Dismantling the United States of America
America . . . we have a problem!
It seems the United States of America is undermining the United States of America.
The smoldering social ruckus—the internal strife and intrigue—that is occurring in the United States today should not be, but it is, and it didn’t just happen—it was caused, caused by generations of bigotry and injustice, nurtured by prejudice and intellectual poverty. To some it may seem a trivial consequence—a disruptive interlude that interferes with their everyday pursuit of physical pleasures and comforts. But for those thoughtfully affected by the turmoil, it is a leap into a social abyss from which there seems to be no escape. How did this happen?
Part I: The Beginning
The preamble to the Declaration of Independence—The Unanimous Declaration of the thirteen United States of America (1776)—explicitly states: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”1 This statement underscores all of mankind’s reliance on their Creator and therefore must be considered a universal maxim applicable to all Americans regardless of any racial, ethnic, or cultural characteristic, and to all branches of all governments within the bounds of the United States. This single statement is the most significant and most far reaching of any of mankind’s humanly contrived notions that have ever been expressed. Additionally, the substance of this preamble is repeated in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States (1789).
In 1787, delegates from the thirteen United States of America met in Philadelphia to address the need for a more substantial national government than that afforded them by the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union (1781). Overall, the more populated states wanted legislative representation based on a state’s population, while the less populated states wanted equal legislative representation for each state. Additionally, the delegates realized that some semblance of state sovereignty must remain—a federal republic—as there were too many nuances between the individual states for an all-encompassing, centralized governing body to address all of the sectional parochialisms of the individual states—one size does not fit all.
The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 vol. 12a, 22b & 32c comprise the collection of extant notes from the daily proceedings of that convention from which the Constitution of the United States was crafted. As noted in the records, the so-called Great Compromise of 1787 was offered by Connecticut delegates Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth to resolve the dispute between the less populated states and the more populated states over representation in the new national government. Two other notions seemed to be prevalent throughout the convention as well: There was adamant opposition to an all-encompassing centralized, national government—which was deemed authoritarian and oppressive—and opposition to open-ended, majority-rule democracies—which were regarded as self-indulgent and neglectful of lesser populated social segments. In addition, some of the delegates held the opinion that the majority of any population—the people- at-large—was vulnerable to deceptive tactics that might be perpetrated by unscrupulous, self-serving politicians.
During the course of the convention, then:
“Mr. Roger Sherman opposed the election (of the legislative body) by the people, insisting that it ought to be by the〈State〉 Legislatures. The people he said, immediately〉 should have as little to do as may be about the Government. They want information and are constantly liable to be misled.”2a (Madison, Thursday May 31, 1787)
“The objects of the Union, he (Roger Sherman) thought were few. 1. Defense against foreign danger.2 (Defense) against internal disputes & a resort to force.3 Treaties with foreign nations.4 Regulating foreign commerce, & drawing revenue from it. These & perhaps a few lesser objects alone rendered a Confederation of the States necessary. All other matters civil & criminal would be much better in the hands of the States. The people are more happy in small than large States.”2a (Madison, Wednesday June 6, 1787)
(Alexander Hamilton) “Society naturally divides itself into two political divisions—the few and the many, who have distinct interests. If government in the hands of the few, they will tyrannize over the many. If [in] the hands of the many, they will tyrannize over the few. It ought to be in the hands of both; and they should be separated.”2a (Hamilton, Monday June 18, 1787) “I (Judge Oliver Ellsworth) think the second branch of the general legislature (the Senate) ought to be elected agreeable to the report . . . The state legislatures are more competent to make a judicious choice, than the people at large.”2a (Yates, Monday June 25, 1787)
“I (Judge Oliver Ellsworth) now move the following amendment to the resolve—that in the second branch (the Senate) each state have an equal vote. I confess that the effect of this motion is, to make the general government partly federal and partly national. This will secure tranquility, and still make it efficient; and it will meet the objections of the larger states. In taxes they will have a proportional weight in the first branch (the House of Representatives) of the general legislature.”2a (Yates, Friday, June 29th, 1787)
Further, in regards to the election of United States Senators:
“I (Judge Oliver Ellsworth) have the greatest respect for the gentleman who spoke last. I respect his abilities, although I differ from him on many points—He asserts that the general government must depend on the equal suffrage of the people. But will not this put it in the power of few states to control the rest? It is a novel thing in politics that the few control the many. In the British government, the few, as a guard, have an equal share in the government. The House of Lords, although few in number, and sitting in their own right, have an equal share in their legislature. They cannot give away the property of the community, but they can prevent the commons from being too lavish in their gifts.”2a (Yates, Saturday, June 30th, 1787)
The commons to which Judge Ellsworth referred is the House of Commons in England’s Parliament—equivalent to the House of Representatives in the Congress of the United States —the representative of the people-at-large.
To ensure the goals of the delegates, the compromise provided for a bicameral federal legislature comprising two operationally and physically separated chambers: The Senate would have equal representation from each state (chosen by each state’s legislature to retain state sovereignty and to guard against an open-ended, majority rule democracy), while the House of Representatives would have proportional representation based on each state’s population (chosen by each state’s people-at-large). And so, the delegates from each of the states to the convention achieved their objectives by crafting a constitutional federal republic in sharp contrast to the centralized, national governments of their European ancestors.
Although perhaps not specifically stated or intended by the delegates, the Great Compromise of 1787 virtually advanced the notion that representation of minorities in government was a necessary requisite for any successful federal republic; minorities—whether states, districts, or social segments— must be represented in the daily affairs of government to be other than helpless onlookers who might thereby become dissident citizens.
Part II: The Problem
The Indian Removal Act (1830)3
On May 28, 1830, the national government of the United States began the relocation of Native Americans to “west of the river Mississippi.”3 This act—the Indian Removal Act of 1830—essentially ignored a basic, unalienable principle of the founding fathers, to wit: “no person . . . shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”4 The removal act expelled Native Americans from their homelands and virtually declared Native Americans to be “non-persons” in the eyes of the majority of the then federal government, and thus began the long Trail of Tears episode. The removal scheme continued into the late 1800s, concluding with the Wounded Knee Massacre (1890) in South Dakota.
The Indian Removal Act emboldened the already established caste system—which began with legalized slavery—not in law but in fact. The caste system essentially declared Native Americans and African Americans to be unqualified recipients of the benefits of the United States of America; it seems Native Americans and African Americans were considered little more than social refuse, even beasts of burden—property—in the case of African Americans. This injustice continues to this day, with more than one-million Native Americans5 still living—willingly and unwillingly—on over three hundred reservations6 in North America, mostly “west of the river Mississippi,” under subjugation of the national government of the United States, to wit: Unalienable human rights and superficial human rights are mutually incompatible.
The Catholic Petition for Common School Funds (1840)7
During the early 1800s, New York City began the distribution of tax revenues to common schools—specifically to secular schools or those affiliated with Protestant Christianity. Catholic Christians, as might be expected, sensed the inequity of their being singled out as unqualified to receive government financial assistance for education and accordingly submitted a petition to their city government for such financial assistance; given that all the people of New York City pay taxes equally, it seemed all the people of New York City should benefit from those taxes equally.
In 1824 the Board of Aldermen of the City of New York were empowered by the state legislature to select those schools qualified to receive state funds. . . the (Public School) Society distributed almost all of the funds to Protestant schools. The Catholic Petition for Common School Funds was written on September 21, 1840, and was also endorsed by some of New York City’s Jews . . . the petition was denied.8
Even though Congress could make no law “respecting an establishment of religion,” the Constitution did not prohibit either the Supreme Court of the United States or a sovereign state such as New York—or the City of New York—from exercising religious bigotry, to wit:
Congress shall make no law respecting [or disrespecting?] an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.9
This act by the New York City aldermen further emboldened the caste system by incorporating Catholic Christians as unqualified recipients of the benefits of the United States of America. The lower caste now included Native Americans, African Americans, and Catholic Christians, while the upper caste—the democratic majority—was the ruling class. In the course of time, this common school fund injustice was replicated throughout the United States and continues to this day, to wit: Religious freedom and religious exclusions are mutually incompatible.
Dred Scottv. Sandford(1857)10
Slavery was a major issue of the 1787 Federal Convention,2b as the delegates knew full well there was no compromise between free and slave. Not only were the delegates struggling to determine whether the representation of each state should be relative to their populations, but the delegates were also plagued with the notion of legalized slavery: Five states from the South were adamantly pro-slavery, while eight states from the North were opposed to slavery. As it turned out, the slavery issue was deemed of lesser importance to the delegates than the formation of an effective national government, so it was sluffed off as a state sovereignty issue. During the course of the convention, then, the delegates simply concerned themselves with how slaves would be evaluated for tax purposes—because slaves were considered property—and with how they would be calculated toward each state’s population in determining their legislative representation, avoiding the fact that slaves were persons. This particular scenario during the convention can only be regarded as cold-hearted and sociologically ugly. If the crafting of the bicameral federal legislature by the delegates to the convention was the Great Compromise of 1787, the legitimization of slavery via state sovereignty was the Great Blunder of 1787.
Essentially, Dred Scott v. Sandford declared that African Americans were not and could never be citizens of the United States of America. This is the first time the Supreme Court explicitly declared African Americans to be unqualified for participation in the society of the United States of America. The author (Chief Justice Roger Taney) had the courage to acknowledge that Dred Scott was a person according to the Declaration of Independence. That is, he was a human person created by God and enjoyed the rights of life, liberty, and happiness according to his Creator but, because Dred Scott was a slave—property under the constitutional provision of state sovereignty—the author lacked the courage to acknowledge him to be a person according to the contemporary interpretation of the Constitution. African Americans were persons according to their Creator, but not according to the Constitution.
What? To most people of any faith, Man’s Law (or its interpretation) may not usurp Nature’s Law or God’s Law (or their interpretations).
Dred Scott v. Sandford is very wordy, but essentially the author declared African Americans cannot be persons because they are slaves, i.e., property; it seems the author could just as well have declared African Americans cannot be slaves, i.e., property, because they are persons, but lacked the courage to do so. Disastrously, the legalized racial injustice effectuated by Dred Scott v. Sandford was a catalyst to the American Civil War (1861-1865) and its aftermath—a social disorder that perpetuates racial prejudice and injustice throughout the United States yet today, to wit: Freedom and slavery are mutually incompatible.
Seventeenth Amendment (1913)11
The Seventeenth Amendment—the selection of United States senators by the majority vote of each state’s people-at-large rather than by a state’s legislature—ended the liaison between state legislatures and the national legislature—the Congress—in direct opposition to the foresight of the founding fathers. Whereas the United States Senate previously acted as a check against “lavish gifts” that might be bestowed on the people-at-large by the House of Representatives, it now became arm-in-arm with the want of the masses. In addition, state sovereignty—which was a major declaration of the convention—was weakened, as was the federation of states. It is puzzling that the legislators of the individual and sovereign states voted for this amendment, which vacated their authority to select their own state’s senatorial representative to the Congress of the United States. Thus began the transformation of the United States from a federal republic into a democratic republic—a majority-rule democracy—notwithstanding the wisdom of the delegates to the Federal Convention:
“I (William Pierce) was myself of opinion that it would be right first to know how the Senate should be appointed, because it would determine many Gentlemen how to vote for the choice of Members for the first branch,—it appeared clear to me that unless we established a Government that should carry at least some of its principles into the mass of the people, we might as well depend upon the present confederation. If the influence of the states is not lost in some part of the new Government we never shall have anything like a national institution. But in my opinion it will be right to shew the sovereignty of the state in one branch of the Legislature, and that should be in the Senate.”2a (Pierce, Wednesday, May 31, 1787)
(Mr. Patterson) “We are met here as the deputies of 13 independent, sovereign states, for federal purposes. Can we consolidate their sovereignty and form one nation, and annihilate the sovereignties of our states who have sent us here for other purposes?”2a (Yates, Saturday, June 9, 1787)
“He (Mr. Sherman) observed that as the people ought to have the election of one of the branches of the legislature (House of Representatives), the legislature of each state ought to have the election of the second branch (Senate), in order to preserve the state sovereignty.”2a (Yates, Monday, June 11, 1787)
The Seventeenth Amendment exasperated members of the former Confederate States of America (1861-65)—the South—that alleged the amendment to be nothing more than an act of Civil War revenge and a constitutional scheme to diminish state sovereignty; Southerners defended sovereignty as a state’s rights issue, whereas Northerners alleged state sovereignty to be nothing more than a Southern ruse to ensure a shadow of legalized slavery. Whatever, this amendment widened and deepened the social rift between those supportive of state sovereignty and those supportive of a centralized, national government.
The Seventeenth Amendment did not fix the problems mentioned in the plea for the amendment, but simply transferred them to the masses. In so doing, this amendment became a classic example of “throwing the baby out with the bath water.” Though seemingly well intentioned, it lessened both the federation of states and the sovereignty of states and set into motion a migration from a federal republic toward a centralized, open-ended, majority rule democracy—a democratic republic—which the founding fathers had shunned, to wit: Sovereign-state federal governments and majority-rule centralized governments are mutually incompatible.
Engel v. Vitale (1962)12
Engel v. Vitale ended the practice of prayer in public schools—taxpayer-funded schools—as envisioned by the 1824 Board of Aldermen of the City of New York. It effectively ended Protestant Christianity’s cultivation of morals and ethics in public schools, and opened Pandora’s Box to popularly contrived, manipulated, and determined morals and ethics, which coincides with one of Karl Marx principles: “There are, besides, eternal truths, such as Freedom, Justice, etc., that are common to all states of society. But Communism abolishes eternal truths, it abolishes all religion and all morality, instead of constituting them on a new basis; it therefore acts in contradiction to all past historical experience.”13
During this same era and accompanying this court’s decision were the deterioration and ultimate disregard of the Motion Picture (and TV) Production Code; the propagation of the slogan “If it feels good, it must be good” and its corollary: “If it feels good, do it”; Woodstock (1969) and its aftermath— sexual anarchy and hallucinogen usage; and, in more recent years, greater boldness in the nation’s anarchic social climate, such as bullying, shoplifting, vandalism, scamming, casual sex, and porch piracy.
This Supreme Court ruling seems to have disregarded the First Amendment and placed Protestant education in the same class as Catholic education—or any other religious-based education—and opened the way for secular religion and its counterpart, social anarchy. It greatly expanded the financial injustice initiated by the New York City aldermen, which was originally perpetrated only against students affiliated with Catholic education. This court’s decision instituted secular religion as the basis of government-funded education, which seemingly contradicts the First Amendment. Incidentally, this court could just as well have interpreted the First Amendment to declare taxpayer funds must be allocated to every student’s tuition regardless of whether the school attended was religious or secular in nature, but, again, the court lacked the courage. On the other hand, remember that the Supreme Court need not abide by the First Amendment—only the Congress. Had the 1824 New York City aldermen practiced religious tolerance and equality in the first place, how different education—and maybe our nation’s social fellowship—might be today; in addition, had the 1962 Supreme Court exercised the courage to empower the First Amendment instead of gutting it, how different the United States social climate might be today, to wit: Social order and social anarchy are mutually incompatible.
Reynolds v. Sims (1964)14
Reynolds v. Sims furthered the influence of the Seventeenth Amendment by mandating that all legislators in state governments be elected from districts of approximately equal populations, according to the court’s interpretation of the so-called “equal protection clause” of the Fourteenth Amendment. Consequently, the participation of minority-populated districts in state legislatures was terminated—an unambiguous contradiction to the wisdom of the Founding Fathers. Many if not most state constitutions were at the time patterned after the original federal Constitution, so that minority-populated districts might have some representation in their legislatures—a Senate and a House of Representatives—where State senators were elected from county or parish geographic districts and State representatives were elected from nearly equally populated districts: “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.”15
That this Supreme Court did not complete the transformation of the national government from a federal republic into a majority-rule democratic republic by mandating United States senators to be elected from equally populated districts is a conundrum. Be that as it may, Reynolds v. Sims furthered the transformation of the United States into a majority rule democratic republic, and furthered the adulteration of state sovereignty by its infringement of the constitutions of the various states—constitutions that were previously accepted as in conformance to the Constitution of the United States. It is uncanny and mindboggling that—after an elapsed period of nearly two hundred years—the Supreme Court should suddenly declare it unconstitutional for state constitutions to be patterned after the Constitution of their own parent nation, that is, the United States of America. This court’s opinion, by the way, is like declaring it unnatural for children to be of the same species as their parents.
After World War II and the memories of atrocities committed by centralized, autocratic governments during that war, majority-rule democratic action flourished with reckless abandon in the United States, whence Reynolds v. Sims, together with other initiatives—the Seventeenth Amendment, Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Gallup Polls (statistical analysis of popular opinions), etc.—magnified the antagonism between state sovereignty advocates and centralized, majority rule government advocates, to wit: Minority-inclusion representation and majority-exclusive representation are mutually incompatible.
Roe v. Wade (1973)16
Without a single phrase cited from the Declaration of Independence or the Constitution of the United States to support the “right to abortion,” Roe v. Wade became the death blow for civil harmony in the United States. Roe v. Wade simply declared pre-born human persons to be “non-persons” because they were not explicitly itemized as “persons” in the Constitution—weird, neither were Native Americans, African Americans, Asian Americans, Latino Americans, nor European Americans. Yet, this court singled out pre-born persons—alone—as being “non-persons” over all other persons, not unlike the way the Dred Scott v. Sandford court virtually pronounced African Americans to be “non-persons.” However, unlike Dred Scott v. Sandford—whose author acknowledged African Americans to be persons according to their Creator— the author of Roe v. Wade, Justice Harry Blackmun, had not even the courage to acknowledge all human persons to be “persons” with rights according to their Creator: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”1
When the preamble states that “all men are created equal,” it must mean at the moment of a person’s conception, because that is when—and only when— a particular person is created; even Chief Justice Roger Taney intimated that in Dred Scott v. Sandford. How different our society would be today had the 1973 court truly and courageously stated that the Constitution simply does not grant a “right to abortion.”
An outgrowth of Roe v. Wade was a statement by then Rep. Geraldine Ferraro that “she personally opposes abortion but supports a woman’s right to choose for herself on the subject.”17 Ferraro’s dichotomous notion has become highly regarded by pro-abortion advocates, pro-choice advocates, and other waywards as a way to hide their cultural malignancy: They don’t care. Be that as it may, we—the people-at-large—seem not to care either; we care mostly about what affects us immediately and personally, to wit: Pro-life and pro-abortion are mutually incompatible.
Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)18
Obergefell v. Hodges seems to be a copy-cat of the same moral rationale that Geraldine Ferraro’s statement concocted regarding Roe v. Wade. Her dichotomous statement suggests “truth be damned, do whatever you want,” which, by the way, seems to be in agreement with the moral and ethical deficiencies that emerged during the era of the Engel v. Vitale decision. This rationale seems likewise to be the basis of liberty as interpreted by Justice Anthony McLeod Kennedy in the Obergefell v. Hodges decision: “The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and, under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, couples of the same sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”18 Combining the implied judicial thoughts discerned from Engel v. Vitale, Roe v. Wade, and Obergefell v. Hodges breeds a jumbled standard of morals and ethics—if any at all—in accordance with Geraldine Ferraro’s dichotomous statement. Accordingly, it seems liberty in conjunction with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment allows whatever. Future extrapolations from these decisions, then, might easily be exploited by the Supreme Court to legitimatize hallucinogens, prostitution, euthanasia, termination of defective persons, national government mandating states’ affairs, public opinion quashing unalienable rights, etc., and thereby perpetuate and intensify the already divisive social ruckus—the internal strife and intrigue—that is undermining the United States today.
Marriage has historically been a natural contract—written or unwritten— between one man and one woman, at least since the time of the writing of Genesis. Marriage is a natural right not a state right, and the state has nothing to do with it other than respect it and accept it. Further, as was previously stated, Man’s Law may not usurp Nature’s Law or God’s Law.
Obergefell v. Hodges’ legalization of same-sex marriage obliterated the foundation of civilized human society, i.e., the nuclear family. Heretofore, marriage was considered—and in some cases legally defined—as a contractual union between one man and one woman. In fact, sex has as its natural purpose the procreation of the species—whether human persons or some other species—and the family has as its primary purpose the protection of that relationship and its offspring; not so homosexual relationships. It seems the Supreme Court would have better served itself and the Constitution by declaring that it had no jurisdiction in the matter. None of this, however, censures homosexuality or casual sex or whatever; only that marriage per se is a contractual union between a man and a woman, not between anybody and anybody for any reason.
Civilized human society has thrived on the foundation of the nuclear family—the relationship between one man and one woman, and their children— but some contemporary social engineers want to include everyone in what they refer to as “the family.” To some, “the family” is a mass of individuals whose relationships resemble those associated with a tribe; thus, a regression toward the tribal family. Note that the “Abolition [Aufhebung] of the (nuclear) family”13 was one of the key historical aspects of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels’ social enlightenment: the Manifesto of the Communist Party. Throughout the Manifesto, the tribal family as such is vigorously predicted and promoted: “The bourgeois (nuclear) family will vanish as a matter of course when its complement vanishes, and both will vanish with the vanishing of capital,”13 to wit: Nuclear families and tribal families are mutually incompatible.
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022)
It seems our nation too often has been challenged with social issues inundated by the forces of popular opinion on the one hand and constitutional truth on the other, and that government delegates too often seem attracted to those decisions that favor popular opinion—but then, as they say, we are a democracy. It further seems that righteous government social acts flow along with little or no notice by the people-at-large, whereas errant acts or decisions by government delegates engender everlasting turmoil and even conflict. And, notwithstanding previously and seemingly errant government decisions chronicled in this essay, every future litigation before the court must be regarded as an opportunity to set the course aright.
On June 24, 2022, Associate Justice Samuel Anthony Alito Jr. delivered the majority opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, a case challenging the constitutionality of a Mississippi law prohibiting most abortions after fifteen weeks of gestation. In the opening paragraph he remarks:
Abortion presents a profound moral issue on which Americans hold sharply conflicting views. Some believe fervently that a human person comes into being at conception and that abortion ends an innocent life. Others feel just as strongly that any regulation of abortion invades a woman’s right to control her own body and prevents women from achieving full equality. Still others in a third group think that abortion should be allowed under some but not all circumstances, and those within this group hold a variety of views . . . views about the particular restrictions that should be imposed.19
This overview of the abortion issue underscores the infinite disparity that exists between the different social stances of the people-at-large in the United States. Unfortunately, Dobbs failed to resolve the fundamental issue that pre-born human beings are persons and, therefore, have a right to life under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. If this seems reminiscent of and a rehash of the slavery and sovereign state issue of 1787 through 1863, so be it.
With respect to the forthcoming argument in this section, the reader is reminded of two indisputable scientific notions. First: Something cannot be born from nothing. Creatures lacking a specific nature and substance cannot—by their own doing—beget or transform their selves into creatures that embody that specific nature and substance. That is, inorganic substance cannot beget or transform its self into vegetable substance, nor can vegetable substance beget or transform its self into animal substance, nor can animal substance beget or transform its self into rational substance, i.e., a human person. Second: Because something is neither added to nor subtracted from the formulation of the conceived substance of a human being after conception, and because the conceived substance grows its self into the living person that it is, personhood must be intrinsic to the conceptual substance of every human being.
From the Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, then, it seems the Founding Fathers demonstrated a great deal of knowledge and courage in their creation of our federal republic. And, with such records in hand, it seems a sovereign state—such as the State of Mississippi or any other sovereign state—has not only the right but the obligation in accordance with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America (cited in numerous cases tried before the Supreme Court) to legislatively ensure that “NO PERSON . . . shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”4 and, thereby, empower legal protection for the life of every person—including pre-born persons. Similarly, it seems a sovereign state—such as the State of Mississippi or any other sovereign state—has not only the right but the obligation in accordance with the preamble to the Declaration of Independence (previously cited in numerous cases tried before the Supreme Court) to legislatively “hold these truths to be self-evident, that ALL MEN are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness”1 and thereby empower legal protection for the life of every person—including pre-born persons. In these regards, the obligation to legislatively protect the life of pre-born persons, as in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, reinforces the intent of the Constitution, whereas the right to terminate the life of pre-born persons, as in Roe v. Wade, subverts the intent of the Constitution.
Part III: Understanding the Ruckus
America . . . what can be done?
Insights into the problems presented above reveal that we are not lacking in the knowledge of truth, but the decisions rendered in them indicate that truth and courage are suffering defeat at the hands of seemingly twisted legalism, social bias, and popular opinion. The Founding Fathers are dead and so too, it seems, is courage: The Supreme Court lacks courage; the major political parties lack courage; we, the people-at-large, lack courage.
It would be easy to simply suggest the foregoing problems be resolved through revocation or repeal, but that is not going to happen. Human history has shown that society does not self-correct or reverse direction of its own accord: Self-righteous judges are reluctant to reverse errant court decisions; self-serving politicians are only concerned with voter applause; self-centered people-at-large are made submissive through “lavish gifts” of welfare and entitlements (the counterpart of the “bread and circuses” of ancient Rome). Perhaps it would help if we could only see each individual person as our Creator does, but then, of course, we would have to recognize God, and that would violate social secularism.
Perhaps the reader can better understand today’s social ruckus by reflecting on present-day art forms; after all, “Art is a reflection of society.”20 Much of contemporary art seems to be incoherent and characteristically obscure—a lot of the visual arts appear as mindless arrays of psychedelic colored splotches intermingled with meandering streaks of conflicting hues and shadows; a lot of the aural arts sound like endless contrivances of ear-piercing, high-pitched shrieks of incoherent vocalized syllables accompanied by repetitive, body-throbbing BOOM-BOOMS. Or, maybe, our social ruckus might be likened to the visible snow seen in early-era television broadcasts, or the audible static heard on early-era radio broadcasts: noise . . . noise that drowns out the reality of sight and sound, the reality of what we need to see and hear to survive.
A cursory examination of presidential election after-effects in the United States since Roe v. Wade seems to exhibit the following divisiveness in our social environment:
• The northeastern geographic region of the United States—from Baltimore, MD, to Minneapolis, MN—seems to exhibit a social aura supportive of majority-rule socialism coupled with an advocacy for legalized abortion.
• The southeastern geographic region of the United States—from Raleigh, NC, to Tulsa, OK—seems to exhibit a social aura supportive of social conservatism coupled with an opposition to legalized abortion.
• The Pacific Coast geographic region of the United States—from Seattle, WA, to San Diego, CA—seems to exhibit a social aura supportive of social liberalism coupled with an advocacy for legalized abortion.
• The central geographic region of the United States—from the Appalachians to the Rockies—seems to exhibit a social aura supportive of free enterprise individualism coupled with an opposition to legalized abortion.
These observations are not hard and fast, but they should be indicative of the extensive civil division that percolates throughout every aspect of social life in the United States.
In the world of physical science, Sir Isaac Newton’s first law of motion states: “An object continues its present state of motion or rest unless changed by an external force.” Applying an analogy of this law to the social world suggests that the United States will continue its present migration away from its founding constitutional federal republic and its maxim “that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness”; and will gravitate toward some kind of centralized, open-ended, majority-rule democracy—wherein the individual states become little more than subjugated districts within that government, and the lesser populated social segments become “helpless onlookers”—and, bolstered by self-confirming Gallup Poll opinions, will gravitate toward popularly derived morals and ethics, because a constitutional federal republic and an open-ended democratic republic are mutually incompatible.
NOTES
1. Declaration of Independence, https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript (accessed October 20, 2021).
2a. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, volume 1, Records of May 14 to July 13, 1787, https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/farrand-the-records-of-the-federal-convention-of-1787-vol-1
(accessed October 21, 2021).
2b. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, volume 2, Records of July 14 to September 17, 1787, https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/farrand-the-records-of-the-federal-convention-of-1787-vol-2 (accessed October 21, 2021).
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