of their population and resources and the courage to translate their findings into policy.” They have indeed. (You will note that Mr. Mosher not only finds that “policy” immoral but also predicts disastrous economic and social consequences.)

A few days later (May 18), the Times headlined a report from Peking “China Adds Compassion to Its Birth Control Drive”—although in fact the story reported that provincial officials had “responded with a vengeance” to the most recent “family planning” drive, issuing IUDs “without much concern” for the consequences, never mind for the “nearly 1 in 10 married women of childbearing age” who “reportedly” had abortions. The sole mention of “compassion” (buried in the middle of the story) refers to an American woman anthropologist who “spent 10 days” at a Peking medical college which “is concerned about making birth control more compassionate”—no facts supplied. Mr. Mosher spent over a year in China, not at a government institution in the capital but virtually on his own among the victims of such compassion.

We could go on and on—for instance, as everybody knows, our own government has helped pay for these atrocities—but all that has been headline news in recent months (again, thanks largely to Mosher’s revelations of what so many “officials” knew was happening). The lesser-known background supplied here will, we hope, add to the reader’s appreciation of Mr. Mosher’s important—historic, we’d say—*exposé*.

It also provides the perfect introduction for the following article, in which Mr. Allan Carlson describes the beginnings of the “population control” mania that now ravages so much of the globe. The Malthusian myth is by no means the only example of a *fausse idée claire* that has changed history (add Marxism, etc.). Still, as you read Carlson’s dispassionate description, you may find yourself wondering *how* it happened that “Even as the facts repeatedly proved Malthus wrong, the power of the Malthusian idea continued to grow and reassert itself again and again in Western history.” Never more so than today, alas, with consequences that now threaten the future of our nation as we know it. A nation that ceases to grow is ripe for replacement. At the present moment in history, replacements are more readily available than ever before (many have already arrived).

Next we have our faithful friend Joseph Sobran, with another of his fine essays. This one ranges over quite a spectrum of issues, beginning with his talk
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with a young man convicted of bombing abortion clinics (for which he's “doing twenty years” in jail—our courts are not as lenient to those who would prevent what they believe to be murder as they are to, say, convicted murderers) and running through other “social issues” including, even, the fairness of taxes. All *apropos* his central question: “How has our traditional sense of right and wrong become so unraveled?” He too quotes Chesterton, who noted “the modern and morbid habit of always sacrificing the normal to the abnormal.” Our regular readers are undoubtedly Sobran addicts by now; those just now discovering his perfect pitch for the right phrase or quote should find this essay a delightful initiation.

Regular readers will also remember Susan Austin as the author of two earlier, graceful essays published in this journal. Here she writes about the mental pictures conjured up by abortion, a subject that would not be complete nowadays without discussing *The Silent Scream*, a film that has had a phenomenal impact on “the issue.” It is a sonogram that portrays, quite hazily, an actual abortion. Yet for many who have viewed it the effect has been overwhelming, not least among those who support abortion. From the start, they have been plagued by grisly photos of bloody, dismembered “fetuses”; now they must somehow answer the cold vision of an unborn child visibly struggling to avoid execution. Mrs. Austin summarizes the overall response: such pictures “are not pictures of anything real.” She asks: “What, I wonder, looks like a mangled fetus but isn’t a mangled fetus?”

Another reaction to *The Silent Scream* has been the recent “Silent No More” campaign organized by various pro-abortion groups, the point being to encourage women who have themselves had abortions to tell their “real-life stories” publicly. At this writing the effort has produced meager results: the “personal choice” of abortion manifestly produces an emotional residue that most women are not happy about remembering, even privately. But the campaign inspired Eileen Farrell to write an article (her first for this journal) arguing that such “real” accounts end up sounding like a “Dear Abby” column: the reality is more likely to be found in literature, because “fiction is an incarnational art in which one can find a larger portion of truth about the human condition than in ‘true confessions.’” Mrs. Farrell acknowledges another inspiration: Professor R. V. Young’s article “Literary Abortions” (which appeared in our Fall, 1983 issue). Here she adds a good number of additional examples to Young’s literary canon. And readers who enjoyed the TV series based on Paul Scott’s *Raj Quartet* should find her discussion of it especially interesting.

We’d say Mrs. Farrell makes her point impressively: literature gives little
support to any notion that abortion “can ennoble the quality of life.” We made a related point in the last (10th Anniversary) issue—that we couldn’t think of a single gifted writer who had used his art to advocate abortion. It is interesting to note that, as we write, a pro-abortion novel (John Irving’s *The Cider House Rules*) is on the best-seller list. The question remains: Is it literature? We hope to address that question, and the novel itself, in coming issues.

Next we give you an unusual treat. When this journal began publishing in 1975, James L. Buckley (then a U.S. Senator from New York) contributed the lead article to our first issue. It described the “Human Life Amendment” he had introduced in the Senate on May 31, 1973—just four months after the Supreme Court handed down its *Roe v. Wade* decision legalizing abortion on demand nationwide. In short, Senator Buckley has an enviable place in history as a Founding Father of the anti-abortion movement.

Since leaving the Senate in 1977, Mr. Buckley has continued his public service, notably in the State Department and—of special interest to those opposed to the world-wide “population control” apparatus—as head of the U.S. delegation to last year’s UN population conference in Mexico City, where he successfully lead the effort to have President Reagan’s pro-growth (and anti-abortion) policies adopted. Currently he is President of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in Munich. Earlier this year he agreed to speak to an anti-abortion meeting in Delaware. We are glad to reprint here the full text of his address.

The final article is another unusual treat. Our esteemed colleague Francis Canavan, S. J., has recently authored a book, *Freedom of Expression*, which examines the nature of the “freedoms” supposedly guaranteed by the First Amendment. While it contains nothing about abortion, it provides fascinating insights into the philosophical mindset that has lead our courts into the legalization of license never dreamed of by the Framers. Father Canavan has kindly adapted his final, summary chapter for publication here. Again, we are pleased to publish it (see our publisher’s statement for information as to how you can get a copy of Father Canavan’s seminal book).

* * * * *

We assume most of our readers well remember Karen Ann Quinlan, who died in a New Jersey nursing home after having lain comatose since 1975. In April of that year, she had lost consciousness, and when admitted to a hospital she had been put on a respirator. Her doctors said that she had suffered irreversible brain damage and, later that year, her adoptive parents went into court to win permission to remove the respirator. In the event, the state’s Supreme Court granted such permission (grounding its decision in the “right
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to privacy"), and Karen Ann was removed from the machine—but lived on until June 11 of this year.

Her case is generally considered to have produced a "landmark" decision confirming a "right to die." Without question, such a "right" is now being widely supported by courts and legislators. But not without serious opposition. For instance, Professor Yale Kamisar (in a June 17 New York Times Op-Ed article) strongly questions the Quinlan decision. And he does so not merely as a law professor (currently at the University of Michigan) but as perhaps the nation's foremost authority on the subject: in 1958, Kamisar wrote what many consider the definitive treatment of euthanasia; titled "Some Non-Religious Views against Proposed 'Mercy Killing' Legislation," it originally appeared in the Minnesota Law Review. That edition having gone out of print, it was reprinted (in two parts) in the Spring and Summer, 1976, issues of this journal. Thus we are happy to add Kamisar's recent article (Appendix A) to the permanent record of the continuing controversy. We expect that our readers will find his grim conclusions well worth pondering.

As it happens, Appendix B also concerns the wisdom of High Court rulings, in this case the infamous Dred Scott decision, and how Abraham Lincoln treated it. If nothing else, it is a timely reminder that courts and judges are not only resistable but also reversible.

Appendix C is an example of the kind of thing that regularly appears in the press. It is a rare week in which we do not receive some such article in our mail (more proof that abortion is "the issue that won't go away"). But this one seemed especially worth reprinting, given the current effort by abortion supporters to encourage women to tell their "real-life" stories. They can and do, often. But the usual motif is not justification, but rather guilt.

We conclude with a column by Joseph Sobran (Appendix D) on the same subject. As always, Sobran hits a different nerve, and illuminates something so obvious that others missed it (confirming another quote from Chesterton in his article: "Men can always be blind to a thing, so long as it is big enough").

Thus we conclude our 43rd number. The next issue will complete our eleventh year of publishing a journal dealing with what was once called a "single issue"—but which now permeates so many other issues that it has truly become what we always believed it would become, the moral issue of our lifetime.

J. P. McFADDEN
Editor
Thinking Clear:

Forced Abortions and Infanticide in Communist China

Steven Mosher

The immediate, primary task is to advocate each couple to have just one child. The result problems are secondary.

Chen Yun, member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, 1979

The eighteen women from Sandhead Village, all from five to nine months pregnant, sat on short plank benches facing the front of the room. Red-eyed from crying and lack of sleep, they listened listlessly as He Kaifeng, a commune official, explained why they had been taken away from their homes in the village and brought here into the town. “China must develop into a strong socialist state,” he was saying, “but whether or not we develop depends upon controlling our population. You are here because you have yet to ‘think clear’ about getting an abortion. You will remain here until you do.”

Sitting at a table in the corner of the room, I could not at first believe what I had just heard. I had been told by officials that the women had been brought to the commune town to attend “study sessions on the need for family planning.” Now they were telling the women something quite different: “You will remain here until you get an abortion.” These women were to be incarcerated until they submitted to an abortion.

One of the women in the back angrily muttered something to her neighbor. Her voice was pitched too low for me to hear all of what she said, but the words “children” and “Communist Party” came through distinctly.

He Kaifeng’s voice cut through this undercurrent of discontent suddenly, startling all those present. “Don’t say anything against the Communist Party,” this long-time local Party chieftain boomed out.

Steven W. Mosher, a Stanford University anthropologist, spent a year doing research in a rural Chinese village. He is the author of Broken Earth: The Rural Chinese (1983) and Journey to Forbidden China (1985), both published by Free Press (Macmillan, New York).
“The Party is very concerned about you. The Party is not saying that you are not allowed to have children, just that two children are enough, and that it is best to have just one child.”

You can’t expect women who have been locked up to view this as a benign manifestation of the Party’s concern for their well-being, I wrote in my notebook.

Fixing the women in the room with a steely gaze, He Kaifeng continued, “You must realize that none of you has any choice in this matter.” He spoke coldly and with great deliberation. “Your pregnancy affects everyone in the commune, indeed everyone in the country. You will be given a shot which will cause you to abort. If necessary, the fetus will be removed by caesarean.”

These words continued to reverberate through my head even after I had written them down. I struggled to keep my face impassive as muffled sobs came from some of the women.

He Kaifeng did not stop there. Addressing himself to the half dozen women in the room who were very close to term he said: “You who are eight or nine months pregnant should not think that you can hold out until you have your children naturally. When your time comes, you will be taken to the clinic by commune order.” Taking out a copy of the commune population control regulations, he read from it in a stern voice: “All children must henceforth be born in the commune clinic. The safety of over-quota children born in the commune clinic is not guaranteed.”

He was threatening these women with infanticide! The blood rushed to my face and I bent my head down over my notebook as if preoccupied with taking notes.

The pressure on the women to submit to an abortion continued throughout the long day. Finally, late in the afternoon, Chen Shunkui, another one of the many officials present, stepped forward to make an announcement: “It is time for all of you to decide whether to stay overnight at the commune or go home,” he said. There was to be a price exacted for the privilege of spending the night at home. “We will allow you to go home, but only to convince your husbands, mothers-in-law, fathers-in-law, or others at home that it is best that you have an abortion. You must first tell me that you agree to an abortion and are
going home to convince others. If not, then you must stay here tonight.”

Opening up a small notebook, he read out the first name on his list. “Lin Xinlan. Do you want to go home?”

Heads swung around to regard a woman flanked by two small daughters. She was staring fixedly ahead, to all outward appearances oblivious to this scrutiny. She did not reply to the question that had been addressed to her.

“Do you want to go home?” Chen Shunkui demanded, “Or would you rather stay here tonight?”

Lin Xinlan’s face, up to this point an expressionless mask, suddenly twisted into an agony of grief. “I will never abort,” she cried out loudly, and then broke down into sobs.

Ignoring her outburst, Chen Shunkui smoothly read out the next name on his list. “Su Shaobing.” A very young and very pregnant woman replied in a small, hesitant voice that she wanted to go home. “Good,” the cadre said quickly. “Go home and convince your husband and family that you should have an abortion. Remember that you have already agreed to have one.”

Chen Shunkui continued down the list, reading one name after another, asking each if she wanted to go home. Knowing that to go home was to agree to an abortion, most of the women refused. But their demurrals issued forth quietly, even fatalistically, as if they knew that this unequal struggle between powerful officials and themselves and their unborn children could have only one end. Only one other woman, whose only child was severely retarded, shouted out angrily—or was it fearfully—that she was going to bear her child regardless of what they did to her.

WHAT WAS TO BE DONE?

As an American research scholar sent to study life in rural China, I told myself, it was my role to observe and record, not to intervene. But my heart went out to these frightened, inarticulate village women who were being confined, browbeaten, and threatened by domineering male officials. Even though the issue was something as near and dear to these women as their bodies and their babies, I knew that they could not long resist the terrible pressure that bore down upon them.
I had not expected, when I arrived in a village in South China for a year-long stay, to be an eyewitness to women in their third trimester of pregnancy being coerced into abortions, nor had I expected to find infanticide used by the government as a means of controlling births. If I was profoundly shocked by what I had seen, I was also perplexed by the question of what to do with this unwanted information.

I saw that, as an American research scholar, I could be accused of intervening in the field were I to publish my research findings while still in China. More worrisome still, I would be putting my sources in considerable danger. Prudence dictated silence. So it was that for the remaining three months of my time in China I did nothing. I even tried, albeit with little success, to put the entire appalling business out of my mind.

In July 1980 after a lengthy trip by van into the interior, I exited China. Even then I was reluctant to immediately publish my findings. Instead I wrote first to the then Vice-premier in charge of family planning, a woman named Chen Muhua. “Canton province’s own population control regulations,” my letter to Vice-premier Chen read, “which forbid abortion after the sixth month of pregnancy, prohibit the use of coercion in abortion, and outlaw infanticide, are being widely and systematically violated in certain areas of the Pearl River Delta.”

In retrospect it seems that I was bending over backwards to give Peking the benefit of the doubt. Yet what was in doubt? Peking was almost certainly aware of what was happening in Canton. After all, this coercive campaign against births was not restricted just to the 80,000-member commune where I had lived. The procedures drawn up by the commune’s population-control group—including the threat against the lives of “over-quota” children—had followed a directive issued by the prefecture, a subdivision of the provincial government. What the provinces do openly in China, they do with the knowledge and approval of the central authorities. What I had observed in the Canton countryside was part and parcel of the national plan, directed from Peking.

Vice-premier Chen never answered my letter. But I did receive a response of sorts. Before the summer was out, a campaign of slander against my research and my reputation was in full swing. Peking had decided that here was a foreigner who had found out far too much
about conditions in the countryside. At least that’s what I concluded after hearing that the Ministry of Public Security—Peking’s KGB—had declared me to be an “international spy.”

Several months later my first article on the coercive population-control program was published. Its appearance unleashed a storm of criticism from academic circles in the United States—not against Peking, but against me. Angry sinologists predicted that my article would have a negative impact on U.S.-China relations, and would endanger the scholarly exchange program between the two countries. Professors at Stanford University, where I was completing a doctorate, put the matter in more personal terms, complaining in letters that further publication of my findings might lead to their being deprived of opportunities to do research in China.

Others made reference to domestic political considerations. Clifford Barnett, the former Chairman of Stanford’s Anthropology Department, was most explicit. “What will happen when the Pro-Life movement in this country becomes aware of what is happening in China?” he asked rhetorically, as if he could imagine no greater calamity. I was dismayed at what I took to be the suggestion that I should deliberately withhold legitimate research findings for personal ideological reasons.

Amidst all this hue and cry about the political consequences of publication, the substance of my reports was greeted with silence. I had not expected Stanford professors to be concerned about the abortion issue per se, since most of them supported it as a “woman’s choice.” But I had looked for some indication that they found infanticide repugnant, not to mention some dismay that women in China were being denied a choice. Only one member of the anthropology faculty even mentioned this issue, and his throwaway comment revealed “moral standards” that make a mockery of the phrase. He drew a parallel between China’s coerced abortions in the third trimester of pregnancy and the Reagan administration’s efforts to stop the federal funding of abortions. Both these actions, he wrote, he found “equally reprehensible,” as if the forcible taking of a human life could be equated with its preservation.

In short, I was urged by academics at Stanford and elsewhere to join with them in a conspiracy of silence about what was happening in China. I could not in good conscience do this, given my responsibilities as a scholar to the truth and my personal commitment to human rights.
I wrote back that I would continue to publish factual, objective reports about conditions in Communist China. At that point the anthropology faculty determined to launch an investigation into my “research ethics,” and with that decision began my long academic travail with Stanford University. Peking was only too ready to cooperate in this illegal action, providing a long list of unsupported allegations to the university. Deal with Steven Mosher “severely,” this secret document urged in closing. In a blatant violation of academic freedom, I was expelled from the Stanford Ph.D. program a year and a half later, denied the doctorate that I had been working towards since 1976.

A GRIM GAME OF NUMBERS

The state advocates and promotes fertility planning in order to achieve compatibility between population and various socio-economic development plans.

The 1982 Constitution of the People's Republic of China; Section on the Role of the State; Article 25.

What gives rise to the coercion and brutality that I observed—which continues unabated to the present day—is the system of birth by quota. Following a central plan drawn up by Peking, officials throughout China are told how many live births the population under their control are to be permitted each year. Since demotions and dismissal await those whose territories exceed their yearly allotment of babies, it is not surprising that many officials will stop at nothing to meet their quotas.

The problem began in 1979 when Peking adopted a long-term plan to severely restrict population growth. As originally drawn up, the natural population increase rate (births minus deaths) was to be reduced from the then 1.4 percent to 0.5 percent by 1985, and to zero population growth by the year 2000. Although these goals were later somewhat relaxed, China's leaders decided to hold the population under 1.2 billion by the turn of the century. It was soon apparent that this target virtually mandated a limit of one child per family.

In February 1980, Vice-premier Chen Muhua, to whom I was to write later that year, made this limit explicit: “We will try to attain the goal that 95 percent of married couples in the cities and 90 percent in the countryside will have only one child in due course.”

In theory these goals were to be achieved by a system of economic
rewards and penalties. Couples could still choose to have a second or third child but would be taxed for doing so. In practice these penalties were so heavy, amounting in some areas to a year’s income or more, that their imposition would have devastated many families economically. “The fines and other sanctions are nothing more than a plan to force women to abort,” one official in China admitted to me in confidence. Soon the one-child limit had become compulsory, and second and third pregnancies were to be aborted whenever they occurred.

If there was any doubt that coerced abortion and sterilization was de facto state policy, they were dispelled by Wang Pingshan, the Vice-governor of Canton province and member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, who made clear in the following interview who was responsible:

**REPORTER FROM THE Southern Daily:** Comrade Wang Pingshan, will you please tell us what is the technical policy of birth control, and how should we understand and implement this policy correctly?

**WANG:** The technical policy of birth control is formulated by the State Family Planning Commission with the approval of the leadership of Party Central. Its principal content is: “Those women who have already given birth to one child must be fitted with IUDs, and couples who already have two children must undergo sterilization of either the husband or the wife. Women with unplanned pregnancies must adopt remedial measures [i.e., abortion] as soon as possible.” This is based on the directives of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and the State Council and on the summation of family planning practices of many years.

**REPORTER:** With the current emphasis on sterilization of either husband or wife in couples with two children, is there any change in the policy of childbirth?

**WANG:** No, there is no change. According to the stipulations of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council, the family planning work in Canton must continue to do well in late marriage, late birth, fewer number of births, quality birth. To put it precisely, all state cadres, workers and employees, and urban residents, except for special cases which must be approved, may have only one child per couple. One child per couple is promoted universally in the rural areas. . . . It is hoped that the people of the province will abide by it voluntarily. Birth plan targets must be strictly set according to the policy on childbirth.
Vice-governor Wang’s references to “birth plan targets” and “unplanned pregnancies” were not made casually. By 1981 a nationwide quota system for births was in place. Shen Gouxiang, propaganda chief of the State Family Planning Commission, explained at the United Nations International Conference on Population held in Mexico City last year that:

... the national plan for population growth is based upon (China’s) actual demographic situation, the relevant data of which are collected from the grass-roots levels through various local governments and sent to the central authorities for analysis and study before decision is made. With the broad masses as the foundation, China’s population planning becomes practical and feasible, whereby targets for population control in different localities will be reached.8

What Shen Gouxiang didn’t say was that the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) has, in its own words, been instrumental in “introducing China to modern methods for population program management and related modern technology.”9 The computer systems and demographic training the UNFPA has provided to the State Family Planning Commission facilitates the state’s setting of quotas, such as these reported by the Liaoning provincial newspaper:

... At the end of 1982, the population of Liaoning province has reached 35.92 million persons. The state (i.e., the central authorities) has requested that by the end of the century the population of Liaoning province not exceed 41.5 million persons. That is to say, that in the next 18 years the annual population growth should be controlled to 310,000 persons. ... Whether the work can be done well in the next eight years will have an extremely great effect on the realization of the planned target for the end of the century assigned to us by the state (italics added).10

Once annual provincial target figures for births are set, they are then broken down proportionately by prefecture, town, and district. Each “unit”—a village, a factory, or government bureau—receives a yearly allotment of allowable births. Although it is the one-child-per-family limitation that has captured the headlines, the population control program actually goes well beyond the proscription of second and higher-order births to regulate the timing of first births. Couples are not only restricted to one child, they are allowed to conceive that child only after they have received written permission from the state.

The quotas that are given to the basic units are very small. In the
neighborhood I lived in, where previously newborns numbered 15 to 20 in any given year, an annual quota of only seven babies a year has been imposed since 1981. There are far more couples anxiously awaiting parenthood than there are “conception certificates” available, and the competition is intense. Many newly-married couples, as yet childless, must wait several years before they are awarded quotas.

Deciding just who gets a quota is the prerogative of local officials, who often set additional conditions such as sterilization. How this “licensing of first births” worked in one commune in South China was described to me by a population-control worker. “Every village will be given an annual quota of babies,” she explained. “Newlyweds who wish to have a child must apply to the commune birth control office for a birth quota. To receive this, they must meet two conditions: they must fall within their brigade’s yearly quota, and they must agree to have only one child.” Couples who conceive a child without first obtaining a permit will be ordered to attend birth control meetings, at which they will be pressured to accept the one-child limit and sterilization. “After all, sterilization is better than abortion,” this official concluded.

Such a rigorous quota system could not be enforced were Chinese society not already highly regimented by the Communist Party, operating without fear of political opposition. Every Chinese belongs from birth to a “unit,” and every unit is headed by Party officials. These men (for they are almost invariably male) wield enormous power over the lives of their subordinates, deciding who earns bonuses, who gets housing space, who gets good land, who grows cash crops, who gets married and, now, who has a child.

Local Party chiefs have been told in no uncertain terms that they must “grasp fertility planning work firmly,” and meet the quotas. “Although the task is difficult, the targets can be attained with strong leadership,” they are ceaselessly exhorted by higher-ups.

To further strengthen the resolve of local officials, they have been increasingly subject to various rewards and sanctions. From the early 80’s on, local leaders have been required to be exemplars of family planning, Peking-style. They are expected to be the first in their units to sign a single-child pledge, to abort a no-quota child, and to accept sterilization. Cadres who have been forced to severely limit their own
fertility will presumably be more zealous in limiting that of others.

Another scheme is the “officials job responsibility system,” introduced in 1982 and now implemented throughout the country. Under this program each local official has to guarantee in writing to his superiors that no one in his unit will violate the government’s “late marriage, late births, few births, quality birth” regulation. If every marriage is a “late” marriage, every birth is a “quota” birth, and all couples stop childbearing after one child, the official receives a commendation and a cash bonus. But if even one couple in his unit marries before the legal minimum age (approximately 24), has an over-quota birth, or has a second child, the official has his wages docked. With a financial stake in the state plan, it is not surprising that such officials bear down heavily on members of their units who threaten to violate it.11

Notwithstanding the awesome might of the Communist Party, no program which goes so counter to the wishes of the Chinese people could achieve perfect compliance. Some women do manage to become pregnant outside of the plan, often by having their state-inserted IUDs removed by so-called “black” doctors for a small fee. They keep their pregnancies secret, telling only their families, and avoid prenatal physicals, knowing that the clinic midwives will report their condition to the authorities. They continue to work in the fields as usual, binding up their abdomens under their baggy pants and blouses from the fourth month on so that they will not show. Many thus avoid detection until they are only two or three months from term. Others practice what is called “childbirth on the run,” leaving their home villages to live in the hills or in the homes of relatives in distant villages and towns. It is because of the prevalence of these forms of passive and not-so-passive resistance to the quota system that abortion in the second and third trimesters remains common. Although abortion is legally permitted only during the first three months of pregnancy, this law is violated with impunity by officials out to meet their quotas.

Those women who manage to carry their children to term face another gauntlet. Each woman brought into the delivery room must prove to the satisfaction of hospital Party officials that she has a quota for the child. Those who cannot produce a government-issued “birth certificate” are given an involuntary abortion. This is in fact infanticide, for it results in the death of a full-term, healthy infant. In South China
where I was, the child is killed by means of the “poison shot” into the womb or by strangling as it emerges. Michael Weisskopf of the Washington Post found that in one area of North China the usual method appears to be an injection of formaldehyde into the soft spot in the infant’s head, or the actual crushing of its skull by forceps. That this infanticide is carried out at the insistence of the government is indisputable. These operations are carried out in government hospitals and clinics by government doctors acting under the orders of Party officials.

According to the Chinese Ministry of Public Health, some 53 million abortions were performed between 1979 and 1984, a staggering number approximately equal to the population of England. An unknown but high percentage of these abortions, certainly over half, have been performed on women in the second and third trimester of pregnancy. An unknown but significant number of these, probably in the millions, have involved the killing of children as they are being born.

WHAT PEKING MEANS BY VOLUNTARY

Both husband and wife have the duty to implement fertility planning.

The 1982 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China; Section on the Basic Rights and Duties of Citizens; Article 49.

Peking’s initial response to reports of forced abortions and infanticide was to issue bland and unconvincing assurances that the program was being carried out following the Communist tenet of “mass voluntarism.” As evidence and criticism have mounted, however, governmental denials have grown increasingly strident. The policy of “one child per family” is “highly flexible” and is being carried out by officials who adhere strictly to the principle of “voluntarism” in their work, New China News Agency press releases claim. Peking has even taken to impugning the reputation and motives of certain critics by name. For example, I have been accused of writing about the campaign in order to “attack China.”

At first I was tempted to dismiss Peking’s self-serving denials out of hand. After all, the Communist Party is condemned by its own constitution, which reads that “Both husband and wife have the duty to implement fertility planning.” One cannot be bound by a constitu-
tionally-imposed “duty” to practice fertility planning, and yet still possess full freedom of choice. I had been an eyewitness to the coercion that resulted as the state sought to impose its own radical population goals on people whose personal ideals were quite different.

Since leaving China, numerous reports corroborating my own have emerged, and the government’s use of force is well documented. There is nothing in the process of fines, threats, and incarceration, nor in the abortion, infanticide or sterilization that follows, that can reasonably be called voluntary. It involves force, or the threat of force, at every stage. The high Chinese officials who were now claiming otherwise, I was tempted to conclude, were simply displaying the unprincipled duplicity that their class is known for in China. I was reminded of a group of officials from another twentieth century government, now defunct, that had likewise insisted that their population control program did not involve coercion, that people had gone “voluntarily” to the gas chambers at Dachau and elsewhere.

Yet could there be more to the Chinese government’s insistence that it cleaves closely to the principle of “voluntarism” than simple falsehood? The episode of Huiyang prefecture, a dozen fertile, rice-growing counties in Canton province, suggests that there is.

It was in Huiyang, in the spring of 1981, that orders went out that all unborn children over the quota were to be aborted. Force was to be used where necessary. Making a house to house sweep of each village in the county, local authorities rounded up expectant mothers, including many in their last months of pregnancy. The public security bureau of one county even issued arrest warrants for pregnant women on which the word “pregnant” was entered as the offense for which charged. These women were bound hand and foot, thrown into hog cages, and delivered by the truckload to rural abortion clinics. There they were strapped down on operating tables and aborted. This reign of terror lasted 50 days; the number of victims—mothers and infants—in one county alone reached 38,000.

At first the provincial authorities sought to discredit these tactics, identifying them as “leftist” errors. Then Peking stepped in, overruling the province in favor of the prefecture. The provincial authorities instantly reversed themselves, holding up the prefecture as a model for emulation throughout the province, and congratulating the Huiyang
Party Committee for making "a big show of strength," for its "great determination," and for observing "the [birth] target." Later, Peking singled out the Huiyang Party Committee for special praise, applauding its "speedy lowering of Huiyang's rising population growth rate through patient and meticulous ideological work among the masses."  

Still, there were signs that the powers-that-be were disturbed by some aspects of the Huiyang campaign. The prefecture was ultimately not held up by Peking as a model for other prefectures, perhaps because it exceeded the limits of "voluntarism." The Party official who had organized the campaign was transferred, though he was not otherwise punished. More frequent references to the need to refrain from coercion began to appear in the press and in directives. "No operation can be done by binding up a person and carrying him or her to a hospital for sterilization," Family Planning Commission spokesman Wang Liancheng was quoted as saying in 1983, in connection with a nationwide mandatory sterilization campaign. "No operation can be done without the person's consent." On March 8, 1984, the People's Daily reported that a conference of directors of family planning commissions of all provinces held a few days prior had agreed that, "On the one hand, we must control the population growth rate to realize the planned target; on the other hand, we must take the actual condition of some people into consideration. This requires that the family planning workers improve their work method and work style, refrain from coercion, strictly forbid any illegal and disorderly action, and carry out their work consistent with actual conditions and reasonably" [italics added].

Given the continued stress on aborting all unborn children whose mothers do not have a birth quota, it may not be immediately clear to the Westerner precisely what the Chinese government means when it instructs its officials to "refrain from coercion," or when it insists to the outside world that its population control program is "voluntary." For a working definition we cannot rely on a dictionary but must look to real life, PRC-style. This tells us that it is permissible to arrest a woman, take her from her home and family, lock her up some miles away, and subject her to grueling propaganda sessions. She can, in addition, be fined, harassed, and threatened. In the eyes of the government these measures are not in themselves "coercive."

Before the abortion itself is performed, however, she must have
ceased her resistance. She must have been made pliable enough to walk those last few steps to the abortion clinic under her own power, for at this final stage overt force cannot be used. Unlike her poor cousins in Huiyang, she can neither be taken under restraint to the clinic, nor can she be strapped down on the operating table. She must submit herself freely to the needle and the knife. As long as she does so, regardless of how much she has been brutalized up to this point, the Party considers the abortion or infanticide that follows to be "voluntary."

The true nature of the "mass voluntarism" that Peking claims characterizes its program is revealed occasionally even in official pronouncements. A member of the Chinese delegation to the Mexico City conference said: "Certainly people should be willingly involved in practicing family [sic] planning, but this is not tantamount to letting people do whatever they please to develop the population spontaneously."17 Minister of Population Control Qian Xinzhong was even more explicit in 1984. "The size of a family is too important to be left to the personal decision of a couple," he was quoted as saying. "Births are a matter of state planning, just like other economic and social activities, because they are a matter of strategic concern. A couple cannot be allowed to have a baby just because it wants to."18

Obviously, Peking officials are using "voluntary" in a tortured, Orwellian sense that means precisely the opposite of its true meaning.

Just how much coercion is there? In a survey of peasant preferences as to family size and sex of offspring I found that the official norm of one child per couple was totally unacceptable to my villagers. All of the women I interviewed stated a preference for two or more children; none were willing to stop at just one. Official surveys from widely separated parts of China have produced similar results.19 Based on the results of these studies I would estimate that of the 53 million abortions performed in the last five years roughly 90 percent, or 47 million have been involuntary.

From the 1946 Nuremburg Tribunals to the 1981 United Nations Symposium on Population and Human Rights, it has been repeatedly affirmed that compulsory abortion is a crime against humanity and a violation of human rights. China’s coercive population control program entails the most flagrant and widespread violation of these central principles in human history.20
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Just as official infanticide is the violent response of officials caught between the quota system and parental desire for more children, so female infanticide is the desperate act of parents caught between those same pressures. It is in the killing of newborn baby girls that peasant resistance to one-child controls finds its most tragic expression.

THE TrAGEDY Of FEMALE INFANCIDE

The problem is as old as China, yet as new as the coercive population policy. In 1980, when I was living in China, I asked village friends whether female infanticide ever occurred locally. The answer, which came with rather more heat than I had expected, was an emphatic no. "Ours is a land of fish and rice," one wrinkled old midwife told me in explanation. "All the people here have always been able to raise their daughters." She and others insisted that even under the old imperial regime girl babies had never been put to death, and she was old enough to know.

Yet less than two years later Chinese friends in Hong Kong who had recently been back to my village began to tell of girl infants dying soon after birth in suspicious circumstances. One young woman was even more candid, admitting to me that when her mainland sister-in-law had recently given birth to a girl, the baby had been murdered immediately. A bucket of water had been prepared beside the bed. When the newborn had the misfortune to be a girl, she was drowned.

Female infanticide isn't just an anomaly of the village I lived in. Beginning in late 1982 and continuing to the present, provincial newspapers throughout China have reported grisly tales of the murder of female infants. On March 3, 1983, the People's Daily itself, Peking's Pravda, admitted that "the butchering, drowning and leaving to die of female infants has become a grave social problem."

The "problem" varies widely from place to place, in some areas like the Pearl River Delta still rare, in other regions running rampant. One district in the capital of impoverished Anhui province reported that over 50 baby girls were drowned within a period of two months in 1981. Overall, an examination of the results of a recent census indicates a nationwide shortfall of over 230,000 female infants in 1981 alone.

Peking claims that these crimes are committed by "backward" vil-
lagers in the name of the “feudal” attitudes that “boys are precious, girls are worthless.” Male villagers, said to desire sons to “carry on the ancestral line and extend the generations,” have been especially singled out for censure. “In their keen desire to have sons,” the English-language Peking Review said in January, 1983, “some men still torment their wives who bear daughters and worse still, they kill the baby girls through neglect or outright murder.” If Peking is to be believed, many peasant men are ignorant and misguided monsters who willingly sacrifice their infant daughters on the altar of some feudal belief.

Nothing could be further from the truth. Infanticide does have a long and tragic history in many parts of China. But by the middle decades of this century, it looked as though this barbarism was on its way to extinction. In Chinese villages today, where ancestral land has long since been expropriated by the state and ancestor worship is on the decline, traditional notions of clan and family continuity no longer exert the influence they once did. These attenuated ideas could not possibly account for the sudden reoccurrence of female infanticide.

The wave of female infanticide sweeping China is a direct consequence of a population control policy which restricts families to one child, ignores the realities of old-age economics in the countryside and systematically denigrates the value of human life.

Sons are the only social security system known to villagers, for there are no pension programs in the Chinese countryside. Neither can daughters give long-term assistance, for rural custom decrees that they take up residence with their husband’s family upon marriage and sever all economic ties with their natal family. Thus, even if they were to keep a daughter at home, peasants say, it would be impossible to find her a husband. Those who are without sons must toil in the fields throughout their twilight years. As their strength declines to the point where they cannot keep up, they are assigned lighter work that pays scarcely enough for their rice ration. Old age becomes a long downward spiral of flagging vigor, worsening diet and weakening health.

While the arrival of a son has always been a more important event than the birth of a daughter, Peking’s policy of one child per family has raised the stakes. For the peasantry birth has become a kind of Russian roulette: The arrival of a son heralds a relaxed and secure old age; the coming of a daughter portends poverty and slow starvation during one’s
declining years. It is not “feudal nonsense” but brutal economic reality that moves the parents to hope for a man-child.

If the child isn’t male, then the choice is a stark one: Either kill or abandon the newborn female infant, reserving your one-child quota for the birth of a boy, or face a harrowing old age. It is no surprise that many peasants decide in favor of their own security, and trade the infant’s life for their own. Appalling as the abortion rate is in America, one shudders to think what dimensions it would reach if parents were forced to choose between their own unborn children and their social security pensions.

No overall statistics on the occurrence of female infanticide are published in China, nor are they likely to be, for the authorities are embarrassed by the sudden resurgence of this once-dead custom. But a look at data compiled in the 1982 census suggests the dimensions of the problem. This census revealed 1981 births of 10,765,292 boys and 9,924,412 girls, for a sex ratio of 108.5 males for every hundred females, or 1.085. This is well above the sex ratio at birth of 1.06 established by demographers as an international norm. In 1981 the number of female infants was less than that predicted by the norm by 232,000.

Not surprisingly, Peking has turned down requests for the sex ratios of newborns in the years since 1981. But the problem seems to be becoming rapidly worse. Chinese demographers in Peking have revealed privately to Westerners that the sex ratio climbed to 1.09 in 1982, and 1.11 in 1983. From this ratio and total births the actual number of female births can be calculated. Comparison with the world norm indicates a growing shortfall of baby girls, 300,000 in 1982 and 345,000 in 1983.22

China’s official explanation for these missing girl babies is scarcely credible. Shen Guoxiang, propaganda chief of the state Family Planning Commission, told Western correspondents during a press conference that “Chinese studies show the 1.085 ratio to be ‘normal.’” When he was reminded of the international norm and of earlier Chinese censuses showing much lower proportions of male to female babies, it is reported that he became angry and stalked out of the interview.23

The sensitivity of the central authorities to the question of female infanticide has been enormously heightened by the belated recognition
that both their one-child policy and their grass-roots representatives are silent accomplices in this tragedy. The English-language *China Daily* printed in Peking may publish editorials lamenting the resurgence of infanticide, but the strict enforcement of the quota system in the villages not only leads parents to commit this desperate act, it encourages local officials to overlook it. County, district and village officials who are rewarded or punished on the basis of whether they meet their birth quotas, do not find it in their best interests to discourage or prevent female infanticide. Each baby girl who dies at birth or disappears soon after is one less head that their superiors will hold them to account for at year's end.

In one incident which occurred shortly after I left Sandhead village, a young woman pregnant for the first time gave birth to twin boys. What should have been an occasion for rejoicing quickly turned tragic as local officials asked her which one she wanted. Both of them, she replied, but to no avail. One of the babies—she could not and would not choose which—was taken from her and put to death.

An official who oversees the abortion of women in their third trimester of pregnancy or the strangling of over-quota children is scarcely going to view the suffocation of a newborn girl by her parents or a midwife as a serious crime. After all, it is nothing more than he himself has done on numerous occasions.

THE LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES

Peking's aim is not just to achieve zero population growth, it is to produce a better breed of Chinese men and women. According to Vice-premier Chen Muhua, the Chinese program of eugenics is designed "to enable our future offspring to develop their moral, intellectual and physical capacities to the full. They will then become useful citizens for the Four Modernizations Program, and they will make the Chinese nation strong and prosperous."24

The darker side of the push for "quality birth" is the planned elimination of defective children in the next generation. The immediate rationale is that they are "a big burden on the country," and will impede the modernization campaign. In support of this argument it is pointed out that there are already 10 million children in China with congenital defects, including schizophrenics, the retarded, and the physically

24
deformed, who are said to be economically unproductive.  

This criticism seems unfair on the face of it, since neither the state nor the rural collectives provide significant assistance to the handicapped. Heavily discriminated against by society at large, they are supported in almost all cases by their immediate families. And to further reduce this "big burden," the central authorities have decreed that the congenitally defective will not be allowed to have children.  

More marriage restrictions that take advantage of modern technology are also under consideration. It has been proposed that couples should not be allowed to marry until they have submitted to a medical examination to determine that they are free from hereditary diseases. Amniocentesis, to date available in only a few of China's best-equipped hospitals, is also in line to be used to identify defective children for abortion.

I need not review here the entire range of moral and ethical questions raised by China's eugenics program. Like the population control measures as a whole, they involve the intrusion of the state into the most private areas of individual and family life. What definition of a "congenital defect" is the state going to impose on couples? In the case of possible mental retardation, are parents going to have to pass intelligence tests before being issued a quota to reproduce? Is the projected "economic productivity" of an unborn child going to determine whether he or she will be allowed to survive?

The pernicious effects of the eugenics program could easily spread beyond questions of reproduction into other areas of life. In the spirit of the times, a professor at Fudan University has already proposed a scale to measure a person's "quality" at the age of 45. A score of 5 is attached to moral quality; 10 to occupation; 10 to educational attainment; 5 to physical health; 10 to other qualities; and 60 for "creative ability." A physically-handicapped person will receive a score of zero for physical health, a criminal a score of zero for moral quality, while a mentally-handicapped person would receive a score of near zero for educational attainment, not to mention for "creative ability." Peking would find it child's play to impose this kind of social ranking upon the young to determine who would be allowed to reproduce, or among the old to decide who would be "allowed" to die.

Rightly suspecting that these measures will generate a negative reaction overseas, Peking has launched a preventive propaganda campaign.
The eugenics campaign should not be confused with that of the Nazis, it is claimed, for its goal is not racial superiority.\textsuperscript{29} In terms of human suffering, this would seem to be a distinction without a difference.

Another disturbing aspect of these new eugenics and population measures is that they are to be applied to China's racial and ethnic minorities, as well as to the Han Chinese majority. In the past the central authorities have repeatedly pledged to these groups, who comprise only 6.7 percent of the population, that they would be exempt from the new population policies and that their customs and traditions in marriage and childbirth would be respected.\textsuperscript{30} The rationale for breaking this promise and forbidding, for example, marriage among close kinsmen, is eugenic. Cousin-marriage is responsible for a high rate of physical deformities and mental retardation, Chinese propagandists argue, which must be eliminated to improve the "quality" of these groups.\textsuperscript{31} In reality, the main problems holding back Chinese minorities are high rates of illiteracy, the inadequate provision of medical care, and discrimination by the Chinese majority. To suggest that their difficulties reside in supposed genetic consequences of their "backward" customs combines the worst elements of racism and eugenics.

The reason why the birth-quota system has been extended to minority groups may have as much to do with longstanding racial antagonisms as with demography. "At present most of the national minorities have relatively high population growth rates," one population control official wrote. "If these are not controlled and fertility planning not instituted, then it is estimated that over the course of the next hundred years the Han [Chinese] population will decrease to 800 million and the minority population will increase to 300 million..."  

China's many minorities vary widely in numerical strength, from the over 12 million strong Kwangsi Chwang to groups with just a few ten thousand members. Imposing the one-child policy on these smaller ethnic groups, which are for the most part already in the throes of sinicization, raises the specter of cultural genocide.\textsuperscript{33} As the population control program reduces their number, it is inevitable that some of these groups will sink below the critical mass at which a people is capable of maintaining itself and its customs, and their culture will die out.

The growing shortfall of girl children will create a different problem over time. As female infanticide in the countryside continues, and the
sex-selective abortion of unborn girl children following amniocentesis becomes more common, the sex ratio is going to become increasingly skewed. Twenty years from now there are going to be millions of young men who will be unable to find mates. Since marriage has always occupied a central place in Chinese society, and remains universal even today, those men who cannot realize their strongly-held aspirations for a wife and family will probably see their lives as incomplete and unfulfilling. These reluctant bachelors should prove to be one of society's more troublesome elements. Not enjoying the settling influence of a wife nor the sobering responsibility of a family, one would predict that these singletons as a group would display more anti-social behavior, have higher crime rates, and perhaps even demonstrate a greater willingness to confront the juggernaut of state power.

Serious though the above-mentioned consequences are, they pale before the prospect of an aging population that the one-child policy raises. With each couple permitted to have only one child, the population of each succeeding generation will be roughly half that of the one gone before. The average age of the population will increase at an unprecedented pace. This process is already underway. At the time of the 1982 census there were only about 77 million people in China age 60 and above, constituting 7.6 percent of the population. This will increase to about 9 percent, or roughly 100 million people, by 1990.34 The country will be saddled with an increasingly unfavorable ratio of workers to dependents as time goes by.

To date the official response to these concerns has been that the problem of aging will not reach serious proportions for another 40 years, allowing sufficient time for policy adjustment.35 Criticizing this view as shortsighted, one Western China scholar has written: "... a period of 40 years is a very short time in demographic development. The policy makers obviously 'view population growth rates as amenable to the same type of short-term manipulation as other societal rates such as investment rates, interest rates, and unemployment rates.' They do not seem to have paid sufficient heed to the well-known demographic principle of the momentum of population growth. By the time a certain trend becomes noticeable, it can no longer be arrested because of the delayed effects of population measures."36

This view, while correct in its assessment of the impending demo-
graphic disaster, underestimates Peking's ability and commitment to, in the words of the 1982 constitution, "... achieve compatibility between population and various socio-economic development plans." When Peking finally falls into the demographic trap that it is setting for itself, it is fully capable of extricating itself by launching another population control movement, this time directed not at the very young but at the very old. The elderly would be declared to be "economically unproductive" and to constitute a "burden on the state." They would be sent to study sessions where they would be told that, "for the sake of the modernization program, they should 'voluntarily' submit to euthanasia." To wear down their resistance and that of their families, economic incentives would be offered, such as better housing for their son and daughter-in-law, an education for their grandchild, and a cash bonus to be awarded after the act has been committed. Sanctions would also be imposed, such as fines for each month they refuse to terminate their existence, or perhaps a reduction in the size of the fields leased to their family by the state. Ultimately it might come down to a quota system, wherein each village, factory, and office Party head throughout the country was told how many euthanasia "volunteers" he was expected to produce each year.

If some of these methods sound improbable, bear in mind that they are not creations of the imagination. They are in use, on a daily basis, in Communist China today.

THE HUMAN COST OF THE POPULATION PROGRAM TO DATE

Richard W. Walker, a well-known sinologist currently serving as our Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, estimated in 1971 that the Communist movement, over the course of its then 50-year history in China, had been responsible for from 34 to 64 million deaths. To these appalling numbers we must now add the human costs of the population control campaign. Deaths from female infanticide to date may have reached 1,300,000. Higher mortality rates among women of child-bearing age, a result of government denial of prenatal care to women pregnant with "overquota" children and the dangers of late-term abortions, suggest several hundred thousand more names must be added to the casualty list.

But the main cost of the program must be counted in infant lives.
Between 1971 and mid-1985, China's state-run abortion clinics performed over 114,000,000 abortions, a number greater than the population of Japan. Many tens of millions of these unborn children were executed late in term. Not a few were put to death at birth.

**Is The Program Really Necessary?**

In the name of modernization, the Chinese state is actively seeing to the death of live human beings. There can be no justification for murder. But let us put aside for a moment our fundamental moral objections and consider whether the case as put by the Chinese Communist Party is convincing on its own merits. Is it true that China can modernize only by radically reducing its population growth? Is it really the case that the population must be strictly limited to 1.2 billion by the year 2000 if the economic reforms now sweeping the nation are to succeed? Or has this policy been set by superannuated leaders whose lack of concern for the human suffering their policies are causing is only exceeded by their ignorance of the economic factors involved?

Certainly there is very little in the official press suggesting any awareness of the intricate complexities of the relationship between economy and population. Instead we find simpleminded rationalizations, such as the following joint promulgation of the Propaganda Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the Birth Planning Leadership Group of the State Council: “The Central Committee of our Party has said that our gross national product should reach an average of US $1,000 per capita [later reduced to US $800] within this century. In order to achieve this target, our GNP would have to increase at an annual rate of 8.6 percent if our total population did not exceed 1.2 billion. But if the total population reached 1.3 billion, then the GNP must grow by 9.6 percent annually. The latter rate would be very difficult to achieve.”

My first objection to population control, as it is practiced in China today, is that it is economically inefficient on the face of it. It is expensive to force a woman to submit to an abortion, especially in the second or third trimester of carrying an unborn child that she strongly desires to bring to term. The salaries of officials, the use of limited meeting rooms and other administrative costs quickly mount during the long meetings. Then there are the actual medical costs—the salaries of doc-
tors, the cost of equipment, the expense of abortifacient and other drugs, the cost of administration and overhead—which are also significant. The Canton provincial government estimates that it costs a total of US $865 to prevent one birth. This figure, almost three times the per capita GNP, is a substantial amount of the capital in China. Significantly, it is fourteen times the annual cost of supporting a child in China, of paying all his or her food, clothing, educational, and medical expenses. What this means is that it costs more in China to prevent the birth of a child than it would to set up a trust fund to raise that child from birth to age fourteen, when he or she would be, at least in the countryside, economically self-supporting. The amount required for such a fund would be about $500 (assuming an interest rate of 5 percent), resulting in a saving of $365 per child over the abortion program that could be invested in the economy. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the program is wasteful of China's scarce capital and is thus hindering, not helping, the modernization process.

My second objection is that the economic consequences of population growth and decline are still not entirely understood. A convincing case has been made by Professor Julian Simon that population growth, while it brings with it certain disadvantages, has advantages which more than offset these, making population growth a positive force. An expanding population creates business opportunities by enlarging demand and reducing risk. Expansion occurs in existing industries, allowing increased economies of scale, while investment in entirely new ventures becomes increasingly attractive. Human creativity, an important but difficult-to-quantify factor, also responds positively to population growth. Over the long run the contributions people make to knowledge more than offset the costs of raising them.

This is true even in an undeveloped country like China. After analyzing patterns of growth in Third World countries, Simon concludes that "moderate population growth leads in the long run to higher per worker income than does a constant-size population or very fast population growth." And what about the economic costs of having more children? "If one gives little or no weight to society's welfare in the far future, but rather pays attention only to the present and near future, then additional children have a negative effect," Simon states. "But if one weighs the welfare of future generations almost as heavily as the
welfare of present generations, then additional children now are a positive economic force.” Such analyses call into question Peking’s contention that future generations of Chinese will benefit from the sacrifice of roughly half of the next generation on the abortion table.

The attempt to achieve a per capita GNP of US $800 by the end of the century is ostensibly being made to improve the lives of the people. Yet, objectively speaking, elderly peasants would be far better off living with two sons, each of whom made $600 a year, than with one son who earned $700 a year. Even the provision of adequate retirement benefits in the countryside, which in any event does not seem likely before the turn of the century, is not the entire answer. Elderly Chinese parents like to have their children living with or near them not only for economic support, but for help when they are sick. And there are emotional needs for love, affection, and companionship that are better met by having two or three children—and grandchildren—than just one.

Anyone familiar with Communist China’s recent history will realize that what China needs most is not population control but political rationality and economic efficiency. This has been ironically confirmed in recent years by the abandonment of the Maoist collectives in the countryside. With the peasants farming in family units again, agricultural production has increased at an average annual rate of 7.9 percent since 1978, and rural yearly per capita income has more than doubled from $67 in 1978 to $155 in 1983. Nearly half of peasant housing in the countryside has been built since 1980. This dramatic economic turnaround—after years of rural stagnation—came about not because of population control but because the Peking Old Guard embraced a “new” economic philosophy in the countryside stressing private rewards and incentives. While still less than the growth rates of a freely-expanding market economy like Taiwan’s, growth has been significant enough to allow most peasants to gain a little breathing space on subsistence.

Whether or not the standard of living of the Chinese people continues to improve depends far more heavily on continued economic reform and political stability than it does on population control. When there are annual gains of 8 to 10 percent to be made by stimulating the economy, why does the Chinese state continue to expend such a disproportionate effort into curbing births, where the (negative) gains are
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expressed in fractions of percentages, and come only at great price? Does it really matter if the population is growing at 1.5 percent a year, or 0.5 percent, if the economy is expanding at several times that rate?

Even if Peking's contention that population control is critical to achieve modernization and ultimately improve the lives of the people were true, that would still not justify coercion. Is it really necessary to enforce the one child per family limitation so severely that peasant couples are driven to kill their infant daughters? Is it really necessary to control births to the extent of subjecting pregnant women to grueling brainwashing sessions, to constant harassment, to detention? Would it really derail the birth control program to stop the worst abuses by enforcing China's own ostensible laws, that is, no abortion after the third month of pregnancy, no coercion, and no infanticide?

Curbing the worst violations of human rights would require at a minimum putting teeth into the above-mentioned laws and abolishing the inhumane birth-quota system, which has caused the worst abuses. Transforming the coercive population control program into a largely-voluntary one would still leave China's birth rate very low for a developing country. Such a large proportion of young married couples have had one partner sterilized that, depending on how severely economic sanctions continue to be enforced, I estimate that the birth rate would rise by only 0.3 to 0.6. An increase in China's annual population growth rate from its current 1.1 percent to between 1.4 to 1.7 percent would not constitute a serious impediment to improving conditions in that country. Indeed, the end of forced abortions and infanticide would itself spell a striking improvement in the lives of ordinary people, especially women.

NOTES

2. The population control campaign that I witnessed is described in more detail in Broken Earth: The Rural Chinese (The Free Press, 1983), Chapter 9.
3. This trip is the basis of a book about conditions in the impoverished interior of the country, entitled Journey to the Forbidden China, (The Free Press, 1985).
11. This system is described in detail by Judith Banister in “Population policy and trends in China,” The China Quarterly, December 1984 (100), pp. 726-27.
13. Lo Ming, “‘Left’ has not been changed; it is a crime to be pregnant,” Zhengming ribau, July 27, 1981, p. 1.
19. For example, a 1981 survey in Hubei province of 728 rural women of child-bearing age showed that 51 percent expressed a desire for two children; 28 percent wanted three; and 16 percent wished to have four or more. Only five percent stated that they would be satisfied with just one child, a figure that is itself probably inflated because of the tendency of Chinese to pay lip service to the current official line. See Cheng Du, “Fertility survey in the rural area of Hubei province,” Renkou yanjiu, No. 5 (1982), p. 31.
20. This conclusion is supported by Judith Banister, one of America’s leading experts on China’s demography. See China’s Changing Population (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, forthcoming 1985), Chapter 7.
27. Ibid., p. 31.
33. See Journey to the Forbidden China, Chapter 6, for a discussion of this problem.


OFFICIAL WASHINGTON’S attention again seems focused on the large and apparently growing deficit in the Federal budget. Other questions on the national agenda, particularly the “divisive” social issues of abortion and family protection, have been pushed aside so that the White House and Congress can concentrate their collective mind on the budget crisis.

The supreme irony is, however, that these very social issues left unattended are creating their own budget deficit, one that will begin to affect Federal revenues negatively this year and that will quickly grow in magnitude after 1987. Alongside this gaping hole in future Federal fiscal accounts, the nation’s current deficit seems paltry.

This looming deficit is the offspring of an ideological change that occurred during the 1960s. The fundamental conflict of ideas, then as now, has been over the simple question: Is population growth a burden or a blessing?

“The Greatest Public Prosperity”

To understand the contemporary debate on the population issue, one must go back 200 years. The 18th-century political economist Adam Smith well understood that the only effective cure for mass poverty was the creation of a free, competitive economy. Population growth, he maintained, was the surest sign of such a healthy economic order. Smith did acknowledge that no animal could reproduce beyond the means of subsistence provided for it. Such was nature’s law. But man had found a way to transcend nature, he showed. What Smith called “the liberal reward of labour,” or rising wages, uniquely enabled human workers “to provide better for their children” and so “widen and extend those limits” which nature had set. Writing in his Wealth of Nations, Smith concluded: “The liberal reward of labour, therefore, as it is the effect of increasing wealth, so it is the cause of increasing population. To complain of it, is to lament over the necessary effect and cause of the greatest public prosperity.”
short, Adam Smith said that a growing population was the clearest evidence that the people in a free society were cheerful and hearty. In contrast, a stationary or declining population was the surest sign of a “dull” or “melancholy” system.1

Yet Smith’s wisdom and optimism were soon to be swept aside in the wake of the Rev. Thomas R. Malthus’s famed Essay on Population, published in 1799. Malthus himself was a gentle man, trying simply to understand the world. Yet the tragic consequences of the shift in ideas which he spawned are almost incalculable. Where Smith had welcomed population growth as a sign that the limits of subsistence could be increased, Malthus declared that such an increase was impossible. As he put it in his well-known calculation, human population grew in a geometric ratio, while food supplies grew only in an arithmetic ratio. For mankind, he added, the necessary and inescapable results were misery and vice. The law of population, Malthus concluded, “appears, therefore, to be decisive against the possible existence of a society, all the members of which should live in ease, happiness, and comparative leisure.”2

While Malthus modified his ideas in later editions, finally seeing hope through human abstinence from sex, his grim prediction of ever-increasing misery came to dominate economic thinking in the 19th century. It generated, in turn, rebuttals ranging from John Stuart Mill’s early advocacy of the contraceptive society to Karl Marx’s analysis of the coming proletariat revolution. In this debate, Adam Smith’s original understanding of the linkage between economy and population was all but forgotten.

Even as the facts repeatedly proved Malthus wrong, the power of the Malthusian idea continued to grow and reassert itself again and again in Western history. The panic instilled by the Malthusian ratio slowly became pathological, a disease of the Western mind. Indeed, it was transformed into a kind of intellectual herpes, composed of equal parts of doubt, fear, and unreason. Like the appearance of the herpes virus, Malthusianism would strike with particular virulence, then recede back into some obscure part of our civilization’s body, only to break out again in another place and time. Its most sophisticated appearance came in the mid- and late-19th century, when the so-called “classical economists” devised the theory of “optimum population”: calculations of the number of people for which the resources of a given territory could properly
provide. It wasn't until the 1920s that a new generation of economists reduced the "optimum population" idea to rubble through keen analysis and well-deserved ridicule. The Malthusian herpes receded.

Its most recent outbreak came in the 1960s, through the great panics over "the population bomb" and "the environmental crisis." Young adults were the targets for the scare stories devised by new Malthusian disciples and propagated through groups such as the Sierra Club and Zero Population Growth. The propagandists' common message was that America's prevailing three-child family system was an ecological disaster, the cause of all our miseries. The morally-superior act, they maintained, was to have no children, to become voluntarily sterile in order to save the world.

**Manipulating Family Preferences**

It is important to note that the return of the Malthusian disease in this manner and with this purpose was well thought out in advance by the advocates of population control. They sought to achieve their goals by first manipulating climates of opinion; policy changes, they understood, would follow as night follows day. Such an approach proved to be an unqualified success and deserves study as an example of "gently" coerced social change.

Writing in 1958 during the peak of the post-World War II baby boom, Malthusian planner Richard L. Meier described the "catastrophe" which continued population growth in the West invited. Many theorists, he noted, thought that coercive controls might be necessary to eliminate such growth and the three- and four-child family system which had created it. Yet Meier argued that there were alternative ways of achieving Malthusian goals. As he wrote: "Satisfying lifetime roles should be established which do not require parenthood, but would, in effect, discourage it . . . [under this system, a] fraction of the adult population could be depended upon to be sterile and this fraction must be modifiable by incentives normally available to democratic governments." The most effective strategy for increasing the number of sterile adults, Meier continued, would be to move women into jobs that required geographic mobility and so make a stable home and community life impossible: jobs such as truck driving, airline piloting, engineering, sales, and fire fighting. Easy divorce, he added, would also facilitate more sterile marriages.³ In
sum, the ideals of marriage, motherhood, and home should be purposefully eroded.

A few years later Edward Pohlman, writing in *Eugenics Quarterly*, frankly admitted the new opportunity for experts and elites to modify family size preferences among Americans. He wrote: "The population avalanche may be used to justify ... contemplation of large-scale attempts to manipulate family size desires, even rather stealthily." The goal, he continued, must be to reverse the existing climate of opinion so that small families and childlessness would be seen as "good," in noble cooperation with the needs of the nation and world. Meanwhile, the large family of three or more children should be recast as the "flaunting" of the common good for "selfish ends." Such a covert manipulation of opinion, Pohlman concluded, could best be achieved by winning over "the most prestigious strata" of the population and by securing "the blessing of government."4

And so it came to pass. First came the turn in elite opinion. A few examples must suffice. The most dramatic work of the new Malthusian propaganda was Paul Ehrlich's *The Population Bomb*. Published by the Sierra Club, it proved to be one of the most popular and irresponsible books of the late 1960s. Characteristically, the first step in Ehrlich's program of action was "to immediately establish and advertise drastic policies designed to bring our own population size under control."

*Look* magazine, still billed as a "family magazine," featured the article "Motherhood: Who Needs It?" in its September 1970 issue. Citing the "impending horrors of overpopulation," the *Look* article attacked what it called "madonna propaganda" and traced "almost all our societal problems" to "the kids who have been so mindlessly brought into the world." The *Look* article placed its hope in those "younger-generation females" who embraced careers and who recognized that "it can be more loving to children not to have them."5

A year later, Anna and Arnold Silverman released their book, *The Case Against Having Children*. Population expansion, they argued, was "the most potentially disastrous problem facing mankind." Poverty, disease, war, crime, and famine could all be blamed on "the excesses, greed, and selfishness of people who insist on having large families" of three or more children. Particularly villainous, they charged, were suburbanites, described as "those people who swim to the suburbs to spawn." Using an
argument enjoying increasing frequency, the Silvermans urged states to offer abortion on demand based on an "ability-to-pay." They also urged governments to eliminate tax deductions for dependent children, so that if parents "want the luxury of a large family they are going to have to pay for it."6

In Pronatalism: The Myth of Mom and Apple Pie, ZPG's Judith Sendrowitz joined with Ellen Peck to blast social attitudes and policies that encouraged reproduction or in any way exalted the role of parenthood. They mocked in particular "an undercurrent to . . . the way of life we know as 'the American Way': the way of motherhood and the family; the nostalgia of Norman Rockwell and the homeyness of apple pie." The "fact of overpopulation," they concluded, reinforced the need to question and eliminate such pro-family tendencies in American life.7 In short, by the early 1970s, the publishing and media elites had been converted to the Malthusian cause.

The War Against the Third Child

Then came the turn of government. The key Federal event undermining the existing American family system was publication of the 1972 report of the President's Commission on Population Growth and the American Future. Indeed, this widely-circulated document could have been appropriately subtitled "A declaration of war on the three-child family." Among the principle tools adopted in pursuit of this goal were the promotion of free abortion and attacks on any "tradition or custom" which affirmed parenthood and family.

Seldom in the history of major government commissions has the deck of "researchers" been so stacked at the outset, the conclusions so pre-ordained, and the facts so twisted to support those determinations. Virtually every social problem facing the nation, this report concluded, could be traced to overpopulation. From "racial antagonisms" to "wasted countrysides," all of our miseries could be blamed on the three-child family found in the nation's "spreading suburbs." As demographer Judith Blake explained in a supplemental paper, "It is clear . . . that long-run population stability will require either that Americans . . . restrict themselves to micro-families or that a substantial share of the population remain childless."

Major sections of the report were devoted to bizarre comparisons
between futures projected on a two-child and a three-child basis, one calculating that "the regional water deficits" under a three-child system would be precisely 110.6 billion gallons of water per day by 2020 compared to 52.6 billion under a two-child system. The report tossed out wildly misleading conclusions about the effect on Gross National Product of smaller families, suggesting, for example, that per-capita income would be 15 percent higher by the year 2000 under a two-child system, largely through the expedient fact of having fewer mouths to feed (under this logic, though, a zero-child system resulting in human extinction would eventually make us all millionaires). The report even glossed over the problem of paying for the dependent elderly by relying on the latter's high death rates to make sure that they wouldn't be too costly.

In sum, the Commission's report—while acknowledging the obvious fact that the three-child system would "cause more rapid growth in the size of the economy" and "multiply the volume of goods and services produced"—nonetheless concluded that there was "no convincing economic argument for continued national population growth." So much for science; economic growth, like other incidentals, would have to be sacrificed to the "population crisis."

The Commission also exploited the alleged crisis to advocate "that present state laws restricting abortion be liberalized along the lines of the [existing] New York state statute, such abortions to be performed on request." Judging from New York's experience, the Commission expected that free abortion would immediately reduce the birthrate by 8 to 10 percent, with further reductions to follow. Given the looming population crisis, wrote two legal scholars in a Commission-funded research paper, "it is indeed later than we think." They added: "If voluntary birth limitation is to be given a chance in the United States, either the courts or the legislatures . . . will have to knock out our vestigial abortion law prohibitions." The U.S. Supreme Court, of course, soon obliged. Liberalized abortion thus joined economic stagnation as the price that must be paid to eliminate the three-child family from the American scene.8

The impact of such ideas on the "baby boom" generation just then emerging into adulthood was extraordinary. Ehrlich and company became part of the staple diet on most university and college campuses. Textbooks were speedily rewritten. Young minds were "freed" from tradition, only to be recast in the Malthusian mold. Addressing her 1969
commencement at Mills College, graduate Stephanie Mills spoke for her well indoctrinated senior class and generation: “Our days as a race on this planet are numbered,” she said. “We are breeding ourselves out of existence. Within the next 10 years we will witness widespread famines and possible global plagues [raging] through famine-weakened population.” Mankind, Stephanie added, was “like a great unthinking, unfeeling cancer.” She concluded: “I am terribly saddened by the fact that the most humane thing for me to do is to have no children at all.”

In short, the planners had won, first by manipulating opinion and then by turning opinion into policy. A new social ideology now reigned in America. By the mid-1970s, large families had become obscene; small families and the “child free” lifestyle stood as the norms guiding enlightened behavior. Dramatic statistical changes followed. As late as 1967, 55.3 percent of American women, ages 30-34, expected to have four or more children. By 1982, only 11.5 percent did. Motherhood had lost its aura. Indeed, to be a non-parent had become in some circles a badge of honor, the ultimate exercise of responsibility. By way of contrast, bearing a third or fourth child stood as a political act, a minority statement of protest against the new Malthusian ascendency. America had been turned upside down.

**Turning Against the Planners**

This was the past. The future can be different. It is time to unmask the twisted population theories that still dominate our Federal polity, that justify in economic platitudes the annual abortion of 1.5 million children, and that threaten us with economic ruin. The best place to start is with a yet-to-be-recognized fact of economic and political life: the “Malthusian deficit” that is being created at this very moment by the zero-growth mentality that reigns in our land. Where does this new deficit come from? It derives from the population requirements of current social security and defense policies, in collision with our abortion culture.

Turning to the first category—social security—it is critical to note that the early theorists of the comprehensive welfare state were clear on one point: a social security system cannot be maintained in a nation with a declining population. In such a land, they recognized, the growing proportion of the elderly relative to the young would eventually bring the whole system tumbling down.
The clearest thinking on this question came in a volume co-authored in 1934 by the Swedish social democrats Alva and Gunnar Myrdal. Entitled *Kris i befolkningsfrågan* (*Crisis in the Population Question*), this book served as the theoretical underpinning for creation of the comprehensive Swedish welfare state. Stridently anti-Malthusian, the volume argued that the long-term stability of Sweden's welfare structure depended on the enactment of pro-family, pro-natalist policies that encouraged fertile married couples to bear a minimum of three or four children per family. Alva Myrdal subsequently raised the necessary minimum goal to five children per family. If small families predominated, she and her husband said, the whole social security network would be endangered through the aging of the population.\(^\text{11}\)

It is true that Swedes today (including the Myrdals) generally choose to ignore this correct formulation. It is also true that our Federal government, institutionally dominated by anti-birth prejudices, also ignores the hard truth. Yet the consequences of doing so are beginning to grow apparent. Former Social Security Chief Actuary A. Haeworth Robertson, for example, calculates that under projections based on current reproductive behavior, total payroll taxes will have to grow to over 40 percent of my children's salaries in order for government to pay the benefits promised to me.\(^\text{12}\) Other projections of looming fiscal disaster for all the nations of Western Europe (and even Japan) could be cited. The social-security edifice world-wide is being undermined by the Malthusian disease.

National defense makes the other giant claim upon the U.S. Federal budget. Unlike Social Security, Medicare, and most other Federal programs (aid to education, national parks, etc.), though, defense spending *has no direct relationship* to population size. Orders for Trident submarines and Pershing missiles, for example, are not made on the basis of whether the U.S.A. has 200 or 300 million people. Rather, defense decisions are based on matters such as the offensive capabilities of potential opponents. The mandated costs are then borne by the population that exists. This means that a given system of defense is purchased at a lower *per capita* cost by a larger population and that more taxpayers make the defense of our nation and civilization *less* expensive, when the costs of such defense are allocated to each household. In order to carry the
defense burden, then, a growing population seems in the long run to be necessary.

Yet beginning this very year, the needed people will increasingly not be there. The number of legal abortions in the United States began its steady climb upward in 1967, at first through the loosening of state prohibitions and then, after January 1973, as a consequence of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in *Roe v. Wade*. For the last five years, the figure has hovered around 1,500,000 legal human abortions annually. In 1985, the vanguard of these lost children would have reached age 18, ready to become full actors in the American economy. After 1987, the number of such "economic ghosts"—potential working and creating Americans lost to abortion—begins to grow rapidly.

Now it is true that if legal abortions simply replaced illegal abortions, one for one, there would be no net economic loss. However, recent research has shown that the level of illegal abortions between 1940 and 1967 was much lower than previously assumed, reaching as low as 39,000 in 1950 and averaging less than 100,000. These figures suggest that most of the lives now being eliminated would be with us under different legal arrangements.\(^{13}\)

**Calculating the "Malthusian" Budget Deficit**

Which leads to the question: What would be the impact of 1,500,000 new lives on the U.S. economy? If the children lost to the saline solution, scalpel, and suction pump in any recent year had lived, what would be the difference?

In developing this equation, one can be very complex or very simple. The results either way, it turns out, are remarkably similar. So in the interests of understanding, this writer opts for simplicity. Second, in making such a calculation, it is best to suspend moral and ethical judgments for a time and think like modern economists, avoiding value-laden terms like "mother love" or "compassion" and turning instead to matters such as incentives.

With these preliminaries in mind, let us proceed with a few assumptions:

1) **We shall assume that for the first 17 years of their lives, people are consumption goods, having economic value as emotional objects alone.** In contrast to earlier times, children no longer make a significant net
contribution to family income. Nor do children any longer serve as
investment goods, as they once did when parents bore children in order
to insure their own personal support in their old age. Instead, children are
wanted as objects to love, as perpetuators of the family name, or for other
economically-irrational reasons. Even those who would have been
aborted become so wanted either by the decision of the mother after birth
to keep the child or through adoption.

2) We shall assume that persons at age 18 are transformed from con­
sumption goods into potential producers of goods and services.

3) When projecting the individual's earnings into the future, we shall
neatly cancel out two factors: a) an expectation that real earnings will
rise, on an average, by 2 percent a year; with b) an expected average
annual discount rate of 2 percent. 14

4) In calculating the average income of persons age 18 and above, we
shall use the figures on average income provided by the U.S. Census
Bureau. The mean, or average, money income for all U.S. men, age 18
and over, was $17,208 in 1981; for all U.S. women, age 18 and over, the
average money income was $7,684. The beauty of these figures is that
they include all adult persons, whether or not they are working, whether
such work is full or part-time, and regardless of their race, marital status,
or retirement arrangement. As such, they immensely simplify our calcula­
tion. In sum, the people that are conjured up here will be thoroughly
average. 15

5) Assuming that mean money income for men and women has
increased by 6 percent annually since 1981, we arrive at figures for 1984
of $20,494 for men; $9,151 for women.

6) Among all Americans in 1981, 18 years and older, .474 were men
and .526 were women.

7) A reasonable "economic multiplier," measuring the stimulative
impact on one person's economic activity on others is, in this case, 2.5. 16

The calculated annual impact on national income of 1,500,000
economically-active additional lives would then be:

\[
\text{Men: } 20,494 \times .474 \times 1,500,000 \times 2.5 = 36,428,085,000 \\
\text{Women: } 9,151 \times .526 \times 1,500,000 \times 2.5 = 18,050,347,000 \\
\text{Total Additional Annual National Income: } 54,478,432,000
\]

It is true that during the course of their lives, persons do to one degree
or another draw upon "social funds" for support, including public educa­
tion and social security. These drawings represent, in a social accounting sense, negative contributions. How should these costs be dealt with? In his recent look at this problem, economist Marvin DeVries calculated that an additional 1.5 million people would run up total social welfare costs (in 1983 dollars) of $240.9 billion during the first 18 years of their lives and after retirement at age 65. Assuming an increase of 6 percent for 1984, we arrive at a figure of $255.4 billion. Divided by a working lifespan of 47 years, we then have an average of $5.434 billion to be deducted annually. This leaves a net annual increase in national income of $49,044,432,000 even after these “lost children” have in effect paid the social costs for their education and retirement.

The numbers become more dramatic when we look at their cumulative impact. Since 1967, approximately 17.5 million American children have been legally aborted. If they had all lived, their economic impact in the single year 2010 would have been (in 1984 dollars):

\[
\text{MEN: } 17,500,000 \times 20,494 \times .474 \times 2.5 = 424,994,320,000 \\
\text{WOMEN: } 17,500,000 \times 9,151 \times .526 \times 2.5 = 210,587,380,000 \\
\text{TOTAL: } 635,581,700,000
\]

Assuming that approximately 20 percent of income is absorbed by Federal taxes of one sort or another, these never-to-exist taxpayers would have generated roughly $127 billion in tax revenues in that year alone. That “easy” revenue, though, is already lost forever.

Let’s carry the tale one step further. If legal abortion in the U.S. continues at the same level up to the year 2000 (1.5 million annually), that will mean another 22,500,000 never-to-exist adults. Together with the already counted 17.5 million, their economic impact in the single year 2025 would have been (in 1984 dollars):

\[
\text{MEN: } 40,000,000 \times 20,494 \times .474 \times 2.5 = 971,415,600,000 \\
\text{WOMEN: } 40,000,000 \times 9,151 \times .526 \times 2.5 = 481,342,600,000 \\
\text{TOTAL: } 1,452,758,200,000
\]

Of this $1.45 trillion in additional national income, some $291 billion would have gone toward the Federal Treasury.

These figures represent “the Malthusian deficit” or, if you prefer, “the abortion deficit” which we are bequeathing to our shrinking number of children and grandchildren. Even if our contemporary politicians find the courage and common sense to solve the existing deficit problem, it may
be that they do so only to fall victim during the next decade to the "Malthusian deficit" which is being created right now.

The Economic Consequences of Abortion

What conclusions can be drawn from all this?

First, our economic futures are threatened by the abortion culture. Human energy and imagination are the qualities that power a modern economy. Any system which legally destroys each year a large proportion of its future stock of energy and imagination is engaged in a self-destructive, suicidal act.

Second, the justification of abortion for economic reasons, which is still frequently heard, is fraudulent. The Malthusian reasoning behind "the population crisis" of the 1960s proved to be completely wrong, as it has in other times and places for nearly 200 years. Books like Ehrlich's *The Population Bomb* are read today as anachronistic jokes by the scientific community, and would be so read by the general public if it was not for the continuing grip of Malthusianism on key figures in the popular media. Whatever arguments may exist in favor of abortion on demand, the economic fate of the nation or world is not among them.

Third, for the generation just now entering adulthood, the message is clear: it is a socially-responsible act for married couples to bear children; indeed, it is a socially-responsible act for them to create a moderate-to-large family if they so choose. It is time for young Americans to repudiate the "limits of growth" which Malthusian agents have imposed on their lives. In demographics as in economics, such "limits" are a mirage for a free people. Rather, it is those children now or soon to be born who will provide the new wealth allowing the American people to be both generous and secure in the century and millennium about to dawn.

NOTES

14. The discount rate measures the difference between the interest rate and the rate of inflation and is used to deflate future earnings into present value.
16. This multiplier assumes a marginal propensity to consume among Americans of 0.60.
18. "But what about Ethiopia?" is a common contemporary report. The fact is that "overpopulation," in the Malthusian sense of limits on resources and food supplies, has nothing to do with the tragedy of that land. Rather, the political and "planning" failures of Ethiopia's Marxist-Leninist government are the primary causes of the human catastrophe found there. On the obverse side, "overpopulated" China recently experienced an enormous jump in agricultural production through the simple device of allowing farmers to sell their produce in a partially free market. In short, "overpopulation" occurs only in those socioeconomic systems that frustrate economic liberty.
NOT LONG AGO I interviewed a young man named Curtis Beseda, who is doing twenty years in a federal penitentiary for bombing a few abortion spas. (I know they’re not spas, but “clinics” hardly seems like the right word either.)

It was a startling conversation. Beseda is a very bright fellow, though without intellectual affectation. I have seldom met anyone so direct. He decided it was up to him to save the lives that were about to be taken in these places, so he used gasoline and matches to prevent it. He took care not to hurt anyone, but for him that wasn’t the main thing; shutting down a concentration camp might have required the risk of injuring or killing those who operated it. Beseda keeps all the complications in mind, but he also keeps the issue in focus.

After four firebombings, he was arrested. He had fled to Canada and was crossing the border into Washington when they caught him. Did he confess?

“I testified—not ‘confessed’—that I did all those fires,” he told me. He explained that it wasn’t an act of protest or civil disobedience. It was sheer abortion prevention. He didn’t expect to sway the multitudes, as he puts it. He only sought to accomplish what he did, in fact, accomplish: saving a number of lives. When atrocities are being done, “Gee,” he said, “there’s only one thing you can do.”

So federal authorities charged him with something about “maliciously damaging or destroying real or personal property affecting interstate commerce.” This may not sound like much, but it got him the twenty years. He didn’t complain about the draconian sentence. In fact, he told me, “twenty years is not proper deterrence. If you want to deter me, show me that it’s wrong, which will be difficult, because it’s not.”

All the same, he would prefer to abide by the law if he could. After his capture he wrote in USA Today: “Seldom, almost never, should even an unjust law be disregarded.”

Joseph Sobran, our Contributing Editor, is a nationally-known columnist and commentator.
It is a little surprising that more people don’t take his view. But most abortion foes are too staggered by the sheer numbers—1,500,000 or more abortions a year—to think of trying to accomplish anything by direct action. Maybe violence is the wrong course, but at least Beseda thought saving a few lives was worth something, even if he couldn’t change the law. His attitude makes one a little ashamed to be on the law’s side, especially considering that an abortionist can now pass for a law-abiding citizen, and may even be paid by the state for what he does in the way of “interstate commerce.”

Times have changed. A few years ago the editorial page moralists were all deploring the inaction of three dozen New Yorkers who did nothing as they saw Kitty Genovese murdered and raped in the yard below their apartment windows. Those witnesses weren’t prosecuted. Curtis Beseda is at the other extreme of concern. He was prosecuted.

The two cases aren’t parallel, but together they show which way modern society is going. The message is “Butt out.” At least that’s part of the message.

But there’s another part too. Consider the recent rash of “Baby Doe” stories. All have revolved around passive infanticide, and it’s symptomatic that deformed children whose parents are known should be tagged with the anonymous “Doe,” as if to signify that they are being disowned.

While dozens of people in each case have offered to adopt the little Doe child, dozens of editorialists and op-ed columnists have heaped compassion on the parents for facing a “painful decision.” As we know, Macbeth also faces a painful decision, the difference being that he loses our approval when he makes it. Mr. and Mrs. Doe seem to win approval in advance for the decision to let their child die.

Reflecting on one of these cases, a Washington Post columnist edged toward the infanticide position (the one pro-lifers used to be ridiculed for saying was just around the corner) and ended on a self-congratulatory note: “We have all grown up.” That is, we are learning that we can’t apply “simple solutions” to “complex problems.” One example of a simple solution would presumably be “Thou shalt not kill.”

I have watched this particular columnist with fascination ever since. He is a perfect specimen of the sort of people I like to call “morally hip.” He embodies in his daily musings the current phase of moral fashion (or is it dissolution?) at any point. Twenty years ago there were only a few scat-
tered murmurs for legal abortion; even Planned Parenthood's official literature insisted on the distinction—the all-important, essential distinction—between abortion (which "kills a baby") and contraception. At that time, there was also no such word as "sexism"—a word that has never yet been defined, but stands for a whole set of attitudes that are unanimously condemned by the morally hip, the "we" who have "grown up" about things like infanticide.

My fellow columnist has kept pace with the changes. He favors abortion, damns sexism, and discreetly hints that if the rest of the crowd wants to go on to killing infants, Barkis is willin'. This is to be expected. What I marvel at is the idea that everyone else has an obligation to go along with the crowd too. It is somehow immoral to lag behind and cling to the Decalogue. The notion of a permanent moral code strikes him as quaint; the notion that a morality that isn't permanent isn't even morality is totally beyond his comprehension. He follows the party line—or is it a cocktail party line?—and expects the rest of us to do so too. He acts as spokesman for an orthodoxy of flux. Unlike Curtis Beseda, he is free and prosperous.

People like him live happily with rubber law and institutions that change with the seasons. They have the courage of their conventions—an amazing confidence that whatever is, at just this moment, is right. Their characteristic terms of censure are "immoral" and "outdated," which are pretty much interchangeable. The great duty they acknowledge is the duty to move on.

Such people aren't very interested in what may lie at the end of the road of progress, because they don't really believe that progress can ever end: it just keeps right on progressing. They measure it not by any actual improvement—with no permanent standards of good and evil, how would they recognize improvement? and how can they do anything but mock those who speak of "degeneration"?—but by "how far we have come." This too is to be expected. If we were all agreed that things were degenerating, we would put a stop to it. No decline can continue without a powerful corps of pseudo-moralists to interpret decline as some sort of amelioration. Without delusion, no degeneration. It's probably an iron law.

"Men can always be blind to a thing, so long as it is big enough," G. K. Chesterton wrote in *The Superstition of Divorce*. We all have a tendency
to be enveloped by both degeneration and the delusion that sustains it. It takes an effort to stand back from "social change" and see how odd is the society one presently inhabits, against "that monster custom, who all sense doth eat of habits evil."

How has our traditional sense of right and wrong become so unraveled? Chesterton spoke of "the modern and morbid habit of always sacrificing the normal to the abnormal." He is worthy of quoting a little more: "There is a spirit penetrating all our society today by which the exception is allowed to alter the rule; the exile to deflect patriotism, the orphan to depose parenthood, and even the widow . . . to destroy the position of the wife. . . . He who is detached, disgruntled, nondescript, intermediate, is everywhere made the excuse for altering what is common, corporate, traditional, and popular. And the alteration is always for the worse. The mermaid never becomes more womanly, but only more fishy. The centaur never becomes more manly, but only more horsy."

Exactly. I have repeated myself time and again on the point, but I will risk it again: the first push for legal abortion was supposed to minimize the evils of a practice that was already happening anyway. Now the abortion rate is several times as high as it ever was when it was illegal, and abortion advocates push to make it more widely available. They have gone from admitting it is evil to insisting that it is a right—"a fundamental human and constitutional right," as they now hold.

We see the same pattern at every level. Poverty programs were supposed to help the black urban poor. Since poverty caused crime, the programs would also reduce the crime rate. Today the crime rate is higher than ever by far, and black illegitimacy has nearly tripled. But we have also grown so used to these things, and to their worsening, that we think nothing of it when "experts" insist that we need to redouble our federal anti-poverty efforts. But it is considered heartless and insensitive to suggest that we need more severe law enforcement and a return to traditional sexual morality. Too many people have learned to enjoy profit and pleasure by playing the angles of the new system. The descent is easy; a return to normal would entail painful readjustment.

I choose these examples purposefully. They illustrate something. As we have destroyed old structures of family morality and obligation, we have created new structures of civic morality and obligation. The new civic duties have nothing to do with respecting your neighbor's life, liberty, and
property; they involve an abstract obligation to provide for strangers you have never met. The agency of provision is the octopus of national economic redistribution. The Census Bureau reports that 30 per cent of the population now receives money from Washington. As personal fidelity and loyalty are downgraded, a premium is put on “compassion”—the alleged duty of caring about unseen others, “the poor.”

Now it is obvious that 30 percent of the nation isn't “poor,” any more than a million and a half women a year fall into the “hard-case” categories of rape and incest that were originally used as the rhetorical wedge for legalizing abortion. What is emerging is simply a whole new system, based on a radically different principle from the old one.

Under the new system, we are less and less related to other members of our own families. Relations of flesh and blood are disparaged as “accidents of birth.” The petulant child who says he didn't ask to be born is now taken at his word. The state permits or promotes divorce, contraception, fornication, illegitimacy, homosexuality, and abortion. Even its campaigns to detect wife-beating and child abuse may be less innocent than they seem: they are signs that the family is under suspicion and surveillance.

Meanwhile, we are more and more closely related to each other through the political economy, which takes the wealth of some for the benefit of others. Even the Reagan Administration has been unable to reverse the steady drift toward total socialism. Too many powerful people and interests—obviously not just the poor—have a stake in the new arrangements.

And these arrangements only increase the economic pressure on the free family. The combination of inflation and redistribution has pushed everyone who works for a living into higher tax brackets, so that most married women now work to make ends meet. It is startling to recall that before World War II, most people didn't even pay federal income taxes. The change has been gradual but enormous. The personal exemption has increased from $600 to $1000 since 1948, but today's $1000 is worth only about a fifth of the real value of $600 in 1948.

Such facts have been noticed by economists, but their real importance hasn't yet hit home with the general public. What they signify is a profound change in the way Americans are related to each other. We are increasingly related to each other politically and decreasingly related to
each other by kinship and personal affinity. Family relationships are made more fluid, while our membership in the redistributive system gets more inescapable.

I am often struck by that human blindness to big things Chesterton spoke of. We find ourselves uncritically accustomed to peculiar institutions that might astonish an outsider. Modern men are appalled at the idea of the Spanish Inquisition; it never occurs to them that they may be living under something comparable.

In retrospect, historians see that the Spanish Inquisition was part of a profound change in Spanish society and even Spanish identity. And yet one can imagine that it seemed unremarkable and unobjectionable to the typical Spaniard. He assumed that religion was the first of human and social necessities, the basis of any civic order. It wouldn't do to have heretics and hypocrites subverting that order, would it? And while he wouldn't want to run afoul of the Inquisition, he was not likely to be the sort of man it would arrest. He probably saw its work as essentially good, disliked the sort of people who would complain about it, and was as willing to put up with its occasional punishment of the innocent (as he understood innocence) as we are to live with the risk of auto accidents. In a word, the average Spaniard probably understood the Inquisition to be an institution entailed in his whole way of life.

Are we so different? We congratulate ourselves on having no such thing as a religious inquisition, but that may be because we are a secularized people who prefer to live with perils to the soul and social morality for no better reason than that we don't believe in either.

But we do believe in economics; and so we have an economic inquisition. It doesn't use physical torture or burning at the stake; but then this is incidental. We don't use such punishments for rapists and murderers either.

The point is that we do take for granted the state's right to make a complete and minute inquiry into every detail of our personal finances. Its agencies can summon us in to give a full account of ourselves. In doing so it abridges our personal privacy, our protections against unreasonable search and seizure, and our right against self-incrimination. The burden of proof is on the defendant; the presumption of innocence vanishes. Nominally, the tax inquisitor is a public servant; but as Milton
Friedman asks, does the citizen called in for an audit feel he is talking to his servant? Naturally the average citizen hopes he won’t be summoned, but he dutifully makes his annual report and accepts the whole system as entailed by our way of life. And maybe it is. But maybe it should raise questions about our way of life.

At the other end of the redistributive system, those who receive the money collected in taxes seem to have fewer anxieties about being caught. The producer of wealth who holds out on the tax collector is likely to be punished. The recipient of federal aid who is caught cheating is likely only to lose the aid, not to go to jail; and he faces nothing like the huge apparatus of surveillance, record-keeping, collection, and enforcement that is deployed against the taxpayer. It is the taxpayer who is the object of suspicion and who faces advanced techniques of intimidation and humiliation. The young man who, say, welshes on a college loan will be comparatively unscathed. He probably won’t even have his salary garnisheed.

It should be possible to raise revenues with less indignity to the taxpayer, through a system of sales, excise, or other pay-as-you-go taxes. But the reason any such reform is improbable is that a system armed with the inquisitorial powers is much better for the purpose of inducing a sense of dependency and defensiveness in the citizen.

By all this I don’t mean to complain that the tax system is unjust; I am trying to point out how it actually works. The redistributist state recognizes no moral limit on its right to take from the productive. And in order to keep the citizens quiescent, it has to create a sense of its overwhelming power and complexity. It “has something” on nearly everyone; it can force any trouble-maker to prove his innocence.

At the same time, it resents all economic activity that goes on outside its own channels. Partisans of the redistributionist order condemn independent enterprise for its “greed,” a charge to which the order itself is somehow immune, since all its activities are conducted in the name of “the poor” and “compassion.” Even the welfare cheat fortifies this order, because by the mere act of participating in it, however fraudulently, he increases the ratio of redistribution. From the order’s point of view, he is a customer. The tax evader is the only real threat to that order. It can afford to neglect violent crime while it pursues the tax hold-out; it doesn’t
feel menaced by the ordinary thugs. The citizen who doesn't pay taxes, however, is refusing to participate in the ever-expanding order. He must be brought in by whatever means necessary.

For similar reasons, the redistributive order can't be expected to rouse itself against illegitimacy. The woman who bears children out of wedlock is also increasing the participation ratio. Nobody personally favors illegitimacy as such; but the dynamism of the system rewards and doesn't penalize it. In this sense the system has a will of its own, independent of the ideology of those of its partisans who think of it as merely "helping the poor." The structure of sanctions favors some forms of behavior as against others. So married women are having fewer babies these days, and unmarried women are having more.

Among the many changes we are hardly aware of has been a shift in the meaning of the word "tax." Not long ago it was understood on all sides that a tax was a levy imposed to pay for the operation of government as it provided common services to all. It was never thought of as money taken from some private individuals to be given to others. With this elementary distinction in mind, a federal appeals court found the Social Security system unconstitutional in 1938, only to be overruled by a Supreme Court more in tune with the emerging order. It was a fateful moment. From that point on, there was no real limit on what the state could take from the citizen, except the practical political limit of the moment. Under the Reagan Administration there has been a slight remission of the tax rates, but no decrease in federal spending. On the contrary, the federal budget has increased by a third since 1980—which amounts roughly to an increase in spending from $3000 to $4000 per citizen. Total spending will probably reach one trillion dollars next year.

To most citizens this is bad enough; but they see it only as "higher spending," not as the growth of a system with vast moral implications for our whole way of life. Every economic order expresses a moral order—a set of assumptions about who is responsible for and to whom, who has a claim on whose efforts, who may take and who must give, and, finally, who is free and who is not. Feudalism, slavery, Communism, and various forms of capitalism have given their differing answers. At the heart of each is a definite conception of human nature.

At the moment, the U.S. economy is said to be "mixed." This only
means that its sovereign principle of order hasn’t been defined clearly yet and that things at the moment are in a state of flux. Laws are changed, passed, repealed, amended, struck down, and simply multiplied at a fantastic rate. What was criminal yesterday may be a right tomorrow; a former freedom may become a future obligation.

So far this hasn’t seemed to be a problem. Our general respect for our institutions causes to accept as legitimate whatever the state decrees. Not for nothing do we congratulate ourselves on the stability of the American polity.

And it may be that we will all acquiesce in the emergence of a new order that would have horrified our Founding Fathers, because we will be conscious of no discontinuity. The gangrened limb gets numb, doesn’t it? Chesterton speaks of people who are so intimidated that they are half-ashamed even when they claim their rights.

But it is also obvious that there is something irrepressible in us that insists on expressing itself, however abruptly and inarticulately, against wrong. The smooth talkers may justify every feature of the prevailing power, but there will be the occasional man who says no. If people feel that despite all the rhetoric of universal compassion they are simply being robbed, they will either quit working or quit paying taxes; the chronic drunkenness and absenteeism of the Soviet Union bears witness. If they feel that no matter what the Supreme Court says, abortion is simply wrong, they will go ahead and have children they would rather not have to support; now and then they will even firebomb abortion clinics.

The redistributive order redistributes more than wealth: it also demands a redistribution of affect. We are to be moved by poverty thousands of miles away—in Ethiopia, for instance. But we are to suppress our normal reactions to evils in our own neighborhoods. We aren’t supposed to act like Curtis Beseda when we see an abortion facility erected nearby; we’re supposed to act like Kitty Genovese’s neighbors, and mind our own business.

Beseda is clearly maladjusted. He hasn’t “grown up,” like my columnist friend, on abortion. He butted in when he should have butted out. And he is being punished. Twenty years from now, when he is released from prison, he may find himself in a society where everyone is named Doe.

I want to applaud his courage. At the same time, I suspect that he has
grasped only part of the whole situation. It isn’t merely that our law concerning abortion is wrong; the present law is only a tiny part, a corollary, of the new order we inhabit. The basic assumptions of that order are materialist. When we speak in its idiom, we almost automatically conceive of ourselves as interchangeable units. With that order, there is no such thing as sin—only maldistribution or “social injustice.”

Those who are spiritually immersed in the new order will feel toward people like Curtis Beseda an alienation deeper than any disagreement. To them, opposing abortion is not so much wrong as it is baffling. The prolifer is to them like an astrologer at a stockholders’ meeting. He seems to be talking about something totally unrelated to what they understand themselves to be engaged in. They are separated from him not by a single doctrine or proposition but by an entire frame of reference; a thing big enough that men can be blind to it.

Western society may be reaching a condition of division so vast that people on both sides will find it hard even to specify the nature of their differences; a point where we can no longer even agree to disagree, because there won’t even be agreement as to what we are disagreeing about; a state of mutual unintelligibility, in which we won’t even be able to say “We.”
Making Pictures

Susan Austin

She floats above my work space like a calm boat above a restless sea. Her skin is transparent; the light shines through it to reveal her bones and blood. One stubby hand floats beside her mouth; the other half-curls around a thick translucent umbilical cord. Her eyes are closed. She has the intense serenity of an ancient stone carving of the Buddha.

She is a fetus, a "product of conception"; I taped her picture above my desk to remind myself what these words mean.

Her picture affects my consciousness directly and concretely. She is not an argument or a logical "proof." I do not analyze or categorize her. She transmits to my senses something like a direct experience.

When I describe her, I do not appeal to the reader's analytical brain. I attempt verbally to do what she does for me visually—that is, to make a direct, instantaneous impression which bears the character of immediate experience. I am making a picture with words.

In a wide sense, the term "picture" can be used of any attempt to communicate experiences directly to the understanding. A picture can be a powerful tool in any kind of persuasive argument. But in the abortion debate, "pictures" have become a matter for controversy.

The cause of the controversy is what must surely be one of the most powerful and moving of all pictures related to abortion: a sonogram film, with commentary, of an actual abortion, called by Dr. Bernard Nathanson (who made and interprets the film) The Silent Scream. It has caused an uproar.

Right-to-life groups are scrambling to show it to their members. President Reagan has said that he thinks it will move Congress quickly to outlaw abortion. On the other hand, a New York Times editorial has basically denounced it as a pack of lies. Pro-abortion groups call it "propaganda" and promise to counter with their own films about abandoned babies and women mangled by illegal abortions.

The uproar is over the film itself, but the deeper and unexamined ques-

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tion is not whether the film shows what it seems to show, but whether pictures ought to be used at all in this particular public debate. Perhaps they generate only heat and no light, and ought to be discarded.

Even those who are solidly against abortion can be made uneasy by pictures. Some of them would like to dissociate themselves from the pictures of mangled fetuses which have been brandished with such recklessness and stridency. They seem nervously afraid that pictures are the tools of radicals and bomb-throwers. Rational people, they think, do not use pictures: they use rational argument. They are afraid that to assault the emotions with the experience of a picture is sentimental and irrational. Not that they have a quarrel with the motive of the picture-brandishers! But they would rather that premises be laid out squarely and conclusions validly drawn.

However, the unease of some anti-abortionists is as nothing compared to the scorn of pro-abortionists. "Propaganda" is not the worst of the epithets hurled at the pictures carried by picketers of abortion clinics. Every picture, without exception, is made to be part of a campaign of deceit: "They take pictures of a twenty-week fetus and tell you that it is twelve weeks." Or, in a more judicious tone, "They show a picture of little feet, claimed to be those of a ten-week fetus." Why "claimed to be"? The implication is that the picture-brandishers are telling lies.

A famous (pro-abortion) women's health manual, talking about the effort to get Roe v. Wade overturned, comments, "Right-to-life groups appeal to legislators' emotions with slides and pictures of mangled fetuses (when in fact an early abortion removes fetal tissue that is at most 3/4 to 1 inch long)." Without saying it in so many words, they intend you to believe that the pictures are downright falsehoods. Presumably the condition of being mangled is totally incompatible with the condition of being one inch long. Ergo, the pictures are not pictures of anything real. (What, I wonder, looks like a mangled fetus but isn't a mangled fetus?) But the contempt of this comment reaches further. It is not the picture itself, but the attempt to reach emotion by means of a picture, that is truly despicable.

(In this regard, one notices that when this health manual comes to treat of pregnancy and motherhood—after its units on birth control and abortion—it does not discuss nor show any pictures of the development of the fetus. This, it says, is for reasons of space. But how lucky they are
not to have something in their own manual which might undercut their abortion position by an appeal to emotion!

The virulence of pro-abortionists' scorn for pictures of mangled fetuses might lead one to think that they themselves use nothing but sweet reason to present their case. Of course this has never been true. Their "pictures" can be as misleading and emotional as anything of which they accuse the anti-abortionists.

An advertisement for Planned Parenthood appeared in the New York Times on October 7, 1984. A sweet, enormously pregnant young woman (representing "Teenage Pregnancy") sadly pats her large tummy with one hand and clutches a teddy bear with the other. (Only a hard-hearted cynic would dare scoff at the notion that today's sophisticated teenagers still take their teddy bears to bed with them!) Apart from that slight implausibility, the ad makes the perfect impact. Who is not going to be emotionally upset at the picture of a pregnant child?

The questions that later arise belong to the realm of rational discourse. Why are these teenagers getting pregnant? Will "sex-education" as advocated by Planned Parenthood really result in a reduction of teenage pregnancy? Is abortion better for teenagers than bearing a child to term? If so, better in what sense? (Morally? Spiritually?) Can an organization which advocates the destruction at will of unborn children really claim that it is acting "For the Love of Children," which is apparently PP's motto?

The advertisement, however, does not want you to raise these questions: it is an emotional appeal. Allow us (it says) to show you a picture of a pregnant child. Are you instinctively revolted? Very good. Just send us a "tax-deductible contribution" and write your legislator supporting legal abortion. Then all will be well.

This is one kind of picture used by the pro-abortionists. Another is more graphic, more on a par with the "mangled fetuses." Here is a description of how Bill Baird got into the business of abortion-advocacy, told to a political science professor who quotes it in his book Abortion. It is a "picture" in the wider sense, a verbal attempt to communicate an immediate experience, and is intended to assault the emotions:

In New York City, I heard a woman scream going into a hospital. . . . I ran into the hallway and saw this woman, who looked to be about 30 years of age, literally staggering. I was still pretty fast back then and I ran after her and I caught her. As I held her for a moment, I let her slide to the ground and I noticed the lower part of
her body was totally covered with blood and she had an eight-inch piece of wire
sticking in the uterus with which she had obviously tried to abort herself when she
found she was pregnant for the ninth time, on welfare, but single and in those days,
you could not get birth control pills if you were single. That was the law of New
York. So the woman died right before me.2

This gruesome and horrifying tale is not meant to deceive anyone; it is
simply Bill Baird’s description of what led him to become an activist in
the attempt to repeal the abortion laws before Roe v. Wade made such
attempts unnecessary. Nevertheless, this kind of tale has been repeated
over and over again by the pro-abortionists until the coat-hanger abortion
has taken on the status of myth. It has powerfully shaped the convictions
of a large portion of our society, who are “personally opposed” to abor­
tion but do not want to see it made illegal. Why not? “Well, I don’t want
us to return to the days of coat-hanger abortions . . .”

Once again, certain questions might be raised in the realm of rational
discourse. What were the days of “coat-hanger abortions” really like?
How many women died screaming in agony? One? Two hundred? Ten
thousand a year? When that number is bandied about, as it still too often
is, then the use of the coat-hanger picture slides over into deception. A
public health physician, Dr. Herbert Ratner, commented on that in 1967:

The total number of deaths of women in the reproductive age period is...50,000
yearly. If the 10,000 figure were correct it would mean that one out of five women
between the ages of 15 and 45 who die dies of an abortion. This hardly leaves
room for deaths from other causes. Deaths from cancer, cardiovascular and kidney
disease number by themselves about half of the 50,000 deaths of women between
the ages of 15 and 45. Deaths from automobile and other accidents number
another 7,000. Additionally, there are lesser numbers of deaths from influenza and
pneumonia, cirrhosis of the liver, diabetes, tuberculosis and all of the numerous
other causes.3

But the ten thousand a year figure is still used.

Another question: consider the woman who, when abortion was ille­
gal, risked perforating her uterus rather than (for example) bearing the
child and abandoning it on Bill Baird’s doorstep. Such a woman is
obviously feeling completely desperate about her pregnancy. There is
something in her situation which puts enormous pressure on her. Bill
Baird and the society he represents have committed themselves (on her
behalf) to their own solution: legal abortion. But clearly there is another
possibility, which is to relieve the pressure of her situation, so that she
SUSAN AUSTIN

will no longer feel desperate about her pregnancy.

It is, in other words, within the realm of theoretical possibility that when the woman died in his arms, Bill Baird could have taken a firm resolve to give his life in service to the poor, to establish foundling hospitals, to make milk, meat, and clothing available to every woman and child who needed it, and out of love for each least scrap of humanity, to say publicly: “If you do not want the child, give it to me, and I will take care of it.” Only of course, had he done that, he would not have been Bill Baird, but Mother Teresa.

Is the better answer to “coat-hanger abortions” Bill Baird’s or Mother Teresa’s? It is an interesting question to contemplate, but it belongs in the realm of rational discourse. The “picture” of the coat-hanger abortion does not itself invite us to ask that question. It simply makes an appeal, direct and irrational. “Are you instinctively horrified by my gruesome picture? Then support abortion-on-demand.”

Pictures, then, are not just a tactic of pro-life radicals. Whoever dismisses them with scorn on one side must dismiss them with equal scorn on the other.

But must they really be dismissed with scorn? Is there no legitimate use of pictures in a debate? This is the question which all the controversy over the truth or falsehood of The Silent Scream does not approach, and it is something that needs to be addressed. The question of whether the sonogram is a true picture or a pack of lies is not my point. (In any case, I am not expert to judge.) Let us grant that in all cases the truth should be told, both in words and pictures, and that falsehood has no place in any debate. But if The Silent Scream shows what abortion is really like, may we show it? May we brandish pictures outside abortion clinics? May we use pictures to make our arguments for us, or do we thereby yield to irrationality?

Obviously a picture cannot tell us what is wise and prudent to do, but in its painful assault on our emotions, it is a goad for action. It pricks and moves the will, first to discover, in however stumbling a fashion, what ought to be done, and second to do it without delay.

Rational argument, much as we profess to admire it, has not half the power to spur us on to action. I once sat in a class with twenty other students reading St. Anselm’s proof for the existence of God. Most of us found it quite convincing in the rational order. But not one of us was
ready on those grounds to commit our lives to this One Who is “greater than anything that can be conceived.”

Or (to take a less exalted example) suppose you were to read the following: Alcohol in the bloodstream, even in minute amounts, can cause impairment of reflexive and non-reflexive actions, reduce the response time of the brain, and by its depressant effect on the central nervous system cause a feeling of well-being which can result in the abandonment of elementary prudence. Therefore one ought not to operate any heavy machinery, including automobiles, under the influence of alcohol.

Would you be convinced? Probably. To the point of getting a friend to drive you home after New Year’s Eve? Probably not.

Now suppose you were in a New York subway train gazing up at the advertising posters. There right in front of you is a gruesome picture of a very smashed car, upside-down, surrounded by police and other officials looking grim. And the caption, in bold letters, reads: “Don’t be dead drunk.”

Isn’t this a picture you might remember with a vague shiver on an occasion when you’ve had “one for the road”? The Highway Safety Commission obviously thinks so.

Fund appeals, of course, know very well the value of a picture or a “picture” in the larger sense. They do not read simply, “Dear friend, Please send as much money as you can to St. Jude’s Ranch for Children, where we do our best to take care of battered and otherwise abused children.” No, as we all know very well, they begin, “Dear friend, This is Tommy. Last week he came to us with cigarette burns on the soles of his feet and a scar an inch deep on his cheek, which he got when his mother threw him through a window. Now he is at St. Jude’s Ranch for Children where we are trying to do our best for him. But we can’t do it without your help. Please send us as much money as you can.” The two letters do not differ all that much in the realm of rational discourse, but the second letter will send the hand to the wallet quicker.

So pictures act better than reasonable arguments to turn people on to a cause. The danger is that we will be turned on so fast that we will act in the matter before we decide what is wise and prudent to do.

Abraham Lincoln is supposed to have greeted Harriet Beecher Stowe, the author of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, with the remark, “So you are the one
who wrote the little book that made a big war.” An exaggeration, of course, because one picture, no matter how inflammatory, does not lead by itself to civil war. But the “picture” war was horrible and incendiary before the real war itself broke out—some Southerners responded to *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* by cutting off the ears of their slaves and sending them to poor Harriet—and there is no doubt that these things set the stage for the explosion that ensued.

Very few of those who use inflammatory pictures want a civil war over abortion. Really, we do not even want the issue settled by a shouting match. Nearly everyone agrees that it would be best for the fabric of our community life if we could sweetly and rationally decide what is wise and prudent to do. In that case, given the danger of pictures, should we agree to leave them out?

The problem is that we need to act, we need a goad, because the question we are debating is urgent. We are not here engaged in a leisurely inquiry about the nature of virtue (though I think such an inquiry is also seriously important) but we are examining a question of life and death. If ever a need for action was imperative, it is now: fifteen million dead children is not a thing to be casually ignored, even in our violent and bloody century. Not because we need to make the topic any more inflammatory than it already is: but because we humans are constitutionally lazy, we need the pictures of the mangled fetuses and little feet, bodies floating in bloody trash cans, and, of course, *The Silent Scream*.

What about the threat from the pro-abortionists to make their own films and show their own pictures of misery? If we need the pictures of chopped-up babies, do we also want more pictures of pregnant children and coat-hanger abortions, not to mention abandoned children and large poverty-stricken families?

About this threat there are two interesting things to notice. First, that such a battle of pictures can take place in a way that would have been impossible over the issue of slavery. What if the Southerners had threatened to write a heart-rending novel of their own, emotionally portraying the wretchedness of plantation-owners deprived of their slaves? No matter how one tries, one cannot imagine such a counterpoint to *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* being very convincing.

In that sense there are two sides to the abortion debate as there are not two sides to the slavery issue. Unborn children suffer unspeakable wrong
in being ripped apart and killed, yet at the same time there are women who are truly brought to misery by childbearing. (Perhaps the number of these women is not one and a half million yearly, but that is not a question to be gone into at this point.)

It is good that everyone who is in misery be given a voice, and if it takes emotional pictures for a case to be heard, then let the emotional pictures be used.

But will the effect of the pictures of unhappy women ruin the effect of the pictures of the mutilated children? If Planned Parenthood starts screaming as it promises, will the Silent Scream no longer be heard?

This brings me to the second interesting thing to be noted about the abortion picture war. To make my point, I will describe a letter I once got (asking for money, naturally). I do not have the letter, so I am relying on memory and to a certain extent, making up what was in it, but it is substantially a true account of letters that have actually been written.

It began with a description of a woman. I think she was a teenager, and, of course, pregnant. Everything that could be wrong was wrong. She was dependent on her parents, and her father wouldn’t let her set foot in the house if she was pregnant. Her boyfriend, the father of her baby, on being told of this proof of his virility, told her, “That’s your problem,” and went off whistling. She had no money, nowhere to live, no means of supporting a child, no possibility (given her incomplete schooling) of getting a job. She didn’t have the emotional maturity to raise a child even if she could have done so financially. She didn’t have the money to see an obstetrician, and, in fact, she didn’t even have the money to get an abortion.

Are you now asking yourself what on earth I have done to get myself on Planned Parenthood’s mailing list? Obviously this girl needs an abortion, and not only that, but the injustice that forbids the poor to have their abortions paid for by Medicaid (leaving abortion as an option only for the rich) is such blatant discrimination that it needs to be overturned at once. Right?

Oddly enough, it is wrong. This pitiful letter did not come from Planned Parenthood, but from the pro-life Christian Action Council. It was a fund appeal letter asking support for their Crisis Pregnancy Centers, which offer assistance to women who need help to carry their children to term. I quote from their statement of principle:
SUSAN AUSTIN

The CAC is committed to creating an awareness within the local community of the needs of pregnant women and of the fact that abortion only compounds human need rather than resolving it.4

To return for a moment to the woman who died in Bill Baird's arms: it is possible to use her story—there are pro-life groups who are using stories like hers—not to slap the poor in the face with the ultimate insult of abortion, but to appeal to the hearts and minds of the community to give them the help they need.

So there is a fatal flaw in the pro-abortion side of the picture war. Their pictures cut two ways. But a pro-life picture of a bloody fetus can only mean one thing.

NOTES

Abortion in Literature

Eileen Farrell

"It may be time again for women to publicly tell their own stories," a prominent feminist announced not long ago. What kind of stories? Why, "real life stories" about the anguish of inconvenient pregnancy. Attention would have to be refocused, she said, on the paramount issue—"woman's choice." Her conviction was that, by the force of their raw emotional appeal, real-life woman's-choice stories would soon put an end to extraneous issues such as the fate of the unborn. And the nascent being, made visible by ultrasound techniques, who usurped the TV screen and the newsprint for a few short days, would go back to having no voice and no choice, and, insofar as possible, no effective advocate.

But such stories, for all their attempts at persuasion, are always essentially vapid, like the contents of "Dear Abby" or "Ann Landers" columns. You could read them endlessly and remain unenlightened about human nature, whereas when you read fictional stories about women named Anna Karenina, or Kristin Lavransdatter, or Emma Bovary, for instance, you can grasp something of the mystery of human life and human passions. For fiction is an incarnational art in which one can find a larger portion of truth about the human condition than in "true confessions." The reason, as Professor R. V. Young has said, is that literature "seizes the fluid sweep of experience and holds it up for contemplation, [drawing] meaning and purpose out of apparent chaos."

Professor Young, and also Professor John T. Noonan, have both reflected on literature's testimony about abortion. It is valuable testimony that ought to be recalled periodically. I propose to add to it here by calling other witnesses from (mostly recent) literature. Some of them live on in fiction, some in poetry. Some come from masculine, some from feminine pens. All of them, in Professor Young's phrase, offer the authentic representation of significant experience, from which springs a moral value.

The moral value, it seems to me, is the value of the choices that we

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make. Women, men—human beings all—define and refine themselves by their choices. In the case of choices about unborn life, they may, intentionally or inadvertently, define someone else too. But it ought to be noted here that the claim implicit in the “pro-choice” label is essentially fraudulent. From Eden to today, life has never ceased to be a question of choices—not the freedom to make them, which is a given, but the need to make rational ones.

Literature, in seizing the fluid sweep of experience, has always been about choices too. From our English literature, I have extracted a score of choices about unborn life, all of which, in one way or another, testify to the wretched character of abortion. Almost all are distinctively 20th century, but the first one, made by the famous Mrs. Flanders, which dates from early in the 18th century.

If anyone could testify to the turmoil of inconvenient pregnancy, Moll Flanders\(^5\) could. After her marriage to her “Lancashire husband” had broken up for mutual want of a fortune, she found herself alone and pregnant, a desperate plight for a woman in her day, even a woman as resourceful as Moll. Who would blame her for hoping that her acute distress would invite a miscarriage? But the pregnancy progressed, and soon she made the acquaintance of a midwife known as Mother Midnight who “suggested something to make me miscarry.” Moll, who may be our literature’s first witness to the abortion industry, recoiled. “I soon let her see that I abhorred the thoughts of it,” she said, and she gave no account of the “nature of the wicked practices [which also included traffic in infants] of this woman . . . it would be too much encouragement to the vice.”

The vice certainly flourished before and after Moll’s day. Nevertheless, abortion did not enter the mainstream of literature for nearly two more centuries. None of the memorable heroines of English fiction had a word to say about it. And Dickens, whose eye missed little of life’s miseries and injustices, left us no abortionist, no distraught girl seeking or being taken off to one. Thus Moll Flanders may be the earliest and, for a considerable time, the sole defender of the unborn and stern judge of the practice of abortion. That she was less than impeccable in other matters simply makes her repugnance for abortion more compelling.
Reluctant Fathers, Golden Girls

When abortion resurfaced in 20th century literature, new elements were introduced. The choice was sometimes in the hands of callow young men who had got their sweethearts "in trouble." They urged their quick solution to inconvenient pregnancy on the girls with the firm assurance that there really wasn't anything to it. The girls, whether or not they sensed the horror to come, wanted mainly to please. In the end, all of them demonstrated what the choice of abortion does to the main participants; in two cases there were no survivors.

Jack Townsend, the campus hero in O'Neill's one act play Abortion, the upwardly-mobile Clyde Griffiths in Dreiser's novel An American Tragedy and the footloose American in Hemingway's story, "Hills Like White Elephants," all wished to cancel the new lives they had engendered. The girls had little influence on what was a man's choice in these affairs.

The first girl (a lowly townie whose college-boy lover in O'Neill's play was already engaged) was dying of a botched abortion financed by the boy's indulgent father. When the girl's brother came to the campus, gun in hand, to exact justice, young Townsend seized the gun and turned it on himself.

The second girl and her unborn baby also died, though not as a direct result of abortion; the unwilling father died too, somewhat later. Clyde Griffiths in the Dreiser novel sought an abortion for Roberta so he could marry another girl ("It isn't anything that's going to hurt you," he told Roberta, "I know."), but the doctor could not be persuaded. So Roberta was taken instead for a boat ride that ended with her death by drowning in an apparent accident. Retribution came when the drowned girl's pregnancy was disclosed. Clyde was apprehended, convicted of murder, and sentenced to death. In his cell he had time to reflect on his choices: "Murder . . . the murder of Roberta . . . the death of that unborn child too."

The third pregnant girl, whose name was Jig, was still alive at the close of Hemingway's story, but her joie de vivre (it was she who made the figure of speech about the hills that "look like white elephants") was marked for destruction as surely as was her baby. According to the rejecting father, the operation he was urging was "awfully simple . . . not really
an operation at all ... just to let the air in.” Jig, who wanted the baby to live, eventually seemed to give in, but with an air of betrayal and deprivation.

Jig and Roberta and Jack Townsend’s girl seem to be types of the acquiescent female born too early in this century to have benefited from so-called assertiveness training. But actually these girls appeared on the literary scene somewhat after the archetypal pro-chooser, Gloria Gilbert, had taken flesh in Fitzgerald’s *The Beautiful and Damned.* This golden girl of the early 1920s had no intention of sacrificing her body or her time to unwanted children when she married Anthony Patch. Discovering that a pregnancy was in progress she wailed that it would be intolerable to have her body grow ugly and shapeless, to lose her radiance. Anthony told her to do what suited her (a mere formality, for he knew her firm little mind had already chosen abortion). And although the choice did not seem to affect them in a specific way, its callousness was plain. Anthony jibed at Gloria for thinking she had been singled out of all the women in the world for “this crowning indignity” of pregnancy, and she cried:

*What if I do. It isn’t an indignity for them. It’s their one excuse for living. It’s the one thing they’re good for. It isn’t that I’m afraid—of this or anything else. It is an indignity for me. . . . I’m being true to me, you know.*

There were variations on the theme of “being true to me.” In a Frank O’Hara poem, there was a jaded pair who just couldn’t essay parenthood. At dinner they made a half-hearted decision to go ahead and have the baby, but the next morning at breakfast they changed their minds. In their view, they simply would let their daughter drop like a leaf from their tree (as if the fall of a green leaf could somehow be equated with the carnage of a procured abortion) “that she not wither, / autumn in our terrible breath.”

Only the rejecting mother is heard from in Mary Gordon’s poem, “The Unwanted,” and she has a curious clinical interest in her aborted baby: “Mite/ maggot, ovum, sperm,/ What are you?/ My neat trick, my sweet genesis./ Unbearable. Unborn.”

Still another couple, each married to someone else, conspired against an unborn infant. Piet, in Updike’s *Couples,* thought about the seed that bore his face which he had planted in Foxy. Now, he thought, he would like to crawl through Foxy’s “slippery corridors and, a murderer, strike.” Foxy, for her part, had discovered “a great thing about being pregnant . . .
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When you have a baby inside you you are not alone. It's a person.” But the person inside Foxy didn’t have a chance; its parents could see no alternative to killing it.

Paying Nature’s Price

These accounts of choices for abortion convey a blunt sense of finality: the choosers, having made their choice, go on to other matters. Perhaps it was Gloria Patch’s supreme devotion to Gloria that protected her psyche afterwards. She never gave a thought to the presence of a human life in her womb. O’Hara’s couple, Gordon’s analytical non-mother, and Foxy had at least some sense of such a presence, but that ended the matter with them too.

It was different with another significant woman of the century—Nina Leeds in O’Neill’s Strange Interlude.13 Nina, in fact, was the first to make explicit the psychological damage an abortion can cause. Nina had loved Gordon and lost him in World War I. Later, after trying to stifle her grief in promiscuity, she settled down with Sam and was contentedly pregnant when her mother-in-law told her secretly and emphatically that she must not have the baby: there was mental illness in the family, and Sam must not know of it. “So of course I had to agree it would be wrong,” said this atypical daughter-in-law, “and I had an operation.” An operation that scarred her permanently and led her from deception to deception.

I promised her . . . but I couldn’t see how hard it would be to let him [Sam] love me . . . after his baby was gone . . . it was hard even to keep on living after that operation . . . I loved it [the unborn baby] more than I’ve ever loved anything in my life—even Gordon.

Nina’s long-drawn-out cry of psychic pain was subsequently heard from other women. Maria in Joan Didion’s Play It As It Lays,14 for instance, had nightmares about what was done with the “hacked pieces of human flesh,” and about gas chambers to which little children were led. She had morbid thoughts about “fetuses in the East River, translucent as jelly-fish, floating past the big sewage outfalls with the orange peels.” Maria cried:

. . . because something had just come through to her, there in the sun on the Western street: she had deliberately not counted the months but she must have been counting them unawares, must have been keeping a relentless count somewhere, because this was the day, the day the baby would have been born.

Even more searing was the experience of the protagonist in Margaret
Eileen Farrell

Atwood's *Surfacing*. The father of her unborn baby had a wife and family. First she blamed him for the abortion:

> He said I should do it, he made me do it; he talked about it as though it was legal, simple, like getting a wart removed [echoes of the callow young men]. He said it wasn’t a person, only an animal.

Then this daughter of the sexual revolution recognized her own complicity:

> I should have seen that was no different, it was hiding in me as if in a burrow and instead of granting it sanctuary I let them catch it. I could have said No but I didn’t: that made me one of them too, a killer.

She had grown up in a wilderness area and deeply respected the animal world. His contemptuous “only an animal” reverberated in her as “only a baby” might not have, and she left him:

> After the slaughter, the murder, he couldn’t believe I didn’t want to see him any more; it bewildered him, he resented me for it, he expected gratitude because he arranged it for me, fixed me so I was as good as new; others, he said, wouldn’t have bothered. Since then I’d carried that death around inside me, layering it over, a cyst, a tumor, black pearl.

> Of her abortion, she said: “I was emptied, amputated; I stank of salt and antiseptic, they had planted death in me like a seed.” Later, back in her childhood home, she hoped she had conceived in a sylvan rendezvous with a subsequent lover. She vowed:

> Nobody must find out or they will do that to me again, strap me to the death machine, emptiness machine, legs in the metal framework, secret knives. This time I won’t let them.

The immediate horror of undergoing an abortion was just as tenacious as the horror of carrying “that death around inside me,” where once she had carried life. Nina, Maria, and this girl experienced the same grief, specific to a woman.

But two unlikely men give unexpected evidence that a father can grieve too when a young life is destroyed volitionally and violently. Extraordinary testimony to this is provided by a wanton fellow named Alfie in a book by the same name. One of Alfie’s several girls was pregnant, inconveniently so because her husband, the father of her other children, was a patient in a TB sanitarium. Alfie helped arrange an abortion and he let Lily come back to his place after the injection, though he then quickly
left the premises. On his return, he found the baby's corpse on the bathroom floor:

I went in where it must all have happened to her. And I closed the door behind me. . . . I mean I've come upon this thing—I mean this child. I don't care what anybody says, that's what it was. It was so small, yet so real, see, not fully grown, yet so beautifully shaped, and so human. All I was expecting to see—well I don't rightly know what I was expecting—but certainly not this perfectly formed little being—this infant. Nobody had ever told me about those things. I had to stoop down and pick it up, see, for it was lying on this little white napkin where Lily had put it. . . . And the way it lay there, so silent, so still, quite touched me. I thought “I'm your Dad.” Now it's strange I should think a thing like that at a time like that, but it's exactly what I did think. I held him in my hands, see, and I had this feeling: “This is my son, and I'm one of them that has done this to him.” And the more it comes to me that he's dead, and will never breathe the breath of life again, the closer he feels to me as my son. . . . and the thought crossed my mind: “You know what you did, Alfie, you murdered him.”. . . . “Yes, mate, you set it all up and for thirty nicker you had him done to death.”. . . . Now I find I can't get that thought out of my mind—how I had fixed it up to have him done to death.

Later, Alfie began to hear a baby crying. He thought it was the wind and he shut the window tight; he thought it was the water in the pipes and he shut the faucet off “dead hard.” And still the crying went on. “So I decided it must be the imagination, and on and on it went, wailing and wailing away, as if it would go on wailing to the end of my days.”

Another father, in a Cheever story,” paid Nature's long price, even though he never saw the infant and even though he had no part in having him “done to death.” In “The Enormous Radio,” Jim Westcott bought his wife, Irene, a new radio. Not only did the radio bring them the music they both loved but, increasingly, it transmitted other sounds too: gadgets being operated in neighboring apartments, then intimate conversations, even matrimonial quarrels. Fascinated at first with the revelations, they soon became conscious of their own carefully concealed secrets. At last, Jim flung his long-suppressed animosities at Irene, ending with what had rankled most:

. . . . and where was all your piety and your virtue when you went to that abortionist? I'll never forget how cool you were. You packed your bag and went off to have that child murdered as if you were going to Nassau [another Gloria]. If you'd had any reasons, if you'd had any good reasons.

Pregnant with Death

But would Jim Westcott have carried this death with him for so long if
there had been a "good" reason? Possibly even then, for Nature can turn a deaf ear to alleged reasons for killing the unborn. Kate Armstrong, in Margaret Drabble's *The Middle Ground,* found that out. She was a 40-year-old divorcee, a convinced feminist, a successful career woman, a mother of four teenagers. And she was surprised by pregnancy. She supposed that Ted, her lover, would stand by her if she decided to have the baby. He might even marry her, but she really didn't want that and she was certain he didn't either. "An abortion, or, as the doctor more tactfully suggested, a termination, seemed the obvious solution."

But Kate, intrigued with the possibilities of a "last chance" baby, told herself she didn't need to marry anyone to raise this child. She worried, however, as pregnant women over 35 have been trained to do, about the risk of Down's Syndrome. Tests disclosed spina bifida instead. Surprisingly, Kate hesitated before choosing "termination" for her handicapped unborn infant, yet finally decided to abort. A while later she faced up to what she had done in making this choice:

For the first time in months she had thought of the baby she might have had. Ted's baby. She had murdered it. For every good reason, she had murdered it.

Must I simply admit the violence done, the death of a soul? There was no way out of this, it must be borne forever and ever, repeatedly, and she could not tell Ted... he could not help her, her dream of some final reconciliation was an empty dream: death lay between them.

Death lingers after an abortion. "Somebody who should have been born is gone," says the refrain in Anne Sexton's poem, "The Abortion." It was nearly springtime and the earth was "puckering its mouth" when the woman in the poem changed her shoes, got in her car, and drove south. As she looked at the bristly grass that would soon send up tender new blades, she wondered "how anything fragile survives." What was fragile within her did not survive, for at her destination she met a "little man [who] took the fullness that love began." Afterwards, as she drove back, "even the sky was thin... The road was as flat as a sheet of tin" and "Somebody who should have been born" was gone.

But no one has described the abiding post-abortion presence of death as poignantly as poet Gwendolyn Brooks:

Abortions will not let you forget.
You remember the children you got that you did not get.
... I have heard in the voices of the wind the voices of my dim killed children.
People who Give Children Life

There are, nevertheless, some stories that do not end in killed children. One father recognized in time the wonder of generation and the humanity of his child. In Orwell’s *Keep the Aspidistra Flying,* Gordon Comstock’s sweetheart Rosemary came to tell him “the most awful thing”—she was pregnant. Gordon, a nearly-starving poet who despised money and couldn’t or wouldn’t keep a job, was stricken. But Rosemary consoled him with the information that she had heard of someone who charged only five pounds [the 1930’s!] for an abortion. At the mention of money, Gordon’s paternal sensibility came to life:

For the first time he grasped, with the only kind of knowledge that matters, what they were talking about... a bud of flesh, a bit of himself, down there in her belly, alive and growing. His eyes met hers. They had a strange moment of sympathy such as they had never had before. For a moment he did feel that in some mysterious way they were one flesh... [It was] as though some invisible living cord stretched from her entrails to his. He knew then that it was a dreadful thing they were contemplating—a blasphemy. ... It was the squalid detail of the five pounds that brought it home.

Gordon got a job and they were married. On their wedding day Rosemary felt the baby move within her. Gordon fell on his knees, pressing his head against her belly, hoping to hear something. “He heard nothing, only the blood drumming in his own ear. But she could not have been mistaken. Somewhere in there, in the safe, warm, cushioned darkness, [the baby] was alive and stirring.”

That bit of himself, alive and stirring, could have sung Joyce Carol Oates’ “Foetal Song”22: “She and he, months ago, decided not to kill me./ I rise and fall now like seaweed fleshted to fish, a surprise./ I am grateful./ I am waiting for my turn.”

One other infant who escaped the secret knives was Ruth’s unborn baby in *A Raisin in the Sun.*23 Suspecting that her daughter-in-law was thinking of abortion as the only possibility, Mama called her unreliable son to account. Having told him that Ruth was “thinking ’bout getting rid of that child,” she waited for him to protest, to be, as she put it, the man his father was:

Your wife say she going to destroy your child. And I’m waiting to hear you talk like him [your father] and say we a people who give children life, not who destroys them—I’m waiting to see you stand up and look like your daddy and say we done give up one baby to poverty and that we ain’t going to give up nary another one.
EILEEN FARRELL

A “Bloody Thing” or Flesh and Blood?

Our final witnesses from literature give a dramatic recapitulation of much that their predecessors have established.

Viewers of the Masterpiece Theatre production, “The Jewel in the Crown,” will remember Sarah Layton and Daphne Manners. But it takes a reading of Paul Scott's *Raj Quartet*,24 on which the TV series was based, to perceive the ethical splendor of Daphne’s choice and the moral squalor of Sarah’s.

Both were British girls who, after their English schooling, had come to India in the 1940s to join relatives. Each girl had a devoted aunt, and each aunt was somehow involved with the outcome of her niece’s inconvenient pregnancy. Though the two girls never met, Sarah had heard about Daphne; she had met Daphne’s aunt and had seen Daphne’s infant.

On a visit to her Aunt Fenny in Calcutta, Sarah had first resisted, then wavered, and finally succumbed to Clark, a lecherous army officer who seduced her in the immensely sensual atmosphere of a Calcutta nightclub. Two months later, her hawkeyed mother Mildred, herself involved in alcoholism and adultery, suspected that Sarah was pregnant. Mildred, who lacked the most elementary maternal responses, made Aunt Fenny take Sarah back to Calcutta to get “the bloody thing aborted.” And Sarah submitted, without a murmur, as if she were mending a breach of etiquette (“I know what I have to do, Auntie”). The abortion was all right, she thought, because she didn’t love Clark; their encounter had nothing to do with love. But Sarah’s impressive composure vanished afterwards. She became wildly promiscuous for a while. Looking back later, she analyzed her sudden consuming compulsion. It was, she said,

... enclosed by a kind of anguish ... for the loss of a scarcely begun life, the destruction of a child I had conceived, should have carried, loved, and looked after. Appeasing the ache of physical desire I was ... also comforting that anguish, trying to numb it.

The other girl, Daphne Manners, whose rape was the central fact and symbol of the *Raj Quartet*, left a living child instead—and a stunning message for those who suppose abortion has to be all right in the case of rape. Daphne and her Indian friend, Hari Kumar, lying in a ruined pavilion in the Bibighar gardens of the fictional town of Mayapore, had been discovered and set upon by a band of ruffians. Hari was bound and gagged. Daphne was gang raped. By a complicated and dreadful miscar-
riage of justice, Hari was jailed along with some friends; all were accused of the rape, but they could not be tried because Daphne refused to identify anyone. Nevertheless, they were held under the Defense of India Act. Hari was tortured, then held for long months in solitary confinement. He and Daphne never met again.

"You will go through? Go through to the end?" asked Sister Ludmilla who ran a shelter for the dying. "Why do you ask?" Daphne responded. Then Sister, confident that Daphne would indeed go through with the pregnancy, wanted to know if "they" had tried to dissuade her? Yes, they had tried. They made it sound awfully simple, she said, like a duty.

But of course it was not simple at all. For them, perhaps, yes, it would be simple. An obligation even. To get rid. To abort. To tear the "disgusting embryo out of the womb and throw it to the pi-dogs" as a white woman had said, adding, "Personally if it had happened to me, I would have had a public abortion outside their bloody temple and thrown the filthy muck to the pi-dogs. Or made them stuff it down their priests' throats."

Daphne died after giving birth to a daughter. Lady Manners, her aunt, then inserted a death notice and a birth announcement in the English newspaper, an act that aroused further indignation in the white enclave. Captain Merrick, the omnipresent villain, rejected suitor of Daphne and torturer of Hari, expressed the common reaction: "The death, yes. But the birth of an illegitimate half-caste kid whose father couldn't be identified?" Merrick's contemptuous view was countered by a Count Bronowsky who said, "It was a human life lost, and a human life beginning," and then acknowledged suavely that most of the white ruling class would agree with Merrick.

Daphne had managed to conceal her brief love story from all questioners. In her last desperate moments with Hari, she had made him promise secrecy too, lest he be made to suffer for daring to love an Englishwoman. She never knew that he was made to suffer anyway. Lady Manners learned eventually, and it was she who procured his release. Daphne had left her aunt a journal in which she told what had happened, telling, too, of her hope that the child was Hari's. But, she said,

If it isn't [Hari's], it is still a child . . . a part of my flesh and blood . . . I have nightmares of the child growing up to resemble no one, black-skinned, beyond redemption, a creature of the dark, a tiny living mirror of that awful night. And yet, even so, it will be a child. A God-given creature, if there is a God, and even if there isn't, deserving of that portion of our blessing we can spare.
With her calm assessment of the minimum debt owed to the unborn, Daphne is the last of our witnesses. All of them have said, or exemplified, the reality of abortion. Some of them—the young bachelors, the adulterous Piet, Anthony and Gloria, O'Hara's enervated couple, Irene Westcott, even Sarah Layton—manifest the utter callousness of choosing abortion for personal or economic convenience, or as a way to paint over the grime of carnal entanglements. In some cases, abortion was a man's choice, made without regard for the dawning of maternal sensibilities of the woman. Sometimes it was a woman's uninhibited choice. Sometimes it was a his-and-hers choice. But no matter who did the choosing, the choices all appear in our literature as merciless.

A few of the witnesses—Mildred Layton, Merrick, the white ladies of Mayapore—stand as sickening evidence of abortion as a puritanical, vengeful attack on a new life that was not planned or sanctioned by the people in charge. By contrast, there are some witnesses—Alfie, the protagonist of Margaret Atwood's *Surfacing*, Jim Westcott, Kate Armstrong—who convict themselves or their partners of murder. Quite a few—Nina, Maria, Kate, Sarah, the *Surfacing* girl, and poets Sexton and Brooks—tell of Nature's punitive judgment on a woman who chooses abortion. Two—Alfie and Jim Westcott—show that a man may be judged as well.

Finally, there are three who look with awe on the mystery of procreation—Orwell's Gordon, the incomparable Mama, and Daphne. And though only these three, along with Moll Flanders, speak with uncompromising reverence for life, there is nonetheless a message, however oblique, in the attitudes of the others. Taken together, these witnesses say: no one should choose to kill the child in the womb; whether that unborn infant constitutes an inconvenience or an embarrassment; whether it will probably be handicapped or just might be handicapped; whether it may suffer from poverty, racism, injustice, or whether it was begotten in seduction or in rape.

None of the witnesses, except possibly Moll Flanders, who had a vestigial faith, speaks from religious conviction. Only one mentions God—Daphne, and she isn't even sure He is. Like so many of our contemporaries, nearly all are people from whose lives religious and moral convictions seem to have been leached out. Those who reject abortion, or who regret an abortion, must therefore be speaking from the categorical imperative: a
recognition in the depths of their consciousness that the being in the womb, however minute, is a human person, a life in progress that must not be crushed.

Against the weight of this testimony, the most industrious campaign of "true life stories" will have little to offer beyond the usual chaos. For truth about abortion, we had best consult our literature where men and women have made choices about unborn life. The consensus of their testimony is: a man or a woman, a man and a woman, can either devalue the quality of life by choosing to end a new human life at its beginning, or they can ennable the quality of life by choosing to welcome and nurture that bud of their flesh as it awaits the parental blessing it has every right to expect.

NOTES

17. John Cheever, "The Enormous Radio." In The Stories of John Cheever (New York: Knopf, 1978). Note: Susan Cheever, in Home Before Dark (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1984) says that Cheever's parents "had not wanted another child before he was born. His conception was a drunken accident between two people who no longer cared about each other. When his mother found out that she was pregnant, his father tried to force her to have an abortion."
24. Paul Scott, The Raj Quartet (New York: Morrow) which consists of four books published as follows: The Jewel in the Crown (1966), The Day of the Scorpion (1968), The Pillars of Silence (1971), and A Division of the Spoils (1975). Sarah Layton's remarks are from A Division of the Spoils, p. 356; Daphne Manners are from The Jewel in the Crown, pp. 151-152, 364, 376; The Merrick-Bronowsky dialogue is in The Day of the Scorpion, p. 193. Another comment on Daphne's story can be found in The Pillars of Silence, p. 164.
There is always a danger in inviting a former member of Congress to address present issues of public policy. The danger is a tendency toward retrospective nostalgia: to speak of what used to be rather than what is at hand; and the past tends to be magnified by the passage of time. The dragons we slew are more monstrous in memory; the molehills we moved have become mountains in the retelling.

Fortunately for you, when I was in the Senate I proved so far in advance of my times that the voters of New York chose not to re-elect me, so I was unable to tend and cultivate all the legislative seeds I had sown—although some of them, such as tax indexation and regulatory reform, were taken over by others and are now written into law.

But six years in the legislative arena did give me insights into the dynamics of democratic societies—or at least American society—that convince me that in God’s good time we too shall overcome. As in the case of volcanic regions, the surface may appear calm and unchangeable for decades on end while subterranean pressures build up that ultimately erupt with a force that transforms the social landscape for all time.

So it was over the long years in which the great civil rights crusade against racial discrimination gathered strength. The American people came to understand the inherently intolerable nature of the “separate but equal” standard sanctioned by the Supreme Court to justify segregated education. And when the court finally reversed itself, the seismic shocks spread across the continent and brought the remaining barriers tumbling down.

So will it ultimately be with our crusade as more and more Americans come to understand the realities of abortion; as more and more of them are forced to acknowledge what they already intuitively know: that such antiseptic phrases as “terminate a pregnancy” and “freedom of choice”...
are nothing more than euphemisms for the deliberate destruction not of potential life, but of a living and biologically unique human being that is capable of pain before it leaves the sanctuary of the womb. I make reference to biology because I have always thought it important to defuse the idea that abortion is at heart a religious issue: a misconception which the pro-abortionists have played to their advantage. Religion forbids the taking of an innocent life. It is biology that informs us when that life begins. And it is the increasingly graphic evidence of the realities of life within the womb that will ultimately win the day.

When sufficient numbers of Americans are no longer able to hide from the biological facts of human development, there will arise an irresistible demand to reverse the carnage unleashed by *Roe v. Wade*; and one way or another, whether by judicial action, or constitutional amendment, or legislative restraints, it too will be reversed.

That the pro-life cause is gaining strength is no longer in doubt. When some members of Congress attempted to restrict federal funding of abortion back in the 1970s, we could expect a decisive margin against us in the Senate. It was only the adamance of a narrow pro-life majority in the House of Representatives that kept us going, gave us leverage, and eked out compromises year by year. The best we could do, it seemed, was to put cosmetic restrictions upon federal funding of the taking of a child’s life, so that both sides could claim victory.

But things did not turn out that way. In this, as in so many battles, final victory belongs to the determined, to those who are not smart enough to know their case is hopeless. Persistence pays, and more and more we are beginning to see tiny but significant gains toward a more distant goal.

I look back this way so that we can see more clearly ahead. I realize that, to all who are still working to secure constitutional protection for children before birth, our current situation is full of frustration. How long must we continue this work, year after year: the same old letter-writing, organizing, fund raising, marching, lobbying, educating, praying? The answer today is the same as it was twelve years ago, when even a halt to federal funding of abortions was beyond our reach. The answer still is: as long as it takes.

Twelve years ago, in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision in *Roe v. Wade*, I introduced a constitutional amendment to overturn that ruling. My warning at the time has been amply justified by subsequent
events. If I may repeat what I said on the floor of the United States Senate on May 31, 1973:

(The) court not only contravened the express will of every state legislature in the country; it not only removed every vestige of legal protection hitherto enjoyed by the child in the mother's womb; but it reached its result through a curious and confusing chain of reasoning that, logically extended, could apply with equal force to the genetically deficient infant, or the retarded child, or the insane or senile adult.

In 1973, most thought that view alarmist. Today, it is fact. The grisly consequences of what the Supreme Court did in Roe v. Wade are all about us: in Bloomington, Indiana, where retardation amounted to a death sentence by willful starvation for a baby boy; in California, where a young man would have died from neglect had there not been a public outcry—God bless George Will for leading it—an outcry to demand he receive the necessary surgery; and, most recently, in New Jersey, where the state Supreme Court has declared routine intravenous feeding to be unnecessary for terminally ill patients.

Everything we feared in 1973 is already upon us, and with it has come a tide of abortion that embarrasses even those who defend it. The more than 1,500,000 abortions a year are a multi-billion dollar business, probably the least regulated industry in America, operating entirely under the protection of the Supreme Court.

Twelve years ago, I was under no illusions about the task we were undertaking in attempting to undo the court's incredible decision. We did not fool ourselves. We knew it would not be easily or quickly accomplished. What we did not know—what we have discovered since then—is that the pro-life enterprise, launched in shock and outrage against the greatest odds, would have so large an impact on the American political system.

We did not anticipate how opponents of abortion—defenders of children, really—would create one of the most amazing grass roots movements since abolitionism. We did not anticipate how this issue would shatter long-established patterns of political allegiance, how it would wrench millions from their partisan moorings, how it would encourage millions more to participate in our electoral system.

I certainly did not anticipate how the question of abortion would radically change both major parties in this country. In my most partisan moments, I did not expect the leadership of the Democratic Party to
allow that venerable institution to become the vehicle for what are euphemistically called “abortion rights.” Nor did I expect the Republican Party, with its own divergence on this issue, to be transformed, willingly or not, into something of an anti-abortion vehicle. Indeed, to be fair to all my Democratic friends, it should be noted that some of the most determined pro-abortion leadership in the Congress still comes from the Republican ranks. But despite that, it is more and more clear that the Republican Party has been transformed by the abortion issue.

In the tumultuous sixties, it was faddish to speak of participatory democracy. Legislators tinkered with voting laws and party rules to try to entice more citizens into personal participation in our political system, with little real effect. But the abortion issue has energized our political life. It has given vast numbers of citizens the impetus for doing things they had never done before: canvassing, volunteering for campaigns, turning out for caucuses and primaries, lobbying, picketing, learning about legislative procedures, and even running for office themselves.

That, certainly, we did not expect back in 1973, when the prevailing wisdom was that pro-life sentiment would gradually flicker out under the moral darkness of our new, judicially-imposed reality. And I want to take this opportunity to say to pro-lifers that their incredible determination over twelve years has been both a lesson and an inspiration for many in public life.

When they lost, their ranks grew. When they won, their ranks grew, and they kept at it. When they were scorned as “single-issue people,” their ranks grew and they wielded that single issue more forcefully than ever; and thanks to their single-minded persistence, an awareness of the full implications of legalized abortion is slowly taking hold.

How easy it all seems now, when we hear the unborn championed in a presidential inaugural address and when, to the applause of most members present, the State of the Union Address calls for legislation to protect them. But it was not easy. It was—and it will still be—hellishly difficult to restore protection of the law to our people at all stages of human development: before birth, during senility, after incapacitation, and in lives retarded at birth. But how far we have come! And how noble the journey!

An important part of that progress came last year, when President Reagan advanced an international pro-life standard in the policy state-
ment prepared for the United Nations' Second Decennial Conference on Population, in Mexico City. That paper sparked international controversy and admirers and critics alike agree that it was a benchmark.

It was my honor to lead the U.S. delegation to that meeting, and that may have something to do with my being invited to speak here this evening. I am delighted to take up the subject, to clarify the record. For even in the often befuddling world of diplomacy, I know of few policy initiatives that have been so poorly reported as the U.S. position and its reception at the population conference.

I am sure you remember the media coverage of the matter. There were editorial cartoons portraying Mr. Reagan lecturing starving masses of Third World children on the merits of free enterprise. There were indignant editorials, in all the important papers that are usually indignant whenever Mr. Reagan does anything, decrying the "know-nothingism"—some called it the "Voodoo Demographics"—of his population policy.

We were reminded that the world is allegedly on the brink of a population Armageddon. We were told the world is running out of resources: that the planet is about to be overwhelmed in a sea of humanity. On the eve of the conference, Robert McNamara assured a national NBC audience that the American delegation would be laughed out of Mexico City. What the media later failed to report is that we emerged with some significant achievements.

As the result of our initiatives, the conference reaffirmed the primacy of parental rights in determining the size of individual families, condemned the use of coercion to achieve state-defined population objectives, and acknowledged that government is not the sole agency for the achievement of social objectives. Also, given the intensity of the attacks on the U.S. position on abortion, we took considerable satisfaction from the adoption, by a conference consensus, of an almost identical position: namely, that abortion "in no case should be promoted as a method of family planning."

Where we did not succeed, nor would it have been anything but romantic for us to think we could have succeeded, was in securing an explicit endorsement of the American proposition that the best way for developing nations to achieve the twin objectives of economic advancement and population stability would be through the adoption of freer, market-oriented economic policies as an alternative to the centralized
controls that have stultified the economies of so many countries of the developing world. To have succeeded would have required that a significant number of delegations acknowledge the responsibility of their own governments for much of the misery experienced by their people.

Nevertheless, raising the issue of economic policy enabled us to cite the compelling historical linkage between rising income and declining birth rates, and to draw on the examples of such developing countries as Singapore, South Korea, Colombia, and Botswana to demonstrate the linkage between economic freedom and economic growth. And we were not laughed out of town for having made the attempt.

Few historical correlations are so clear as the impact of economic well-being on the number of children couples will choose to have. In Western Europe today, the principal demographic concern is not over a surge in numbers, but over the problems associated with aging populations in societies in which birth rates have fallen below replacement levels. Quite clearly, family planning programs address only half the population equation.

As the U.N. Fund for Population Activities itself acknowledges, “It has been clear for a long time that family planning campaigns are largely ineffectual in producing a lower rate of population growth.” The Fund concludes that “while family planning programs . . . will help couples to have the number of children they wish, other economic and social factors lie behind their ideas of desired family size.” On the record, rising income is the most important of those factors. So much for the charge of “Voodoo Demographics.”

At the conference we were also able, through the sheer mobilization of statistics, to pierce the Malthusian gloom with which so many wanted the proceedings to be wrapped. We were able to demonstrate, for example, that over the last thirty years, the birth rates in the developing world had fallen more than halfway toward the goal of population stability, that human life expectancy had dramatically increased, that caloric intake had improved, literacy soared, disease diminished, and per capita income grown substantially. At the same time, we helped focus on those nations—particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and portions of the Indian subcontinent—that had not shared in this undoubted progress, and therefore required particular attention. Although these tender rays of sunshine were not universally welcomed, they did help illuminate the true dimen-
sions of the problems that remain to be resolved, and place them in the unhysterical perspective that is essential to intelligent analysis.

In retrospect, this is not a bad track record for what the American press almost unanimously predicted would be an American disaster. But the myths about Mexico City persist, so let me dispel a few of them.

First, there is the curious accusation that Ronald Reagan deliberately used the Mexico City conference as a political ploy to win support from pro-lifers for his re-election. Now, as I recall, the President’s re-election effort was not in any immediate danger at the time, to put it mildly. He was, moreover, already a hero to pro-life voters, who did not have to be reminded, through the Mexico City Conference, of his steadfast opposition to abortion.

But beyond that, can anyone imagine this president plotting the exploitation of an international conference—any international meeting—for a brief spurt of popularity here at home? I am not saying that Mr. Reagan is naive about these things, only that he is above them.

A second myth about Mexico City is that the U.S. stand on population issues was an abrupt reversal of all previous policy, a repudiation of everything our government had done to date. I have been amazed by the mindless repetition of that assertion both by journalists and by public officials who have not taken the time to read the policy paper upon which they comment. That paper explicitly reaffirmed continuing U.S. support for non-coercive family planning programs in developing nations. It did not propose to end them, or even to cut them back. But it did put them into a fresh context, a reasoned context.

The American position rejected the doomsday analysis that has served to justify any measure to control population however abhorrent, and proposed instead to focus U.S. funding on programs that, in Ronald Reagan’s words, are “truly voluntary, cognizant of the rights and responsibilities of individuals and families, and respectful of religious and cultural values.”

The U.S. policy was also an expression of confidence in mankind’s continued ability to meet new challenges in a responsible way; and in this we were not alone. As Mexico’s President de la Madrid stated when he addressed the conference: “Our planet, inhabited today by 4.8 billion human beings, has the natural resources, production capacity, and different administrative and political skills it needs to fully meet the basic needs of its future population.”
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A third misconception is that our government—and I as it representative—was blindly insisting that population growth poses no problems, and that a conversion to market economics would bring about instant relief for all the world’s ills. That distortion of our message is directly contradicted by the policy paper that guided us. Its initial paragraph declared: “It is sufficiently evident that the current exponential growth in global population cannot continue indefinitely. There is no question of the ultimate need to achieve a condition of population equilibrium. The differences that do exist concern the choice of strategies and methods for achieving the goal.”

At the conference itself, we fully acknowledged that “the current situation in many developing countries is such that relief from population pressures cannot be achieved overnight, even under optimal economic policies.” At the same time, however, we noted that “slowing population growth is not a panacea. Without sound and comprehensive development policies, it cannot in itself solve problems of hunger, unemployment, crowding, or potential social disorder.”

The same can be said of the impact of population pressures on the environment; and here I speak with some feeling (and I think knowledge) as one who has had a life-long concern for conservation and who, during his Senate term, exercised considerable leadership in the environmental field. Under anyone’s scenario, we can anticipate a significant increase in the world’s population well into the next century. We cannot defer imperative measures to protect the environment and the world’s renewable resources pending the achievement of population equilibrium. The work to arrest soil erosion, protect forests, and preserve watersheds cannot be postponed. With intelligence and the necessary will, we can deal with these problems without imposing draconian measures under the guise of population control. Moreover, the greater the economic well-being of the societies in question, the greater their capacity to manage their environmental problems.

The fact is that population growth has been the most convenient excuse for the dismal failure of bad economic theories and practices over much of the world. State-controlled economies in underdeveloped nations have performed as poorly as state-controlled economies always do, in any circumstances. And the governments of those countries, with encourage-
ment from many in the West, have made their own people the scapegoats.

And so, at Mexico, we rejected the “economic statism” that has inhibited development in so much of the Third World and, in the process, disrupted the natural mechanism for slowing population growth. Our position in this regard was hardly the triumph of ideology over science. It was their conjuncture in common sense.

That leads me to another myth about Mexico City: the report that the U.S. delegation was isolated because it was out of step with the rest of the world. Untrue, as my summary of conference accomplishments has demonstrated.

I grant you that Mr. Reagan’s approach to population problems may have isolated the U.S. delegation from those professional population planners, both in the U.S. and elsewhere, whose careers have been based on Malthusian blinders that require a limit to population at whatever moral cost. And there is no doubt that the tightened controls imposed on the allocation of U.S. family planning funds worried past recipients who funded abortions or resorted to coercion to achieve population goals. The new measures, however, merely tightened restraints already in place—a closing of loopholes, if you will. And if one of the major family planning organizations has refused to accept that condition of eligibility, then it has at last come out of the closet, so to speak, and revealed what many had suspected all along.

It is revealing that this subject of abortion, to which were devoted only a few lines in the President’s policy paper, became the focal point of media attention to our participation in Mexico City. By raising the subject of abortion, we were told, the U.S. delegation would disrupt the conference. We would be repudiated by the world community. We would be viewed as attempting to impose our own morality upon others.

The actual results were more benign. The assembled delegates from every continent included in their final recommendations to the world community a statement that was unambiguous in its rejection of abortion.

First, a word of explanation. The original draft from which the delegates were working had language calling upon governments to protect women from illegal abortion. We all know what that means. It is a way of advocating legalization of abortion without quite saying so.

Let me read you the text of that portion of Recommendation 18 as the
delegates finally approved it: “Governments are urged . . . to take appropriate steps to help women avoid abortion, which in no case should be promoted as a method of family planning, and whenever possible, to provide for the humane treatment and counselling of women who have had recourse to abortion.” What a transformation!

As if to make perfectly clear that the conference had taken quite an unexpected stand on this subject, the Swedish delegation complained about the change in wording. It preferred the original language, which had referred only to “illegal” abortion. And the Swedes explicitly registered their dissent from the implications of the final text, going on record to insist that abortion must remain legal and universally accessible.

A final myth about Mexico City is that the consequences of President Reagan’s population policy would be devastating. Because the U.S. would no longer contribute to organizations involved in abortion with their own resources, family planning programs would collapse around the globe.

This myth proved to be the most ludicrous of all. Faced with the Presidential ultimatum—dissociate from abortion or do without U.S. funding—most population groups quickly complied. After all, if they meant what they often said—that no one really likes abortion—then it would not hamper their activities to ensure that none of their resources are devoted to its performance or advocacy.

The International Planned Parenthood Federation did not see things that way. To its directors, its involvement with abortion was more important than the millions of dollars they annually received from U.S. taxpayers. So be it. That is their choice. After all, the money is not going to sit in a vault somewhere within the State Department. It will be re-deployed to other family planning organizations and programs around the world.

The net result is that President Reagan effectively established a norm of decency for all international family planning efforts in any way associated with U.S. tax dollars. We do not purport to change abortion laws in other countries; we haven’t yet managed to do that here at home. But we will not contribute to organizations abroad that are involved in that practice.

All of which brings me to an unexpected side effect of the controversy surrounding our work in Mexico City: namely, the tremendous media attention it drew. It made many take more seriously President Reagan’s pro-life commitment. That may be why his recent endorsement of Dr. Bernard Nathanson’s film, “The Silent Scream,” has become national
news. Following the President’s example, much of official Washington has viewed the film, with its sonogram photos of an abortion process; and thanks to television, so has much of the nation.

How long did we try to get pictorial coverage of abortion on television? How long have we tried to make people see—not just hear about—the victims of abortion? It was as if the networks had covered the war in Vietnam all those years without showing the wounded, the maimed, the dead, the dismembered.

It may be too much to hope that we have reached a watershed in media coverage of the abortion issue, and that the pro-life cause—or even the simple facts of fetal development—will be given more extensive publicity.

But there is general agreement that the news coverage of the annual March for Life, last January 22, was much improved from past years. Even the major pro-abortion newspapers finally accepted the park police estimate of the crowd, instead of coming up with their own much smaller numbers. That sounds like a little thing, but on this issue, it’s a real media breakthrough!

Perhaps it was the extraordinary juxtaposition of the 1985 March for Life with the cancelled inaugural parade, scheduled for the day before, that demanded fair play in the press. After all, one day after America’s most important procession down Pennsylvania Avenue had to be cancelled because of the most bitter cold in Washington’s memory, some 70,000 pro-lifers trekked down the same street, as they have done every year since Roe v. Wade.

As always, they demonstrated the diversity that has been the strength of the pro-life movement and that accounts for its endurance and growth. The elderly and the students walked, while others steered their wheelchairs over the patches of ice. A group of rabbis smiled back at the pro-abortion heckler who screamed at them that he wished they had all been aborted.

There were the evangelicals who have learned to combine the power of prayer with the force of the ballot, the gospel choir and the folk singers, the regulars and the newcomers.

There were members of what I understand is the fastest-growing pro-life group, WEBA (Women Exploited by Abortion), whose personal tes-
timony in defense of women and their infants has cornered the abortion profiteers in their dens.

I purport to speak for none of them, though I used to speak to them, from the steps of the Capitol, when I was a member of the Senate. And yet, I venture to say that most of the marchers this year feel as I do: that their goal, so distant for so long, as impossible a dream as Don Quixote ever envisioned, is now quite possible and perhaps nearer than we dare to think.

I do not know whether it will be achieved by legislation or a transformed federal judiciary. One way or another, as we have said all along, we will win the fight we began twelve years ago.

When that finally happens, when the Constitution and our laws again protect the unborn from slaughter, the aged from euthanasia, and the infirm from extermination, I am sure there will be one last march down Pennsylvania Avenue. But this time, it will be a victory parade.

Perhaps because I now live in Europe as president of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, I am reminded of another dramatic march. Many of you are too young to remember how, after the liberation of Paris from the Nazis, Charles de Gaulle led, it seemed, virtually everyone in Paris down the Champs Elysees. They marched to celebrate the rebirth of the City of Light after years of savage brutality. They marched to let the world know that Western civilization had endured and was resurgent.

And so do I look confidently ahead to the day when we will have one last march down Pennsylvania Avenue, celebrating the liberation of our country, not from an alien army, but from alien ideas, ideas foreign to our Judeo-Christian culture and hostile to the ethical underpinnings of Western civilization. Those ideas have already claimed victims by the millions, sacrificed to the notion that life is not sacred, that the quality of life determines the right to it.

And just as liberated Paris became a symbol and an incitement to those who still fought on, in other lands, against the old barbarism, so will the liberation of our country from the barbarity of abortion inspire women and men around the world in their crusade for life.
The freedom of speech and press which the First Amendment to our Constitution guarantees has been telescoped in recent decades into "freedom of expression." It now covers anything that can be brought under the heading of "expression," from publishing heavy commentaries on the even heavier works of Immanuel Kant to nude dancing in peep shows. Yet it is dubious that this amorphous freedom of expression was the original intention of the Freedom of Speech and Press Clause of the First Amendment or should be taken as its meaning now. It becomes necessary, therefore, to ask what rational purpose the Clause serves, for it is the purpose of a legal right that furnishes the standard for judging both its scope and its limits.

My answer to this question was a book published late last year under the title, Freedom of Expression: Purpose as Limit. This article is a slightly revised version of that book's concluding chapter.

In the body of the book, after a chapter based on U.S. Supreme Court opinions, I reviewed "the literature" on freedom of speech and press. As Willmoore Kendall said, "We may . . . speak properly of a literature of the problem of freedom of thought and speech, one easy to identify in the sense that most scholars in the field of political theory, regardless of their views on the problem, . . . would name the same list of 'must' items dealing with the problem, and cite those items over and over again when they address themselves to the problem."1 I added some names to Kendall's list of "classical" writers on the subject, borrowing them from Professor Thomas I. Emerson of the Yale University Law School, who is a leading exponent of absolute freedom of expression. I think I may say that I have covered the major writers, from the seventeenth century on, who argued for freedom of speech and press.

They are John Milton, John Locke, Benedict de Spinoza, Tunis Wortman (a minor figure, but a stand-in for Thomas Jefferson), John

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Stuart Mill, Walter Bagehot, Harold Laski, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., and Alexander Meiklejohn. These men argued almost exclusively in terms of reason, truth, and moral and political development. They were, of course, arguing for freedom of speech and press, not against it. The case they made therefore emphasized the benefits that society would derive from allowing men freely to speak their minds and express their thoughts; they did not dwell on the limits they would put on that expression. But their understandable failure to do so is relatively unimportant. What matters here is that the freedom they contended for was the freedom of reason to pursue the true and the good through discussion and debate. This is a broad freedom, but not a simply amorphous one. Having a goal, it does have limits, and there is much in the way of expression that it does not cover or covers only lightly.

The thrust of these men’s argument was certainly against the idea of an “orthodoxy,” that is, of an established public truth which, because established, was to be held immune from criticism. They did not agree with Edmund Burke that it is the misfortune, and not the glory, of this age, that everything is to be discussed. They believed, in varying degrees, that everything should be discussed, but not because nothing is true. Rather, it was because they saw discussion as the method by which the human mind acquires a fuller and sounder knowledge of truth.

They had their own limitations, as one would expect. None of them was a truly great writer, except John Milton. None of them was a first-rate philosopher, with the possible exception of Spinoza. John Locke was a major figure in the history of Western philosophy because of the influence he had on later generations and has to this day. But it is hard, for this commentator at least, to take him with full seriousness as a philosopher. John Stuart Mill would probably be known today only to specialists were it not for the enduring popularity of On Liberty. The other writers whose thought I analyzed were articulate intellectuals who abode their destined hour and went their way. As time goes by, it proves to be their fate, as it is of almost all of us who write for publication, that the world has little noted nor long remembered what they said here.

Still, these men were all of them, even Milton in his way, rationalists. Milton, the only artist among them, was the only one to plead for the
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reading of “bad books” as a necessary exposure of virtue to the enticements of vice. The rest of them, when they adverted at all to “bad books,” defended them for their intellectual content, the unorthodox but possibly true ideas that they conveyed. The case that could be made for the freedom of artistic expression in the service of beauty is hardly touched on in their writings. Their case was pitched rather in terms of truth, which they assumed would also make people good.

Their rationalism, it must be admitted, was a fairly thin one and became thinner as the generations succeeded one another. With Laski it almost peters out. What they meant by truth is often obscure and those of them who attempted to explain it, as Locke did, helped perhaps as much to weaken as to foster men’s confidence in the power of reason to attain it. Yet they always argued from some conception of reason and of truth. Even an evolutionary view of truth still assumes truth to be a goal towards which we move and implicitly asserts that we can measure movement in that direction. The whole idea of intellectual progress, and the consequent advance of civilization, on which these men based their demand for freedom of thought and expression, would collapse if truth were simply unattainable.

The core of their argument was, in Spinoza’s words, that “human wits are too blunt to get to the heart of all problems immediately; but they are sharpened by the give and take of discussion and debate, and by exploring every possible course men eventually discover the measures they wish, measures which all approve and which no one would have thought of before the discussion.” As Meiklejohn saw, it is at least problematical to what extent this argument supports “the rights to freedom which are claimed, for example, by lobbyists for special interests, by advertisers in press and radio, by picketing labor unions, by Jehovah’s Witnesses, by the distributors of handbills on city streets, by preachers of racial intolerance, and many others.” Laski recognized in 1932 that, confronted with Hitler’s propaganda, “if the Jews trusted to reason only for the defence of their lives their chance of survival would be relatively small. For the temper in which they are attacked is inherently unamenable to rational discussion.” So intent was Laski on claiming freedom for radical leftwing propaganda that he did not pause to ask why freedom should also be guaranteed to these other expressions that threatened people’s lives and were inherently unamenable to
rational discussion. But in the light of the tradition of which we take Laski to be a part, it is a valid and necessary question. For the tradition stands for nothing if not for rational discussion as an avenue to truth.

Yet to assert that truth is beyond the reach of reason is the constant temptation of contemporary liberals. In order to protect its central value, individual freedom, the liberal mind is impelled (and often yields to the impulse) to deny that there are any standards of truth, goodness, or beauty, or even of common decency, on which a limitation of expression could be based. This is more than a denial that any person, any institution and, above all, any church, has a full and final grasp of truth. That much would be compatible with a belief in a collective process of discussion and argument aimed at truth. The liberal temptation is a deeper one: to lapse into radical skepticism and moral relativism in order to leave the individual free to set his course by whatever standards he chooses.

But this is to leave him in mid-ocean without a compass, because in order to assure his freedom, liberals have postulated that there are no rationally-grounded standards that he can choose. This guarantees, to be sure, that no one else has a ground for imposing a standard upon him. It also makes it impossible for him to impose one on himself on any principle that can be validated by reason. Furthermore, and not merely incidentally, it destroys any rational basis for attaching importance to freedom of expression.

If expression need serve no goals beyond itself, if all expressions are on the same level because they are all identical in the only essential respect, that of being expressions, then to say that they are all equally valuable is tantamount to saying that they are equally valueless. Freedom to speak and publish was originally advocated for the services it would render to reason in the pursuit of truth. Now it is defended on the ground that, not only is there no definitive standard by which we may judge what is true, there is not even any standard by which we can distinguish reason in pursuit of truth from passion in the pursuit of pleasure, or greed in quest of pain, or the libido dominandi in its drive for power. But to take this position is to undermine the whole case for the freedom of the mind and its expression in speech and publication.

Justice William Brennan strongly believes in "the transcendent value of speech" and has often asserted it. But speech has no transcendent
value in and of itself. Much speech, in fact, has no value at all. The value of "expression" is the value of that which is expressed, nothing more. Expression is valuable because it is the expression of a mind making some effort to grasp reality. Yet even this is not a transcendent value because the product of any particular mind may be shallow or distorted.

The only transcendent values are the truth, goodness, and beauty that inhere in the real, and it is basic to any effective defense of freedom of expression to maintain that the human mind can at least approach them through the exercise of its intellectual powers. False ideas have their value, as Mill contended, and so, too, do even silly or dangerous ideas in the process of discussion. But their value consists in the service they eventually render to true ideas. This is the lesson taught by the whole tradition we have considered here: freedom of expression is desirable because (and therefore to the extent that) it is necessary for human minds, through communication with each other, to pursue the truth, above all the truth they need for the guidance of their social and individual lives.

It is also the substance of the thesis argued in my book. In order to frame a rationally defensible theory of freedom of expression, we need to shift the focus of attention from expression in itself to the purposes that expression serves. If we do this, we shall find that we must make distinctions among kinds, modes and media of expression. We shall also find that we cannot treat all kinds and manners of expression as if they all stood on the same level and were equally deserving of protection.

Much of this may be granted by libertarians who are prepared to make a strategic retreat and fall back to the next line of defense. All expressions, they will argue, however mindless and pernicious they may appear to the unsophisticated to be, really do perform an intellectual and socially useful function; all therefore deserve full protection. Donald Thomas, for example, tells us that "the pornographer's effect is to subvert the prevailing moral values of society"—yet we need him. Says Thomas:

In literary terms, pornography is destructive of moral aspirations, as satire may be, and yet, depending on one's view of the human race and its predicament, pornography may be as necessary as satire. The fiction of de Sade or the satire of Swift
can only aim to mock human nature as it is, not to transform it into anything better. It is a recognition of something more than the darker side of human nature that while the propagandist of the new order prophesies that the heavens shall declare the glory of man, he hears at his shoulder a derisive chuckle.\footnote{As Thomas sees it, pornography is a kind of satire and a useful antidote to Marxist dreams of Utopia. But the current social reality in the United States is that pornography is big business, said to gross at least eight billion dollars a year and to be increasingly controlled by organized crime. So great is its success that \textit{Time} has casually referred to “the U.S., where hard-core pornography can be bought openly in Mom-and-Pop candy stores.”\footnote{This business has little to do with the kind of literary efforts that Thomas seems to have in mind.}}

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The hardheaded gentlemen who run the pornography industry know that they make money by giving the customer what he wants, and it is doubtful if the average patron of X-rated films is looking for derisive chuckles. Nor is he greatly interested in commentary on the human predicament, though he may have to put up with some of it if the filmmaker still thinks he has to show the courts that his product has some redeeming social value. Profitmaking pornography, however, to the extent that it dares, ignores these distractions and goes (to put it delicately) straight for the jugular.

What the customers want is male sexual fantasy, divorced from any human reality. In real life, prostitutes (about whom, etymologically, pornography is written) have other purposes in living than satisfying male sexual desire. Even the legendary prostitute with a heart of gold, who is entirely happy in her work, has some joys and sorrows not simply reducible to that work, if she is a real human being. But the women in commercialized pornography have no other function; they are mere creatures of fantasy, abstractions from reality that retain only those qualities which make them pleasure-giving objects. Of course there have been writers who used obscenity for satirical purposes. But such writers do not furnish the staple diet of the patrons of mass pornography. To paraphrase the poet, the readers of this “literature” look not for mind in women. It is precisely this mindless appeal to raw appetite that furnishes the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole in pornographic writings, films, and other productions.

\textit{This material is therefore undeserving of protection as an exercise of}
freedom of expression. It is urged, however—and whoever said it first, it is now a commonplace—that we should be willing to wade through an ocean of garbage because there might be a pearl in it. To this remarkable argument it is a sufficient answer that we know that it is an ocean of garbage, but we do not know if there is a pearl in it. Nor do we know whether, even if there is a pearl, it is of such value that it is worth wading through an ocean of garbage to get it. Still less do we know that wading through this ocean is the only way to find this pearl. It might, after all, be an insight that has also occurred to someone else who was capable of expressing it without burying it in an ocean of garbage.

The above arguments are attempts to show that one can find some content in every expression, however depraved, that justifies its publication. So one can, too, but only if one is determined beforehand to find some justification for every expression. This kind of argument is really a reversion to the position that expression is an end in itself regardless of its content. The argument collapses once we look at the content of certain expressions and ask what contribution they make to the purposes of a civilized society.

Pornography is only the extreme example of expression of no or very dubious worth. Advertising, too, is a big business, certainly a legitimate one, but few would defend it for its contributions to the quest for meaning in human life. When it threatens something that we take seriously, like health, we are willing to ban it as we banned cigarette advertising from the airwaves. The number of other expressions which, if they deserve protection at all, deserve something less than absolute protection is legion. Even political speech, which it is the primary purpose of the First Amendment to protect, at some point becomes so irrelevant to the purposes of a constitutional democracy that it loses its claim to immunity.

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ much admired dictum that “the only meaning of free speech” is that “the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship . . . should be given their chance and have their way” is in reality a piece of political doctrinairism. It was an irresponsible statement, or rather, it would have been one if Holmes had really meant it. The chances are, however, that he did not and only meant that we could safely let totalitarians talk because we could be sure that not many people in this country would agree with them. If that is all he
meant, he was right in his practical judgment. But that is not what he said, and what he said was silly.

We know nothing about human beings that leads us to believe that they are willing to sacrifice their property, their religion, their control over the education of their children, and possibly their very lives to a proletarian dictatorship because they have been assured from the bench that that is the only meaning of free speech. Men have been known to pledge their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor on the outcome of a war. They do not stake them on the outcome of an election to the results of which they propose tamely to submit. Nor are they likely to wait peacefully to see how an electoral contest comes out when it threatens to prevent any subsequent election from being held. One of the essential conditions for the successful operation of a constitutional democracy is that the political stakes must not be too high. To ignore that elementary truth is to make the First Amendment a charter for civil war.

But Holmes was willing to make his reading of social reality—revolutions don’t happen in this country—the meaning of the First Amendment, even though he professed to be keenly aware of how changeable social reality is. His dictum was at best a prudential judgment about a set of social facts and their probable consequences. All brave statements about the right to advocate and to associate for the violent overthrow of the government rest on such prudential judgments. They always include either the unexpressed qualifying clause, “when the Supreme Court judges that no undue risks are involved,” or the indemonstrable prediction that undue risks will never be involved.

To say that the limits are set even on political speech by prudential judgments is not to say that such judgments must always or usually be in favor of political repression. It is only to say that they are prudential judgments. Such judgments may and, for sound reasons, generally will be in favor of letting people talk even though what they say, if acted upon by a sufficient number of hearers, would lead to the end of constitutional government. Whether courts of law are the organs of government best qualified to make the judgment in this matter is another question. Suffice it to say here that courts are certainly not required by the First Amendment to lay it down that prudential judgments may never be made in the area of expression.
The final argument on which defenders of an unlimited freedom of expression are forced back is that the risks in allowing any limitation on expression are always greater than the risks in giving expression free rein, at least in the long run. This was John Stuart Mill’s ultimate reason for insisting on the degree of individual freedom that he advocated: the public always goes too far. This argument reveals the doctrinaire mind’s fear of prudential judgments and especially its fear of allowing the public to make them. The public is unenlightened and prone to “hysteria,” a disease to which the intellectuals are notoriously immune. The public therefore must not be trusted to have a part in deciding First Amendment cases.

It was “an accepted article of faith” among eighteenth-century advocates of freedom of speech and press that juries should be allowed to decide, not only the fact of publication, but also the question whether a publication was criminal and subject to legal penalty. Juries, it was felt, were the natural protectors of popular liberties from the tyranny of royal judges. The desired reform was accomplished in Great Britain by Charles James Fox’s Libel Act of 1792 and was brought to the United States, curiously enough, by the infamous Sedition Act of 1798. But in the present century the U.S. Supreme Court went far toward repealing this reform by taking unto itself a flood of First Amendment cases.

Judgment in matters involving the freedom of speech and press was removed from juries, local governments and State legislatures, and was transferred to the Supreme Court Building in Washington. So we had for a period of years what Justice Hugo Black called the “absurd spectacle” of Supreme Court Justices “sifting through books and magazines” and trooping to the basement of their building to see an unending series of really or allegedly obscene films in order to determine whether they had “redeeming social value.” For all the Justices knew, there might be a pearl in all that garbage. But, pearl or no pearl, the Court’s liberal wing was determined that no one in the United States except themselves could find anything obscene, and they were seldom willing to do so. Justice Black’s only complaint was that he was never willing and therefore saw no reason for wasting time on such material.

With the passing of the Warren Court and the dwindling in numbers of the liberal wing, the Court has become more ready to grant States and localities some discretion in judging when freedom of expression is
being abused. But the liberal objection remains the same: the public always goes too far, therefore the public must never be allowed to judge. This in effect is to hold that common sense and the judgment of ordinary men and women, of the kind who sit on juries, have nothing to do with questions involving the limits of expression.

Underlying this distrust of popular judgment is the centuries-old liberal quest for abstract, utterly impersonal rules of law, that have only to be applied to cases as they arise, without the necessity of any personal judgment at all. Categories such as "obscenity," "defamation," or "advocacy of violent overthrow" must be rejected because they cannot be precisely defined. If they are allowed to remain part of the law, it becomes necessary for juries and trial courts to decide what they mean in their application to particular cases. Given that much leeway, juries will surely throw out the pearls with the garbage.

Yet this difficulty can be exaggerated. Chief Justice Earl Warren himself once pointed out: "In other areas of the law, terms like 'negligence,' although in common use for centuries, have been difficult to define except in the most general manner. Yet the courts have been able to function in such areas with a reasonable degree of efficiency." He felt obliged, it must be granted, to add, "The obscenity problem, however, is aggravated by the fact that it involves the area of public expression, an area in which a broad range of freedom is vital to our society and is constitutionally protected." But to say that a problem is aggravated is not to say that it is rendered insoluble. Juries, applying general legal definitions and instructed by trial judges, are capable of passing judgment on obscenity and other abuses of freedom of expression. They are often more capable of doing so than civil-liberties lawyers and literary critics who have a vested interest in not recognizing the obvious. When juries err by clear excess, they are subject to correction by appellate courts which will themselves pass prudential judgments on the matter—sound ones, we may hope.

For there is no escaping the personal judgments of human minds in the application of law to concrete decisions. Personal judgment is unavoidable, in fact, even in the hardest of "hard sciences." Even in physics and chemistry, some human minds must judge what constitutes evidence and when the evidence proves a conclusion. There is no set of facts "out there" that talks to men and tells them what is true. All the
more so in the area of practical judgment which guides human action, an area that includes the domain of law. Judgment here necessarily requires evaluation of the facts, estimation of the relative weight and force of a multitude of factors and an effort rationally to predict consequences. Practical judgment is not a blind shot in the dark, but neither is it the mathematical demonstration of an ineluctable conclusion.

This conception of the practical function of reason, however, is intolerable to the doctrinaire mind. Such a mind deals only in logical extremes. The needle on the gauge must point either to zero degrees or to 180 degrees, because there is no fully demonstrable reason for its coming to rest at any one of the 179 other degrees in between. So we must have either uninhibited freedom of expression or total repression. We are always confronted with the choice between Fanny Hill and Torquemada because, logically, there is no other choice.

Yet the claim that in the long run the risks involved in allowing any limitation on freedom of expression are always greater than those involved in removing all limitations, is itself a prudential judgment and a prediction of consequences. There is no way of proving it. There is not even much reason for believing it. Consider the names of Shakespeare, Molière, Cervantes and Dostoevski. Add Dante and Goethe if you wish. Not one of them lived in a liberal democracy. Yet critics have compared their writings favorably with the best work of Ernest Hemingway and Norman Mailer. One would be hard put to it, in fact, to come up with the name of a single author of the same stature as these great writers, who lived under a regime of complete freedom of expression or even, for that matter, in a modern liberal democracy.

Neither, of course, did any of the men named above live in Stalin’s Russia or under an equally repressive tyranny. Writers need freedom, as do scientists, scholars, teachers and voters. But the question is how much and what kind of freedom? That question can be answered only by addressing oneself to the further question, what do they need freedom for? The purposes of freedom must define its nature and its limits. Inquiry into those purposes will yield a more intelligent theory of freedom of expression than groping for a pearl in the garbage or dreading the loss of a pearl if any garbage at all is thrown out.
APPENDIX A

[The following article by Professor Yale Kamisar of the University of Michigan Law School first appeared in the New York Times, June 17, 1985, and is reprinted here with permission. (©1984 by the New York Times Company.)]

The Real Quinlan Issue

Yale Kamisar

More than nine years after the New Jersey Supreme Court granted her parents permission to disconnect Karen Ann Quinlan's mechanical respirator so that she could die “with grace and dignity,” and after years of “defying” the experts who testified that she could not survive without the apparatus, she is dead. It is plain the landmark case will still be debated. What troubles me is that the central issue has escaped attention.

Front-page stories have called the Quinlan case a “historic ‘right-to-die’ decision,” and from the outset it has been almost universally reported and discussed as such. But look again: Was it really a “right-to-die” case? No.

It is far more accurate—albeit more troublesome—to view it as a “power to let someone else die” case. Why? Because letting people die when you have a special relationship with them and a duty to care for them is the equivalent of killing them.

Up until the time the case caught the nation’s—the world’s—attention, there was general agreement that the most important safeguard in various proposals to legalize one or more forms of euthanasia was the requirement that the patient personally request, or consent to, such a course of action (or inaction).

This safeguard was obviously lacking in the Quinlan case. Miss Quinlan did not and (in her condition, of course) could not consent to her death, or ask anyone else to let her die. Nor had she made a “living will” or executed any directive requesting that she be allowed to die without “medical intervention.”

Miss Quinlan’s mother, Julia Quinlan, has told the media that several years before her daughter slipped into a coma after taking tranquilizers and alcoholic beverages, Miss Quinlan told her that she “would never want to be kept alive by extraordinary means”—that is, she would not want her life prolonged unnecessarily by extraordinary medical treatment. It’s hard to believe Miss Quinlan used these words. Indeed, if one reads the book co-authored by Mrs. Quinlan and her husband, Joseph, one discovers that Mrs. Quinlan had “never heard” of the concept of “extraordinary means” until
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Msgr. Trapasso explained the doctrine to her—after Karen Ann had slipped into a coma.

Both a Superior Court judge and the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed that Miss Quinlan's purported expressions of opinion on the issue of "extraordinary means" were so casual, impersonal, abstract and equivocal as to lack the requisite evidential value.

As I understand the New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion, the court would have allowed disconnection of the respirator even if there had been no testimony about Miss Quinlan's wishes. Indeed, the court made such short shrift of her casual statements about a life-and-death decision when she was not actually facing one that it is hard to see how Miss Quinlan's wishes could have had any bearing on the court's decision.

The key to the opinion, I think, is the court's reasoning that if Miss Quinlan's "constitutional right of privacy" included a right to elect to die, and we cannot tell what choice she would have made, we may surmise that she would have chosen to die because we presume the great majority of those in her situation would have so chosen.

Though we all may accept this court assumption, this is not the end of the matter. Even if only a very few patients in Karen Ann Quinlan's circumstances were determined to carry on, their being in a distinct minority is no justification for denying them their personal right to do so. After all, a court, even society's silent majority, cannot speak for all comatose people in Quinlan-type situations. Evidently, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court thought it could—all in the name of Miss Quinlan's "constitutional right of privacy," which, if it means anything, is the right of an individual, not a category of people.

We cannot enter the minds of comatose people to learn if they wish to struggle on. But we can end the fiction of presuming to speak in their behalf. Instead, let courts be honest and say life-support systems should be turned off not because of a patient's wishes but, alas, because they think the patient is "better off dead."
Lincoln Didn’t Defer to Court on Moral Issue

Gary L. McDowell

That politics is an inherently moral enterprise had been, until recently, the received tradition. What is being discounted today as the politics of morality should be celebrated as a return to a properly moral politics.

Going back to the roots of our Western science of politics, it is easy to see why the view that politics is a matter of morality has held such sway. In his two greatest works Aristotle showed the relationship between politics and morality.

In the “Nicomachean Ethics” he argued that all action aims at some good and that action that aims at the greatest human good is politics. His investigation into ethics was, he concluded, “in a sense the study of politics.” He began his “Politics” in similar fashion, arguing that the political association is the highest association, for it alone is concerned with the good of mankind. The “Ethics” concludes by pointing the student to the “Politics,” to the investigation of the best constitution and laws; “Politics” concludes by pointing back to the “Ethics,” to an investigation into the nature and proper education of the human soul. The purpose of political life is the development of the ethical man; and the highest calling of the ethical man is politics, to engage in discussions over what constitutes the good political life.

From the start of our political tradition, then, politics and morality have been seen by the greatest minds as inseparable.

That such an abstract relationship should now be a cause for public (or at least media) concern becomes less a puzzle when one understands that the problem to the critics is the more concrete connection between partisan politics and a certain morality. At bottom, the current debate is over whether the moral stance taken by President Reagan and his allies is a properly liberal and secular one. The rancorous debate over abortion reveals this most clearly.

To those who favor the freedom-of-choice principle posited by the Supreme Court in *Roe v. Wade* (1973), the president’s stand on abortion is outrageous. But his view draws much of its moral support from a time long past when the
nation first found itself seriously divided over another fundamental moral issue: slavery.

The political issues that swirled about the institution of slavery and eventually plunged the nation into a bloody civil war derived from the moral dilemma inherent in that institution. The deepest question in that moral debate was whether or not in a liberal regime human beings can legitimately be held inherently unequal. The answer that had been given by the Supreme Court in *Dred Scott v. Sandford* (1857) was that indeed they could; Negroes were not human beings but property under the Constitution, Chief Justice Roger Taney said. Slavery was constitutionally immune to political interference. The freedom of choice as to whether to hold slaves or not was a more fundamental right than a slave's right to be free.

In a sense *Dred Scott* did for the moral issue of slavery what *Roe* did for the moral issue of abortion. Each case sought to cut off public debate once and for all over the vexing moral questions involved. In *Dred Scott* the Supreme Court by a creative reading of constitutional text and intention preempted Congress's authority to restrict on moral grounds the spread of slavery into the territories. In *Roe* the court by a creative reading of constitutional text and a total disregard of constitutional intention preempted the powers of the states to prohibit on moral grounds the practice of abortion. In both instances the Supreme Court undermined the legitimate constitutional powers of other institutions to deliberate over, to debate vigorously, and to fashion policies that would reflect the true moral tone of the political community. In each instance the judicial attempt to sever politics from morality proved detrimental to both politics and moral discourse.

In the case of slavery and in the case of abortion, the moral question—the political question—is the same: Are some lives more worthy than others? In a nation dedicated to those principles of natural rights embodied in the Declaration of Independence, one cannot be morally indifferent to the answer we, as a people, give.

Those who oppose President Reagan's stand on abortion must do better than mimic the glib response Stephen Douglas offered in his great debate with Abraham Lincoln. To Douglas, it mattered not if slavery were voted up or voted down; to Lincoln, it mattered deeply. As with slavery, so also with abortion. The critics of Mr. Reagan's moral politics must show why a woman's right to privacy and freedom of choice is more morally compelling than the right to life of the unborn. The nation still awaits their answer.

Those who suggest that the Supreme Court's decision on abortion must be forever binding on the nation should reflect on Lincoln's argument made in
the dim moral light still available in the shadow cast by Dred Scott. "If this important decision," Lincoln argued, "had been made by the unanimous concurrence of the judges, and without any apparent partisan bias, and with the steady practice of the departments throughout our history, and had been in no part, based on assumed historical facts which are not really true; or if in wanting in some of these, it had been before the court more than once, and there been affirmed and reaffirmed through a course of years, it might then be, perhaps would be, factious, nay, even revolutionary, to not acquiesce in it as a precedent. But when as it is true we find it wanting in all these claims to the public confidence, it is not resistance, it is not factious, it is not even disrespectful, to treat it as not having yet quite established a settled doctrine for the country."
A Caution—"Think of Forever"

James Dempsey

And still the letters come on the subject of abortion.

The majority are from women, and many of the writers said they had abortions at some point in their lives. What they did was quite legal, and yet all of them, without exception, asked that their names not be used.

Many of the letters contained the usual arguments for and against abortion, arguments which we have all heard before and which cast no new light on the issue.

And yet in those letters from women who had experienced abortion there was something that has not been noted too often.

They told of an anguish, an almost constant pain felt by several of these women. Some of them have since had other children, and they find it hard to look at their living children without thinking of the babies that never were.

It is doubtful that any woman chooses abortion with a light heart. However, some are able to recover from the experience in much the same way one gets over the death of a loved one.

Time heals, as the cliché has it. At first one feels the bereavement all the time. Then slowly the sadness dissipates, and the sense of loss fades. Life becomes worth living again.

Others find it hard to forget, like the writer of one particularly powerful letter we received.

Its viewpoint is strongly anti-abortion, but that is not the main point. It would be sad if readers viewed the letter as being merely another argument against abortion. That would miss the whole point, because the letter tells us more than that. Far, far more.

"I've tried to write this letter to you over and over in my head for days."

"... I've never been able to sit down and think (my abortion) through. To be able to put it away forever is my greatest wish, but the newspaper and TV coverage of the pro-lifers in Washington are forever bringing it back.

"This is going to be hard to put on paper... but if I can give one piece of advice to any woman contemplating abortion it is this: Think it through first. Don't just think of your life in the next two or three years, think of forever."
“I miss my child that I never had. I am repulsed at the fact that it probably recoiled at the doctor’s instruments coming towards him and tearing him apart. And I made that choice.

“I am heartsick over the fact that I never gave him a chance to smile, to coo at me; to trust me to help when he was sick or had a boo-boo to fix. No, this baby couldn’t trust me—I made that choice.

“I am ashamed that I chose my happiness over this child’s well-being. What seemed easy at the time has grown harder every year to bear. It would’ve been easier to bear the teasing of classmates, the scorn of other adults, the pain of childbirth and raising a child alone, than this guilt.

“I look at my children I have now and I know in my heart that they were alive as 3-month-old fetuses. I felt them roll over, elbow and kick me. I felt their hiccups and I felt their life every time I moved. I look at them and I could cry for the brother or sister they should have.

“I look at them now and know I could have made the same choice with their little lives . . . Thank God I didn’t because I love them more than life itself.

“If I could do it over again, God knows I could never hurt my child . . . I ache for that baby. My life may have been harder and it would definitely have been different, but I would not have this awful hurt in my heart.

“I know I murdered my child, maybe not with my own hands, but with my choice. I have to live with that.

“I only hope that God will forgive me. I know I’ll never forgive myself. And if I’ve changed one person’s decision to have an abortion with this letter, then it will have been worth the pain of writing and feeling instead of burying my head in the sand.”

No one who reads this letter would think for a minute that the writer was not suited for motherhood. She loves her aborted child as much as she does her living children. It is hard to think of her as a killer, and it is painful to read the words of a good mother who calls herself a murderer.

I remember reading, probably in some brochure put out by a pro-life group, a prayer for aborted babies. It was an ill-written, though no doubt heartfelt piece.

It was written partly from the point of view of the fetus and described with dismaying detail what the writer considered to be the physical effects of abortion on the fetus. And it spoke of the anguish of the child, who suddenly realized that the one place on earth where it should have been safe from harm—the mother’s womb—had become the scene of its destruction.

There should also be a prayer for mothers such as the one who wrote this letter, the ones who chose abortion because at the time they thought it was the right choice, or because their boyfriends left them, or because their families
insisted or simply because they were young and frightened.
Shame, guilt, anguish and pain are with them all the time.
I'm no writer of prayers, but if I composed a prayer for these women I would ask one thing for them all—the ability to forget.
APPENDIX D

[The following syndicated column was issued May 28, 1985, and is reprinted here with permission. Mr. Joseph Sobran has been a contributing editor to this review since its inception in 1975. (© 1985, Universal Press Syndicate.)]

"We Are Your Mothers"

Joseph Sobran

The pro-abortion lobby has done it again. Breaking all previous records for effrontery, it has played the motherhood card.

A few days back, a group of abortion advocates gathered in Washington to hear the stories of women who have had abortions, as told by the women themselves. This was their slogan: "We are your mothers, your daughters, your sisters, your friends—and abortion is a choice we have made."

Interesting. These women don't want to be called murderers. Grant them that, which seems reasonable enough, and the next thing you know they are telling us they are our mothers.

How can they be our mothers? We aren't their children. Their children were left in the plastic bag out behind the "clinic," waiting for the garbage-man. We are here today only because our own mothers didn't do that.

The pro-abortionists tax our patience enough with their prattle about their precious "rights." Now they want to freeload on our reverence for women who give us love along with life. Pardon me, but it seems just a bit much. They forfeited our reverence when they invited the instruments of death into their wombs.

Mothers, daughters, sisters, friends—do you notice anything missing? How about "wives"? The Supreme Court, in deciding that none of the 50 states had ever managed to propose a constitutional abortion law, also subsequently decided that a man has no legal interest in the abortion of his own child, even if he is married to the mother. For some reason, the pro-abortionists preferred not to remind us of that.

Under the twisted law the court has given us, a husband and father has no means of protecting his own child if his wife chooses to abort it. She need not even inform him. It can be her little secret. Only her abortionist knows for sure.

The fiction of the pro-abortion lobby is that the child is simply "part of the woman's body"—although it bears someone else's genetic code and will be regarded as his child if it is allowed to be born.
Those who don’t want men to have any rights or legal interests in abortion fail to explain how this “part of the woman’s body” can, after a nine-month hiatus in paternity, suddenly become at birth related to someone other than the woman. If the decision to kill the child or let it live belongs exclusively to the mother, how can anyone else be required to bear the cost of her decision by supporting the child? The pro-abortionists are willing to do to men what they say should never be done to anyone: Burden them with unwanted children.

These people should listen to themselves once in a while. They might notice something. They keep saying that unwanted children tend to become abused children. Since fathers abuse children as much as mothers do, then, by this logic, a man should be free to renounce paternal responsibility at any time during his wife’s or paramour’s pregnancy.

After all, he may not be ready for fatherhood. A child might interfere with his education. It might mess up his career plans. Maybe he is just too old to feel like raising another child. Why should he be forced to support it? Is compulsory fatherhood any fairer than compulsory motherhood?

The pro-abortionists have raised these questions, but won’t stay to face them. All rights are for the goose, all responsibilities for the gander. This is called “equality between the sexes.”

Well, they have their bloody rights. Now they want to be venerated as mothers into the bargain. Can self-centeredness go any further?

Traditional law has presumed and expected that parents would love their children. It has held both parents responsible. It has taken the side of the normal against the abnormal.

The new law has inverted this order of things; it has done a reverse on King Solomon. It is willing to turn the disposition of a child over to the one who loves it least. The child may indeed be cut in half, not over the screaming protests of the mother, but at her request.

The pro-abortionists were smart, therefore, to fashion a slogan that would avoid reminding men that their children are totally at the mercy of others. It wouldn’t do for men to look at pictures of aborted babies and say, “That could be my child!” Of course, a bad father wouldn’t care. It’s the loving father who is victimized by the abortion laws.
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